Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Officials of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) challenged the trial court's order granting a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Gregory Rhoades, a Native American prisoner incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison (Calipatria). In granting Rhoades's petition, the trial court concluded that the prohibition on the use of straight tobacco during prisoners' Native American religious ceremonies violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) and it ordered the California Department of Corrections to "formulate and implement policies permitting and reasonably regulating the possession and use of straight tobacco" during those ceremonies. The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court improperly granted relief in favor of Rhoades without holding an evidentiary hearing on disputed factual issues, and reversed and remanded matter with directions that the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing. View "In re Rhoades" on Justia Law

K.B. appealed a judgment terminating her parental rights to her two children, Jc.L. and Ja.L. K.B. contended the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because the court failed to comply with "the inquiry/notice requirements" of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). After review of the trial court record, the Court of appeals concluded the trial court properly determined that the Agency did not violate ICWA's inquiry and notice provisions. View "In re J.L." on Justia Law

In June 2012 the voters of City of San Diego (City) approved an initiative, the "Citizens Pension Reform Initiative" (hereafter, CPRI), which adopted a charter amendment mandating changes in the pension plan for certain City employees. The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) determined City was obliged to "meet and confer" pursuant to the provisions of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) over the CPRI before placing it on the ballot and further determined that, because City violated this purported obligation, PERB could order "make whole" remedies that de facto compelled City to disregard the CPRI. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that under relevant California law the meet-and-confer obligations under the MMBA had no application when a proposed charter amendment is placed on the ballot by citizen proponents through the initiative process, but instead applied only to proposed charter amendments placed on the ballot by the governing body of a charter city. The Court also concluded that, although it was undisputed that the City's Mayor, Jerry Sanders, and others in City's government provided support to the proponents to develop and campaign for the CPRI, PERB erred when it applied agency principles to transform the CPRI from a citizen-sponsored initiative, for which no meet-and-confer obligations exist, into a governing-body-sponsored ballot proposal within the ambit of "California ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v City of Seal Beach," (36 Cal.3d 591 (1984)). Accordingly, the Court held PERB erred when it concluded City was required to satisfy the concomitant "meet-and-confer" obligations imposed by "Seal Beach" for governing-body-sponsored charter amendment ballot proposals, and therefore PERB erred when it found Sanders and the San Diego City Council committed an unfair labor practice by declining to meet and confer over the CPRI before placing it on the ballot View "Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The State Air Resources Board (ARB) was charged with achieving the goal of regulating greenhouse gas pursuant to the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Health & Saf. Code, 38500 et seq. At issue are the low carbon fuel standards (LCFS) the ARB promulgated. In 2009, the ARB violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Pub. Resources Code, 21000 et seq., when it adopted the original LCFS regulations. In 2013, the court identified the violations and directed the issuance of a writ of mandate compelling ARB to take corrective action. At issue in this appeal was whether ARB's disclosures about the project's effects on biodiesel consumption, and the related increases in nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions, satisfied paragraph 3 of the writ of mandate. The court concluded that ARB's view that the "project" included only the regulations adopted in 2015 was wrong and explains why it incorrectly chose 2014 NOx emissions as the baseline. The court explained that the proper baseline for a project normally is the conditions existing when the environmental review of the project is commenced -- 2009, in this case. Therefore, ARB's use of 2014 NOx emissions as the baseline was improper and generated flawed results when that baseline was plugged into the formula for calculating environmental change. The court concluded that ARB's flawed analysis of NOx emissions did not cure the CEQA violation identified in Poet I or comply with paragraph 3 of the writ. The court reversed the order discharging the writ and remanded for further proceedings under a modified writ. View "Poet, LLC v. State Air Resources Board" on Justia Law

This case involved the interpretation, and application of Water Code section 51200 and articles XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution, as approved by California voters in 1996 as Proposition 218, and the interplay between them. Defendants and cross-complainants Reclamation District No. 17 and Governing Board of Reclamation District 17 (collectively "Reclamation") maintained levees and other reclamation works within the district’s boundaries. Plaintiff and cross-defendant Manteca Unified School District (School) owned real property within Reclamation’s boundaries. School filed an action for declaratory relief, arguing section 51200 exempted it from paying assessments to Reclamation and Proposition 218 did not confer such authority. School also sought recovery of over $299,000 previously collected by Reclamation. Reclamation answered and cross-complained for declaratory relief. The trial court found the assessments levied by Reclamation were invalid under section 51200 but denied recovery of assessment payments made during the pendency of the action and concluded School’s action was not barred by the statute of limitations. Reclamation appealed, arguing section 51200 and Proposition 218 allowed assessments against school district property unless the district could show through clear and convincing evidence that the property received no special benefit. School cross-appealed, contending the trial court erred in denying recovery for assessments paid during the pendency of the case. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in declining to apply the constitutional mandate of Proposition 218 to the statutory exemption from assessments provided by section 51200. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal. View "Manteca Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reclamation Dist. No. 17" on Justia Law

Two consolidated cases involved the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (the Act), popularly known as “AB 32”). The Act was passed by a simple majority vote of both legislative houses. Its general purpose is to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to protect the environment. Plaintiffs attacked one part of the implementing regulations adopted by the California Air Resources Board (Board). The Board created a “cap-and-trade” program that included the auction sale of some, but not all, GHG emissions allowances. The Board distributed some emissions allowances for free, but sold others at quarterly auctions. On appeal plaintiffs asserted: (1) the auction sales exceed the Legislature’s delegation of authority to the Board to design a market-based emissions reduction system; and (2) the revenue generated by the auction sales amounts to a tax that violated the two-thirds supermajority vote requirement of Proposition 13. As to the first question, the Court of Appeal held that the Legislature gave broad discretion to the Board to design a distribution system, and a system including the auction of some allowances did not exceed the scope of legislative delegation. Further, the Legislature later ratified the auction system by specifying how to use the proceeds derived therefrom. As for the second question, although the Court's reasoning differed from that of the trial court, it agreed that the auction sales did not equate to a tax. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgments denying the petitions in these consolidated cases. View "Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Resources Bd." on Justia Law

Appellants Arthur Young and John Young, as Trustees and on behalf of the J.S. Abbott Trust, sought a permit to demolish a small cottage on a parcel of land located in Coronado, California (the City). Because the cottage was more than 75 years old, the Coronado Historic Resource Commission (Commission) reviewed the property for potential historical significance. The Commission ultimately concluded that the dwelling should be designated as a historic resource under the Coronado Municipal Code (the CMC). Appellants appealed the determination to the Coronado City Council, which agreed with the Commission's assessment and affirmed the property's designation as a Coronado historic resource. The effect of this designation placed additional limits on a property owner's ability to alter or demolish the property without taking certain ameliorative steps and/or demonstrating a heightened need for the action pursuant to Chapter 84.20 of the CMC. Appellants filed a petition for a writ of mandate seeking review of the City's designation of the property as a historic resource. The trial court denied appellants' petition. Appellants sought review of the trial court's denial of their petition for mandate. Appellants contended that the City abused its discretion in denying them a demolition permit because the City Council's resolution failed to contain sufficient findings to support the conclusion, the City failed to apply its own mandatory guidelines in holding the hearing and making its findings, and the findings are not supported by sufficient evidence. The Court of Appeal concluded appellants have not established that the City abused its discretion in designating the dwelling subject property as a historic resource and denying a demolition permit. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Young v. City of Coronado" on Justia Law

In this writ proceeding, Daniel Ramirez sought review of his independent medical review (pursuant to his workers' compensation claim) on the ground the underlying utilization review was based on an incorrect standard. In effect, he sought review of his utilization review with this the Court of Appeal. The Court concluded this was not a proper ground for appeal of a utilization review determination because "it goes to the heart of the determination of medical necessity. The independent medical reviewer is in the best position to determine whether the proper standard was used to evaluate the medical necessity of the requested treatment, and the statutory scheme requires the independent medical reviewer to use the proper standard in determining medical necessity." Ramirez made no claim that the independent medical reviewer did not use the proper statutory standard, nor did he state a proper ground for review of his independent medical review, which was appealable only for the nonsubstantive reasons. Ramirez also challenged the constitutionality of the independent medical review process, claiming it violated the state Constitution’s separation of powers clause, and state and federal principles of procedural due process. The Court concluded that the Legislature’s plenary power over the workers’ compensation system precluded any separation of powers violation, and the process afforded workers under the system afforded sufficient opportunity to present evidence and be heard. View "Ramirez v. WCAB" on Justia Law

Romo was a volunteer firefighter for Marinwood from 1989-1991 and for the San Antonio Volunteer Fire District, 2002-2006. Beginning in 2006, he was employed full time as a paid Mill Valley firefighter. While working for Mill Valley, Romo was diagnosed with prostate cancer. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) held that Romo was entitled to the benefit of the rebuttable presumption under Labor Code section 3212.11 that his cancer arose out of his employment. While Mill Valley and San Antonio stipulated that the statutory presumption that cancer suffered while employed as a firefighter arises out of the employment would apply to them if the elements set forth in section 3212.1 were proven, Marinwood appealed. The court of appeal affirmed. “While neither of the statutes at issue is a model of clarity, the WCAB’s interpretations of both are reasonable.” The court noted that Marinwood’s fire captain and training officer considers the volunteer firefighters to be employees and that Romo was within 120 months of the “last date actually worked in the specified capacity.” View "Marin Community Services v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law