Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner applied to the trial court in March 2022 to change his name. On the ground that Petitioner has “outstanding warrant(s),” the trial court denied Harris’s petition.   The Second Appellate District affirmed because there was no abuse of discretion. The court explained that by statute, it was proper for the trial court to check law enforcement records when considering Petitioner’s petition to change his name. The California Legislature has directed courts to use the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) to determine whether a name change applicant must register as a sex offender. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law

The County of Santa Barbara (County) appealed from the entry of a preliminary injunction prohibiting its Road Commissioner from removing unpermitted encroachments placed in the public right of way along a portion of East Mountain Drive in Montecito. The County filed a cross-complaint alleging causes of action for public nuisance and trespass against respondents. The trial court issued a preemptory writ that suspends all efforts by County to enforce the right-of-way encroachments.   The Second Appellate District concluded that the trial court erred because Respondents are not correct on the merits of their CEQA claim and will not be irreparably harmed by the removal of encroachments installed without permits in the public right of way of an existing road. The County Road Commissioner is authorized by statute and local ordinance to remove any encroachment on a public right of way. The court explained that Respondents will suffer no irreparable harm because a party suffers no grave or irreparable harm by being prohibited from violating the law. View "Anderson v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

While at his job as a correctional officer at the Lancaster State Prison in August 2002, respondent Michael Ayala was severely injured in a preplanned attack by inmates. He filed a workers’ compensation claim and alleged that the injury was caused by the serious and willful misconduct of his employer, petitioner California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Such an allegation was significant because Labor Code section 4553 provided that “[t]he amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half . . . where the employee is injured by reason of serious and willful misconduct” by the employer. Ayala and CDCR agreed that the injury caused Ayala 85 percent permanent disability, but they could not agree whether CDCR engaged in serious and willful misconduct. Over a dissent, a Board majority found that CDCR “failed to act on a credible threat of inmate violence that was specifically reported to be planned for the day of the attack and took the facility off lockdown despite this threat even though it possessed additional information . . . that this had long been planned.” Ayala contended that, for the period before his permanent disability, his base compensation was his full salary. He was paid his full salary because he was on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave, which were alternatives to temporary disability. CDCR contended the base compensation was only what Ayala would have been entitled to on temporary disability. Assuming that Ayala would have been entitled to temporary total disability, the base compensation would have been two-thirds of his salary, subject to statutory limits. The workers’ compensation judge agreed with CDCR and found that the base compensation was what Ayala would have been paid in temporary disability. But on reconsideration, the Board again rescinded and reversed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision, this time finding that the base compensation was what Ayala was paid on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave. The Court of Appeal held that industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave were not “compensation” as that term was used in section 4553 and annuled the Board’s contrary decision. View "Cal. Dept. Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

Grant Park Neighborhood Association Advocates and four individuals (together, Grant Park) challenged Department of Public Health's (the Department) approval of an entity’s application to operate a needle and syringe distribution program in Santa Cruz County. Grant Park argued the Department’s approval was flawed for four reasons: (1) Department failed to consult with local law enforcement before approving the application; (2) the Department failed to notify three of the affected local law enforcement agencies about the comment period; (3) the Department provided only 45 days for public comment even though its regulations at the time required 90 days; and (4) the Department failed to conduct the environmental review required under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). After Grant Park filed suit, the California Legislature amended Health & Safety Code section 121349 to exempt approvals under the statute from CEQA; Grant Park contended this amendment did not apply retroactively. On Grant Park’s appeal of the trial court’s decision in the Department’s favor, the Court of Appeal found the Department failed to engage in the required consultation, failed to provide the required notice to three local police departments about the comment period, and failed to provide the required 90 days for comment. The Court also found these failures to comply with section 121349 prejudicial. But the Court found it unnecessary to consider Grant Park’s final claim premised on CEQA, because the only relief it sought under CEQA was relief the Court already agreed was appropriate because of the Department’s failures to comply with section 121349. The Court therefore directed the trial court to grant Grant Park’s petition. View "Grant Park Neighborhood Assn. Advocates v. Dept. of Public Health" on Justia Law

The Committee to Support the Recall of George Gascón (the Committee) filed a lawsuit against defendants Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk Dean C. Logan and the Office of the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk (collectively “the Registrar”) to enforce the Committee’s rights under the Public Records Act (PRA) to examine a recall petition the Registrar certified as invalid for placement on the ballot. The trial court granted the ex parte application, ordered disclosure of various voter records, and ordered the parties to meet and confer on increased access. The court directed the disclosure of additional records. On appeal from the original injunction order and the subsequent order, the Registrar contends the trial court misinterpreted sections 7924.000 and 7924.110. The Committee filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the PRA.   The Second Appellate District dismissed the portion of the appeal purporting the challenge the injunction order and partially granted the petition for extraordinary writ. The court concluded that the exclusive means of challenging an order granting or denying disclosure of records in connection with the examination of an unsuccessful recall petition under the PRA is through section 7923.500. Here, the Registrar did not meet the requirements for the injunction order. However, the court exercised its discretion to consider the Registrar’s challenges to new directives appearing in that order as a petition for extraordinary writ. The court concluded that the order improperly commanded the Registrar to (1) authorize the use of electronic voter lists outside its examination room and (2) disclose redacted affidavits of voter registration. View "Committee to Support the Recall, etc. v. Logan" on Justia Law

In the first appeal arising from Plaintiff-respondent Margaret McCann’s dispute with the City of San Diego over the City’s environmental review process of a project to convert overhead utility wires to an underground system in several neighborhoods, she alleged the City violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by failing to properly consider the environmental impact of two underground projects. The Court of Appeal concluded the City’s review process was incomplete as to one project (MND Project) because the City failed to analyze whether they were consistent with the City’s Climate Action Plan. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to issue a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the City of set aside three resolutions that approved the projects. After remand, the trial court also ordered it would retain jurisdiction over the matter until the City complied with the relevant provisions of the CEQA. The City rescinded the project approvals and asked the court to discharge the writ. McCann objected to the City’s return and argued the trial court should not discharge the writ because the City did not perform the relevant analysis or affirmatively indicate it abandoned the projects. The trial court sustained McCann’s objection and declined to discharge the writ. The City then appealed, arguing it fully complied with the courts’ mandates. After review, the Court of Appeal determined the City satisfied the writ, and therefore held the writ had to be discharged. View "McCann v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Matt Vanenti appealed an order denying his post judgment motion for prevailing party attorney fees against the Court of San Diego and granting the City’s motion to strike his. ost memorandum. Valenti made a California Public Records Request; he contended on appeal that there was not sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that his lawsuit was not a “sufficiently ‘substantial’” cause of the City’s production of public records to merit an award of fees and costs. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s order. View "Valenti v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2016, San Francisco voters amended their city charter to authorize voting in local school board elections by noncitizen parents and guardians of school-age children. In 2018, the Board of Supervisors enacted an ordinance implementing Proposition N, including provisions requiring the City’s Department of Elections to develop a noncitizen voter registration form for school board elections. In 2022, after multiple school board elections in which noncitizens voted, this lawsuit was brought alleging the charter amendment violated the California Constitution. The trial court granted found the effective ordinance void and unenforceableThe court of appeal reversed and awarded the city costs. Neither the plain language of the Constitution nor its history prohibits legislation expanding the electorate to noncitizens. The relevant constitutional provisions authorizing home rule permit charter cities to implement such an expansion in local school board elections. This authority is consistent with the principles underlying home rule and permits the voters of each charter city to determine whether it is good policy for their city or not. View "Lacy v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

School districts may levy “qualified special taxes,” Government Code section 50079, with the approval of two-thirds of district voters. A qualified special tax must “apply uniformly to all taxpayers or all real property within the school district” (with some statutory exemptions) and not be “imposed on a particular class of property or taxpayers.” Measure A, approved in 2020 by voters in the Alameda Unified School District, authorizes a tax on improved parcels at “the rate of $0.265 per building square foot not to exceed $7,999 per parcel.” In Traiman’s action challenging Measure A, the trial court ruled that the tax was not applied uniformly and invalidated the tax. The court awarded Traiman $374,960 in attorney fees (Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5).The court of appeal reversed. Measure A tax applies uniformly within the meaning of section 50079 because every nonexempt taxpayer and every improved parcel in the District is taxed using the same formula. Neither the language of the statute, case law, legislative history, nor public policy indicates that a school district cannot base a qualified special tax on building square footage with a maximum tax per parcel. View "Traiman v. Alameda Unified School District" on Justia Law

In 2009, A.B., 13 years old, pled no contest to charges and was declared a ward of the juvenile court. The juvenile court successfully terminated his probation and wardship in 2014. Eight years later, A.B. and the County Probation Department filed an unopposed petition to have his juvenile court and public agency records sealed, Welfare and Institutions Code section 781. Since his juvenile adjudication, A.B. had not sustained any criminal convictions, had married and had a child, and had remained steadily employed.The court granted the petition, finding that A.B. had been rehabilitated and that A.B.’s offenses were not listed in section 707(b). In addition to sealing its own records, the court ordered the five government agencies listed in the petition to seal and ultimately destroy any of A.B.’s juvenile records in their custody. Three months later, A.B. discovered that several public agencies not subject to the original sealing order had retained and could access his juvenile records. A.B. petitioned to seal these additional records, again unopposed. The juvenile court concluded that it lacked the authority to seal additional records after the initial sealing order, acknowledging that, had the additional agencies been listed in A.B.’s first petition, they would have been ordered to seal their records. The court of appeal reversed. Section 781.1 allows a court to grant a petition to seal documents not addressed in an earlier petition. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law