Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A young adult, H.T., was adjudicated a ward of the court after admitting to a crime and was committed to a secure youth treatment facility. Upon completion of his baseline term, the juvenile court prepared to discharge him to probation supervision in the community. However, finding suitable housing proved difficult due to probation conditions: H.T. could not live with his mother, was ineligible for community organization housing due to a registration requirement, and could not be placed in the probation department’s usual facility because of its proximity to a high school. H.T. requested that the court order the County of Sacramento to pay for his stay at a transitional housing facility.The Superior Court of Sacramento County initially granted H.T.’s request for 30 days of housing but later declined to order further payments, concluding it lacked statutory authority to require the County to pay for H.T.’s housing. The court instead directed the probation department to provide hotel vouchers and other support. H.T. appealed the orders denying his requests for continued payment of rent at the transitional housing facility.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the juvenile court had discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 900, subdivision (b), to order the County to pay for the support and maintenance of a ward, including necessary housing expenses. The appellate court found that the lower court misinterpreted its authority and abused its discretion by failing to recognize the full scope of its statutory power. The Court of Appeal vacated the juvenile court’s order and remanded the matter for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion under the correct legal standard, specifically to determine whether payment for H.T.’s housing was necessary at the relevant time. View "In re H.T." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on groundwater management in the Tulare Lake groundwater subbasin, a high-priority basin under California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). Local groundwater agencies developed and submitted a sustainability plan for the subbasin, but the Department of Water Resources twice found the plan inadequate. Following these determinations, the State Water Resources Control Board designated the Tulare subbasin as probationary, triggering state intervention and new monitoring, reporting, and fee requirements. In response, Kings County Farm Bureau and other parties filed a writ of mandate and complaint, challenging the State Board’s authority and actions, including the probationary designation and associated fees.The Superior Court of Kings County reviewed the Farm Bureau’s claims. It granted a preliminary injunction halting the State Board’s implementation of the probationary designation and denied in part the State Board’s demurrer to the complaint. Specifically, the trial court dismissed the equal protection claim with leave to amend but allowed the Farm Bureau to proceed on claims alleging improper underground regulations, unconstitutional fees, and general declaratory relief. The State Board then sought appellate review of the trial court’s order overruling its demurrer.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo. It held that the Act exempts the State Board’s actions under the relevant statutory sections from the Administrative Procedures Act, precluding claims based on alleged underground regulations. The court further found that challenges to the extraction fees as unlawful taxes are barred by the “pay first” rule, requiring payment before judicial review. Finally, the court determined that declaratory relief is unavailable where the Legislature has provided a writ of mandate as the exclusive remedy. The appellate court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer and to grant the demurrer without leave to amend as to the sixth, seventh, and ninth causes of action. View "State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

This case concerns the State Water Resources Control Board’s designation of the Tulare Lake groundwater subbasin as a probationary basin under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). The Act requires local groundwater agencies to develop and implement sustainability plans for high-priority basins, subject to state review. In the Tulare subbasin, five local agencies collaborated on a single plan, which the Department of Water Resources twice found inadequate. Following these findings, the State Board designated the basin as probationary, triggering additional monitoring, reporting, and fee requirements for groundwater extractors. The Kings County Farm Bureau and other plaintiffs challenged the State Board’s actions, alleging the Board exceeded its authority, failed to properly consider requests for exclusion from probationary status, and did not provide adequate notice.The Superior Court of Kings County reviewed the Farm Bureau’s petition and complaint, which included multiple causes of action. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction barring the State Board from enforcing requirements stemming from the probationary designation and imposed only a nominal bond. The court found the Farm Bureau likely to succeed on several claims, including improper denial of the “good actor” exclusion, exceeding statutory authority, and failure to provide required notice. The State Board appealed the injunction and related orders.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing an overly broad injunction affecting the entire Tulare subbasin, when only certain claims regarding specific groundwater agencies were likely to succeed. The appellate court found the trial court erred in its analysis of some claims and that the injunction was not properly tailored to the harm at issue. The order granting the preliminary injunction was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. The petition for writ of supersedeas was denied as moot, and costs were awarded to the State Board. View "Kings County Farm Bureau v. State Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

A law firm sought to recover over $1.7 million in fees and costs for representing the Los Angeles County Sheriff, Alex Villanueva, and the Sheriff’s Department in litigation initiated by the County of Los Angeles. Due to a conflict of interest, the County’s Board of Supervisors offered Villanueva independent counsel, allowing him to select his attorney but reserving discretion over compensation. Villanueva chose the law firm, which entered into an engagement agreement with him. The County, however, sent its own retainer agreement to the firm, which the firm refused to sign. The firm continued its representation but was never paid. After the firm demanded arbitration under its engagement agreement, the County and related plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaration that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed and an injunction against the arbitration.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted a preliminary injunction, then summary judgment for the County plaintiffs, finding the Sheriff lacked authority to enter into the engagement agreement. The court denied the law firm’s post-judgment motion for leave to file a cross-complaint, citing both untimeliness and bad faith. The firm then filed a separate lawsuit against the County and related defendants, asserting breach of contract and related claims. The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer, dismissing the complaint with prejudice on grounds that the claims were compulsory cross-claims in the earlier action and for failure to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed both the judgment in the County’s action and the dismissal of the law firm’s separate lawsuit. The court held that the Sheriff did not have authority to retain counsel on his own; only the Board of Supervisors could contract for legal services. The law firm’s claims were barred as compulsory cross-claims and for failure to comply with the Government Claims Act. View "County of Los Angeles v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP" on Justia Law

The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) planned to conduct preconstruction geotechnical work, such as soil and groundwater testing, in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun Marsh as part of preparations for the Delta tunnel project, which aims to improve water conveyance and environmental protection. Various municipal, tribal, and public interest entities objected, arguing that DWR could not begin this work until it certified that the tunnel project was consistent with the Delta Plan, as required by the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009. The disputed geotechnical work included soil borings, groundwater monitoring, test trenches, and other activities intended to inform the project’s design and mitigation measures.The Superior Court of Sacramento County reviewed several related actions brought by these entities. The plaintiffs sought and obtained preliminary injunctions preventing DWR from conducting the preconstruction geotechnical work until it submitted a certification of consistency with the Delta Plan. The trial court found that the geotechnical work was an integral part of the tunnel project, which was a “covered action” under the Delta Reform Act, and concluded that DWR was required to certify consistency before initiating any part of the project, including the geotechnical work.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s orders. The appellate court held that the Delta Reform Act does not require DWR to submit a certification of consistency before engaging in preconstruction geotechnical work, distinguishing the requirements of the Delta Reform Act from those of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The court found that the geotechnical work was not itself a “covered action” under the Delta Reform Act and that the Act does not incorporate CEQA’s prohibition against “piecemealing.” The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider the motions for preliminary injunction in light of this holding. View "Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

In this case, a group consisting of an alumni association and several descendants of Serranus Clinton Hastings challenged the enactment of Assembly Bill 1936, which changed the name of “Hastings College of the Law” to “College of the Law, San Francisco” and eliminated a statutory requirement that a seat on the College’s board of directors be reserved for an heir or representative of S.C. Hastings. The plaintiffs argued that the original 1878 Act establishing the College constituted a binding contract between the State and S.C. Hastings and his descendants, and that the new legislation violated constitutional protections, including the Contract Clauses, the prohibition on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, and the California Constitution’s provision regarding collegiate freedom.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the 1878 Act was a contract rather than an exercise of legislative power. The court also determined that Assembly Bill 1936 did not constitute a bill of attainder or ex post facto law, and that the changes to the College’s name and governance did not violate the California Constitution, particularly since the College’s board had requested the name change.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the State could not contract away its sovereign authority to manage a public institution, including the power to change the College’s name or governance structure. The court further concluded that Assembly Bill 1936 was not punitive and did not violate constitutional prohibitions on bills of attainder or ex post facto laws. The court also found no violation of the California Constitution’s collegiate freedom provision, as the changes were initiated by the College’s board. The judgment in favor of the State and College defendants was affirmed. View "Hastings College Conservation Committee v. State" on Justia Law

A proposed residential development in downtown Livermore, California, was the subject of a dispute between a community group and the city. The city had entered into agreements with a developer, Eden Housing, to build affordable workforce housing and, as part of a 2022 resolution, authorized the construction and improvement of a new public park, Veterans Park. Move Eden Housing, a local group, sought to challenge this resolution through a referendum, arguing that the city’s approval of the park was a legislative act subject to voter review.The Alameda County Superior Court initially denied Move Eden’s petition for a writ of mandate, finding the city’s resolution to be administrative and not subject to referendum. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed, holding that the park approval was a legislative act and ordered the city to process the referendum petition. In response, the city repealed the 2022 resolution and enacted a new 2024 resolution that reaffirmed the development agreement but omitted the Veterans Park provisions.Move Eden then argued that the city’s adoption of the 2024 resolution violated California Elections Code section 9241, which prohibits reenactment of a repealed ordinance for one year. The trial court agreed and granted Move Eden’s motion to compel compliance with the writ of mandate.On further appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that section 9241 did not prohibit the city from adopting the 2024 resolution because it involved only administrative acts implementing prior legislative determinations not challengeable by referendum. The court clarified that the referendum power and section 9241’s restrictions apply only to legislative acts, not administrative actions. The matter was remanded with instructions to deny Move Eden’s motion. View "Move Eden Housing v. City of Livermore" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to the validity of Measure C, a citizens’ initiative placed on the ballot by the City of San Diego for the March 2020 election. Measure C proposed an increase in the city’s transient occupancy tax, with revenues earmarked for homelessness programs, street repairs, and convention center improvements. The measure also authorized the City to issue bonds repaid from the new tax revenues. Measure C received 65.24 percent of the vote, and the city council subsequently passed resolutions declaring the measure approved and authorizing the issuance of related bonds.After the election, Alliance San Diego and other plaintiffs filed actions challenging the City’s resolution declaring Measure C had passed, arguing it was invalid. The City responded with a validation complaint seeking judicial confirmation of the validity of Measure C and the related bond resolutions. California Taxpayers Action Network (CTAN) and other opponents answered, contending that Measure C required a two-thirds vote and was not a bona fide citizens’ initiative. The Superior Court of San Diego County initially granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that a two-thirds vote was required, and entered judgment against the City. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Measure C was a bona fide citizens’ initiative.On remand, the trial court conducted a bench trial and rejected CTAN’s arguments, finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction, the case was ripe, the special fund doctrine exempted the bonds from the two-thirds vote requirement, and Measure C was a bona fide citizens’ initiative requiring only a simple majority vote. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Measure C and the related bond resolutions were valid, and that the trial court properly excluded certain hearsay evidence. View "Alliance San Diego v. California Taxpayers Action Network" on Justia Law

A fatal traffic accident occurred when a tractor trailer, driven by Andre Hill, ran a stop sign and collided with a vehicle driven by Olivia Mendoza, resulting in her death. Prior to the accident, Hill had picked up produce from Irigoyen Farms for delivery to a Walmart distribution center. The transportation of the produce involved several intermediaries: Irigoyen Farms contracted with a freight broker, who in turn contracted with other logistics companies, ultimately resulting in Hill being hired as an independent contractor by the motor carrier. Law enforcement determined that Hill’s extreme fatigue contributed to the crash.The decedent’s mother, Christina Casarez, filed suit in the Superior Court of Fresno County against Irigoyen Farms and Walmart, alleging motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and wrongful death. She claimed that both defendants were directly negligent in their roles: Walmart for imposing contractual requirements that allegedly incentivized unsafe conduct, and Irigoyen Farms for loading the truck and sending Hill on his way despite knowledge of his fatigue. Both defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted Casarez’s claims. The superior court agreed, granting summary judgment in favor of both defendants.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the superior court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the FAAAA expressly preempts state law negligence claims against parties whose actions relate to the price, route, or service of a motor carrier with respect to the transportation of property, regardless of whether the party is a motor carrier, broker, or shipper. The court further held that the FAAAA’s safety exception did not apply because the claims did not directly concern the safety of the motor vehicle itself. The appellate court affirmed the superior court’s judgments in favor of Irigoyen Farms and Walmart. View "Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the City of Berkeley violated the Ralph M. Brown Act during three city council meetings in late 2023 and early 2024. At each meeting, disruptions from attendees made it impossible for the council to conduct business. The mayor determined that order could not be restored by removing disruptive individuals but did not order the meeting room cleared. Instead, the meetings were recessed and reconvened in a different, smaller room, which could not accommodate all nondisruptive members of the public. The press was allowed to attend in person, and the public could participate by video, but the council did not return to the original meeting room or attempt to remove only the disruptive individuals.The Alameda County Superior Court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, finding that section 54957.9 of the Brown Act did not require the city council to first attempt to remove disruptive individuals before determining that order could not be restored. The court also concluded that the city council complied with the statute by recessing and reconvening the meetings in a different room with the press present. The action was dismissed with prejudice, and plaintiffs appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that section 54957.9 requires a legislative body to order the meeting room cleared and continue in session in the same room, not to recess and reconvene in a different location. The statute does not authorize relocating the meeting as a response to disruption. Because plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the city council did not clear the meeting room but instead moved the meeting, the court found that a claim for relief was properly stated. The judgment was reversed. View "Berkeley People's Alliance v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law