Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the juvenile court denying Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his petition filed under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 388 to reinstate reunification services with Minor, holding that, under the circumstances, it was error to deny Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition.A few days after Minor's birth, the Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a petition on his behalf under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 300. The juvenile court terminated the reunification services of Father, who had been incarcerated since before Minor was born, and set a Cal. Well. & Inst. Code 366.26 hearing. The day before the hearing, Father filed his section 388 petition, stating that he had not been provided with services despite the court's orders. The court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the juvenile court erred in denying Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition. View "In re Damari Y." on Justia Law

San Diego City Attorney Mara Elliott successfully moved to strike a defamation complaint filed against her by a former political rival, Cory Briggs, under the California anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. Elliott spent the next seven months fruitlessly trying to collect on the unsatisfied judgment. She then filed a verified memorandum of costs claiming $13,789.10 in postjudgment collection costs, including $12,941.20 in attorney’s fees and $847.90 in other costs. The trial court awarded her the claimed costs, as well as $2,294.07 in postjudgment interest. Briggs appealed the cost award. Finding that the trial court properly awarded Elliott all of the costs identified in the memorandum of costs, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Briggs v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Ratilal Shah sued the California Department of Transportation and the State Merit Award Board (Board), alleging the Board wrongfully denied him cash awards for suggestions that saved the state money. The California Department of Human Resources (CalHR), acting on behalf of the Board, filed a demurrer, claiming the action was barred by the limitations period in Government Code section 19815.8. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint as to the Board. On appeal, Shah contended the trial court applied the wrong statute of limitations and that, applying the proper statute of limitations, the action not time-barred. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Shah v. Dept. of Human Resources" on Justia Law

The City of Pomona (the City) decided to allow commercial cannabis activities in specific locales within its boundaries. In doing so, the City determined it was exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Guidelines adopted to implement CEQA (Cal. Code Regs.) (Guidelines). Thus, when the City chose areas to locate commercial cannabis activities, it did not conduct additional environmental review under CEQA. Appellant wanted his storefront property included among the locales where commercial cannabis activity would be allowed. The City, however, excluded Appellant’s property. Appellant then filed a petition for writ of mandate to overturn the City’s designation of areas for permissible commercial cannabis activities. He contended the City made the decision improperly by foregoing further environmental review. The superior court denied the petition and entered judgment in favor of the City.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the City properly determined that the Project is Exempt per Guidelines Section 15183 and requires no additional environmental review. The court explained that substantial evidence shows the Project’s proposed commercial cannabis activities were similar to or “consistent” with existing land uses or development density established by the 2014 EIR and General Plan Update and thus meet the statutory exemption per Guidelines section 15183. Further, the court found that substantial evidence—the General Plan Update, the 2014 EIR, the Project, the DOS, and Findings of Consistency—shows the Project “has no project-specific effects” that are “peculiar” to it. View "Lucas v. City of Pomona" on Justia Law

Since 1961, Santa Clara County has owned and operated Reid-Hillview Airport, a reliever airport for the San Jose International Airport. Reid-Hillview serves all aviation other than commercial passenger flights and air carrier aviation, supports emergency responses for Bay Area hospitals, and houses Cal Fire and Civil Air Patrol operations. Although the County is required to operate the airport until 2030, in 2018 the Board of Supervisors voted to engage with the City of San Jose in a joint planning process concerning possible alternative uses of Reid-Hillview after 2031. Mohler claims that, in furtherance of this plan, the County intentionally has allowed the airport to fall into disrepair.Mohler sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the county has committed waste by failing to perform basic maintenance; has failed to repair hangars, rendering one nonfunctional and allowing rust to drip onto planes; and has failed to renew soon-to-expire leases for fixed base operators (which provide support operations such as flight training, aircraft maintenance or repair, and aircraft rental), threatening significant revenue losses. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Code of Civil Procedure 526a’s prohibition against waste requires more than a mistaken exercise of judgment or discretion. Mohler failed to show that the County has any duty to maintain the airport and failed to allege “dangerous conditions.” View "Mohler v. County of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

The City of San Buenaventura (City) removed a statute of Father Junípero Serra because it is now offensive to significant members of the community. This appeal stems from the denial of the Coalition for Historical Integrity’s (Coalition) writ of mandate requiring the City to restore the statue.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment. The Coalition contends that the removal of the bronze statue requires review under CEQA. Here the 2020 HRG report discusses the history of the statue and the criteria for evaluating its historical significance. Among other matters, the report points out that the bronze replica statue does not meet the 40-year-old threshold required for local designation as a historical landmark. The report constitutes substantial evidence.   Further, the Coalition contends that removal of the bronze statue violates the City’s Specific Plan. The court found the Specific Plan provides that the demolition of a historical resource may require review by the Historic Preservation Committee, the committee that approved removal of the statue. Nothing in the Specific Plan prohibits the destruction or removal of a statue that is listed as a historical resource upon a finding that on reexamination, it, in fact, never had historical value.   Moreover, The Coalition contends that the City failed to follow the procedure set forth in the municipal code for removing landmark status from the statue. But the City found that the bronze statue was never a landmark. That finding is supported by substantial evidence. The code provisions for removing landmark status do not apply. View "Coalition for Historical Integrity v. City of San Buenaventura" on Justia Law

Tulare Lake Canal Company (TLCC) filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging Stratford Public Utility District (SPUD) failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when it granted an easement for a 48-inch water pipeline to Sandridge Partners, L.P. (Sandridge). TLCC applied for a preliminary injunction to halt the construction and operation of the pipeline pending CEQA compliance. The trial court determined TLCC was likely to prevail on the CEQA claim but concluded the relative balance of harms from granting or denying injunctive relief favored denying the injunction. TLCC appealed.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed. The court concluded it is a near certainty that SPUD failed to comply with CEQA when it granted the easement. The construction and operation of the proposed pipeline qualify as a discretionary project approved by SPUD, a public entity. As a result, SPUD was required by CEQA to conduct a preliminary review before granting the easement. This strong showing of likely success on the CEQA claims reduces the showing of relative harms needed to obtain the injunction. Second, the court concluded that the trial court erred in stating there was no evidence of harm to the public generally in allowing the proposed project to go forward. Third, the court found that there is a reasonable probability the preliminary injunction would have been granted if the trial court had identified the harm to the public interest in informed decision-making and included it in balancing the relative harms. View "Tulare Lake Canal Co. v. Stratford Pub. Util. Dist." on Justia Law

In January 2023, Assembly Bill 1936 changed the name of the former “Hastings College of the Law” to “College of the Law, San Francisco.” The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of AB 1936. The College’s Dean and Directors in their official capacities (College Defendants) filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., 425.162), arguing that the complaint was replete with references to their public statements and resolutions regarding a new name and calling upon the Legislature to pass legislation adopting it. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the causes of action were based on the Legislature’s enactment of AB 1936, not on the speech or petitioning activity that preceded it.On appeal, the College Defendants argued that the anti-SLAPP statute applied because AB 1936 “authorizes and requires” them to engage in particular speech—the new name by which they “represent the College’s identity and values to the public”—and because the claims, if successful, would prevent or interfere with that speech. The court of appeal upheld the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion. Even assuming that future speech in which the College Defendants use the new name is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, it is not the reason the plaintiffs have sued them. The plaintiffs’ claims are not based on the College Defendants’ speech. View "Hastings College Conservation Committee v. Faigman" on Justia Law

The Regional Water Quality Control Board, Los Angeles Region (Regional Board) renewed permits allowing four publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) to discharge millions of gallons of treated wastewater daily into the Los Angeles River and Pacific Ocean. The Regional Board issued the permits over the objections of Los Angeles Waterkeeper (Waterkeeper). Waterkeeper sought a review of the permits before the State Water Resources Control Board (State Board), and the State Board declined to review. Waterkeeper then filed petitions for writs of mandate against the State and Regional Boards (collectively, the Boards). Waterkeeper further alleged the Regional Board issued the permits without making findings required under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court issued four judgments and four writs of mandate directing the State Board to evaluate whether the discharges from each of the four POTWs were reasonable and to develop a factual record to allow for judicial review of whatever decision the State Board reached.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgments in favor of the Boards and reversed judgments and writs of mandate against State Board. The court agreed with the trial court that the Regional Board had no duty to evaluate the reasonableness of the POTWs’ discharges when issuing the permits. The Regional Board’s purview is water quality, not reasonable use, and the Legislature has not authorized the Regional Board to determine whether a POTW’s discharges could be put to better use. The court further held that Waterkeeper has not adequately pleaded entitlement to mandamus against the State Board, and the trial court should have sustained the State Board’s demurrer. View "L.A. Waterkeeper v. State Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

CalSTRS is a “unit of the Government Operations Agency” authorized to invest the assets of the Teachers’ Retirement Fund (Ed. Code, 22001, 22203). In 2016, CalSTRS formed two LLCs for the purpose of acquiring two properties in Oakland. Both LLC agreements state “The purpose of the Company is to implement the essential governmental function of the Member ([CalSTRS]) … No other person or entity may become a member of the Company.” “For Federal and relevant State income and/or franchise tax purposes and for no other purposes whatsoever, the Company shall be disregarded as an entity separate from [CalSTRS].” The LLCs paid documentary transfer taxes of $3,371,250 to Oakland, and $247,225 to Alameda County for the acquisition of one property and $161,250 to Oakland, and $11,825 to Alameda County in connection with the other property. The LLCs unsuccessfully sought refunds.The superior court ruled “[t]he LLCs are not governmental entities even if a governmental entity is the sole member of the LLC” and the ordinances do not “provide a textual basis for an exemption for transactions in which a business entity takes ownership of real property based on that entity’s ownership” by an exempt state agency. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the competing interests at stake are a matter for the legislature. View "CSHV 1999 Harrison, LLC v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law