Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment in favor of Defendant City of Los Angeles (the City), in a lawsuit alleging the City knowingly failed to remedy a dangerous condition on public property adjacent to Plaintiff’s place of work, as a result of which Plaintiff contracted typhus. The trial court entered this judgment after sustaining a demurrer on the basis that, under Government Code section 855.4, the City was immune from liability.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling finding that the City’s demurrer did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. The court explained that Plaintiff has not proffered any facts she could allege, based on which her complaint would no longer describe injury “resulting from the decision to perform or not to perform any act to promote the public health of the community by preventing disease or controlling the communication of disease within the community” that was “the result of the exercise of discretion vested in the public entity or the public employee.” Rather, her arguments that no exercise of discretion occurred are grounded in a definition of “exercise of discretion,” which the court concluded is inapplicable here. Further, the court reasoned that because it concluded that the SAC sufficiently alleges immunity under section 855.4, subdivision (a), additional allegations Plaintiff represents she could add establishing that the City acted without due care as required by section 855.4, subdivision (b) would not defeat such immunity. View "Greenwood v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

In 2002, plaintiffs M.D. Doe, A.J. Doe, and S. Doe (together, plaintiffs) sued defendant Marysville Joint Unified School District (the District) and at least one District employee, alleging their school counselor sexually abused them. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the District after finding that plaintiffs failed to timely file a government claim before filing their complaint. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied review. In 2019, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 to extend the statute of limitations for victims bringing childhood claims of sexual assault. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed this action against the District and certain individuals predicated on the same set of facts as their 2002 suit. The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer without leave to amend as to plaintiffs, finding that the prior dismissal was res judicata, and that allowing section 340.1 to reopen a final judgment would run afoul of constitutional separation of powers principles. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the trial court erred because their prior claims were not “litigated to finality” within the meaning of section 340.1 and could therefore be revived, and because dismissing plaintiffs’ claims violated equal protection. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal. View "Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

At issue here was the 2015 “public health goal” (PHG) defendant Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) set for the contaminant perchlorate, a chemical found in rocket fuel. After OEHHA set the PHG for perchlorate at 1 part per billion (ppb), plaintiff California Manufacturers & Technology Association (CMTA) filed a petition for a writ of mandate ordering OEHHA to withdraw the PHG. The trial court denied the petition. On appeal, CMTA argued: (1) OEHHA violated the statutory mandate in arriving at the PHG; and (2) the PHG was void based on the common law conflict of interest doctrine because its author, Dr. Craig Steinmaus, had a conflict of interest. The Court of Appeal concluded OEHHA complied with the statutory requirements under Health & Safety Code section 116365 (c)(1)(A), and that the common law conflict of interest doctrine did not apply here. View "California Manufacturers etc. v. Off. of Environmental Health etc." on Justia Law

Some of the practices that have made California's Central Valley an "agricultural powerhouse" have also adversely impacted the region’s water quality and environmental health. Respondents State Water Resources Control Board (State Water Board) and Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board (Central Valley Water Board) are responsible for regulating waste discharges from irrigated agricultural operations in the Central Valley. The State Water Board adopted order WQ 2018-0002 (Order) in February 2018. Environmental Law Foundation (Foundation), Monterey Coastkeeper (Coastkeeper), and Protectores del Agua Subterranea (Protectores) (collectively, appellants) brought petitions for writs of mandate challenging various aspects of the Order. The trial court consolidated the cases and granted a motion for leave to intervene by the East San Joaquin Water Quality Coalition (Coalition) and others (cumulatively, the Coalition). Following a hearing on the merits, the trial court denied the petitions. Appellants appealed, advancing numerous claims of error. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and affirmed the judgments. View "Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

In November 2020, the voters approved Proposition 22, Bus. & Prof. Code, 7448–7467. Proposition 22 concerns drivers that operate transportation or delivery services using an electronic application or platform to connect passengers seeking transportation or customers seeking delivery of goods to drivers or couriers willing to provide those services with their personal vehicles. The Attorney General titled it: “Exempts App-Based Transportation and Delivery Companies from Providing Employee Benefits to Certain Drivers.” The plaintiffs sought a declaration that Proposition 22 violated the California Constitution.The trial court granted the petition, ruling that the proposition is invalid in its entirety because it intrudes on the Legislature’s exclusive authority to create workers’ compensation laws; is invalid to the extent that it limits the Legislature’s authority to enact legislation that would not constitute an amendment to Proposition 22, and is invalid in its entirety because it violates the single-subject rule for initiative statutes.The court of appeal affirmed in part and found that the unconstitutional provisions are severable. Proposition 22 does not intrude on the Legislature’s workers’ compensation authority or violate the single-subject rule, but the initiative’s definition of what constitutes an amendment violates separation of powers principles. View "Castellanos v. State of California" on Justia Law

During an investigation into possible violations of California overtime laws by appellant Nor-Cal Venture Group, Inc. (Nor-Cal), respondent Labor Commissioner for the State of California (Commissioner) subpoenaed Nor-Cal's business records. The Commissioner ultimately issued a wage citation to Nor-Cal, seeking over $900,000 in penalties and unpaid wages for alleged misclassification of about 40 restaurant managers. Nor-Cal challenged the wage citation in an “informal” adjudicatory hearing, and while that adjudication was pending, Commissioner issued a subpoena directing Nor-Cal’s “Person(s) Most Knowledgeable” on certain topics to testify at a deposition. When Nor-Cal refused, Commissioner filed a petition to a trial court to compel Nor-Cal to comply. The trial court agreed with Commissioner and ordered Nor-Cal to comply with the deposition subpoena. On appeal, Nor-Cal challenged the trial court’s order, arguing: (1) the California Government Code did not contemplate parties to adjudicatory informal hearings taking depositions for the purpose of discovery; and (2) because, under the trial court’s reasoning, only Commissioner could issue deposition subpoenas during the pendency of an informal adjudication, the trial court’s order permitting non-reciprocal discovery violated due process. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order, finding that while Commissioner had broad power to issue investigative subpoenas to a company for suspected violations of the law, "that broad power ends upon initiation of adjudicative proceedings against the company." View "Garcia-Brower v. Nor-Cal Venture Group" on Justia Law

Generic versions of ranitidine-containing antacids are sold under the brand name Zantac. In 2019, after an independent laboratory found “significant quantities of NDMA,” a known carcinogen in ranitidine-containing antacids, the FDA issued a public alert. Some manufacturers voluntarily recalled their products. In 2020, the FDA “request[ed that] manufacturers withdraw all prescription and [OTC] ranitidine drugs from the market immediately.”CEH, a nonprofit corporation, sued under Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, Health and Safety Code 25249.5, alleging that the generic-drug defendants continued to expose individuals to NDMA without clear and reasonable warnings regarding the carcinogenic hazards. The trial court dismissed the generic defendants without leave to amend, citing preemption by the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301. The court determined that the generic-drug defendants cannot give a Proposition 65 warning without violating the federal requirement that the generic version of a drug have the same “labeling” as the brand-name version. The court of appeal affirmed that dismissal. Although not all methods of publicly communicating a warning about a drug necessarily qualify as “labeling,” CEH fails to identify any method by which the generic-drug defendants could provide a warning that would satisfy both Proposition 65 and the federal duty of sameness. View "Center for Environmental Health v. Perrigo Co." on Justia Law

People who do not want an eldercare facility built near them have been fighting the project since 2017. Others want the facility, saying the project would fit the neighborhood and the public needs it. The trial court rejected the opponents’ challenge, which was based on Los Angeles zoning laws, the California Environmental Quality Act, and the Coastal Act. These neighbors appealed. The three respondents—the City of Los Angeles, the California Coastal Commission, and the developer— defend the trial court ruling. At issue is whether a reasonable person could agree with the City’s conclusion that adding this urban building to this urban area was compatible with the plan for Brentwood and Pacific Palisades.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that a reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion as the City: that this proposal for an urban building is compatible with the plans for this urban area. Further, the court explained that it was for the Commission to weigh conflicting evidence; and the court may reverse only if a reasonable person could not have reached the same conclusion. For example, the neighbors raise the specter of a parking calamity, but the Commission concluded the nominal increase in traffic would not significantly displace street parking for hikers bound for the trails. The eldercare facility would, after all, include underground parking. This logic is sound. Substantial evidence supports the Commission’s and the City’s decisions. View "Pacific Palisades Residents Assn., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Appellant California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed from a judgment granting Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate (judgment). DMV contends the issues presented on appeal are whether the trial court erred in overturning the suspension of Plaintiff’s driver’s license (1) “by applying [former] Government Code section 11440.30.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the “Judgment Granting Petition For Writ Of Mandate And Awarding Costs And Attorney Fees To Petitioner” and remanded the cause to the court below, with directions to modify the judgment to provide that the matter shall thereafter be remanded to the DMV for further proceedings. The court concluded that former Government Code section 11440.30 was applicable to Plaintiff’s DMV driver’s license suspension hearing. Said former statute is fully consistent with other relevant statutes, including, without limitation, Vehicle Code sections 14100 through 14112 and Government Code section 11501. Further, the court concluded that both CCR section 115.07 and former Government Code section 11440.30 were mandatory and not merely directory. Moreover, substantial evidence supports an implied finding that Plaintiff was prejudiced by DMV’s failure to adhere to former government code section 11440.30. View "Ramirez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In three separate cases consolidated for appeal, a trial court found defendants incompetent to stand trial and ordered them be committed to the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for competency treatment. When DSH failed to admit the defendants in a timely manner, the trial court issued orders to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, and it directed DSH to admit each defendant by a particular deadline. When the defendants were not admitted by that deadline, the trial court issued sanctions of $1,000 for each day past the deadline that the defendants were not admitted, for a total of $91,000. Although only one of the sanctions orders stated sanctions were imposed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, the parties proceeded on the assumption that sanctions were imposed pursuant to that section in all three cases. DSH all three sanctions orders, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in concluding DSH lacked good cause or substantial justification for failing to admit defendants by the court-ordered deadline; (2) the written orders imposing sanctions fail to specify the conduct or circumstances justifying the order in sufficient detail; and (3) the amount of sanctions imposed in each case exceeds the $1,500 limit provided in section 177.5. The Court of Appeal interpreted section 177.5 as allowing sanctions of up to $1,500 for each separate violation of a court order. The Court reversed judgment and remanded for the trial court to determine in the first instance whether DSH committed separate acts of violating a court order on each day that it failed to admit the defendants past the court-ordered deadline, or whether its failure to admit the defendants could only be considered one act of violating a court order. "If the trial court determines DSH committed separate acts of violating a court order, its written order imposing sanctions 'shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying' that determination." View "California v. Edwards, et al." on Justia Law