Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

An employee at a hospital operated by the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA Health) photographed confidential patient information and posted it to his personal Instagram account, despite having received training and signing agreements to protect patient privacy. Although the employee redacted some information, personal details of ten patients remained visible. The hospital responded by placing the employee on administrative leave, ultimately terminating him, notifying affected patients, and reiterating privacy policies to staff. No patients reported adverse consequences from the disclosure.The California Department of Public Health investigated and imposed a $75,000 penalty on the hospital, finding a violation of Health and Safety Code section 1280.15, which requires health facilities to prevent unauthorized disclosure of patient medical information. An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the Department’s finding and penalty, interpreting section 1280.15 as imposing strict liability for any unauthorized disclosure, regardless of whether the hospital had implemented appropriate safeguards. The ALJ noted that the Department did not find a violation of section 1280.18, which requires reasonable safeguards, but still held the hospital responsible. The Department adopted the ALJ’s decision.The Regents of the University of California challenged the decision in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, seeking a writ of administrative mandate and declaratory relief. The trial court ruled in favor of the hospital, holding that a violation of section 1280.15 cannot occur without a concurrent violation of section 1280.18, thus importing a reasonableness standard into section 1280.15. The court ordered the Department to vacate its decision and remanded the matter.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that section 1280.15 is not a strict liability statute; liability requires a failure to implement reasonable safeguards as mandated by section 1280.18. The hospital was not liable absent proof of such a failure. View "Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. State Dept. of Public Health" on Justia Law

A charter city in California was required by state law to update its housing element—a component of its general plan addressing housing needs—by October 15, 2021. The city submitted a draft housing element to the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD), which found the draft would comply with state law if adopted. However, the city refused to adopt the revised housing element, citing concerns about environmental impacts and the number of affordable housing units required. The city also filed a federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Housing Element Law, which was ultimately dismissed for lack of standing.The People of California, represented by the Attorney General and the HCD, filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Orange County Superior Court, later transferred to the San Diego County Superior Court, seeking to compel the city to adopt a compliant housing element. The Kennedy Commission, an affordable housing advocacy group, intervened. The trial court granted the State’s petition for writ of mandate, finding the city had a ministerial duty to adopt a compliant housing element, but the court’s order did not include a 120-day compliance deadline or provisional remedies limiting the city’s permitting and zoning authority, as requested by the State. The court also stayed further proceedings due to pending appeals and unresolved cross-petitions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that Article 14 of Chapter 3 of Division 1 of Title 7 of the Government Code, which includes the 120-day compliance deadline and provisional remedies, applies to enforcement actions against charter cities. The court directed the trial court to vacate its prior order and issue a new order including the required compliance deadline and provisional remedies, and to lift its stay and expeditiously resolve remaining issues. The court declined to order entry of final judgment while other pleadings remained unresolved. View "Kennedy Commission v. Superior. Ct." on Justia Law

A county public guardian sought to place an individual, A.H., under a conservatorship pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, alleging that A.H. was gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. After the initial petition was filed in February 2023, the trial court imposed a temporary conservatorship. A.H. requested a trial, which by statute should have commenced within 10 days, but the trial was repeatedly continued due to court and counsel unavailability, ultimately beginning months later. As the first temporary conservatorship neared expiration, the public guardian filed a second petition and obtained a new temporary conservatorship, further extending A.H.’s involuntary confinement. A.H. objected to the continuances and sought dismissal of both petitions, arguing that the delays violated statutory deadlines and his due process rights.The Superior Court of Contra Costa County denied A.H.’s motions to dismiss, continued the trials multiple times, and ultimately dismissed the first petition at the public guardian’s request. The trial on the second petition began approximately ten weeks after the statutory deadline, and the court found A.H. gravely disabled, ordering a one-year conservatorship with various restrictions. The public guardian did not seek to renew the conservatorship after it expired.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, held that the statutory deadline for commencing trial under the LPS Act is directory, not mandatory, and does not require automatic dismissal if missed. The court also found that, although the trial court abused its discretion by repeatedly granting continuances without good cause, this error was harmless as it did not affect the outcome of the conservatorship order. However, the appellate court concluded that the cumulative delay—over ten months of involuntary confinement before a final adjudication—violated A.H.’s due process rights, particularly since none of the delay was attributable to A.H. and he had never previously been found gravely disabled. The conservatorship order was therefore reversed. View "Conservatorship of A.H." on Justia Law

Catherine Baker was employed by San Mateo County as a Social Worker III but went on medical leave in 2009 due to back pain. In 2015, she returned to work in a different position as a screener trainee, which involved different duties but was compensated at the same pay rate as her original position. Her last paycheck was issued in January 2016. In 2017, Baker applied for a service-connected disability retirement, and the San Mateo County Employees Retirement Association (SamCERA) determined that the effective date for her retirement benefits should be January 22, 2016, the day after her last receipt of “regular compensation.”After SamCERA’s Board approved her application and set the effective date, Baker sought administrative review, arguing that her compensation as a screener trainee did not qualify as “regular compensation” under Government Code section 31724 because she had not returned to her original job. An administrative law judge recommended denial of her request to change the effective date, and the Board adopted this recommendation. Baker then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the Superior Court of San Mateo County, which denied the petition and confirmed the January 22, 2016 effective date.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether “regular compensation” under section 31724 included Baker’s pay as a screener trainee. Exercising independent judgment on statutory interpretation, the court held that “regular compensation” refers to regular salary or full wages, regardless of whether the position is the employee’s original job. Because Baker’s screener trainee pay matched her original position’s rate, it qualified as “regular compensation.” The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, upholding the effective date set by SamCERA. View "Baker v. San Mateo County Employees Retirement Assn." on Justia Law

In 2018, the plaintiff was placed on an involuntary 72-hour psychiatric hold, resulting in the creation of a confidential record by the Orange County Sheriff’s Department. In 2021, during a legal dispute over their father’s estate, the plaintiff discovered that his sister’s attorney had obtained this confidential record and used it to threaten him in an attempt to force dismissal of his elder abuse lawsuit against his sister. The record had been released by an office specialist at the Sheriff’s Department, who admitted knowing the sister was not entitled to the record but disclosed it anyway, believing she was concerned for the plaintiff’s well-being.A jury in the Superior Court of Orange County found that the office specialist willfully and knowingly disclosed the confidential record, awarding the plaintiff $29,000 in economic damages and $40,000 in noneconomic damages. The jury also found the plaintiff’s sister and her attorney responsible for 25 percent of the damages. However, the trial court granted a motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding there was insufficient evidence of willfulness, declined to treble the damages, and apportioned both economic and noneconomic damages, entering judgment for 75 percent of the total damages against the office specialist and the County.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that “willfully and knowingly” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5330 means intentionally releasing confidential records to someone known to be unauthorized, regardless of intent to harm. The court found substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding of willfulness, requiring trebling of damages. The court also held that while noneconomic damages could be apportioned to other tortfeasors, economic damages could not. The case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for $177,000 against the County and the office specialist, jointly and severally. View "Doe v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

A property owner challenged an annual assessment levied by a city for the maintenance of landscaping and lighting improvements within a maintenance district. The assessment, originally set at $196.23 per residential lot in 1996, had increased to $300 per lot by the 2022–2023 tax year. The property owner argued that this increase violated Proposition 218, a constitutional amendment that restricts local governments’ ability to impose or increase taxes, assessments, and fees without voter approval. The city had not submitted the assessment to voters after Proposition 218’s passage, asserting that the assessment was exempt from Proposition 218’s requirements as a preexisting assessment for certain public services.The Superior Court of California, County of Solano, found in favor of the city. The court determined that the assessment was exempt from Proposition 218 and that the increase to $300 did not constitute an “increase” under the law because it did not exceed a range established before Proposition 218 took effect. Judgment was entered for the city, and the property owner appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the assessment had been “increased” within the meaning of Proposition 218 and the implementing statutes because the per-lot rate was higher than the rate in effect when Proposition 218 became law. The court rejected the city’s argument that a flat per-lot assessment does not involve a “rate” and found that the statutory definition of “rate” includes a per-parcel amount. The court also concluded that only ranges adopted in compliance with Proposition 218’s procedures could shield subsequent increases from voter approval requirements. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "Thacker v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

A group of single-family residential (SFR) water customers challenged the City of San Diego’s tiered water rate structure, which imposed higher rates for increased water usage, arguing that these rates exceeded the proportional cost of service attributable to their parcels as required by California Constitution article XIII D, section 6(b)(3) (enacted by Proposition 218). The City’s water system serves a large population and divides customers into several classes, but only SFR customers were subject to tiered rates; other classes paid uniform rates. The City’s rates were based on cost-of-service studies using industry-standard methodologies, including “base-extra capacity” and “peaking factors,” but the plaintiffs contended these methods did not accurately reflect the actual cost of providing water at higher usage tiers.The Superior Court of San Diego County certified the case as a class action and held a bifurcated trial. In the first phase, the court found that the City failed to demonstrate, with substantial evidence, that its tiered rates for SFR customers complied with section 6(b)(3), concluding the rates were not based on the actual cost of service at each tier but rather on usage budgets and conservation goals. The court also found the City lacked sufficient data to justify its allocation of costs to higher tiers and that the rate structure discriminated against SFR customers compared to other classes. In the second phase, the court awarded the class a refund for overcharges, offset by undercharges, and ordered the City to implement new, compliant rates.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s judgment with directions. The appellate court held that the City bore the burden of proving its rates did not exceed the proportional cost of service and that the applicable standard was not mere reasonableness but actual cost proportionality, subject to independent judicial review. The court found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings that the City’s tiered rates were not cost-based and thus violated section 6(b)(3). The court also upheld class certification and the method for calculating the refund, and directed the trial court to amend the judgment to comply with newly enacted Government Code section 53758.5, which affects the manner of refunding overcharges. View "Patz v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Starbuzz International, Inc. and Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc. distributed shisha, a product containing less than 50 percent tobacco, in California between October 2012 and September 2015. During this period, they paid over $2.8 million in excise taxes under the state’s Tobacco Products Tax Law, which imposed taxes on “tobacco products” as defined by statute. Starbuzz later filed refund claims, arguing their shisha did not meet the statutory definition and was not taxable. The Office of Tax Appeals (OTA) agreed, finding the definition ambiguous and resolving it in Starbuzz’s favor, granting full refunds. After a rehearing, a second OTA panel reaffirmed this decision.Following these administrative victories, Starbuzz requested payment of the refunds from the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration. The Department, however, declined to issue the refunds immediately, citing a statutory requirement to review whether Starbuzz had collected the excise tax from its customers and, if so, whether those amounts had been returned to them. Starbuzz filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, arguing the Department had a ministerial duty to pay the refunds and was barred by res judicata from conducting further review. The trial court rejected Starbuzz’s arguments and denied the petition, entering judgment for the Department.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Department’s obligation to review for excess tax reimbursement under section 30361.5 was distinct from the refund claim adjudicated by the OTA. The court found that res judicata did not apply because the primary right at issue in the OTA proceedings (freedom from improper taxation) was different from the right asserted in the current action (immediate refund without review for excess reimbursement). Thus, the Department could require a review before issuing refunds. View "Starbuzz International v. Department of Tax and Fee Administration" on Justia Law

A sitting judge of the San Diego County Superior Court applied to be appointed as the county’s Public Defender in 2023. The County of San Diego informed him that he was ineligible for the position based on Government Code section 27701, which requires that a person must have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the state for at least the year preceding the date of election or appointment. The judge, believing the County’s interpretation was incorrect, filed a declaratory relief action seeking a judicial determination of the statute’s meaning. He argued that the statute only required one year of prior practice at any time before appointment, not necessarily the year immediately preceding.The case was reassigned to the Superior Court of Orange County. Both parties agreed to resolve the statutory interpretation issue through a motion. The plaintiff argued that his interpretation avoided absurd results and was consistent with constitutional principles and legislative intent. The County maintained that the statute’s plain language was clear and required the year of practice to be immediately before appointment. The trial court held a hearing and agreed with the County, finding the statutory language unambiguous and declining to rewrite the statute. Judgment was entered in favor of the County, and the plaintiff appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the language of section 27701 is unambiguous and requires that eligibility for the office of public defender is limited to those who have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the state for at least the one year immediately preceding their election or appointment. The court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, concluding that the plain meaning of the statute must govern. View "Washington v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

A prisoner incarcerated in a California state prison was found guilty of a serious institutional rule violation after a search of his shared cell uncovered a large quantity of inmate-manufactured alcohol. The reporting officer believed both cell occupants were aware of the alcohol due to its strong odor and issued a rules violation report (RVR) for each. The original RVR was classified as a serious offense by Captain Hopper, and after a disciplinary hearing, the senior hearing officer found the prisoner guilty. The chief disciplinary officer (CDO) at that time affirmed the result. The prisoner appealed administratively, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) office of grievances found merit in his due process claim, ordering the RVR to be reissued and reheard.After the RVR was reissued and classified by a different officer, a new hearing was held. The prisoner’s cellmate provided statements suggesting the prisoner had no knowledge of the alcohol, but the hearing officer again found the prisoner guilty. By this time, Hopper had become the acting CDO and conducted the final review, affirming the hearing results. The prisoner’s subsequent administrative appeal was unsuccessful, leading him to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, which was denied. He then sought relief in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One.The appellate court held that under California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3320(h), an officer who classified the original RVR is disqualified from conducting the final review of the same RVR as CDO. Because Hopper performed both roles, the court found this violated the regulation’s requirement for impartiality. The court granted the petition, vacated the disciplinary finding, and ordered a new review by a non-disqualified CDO or restoration of lost credits and pay if such review is not feasible. View "In re Dixon" on Justia Law