Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute over a tariff adopted by the Public Utilities Commission (Commission) of the State of California that affects the compensation utilities provide to customers for excess electricity generated by renewable energy systems. The tariff, known as the net energy metering (NEM) tariff, previously required utilities to purchase excess electricity from renewable systems at the same price customers pay for electricity. However, utilities complained that this overcompensated the owners of renewable systems and raised the cost of electricity for customers without renewable systems. In response, the California Legislature enacted a law requiring the Commission to adopt a successor tariff that promotes the continued sustainable growth of renewable power generation while balancing costs and benefits to all customers.Several environmental groups challenged the Commission's newly adopted successor tariff, asserting that it did not comply with various statutory requirements. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District upheld the Commission's tariff. The court found that the Commission's successor tariff adequately served the various objectives of the law and was based on a reasonable interpretation of its statutory mandate. The court also found that the Commission's decision to value exported energy from renewable systems based on the marginal cost of energy to the utilities was a reasonable approach to fulfilling the law's requirement to balance the equities among all customers. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the Commission had failed to properly account for the costs and benefits of renewable energy, and that it had improperly favored the interests of utility customers who do not own renewable systems. The court also found that the Commission had properly fulfilled the law's requirement to include specific alternatives designed for growth among residential customers in disadvantaged communities. The court affirmed the decision of the Commission. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law

The Zurich American Insurance Company sought a writ of mandate against the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) and the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA), in the Court of Appeal of the State of California. The issue at hand involved the interpretation of Labor Code section 5909, which states that if the WCAB does not act on a party’s petition for reconsideration of a decision by the workers’ compensation judge within 60 days, the petition is “deemed to have been denied.” CIGA filed a petition for reconsideration more than nine months past the filing date. The WCAB justified its late decision on the basis of an “administrative irregularity” that delayed CIGA’s petition. Zurich argued that the petition had already been denied by operation of law under section 5909. The Court of Appeal agreed with Zurich and held that the language and purpose of section 5909 showed a clear legislative intent to terminate the WCAB’s jurisdiction to consider a petition for reconsideration after the 60 days have passed. As a result, decisions on the petition made after that date are void as they exceed the agency’s jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal granted the writ of mandate, directing the WCAB to rescind its order granting CIGA’s petition for reconsideration and dismissing Zurich as a party defendant from the proceeding. View "Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

This case is a labor dispute between Palomar Health, a public healthcare district, and unions representing nurses and healthcare workers employed by Palomar Health. In 2021, during negotiations to renew their collective bargaining agreements, union organizers began a leafletting campaign outside Palomar Health’s main hospital and sought to meet with employees inside the hospital. Palomar Health responded by filing a complaint for trespass and unlawful picketing in San Diego Superior Court, seeking to ban the organizers from their facilities. The unions filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), asserting Palomar Health’s attempts to ban their representatives and the civil lawsuit violated the unions’ rights under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. The trial court overruled the unions’ demurrer and denied their motion to strike, maintaining jurisdiction of the state law claims. On appeal, the unions argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute as their activities were arguably protected by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act and that jurisdiction fell exclusively under PERB. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, agreed with the unions, finding that Palomar Health’s claims were preempted and therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. The trial court’s order overruling the demurrer was reversed and the matter was remanded with directions to enter an order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, and to dismiss the case on the grounds that it is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of PERB. View "Palomar Health v. Nat. Nurses United" on Justia Law

The case concerns Junaid Manzoor, who pleaded guilty in 2006 to a felony violation of attempting to distribute harmful material to a minor. As a result of his conviction, he was required to register as a sex offender for life under former section 290 of the Penal Code. Almost 14 years later, the trial court granted his petition to reduce his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code. After the Legislature amended section 290 to provide for a tiered system of registration time periods, Manzoor filed a petition for relief from the registration requirements. The court summarily denied his petition. On appeal, Manzoor argued that due to the amendments to section 290, he was entitled to relief from the registration requirements because the reduction of his felony conviction to a misdemeanor placed him in "tier one" under the statute. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the trial court's order denying Manzoor's petition for relief. The court held that the reduction of Manzoor’s felony conviction to a misdemeanor did not qualify him for relief from the registration requirements, because subdivision (e) of section 17 of the Penal Code bars courts from granting such relief when the defendant was found guilty of an offense for which lifetime registration is required, and the amendments to section 290 do not reflect a legislative intent to create an exception to this rule. View "People v. Manzoor" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three, the court heard an appeal from a quo warranto judgment which ordered the removal of Ed Sachs, Wendy Bucknum, and Greg Raths from their positions as members of the City of Mission Viejo City Council. The quo warranto judgment was based on the finding that their respective two-year terms of office, which they had been elected to in November 2018, had expired in December 2020. Despite this, Sachs, Bucknum, Raths, and Mission Viejo continued to hold office.The defendants argued that Elections Code section 14029, which authorizes broad remedies for violations of the California Voting Rights Act of 2001, did not permit the implementation of two-year terms of office for city councilmembers because Government Code section 57377 imposes an ironclad requirement of four-year terms. They contended that they must be deemed to have been elected in November 2018 as councilmembers to four-year terms of office and were entitled to stay in office past their two-year terms.However, the Court of Appeal rejected this argument, stating that even if their interpretation of Elections Code section 14029 and section 57377 was correct, the result they propose – that they receive four-year terms of office – was not. In November 2018, Sachs, Bucknum, and Raths were elected for two-year terms, not four-year terms. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment for quo warranto, stating that they were unlawfully holding office. View "P. ex rel. Schlesinger v. Sachs" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Cedrick Conway, is awaiting trial on a petition to commit him as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In preparation for the trial, he requested a court order directing a Department of State Hospitals (DSH) evaluator to update a previous evaluation of Conway which was done several years earlier and concluded that he did not meet the criteria for commitment as an SVP. The trial court denied the request, believing that the pertinent statute only allows the prosecution (the party seeking commitment) to request an updated evaluation—not the defense. Conway challenged this ruling, leading to the present case.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five concluded that the trial court had misunderstood the statute. While the SVPA does allow the prosecution to request an updated evaluation from DSH, the court found nothing in the statute that would prohibit the defense from obtaining an updated evaluation if authorized by a court order. The court therefore held that the trial court erred in denying Conway’s request for an updated evaluation based on a mistaken understanding of the statute.The court also rejected the defense’s claim that the prosecution was not entitled to oppose the defense motion for an updated evaluation. The court determined that the trial court has discretion to decide whether to entertain opposition from the prosecution. The court therefore issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to reconsider Conway’s request for an updated evaluation, taking into account the court's discretion to authorize such an evaluation for the defense. View "Conway v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the filed rate doctrine and its applicability in instances where rates approved by a municipal board are questioned. The plaintiffs, a group of customers, sued Recology, a waste management company, alleging that the company violated the Unfair Competition Law and other laws by bribing a city official to facilitate the approval of Recology’s application for increased refuse collection rates. The trial court ruled in favor of Recology, holding that the claims were barred by the filed rate doctrine. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three reversed the decision, stating that the California version of the filed rate doctrine does not bar this action because the purposes underlying the doctrine – “nondiscrimination” and “nonjusticiability” strands – are not implicated by plaintiffs’ claims. The court also concluded that the judgment in the prior law enforcement action does not pose a res judicata bar to this putative class action. The court remanded the case for the trial court’s consideration of Recology’s remaining challenges in the first instance. View "Villarroel v. Recology" on Justia Law

Appellants’ father died in a multi-car accident caused by a deer crossing State Route 154 (SR-154). Appellants sued respondent California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and others for negligence. They alleged the road constituted a dangerous condition under Government Code section 835. The trial court found that design immunity applied to Caltrans and granted summary judgment. Appellants contend the trial court erred when it found design immunity was a complete defense to Caltrans’ liability. They also contend the court failed to address a separate basis of liability, failed to warn when it ruled on the motion for summary judgment.The Second Appellate District affirmed. Appellants’ theory of the case, in sum, is that Caltrans designed SR-154 without certain specific features they contend would have made the highway safer. The court explained that Caltrans need not produce additional evidence to prove this point. A traffic engineer attested to the applicable design standards and how Caltrans addressed the dangers posed by deer entering traffic and vehicles crossing the median. This constitutes substantial evidence of advance approval. The court wrote that it would not second-guess the decision of Caltrans to include or omit certain design features. The court concluded that substantial evidence showed that a reasonable public employee would have adopted the SR-154 design plans, even without the features and changes Appellants contend Caltrans should have considered and included. View "Stufkosky v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

A dispute arose under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA; Water Code 10720) regarding which local groundwater sustainability agency is authorized to manage the groundwater in a portion of the 180/400 Foot Aquifer Subbasin of the Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin called the CEMEX area. The City of Marina challenged the groundwater sustainability plan of the Salinas Valley Basin Groundwater Sustainability Agency (SVBGSA) as adopted by Monterey County and posted by the Department of Water Resources as the operative groundwater sustainability plan for most of the Subbasin. The County sought a declaration that the formation of the City’s groundwater sustainability agency was void.The court of appeal affirmed the trial court, agreeing with the Department that under section 10724 the County could step in as the presumptive groundwater management agency for the CEMEX area when the City and SVBGSA failed to reach an agreement to allow prompt designation of a groundwater sustainability agency; the Department properly posted the County’s notice of the formation of a groundwater sustainability agency for the CEMEX area on its website and properly identified the County’s groundwater sustainability agency as the exclusive groundwater sustainability agency for the area. View "City of Marina v. County of Monterey" on Justia Law

The California Construction and Industrial Materials Association and the Ventura County Coalition of Labor, Agriculture and Business (Project Opponents) separately petitioned for writs of mandate to require the County of Ventura (County) to vacate an ordinance (the Project) creating overlay zones to protect wildlife migration corridors in rural portions of the County. The Project Opponents claim the Project violates the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975 (SMARA) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court denied the petitions.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Project Opponents claim that the Project’s location distinguishes it from other projects in its exempt class. They point out that the Project overlays 10,000 acres of classified mineral resources. However they cite no evidence that other projects in Classes 7 and 8 do not overlay similar resources. Neither mining nor ordinances that attempt to preserve wildlife are unique to the County. The Project Opponents compare the Project to the Class 33 exemption. That exemption is for projects not to exceed five acres to assure the maintenance, restoration, enhancement, or protection of habitat for fish, plants, or wildlife. But the County is not relying on the Class 33 exemption. It is relying on the Classes 7 and 8 exemptions. They are separate exemptions and not comparable. View "Cal. Construction & Industrial Mat. Assn. v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law