Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The dispute arose when a property owner, after selling his San Diego County home and purchasing property in Trinity County, sought to transfer the base year value of his former property to his new one. In 2009, he sued the Trinity County Board of Supervisors to compel such a transfer under California law. The parties settled in 2012, agreeing that if the County later adopted an ordinance or if a change in law required it, the owner would be entitled to retroactively transfer the base year value. In 2020, after the passage of Proposition 19, which expanded the ability to transfer base year values between counties, the owner requested the transfer from the county assessor, who denied the request.The Superior Court of Trinity County held a bench trial and found in favor of the property owner on his breach of contract claims, ordering the County to specifically perform the settlement agreement and awarding damages. The court rejected the County’s arguments that the agreement was limited to intra-county transfers and that the Board lacked authority to bind the assessor. The court also found that the new law triggered the County’s obligations under the agreement.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, concluded that the Board of Supervisors did not have the authority to direct the county assessor in setting or transferring base year values, as this is a duty assigned by law to the assessor, an elected official independent of the Board’s control. The court held that the 2012 settlement agreement was void and unenforceable because it exceeded the Board’s legal authority. As a result, the judgment on the breach of contract claims was reversed, while the remainder of the judgment was affirmed. The County was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Sceper v. County of Trinity" on Justia Law

Two students challenged the University of California’s policy that prohibits the employment of undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The University’s longstanding practice allowed employment of undocumented students with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, as they have federal work authorization, but excluded those without such authorization. After the federal government stopped accepting new DACA applications, the number of undocumented students without work authorization increased. The University considered changing its policy but ultimately decided against it, citing significant risks of federal enforcement under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and related regulations, and dissolved a working group tasked with exploring alternatives.The students filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, arguing that the University’s policy was an abuse of discretion and violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by discriminating based on immigration status. The court initially denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back, instructing the appellate court to reconsider. The University argued that its policy was based on risk assessment rather than a definitive interpretation of IRCA, and that even if the policy was discriminatory, the risk of federal enforcement justified its continuation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, held that the University’s policy facially discriminates based on immigration status and that, under state law, such discrimination is only permissible if required by federal law, which the University did not establish. The court concluded that the University abused its discretion by relying solely on litigation risk as a justification for its policy. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the University to reconsider its policy using proper legal criteria. View "Munoz v. The Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law

In 1996, California voters enacted Proposition 218, adding article XIII D to the California Constitution, which includes section 6(b)(3). This section mandates that governmental fees or charges imposed on property must not exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel. Plaintiffs, representing a class of single-family residential (SFR) customers of the City of San Diego, challenged the City's tiered water rates, claiming they violated section 6(b)(3) by exceeding the proportional cost of delivering water.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the City's tiered rates did not comply with section 6(b)(3). The court concluded that the City failed to show that its tiered rates were based on the actual cost of providing water at different usage levels. The court found that the City's tiered rates were designed to encourage conservation rather than reflect the cost of service, and that the City's use of peaking factors and other methodologies lacked supporting data.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the City did not meet its burden of proving that its tiered rates complied with section 6(b)(3). The appellate court found that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings that the City's tiered rates were not cost-proportional and that the City's methodologies were not adequately supported by data. The court also addressed the issue of class certification, finding that the class was properly certified and that the plaintiffs had a common interest in challenging the City's rate structure.The appellate court directed the trial court to amend the judgment to allow the City to satisfy the refund award pursuant to newly enacted Government Code section 53758.5, which requires agencies to credit refund awards against future increases in or impositions of the property-related charge. The court denied the plaintiffs' request for attorney fees on appeal without prejudice, allowing the trial court to determine the entitlement to such fees. View "Patz v. City of S.D." on Justia Law

GreenPower Motor Company Inc. (GreenPower) and San Joaquin Valley Equipment Leasing, Inc. (San Joaquin Leasing) were involved in the California Hybrid and Zero-Emissions Truck and Bus Voucher Incentive Project (HVIP), which subsidizes the price of qualifying electric vehicles (EVs). GreenPower's participation in the HVIP program was suspended following an investigation by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) into their compliance with HVIP requirements. Subsequently, the Attorney General's Office began investigating potential violations of the HVIP program and issued subpoenas to GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing for documents related to their compliance with HVIP.GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing filed a petition for writ of mandate in Sacramento County Superior Court to compel CARB to issue vouchers for their EVs. Meanwhile, the Attorney General issued subpoenas as part of a separate investigation. When GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing did not comply, the Attorney General filed a petition in the City and County of San Francisco Superior Court to enforce the subpoenas. The trial court ordered GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing to show cause for their non-compliance and eventually required them to produce the requested documents.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce the subpoenas and that the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction did not apply because the issues in the Sacramento action and the present proceeding were factually and legally distinct. The court also found that the subpoenas were valid, specific, and relevant to the Attorney General's investigation into potential violations of the HVIP program and the California False Claims Act. The order requiring compliance with the subpoenas was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Bonta v. Greenpower Motor Co." on Justia Law

In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 57, which amended the California Constitution to allow the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the department) to award credits for good behavior and rehabilitative or educational achievements. The department adopted regulations to award credits beyond statutory limits and to use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates. The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation and several family members of crime victims challenged these regulations through a petition for writ of mandate.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the writ in part and granted it in part, invalidating the department’s regulations to the extent they allowed the use of credits to advance an indeterminately-sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date. Both the department and the petitioners appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Proposition 57 properly removed statutory restraints on the department’s authority to award credits, allowing the regulations to supersede contrary statutes. However, the court also held that the department may use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates only if permitted by existing law, as Proposition 57 is silent on this issue. The court remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to modify the writ of mandate and enter a modified judgment. View "Criminal Justice Legal Foundation v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

In 2022, the City of Sacramento proposed a new storm drainage fee to fund repairs, maintenance, and improvements to its storm drainage system. The fee was calculated based on parcel size and land use, expected to generate approximately $20 million annually, with City-owned properties contributing about $496,000. The City conducted an election, mailing ballots to property owners, including itself, as it owned one percent of the properties. The fee was approved with 22,178 votes in favor and 20,229 against. Without the City's votes, the fee would not have passed.Dessins LLC, a property owner who voted against the fee, filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint against the City and the City Council, arguing that the City's votes should not have counted. The Superior Court of Sacramento County ruled in favor of the City, concluding that the City was entitled to vote in the election. Dessins then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the City, as a property owner of properties subject to the fee, was entitled to vote under article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution. The court found that the plain language of the provision allowed the City to vote and that the City's vote did not subvert the purposes of Proposition 218. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, allowing the storm drainage fee to stand. View "Dessins v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

Kheloud Allos filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Poway Unified School District (PUSD), alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code. Allos claimed that PUSD's refusal to allow her to work exclusively from home during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in an interactive process, associational discrimination, and retaliation. She also alleged that PUSD failed to maintain a safe and healthy workplace and retaliated against her in violation of the Labor Code.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted PUSD's motion for summary judgment, finding that Allos's claims were barred by Government Code section 855.4, which provides immunity to public entities for decisions related to preventing disease or controlling its spread. The court also found that Allos failed to establish a triable issue of fact regarding her disability, the essential functions of her job, and whether she experienced an adverse employment action. The court noted that PUSD had engaged in multiple interactive meetings with Allos and provided various accommodations.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that section 855.4 provided immunity to PUSD for its decisions related to COVID-19 safety measures. The court also found that Allos failed to present evidence of a qualifying disability under FEHA, as her alleged vaccine allergy and other health conditions did not constitute a disability. Additionally, the court held that PUSD's interactive process and accommodations were reasonable and that Allos did not suffer an adverse employment action, as she voluntarily retired. The court concluded that Allos's claims for associational discrimination, retaliation, and Labor Code violations were without merit. View "Allos v. Poway Unified School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Steve Rogers filed a lawsuit against the City of Redlands, alleging that the rates for the City’s solid waste collection included a surcharge for a City program to repair roads, which he claimed violated Vehicle Code section 9400.8. The trial was bifurcated into two phases. In phase one, the trial court determined that section 9400.8 was violated. In phase two, the court ruled that refunds were limited to those who paid under protest pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 5472. Both the City and Rogers appealed these rulings.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County initially reviewed the case. In phase one, the court found that the surcharge for the City’s pavement accelerated repair implementation strategy (PARIS) program constituted a charge for the privilege of using the City’s streets, thus violating section 9400.8. In phase two, the court concluded that Health and Safety Code section 5472 limited refunds to those who paid under protest, denying Rogers the retrospective remedies he sought.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s rulings. It agreed that the surcharge for the PARIS program was indeed a charge for the privilege of using the City’s streets, prohibited by section 9400.8. The court also upheld the trial court’s application of Health and Safety Code section 5472, which limited refunds to those who paid under protest. The appellate court found no error in the trial court’s decisions and affirmed the judgment in its entirety. View "Rogers v. City of Redlands" on Justia Law

In 2020, allegations emerged that certain officers in the Vallejo Police Department were bending the points of their badges after using potentially lethal force. The department hired an independent investigator to look into these claims but did not release the investigation's findings. The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California (ACLU) requested records related to the investigation under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). The department released some records but withheld the investigative report, claiming it was a confidential personnel record.The ACLU filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Solano County Superior Court, challenging the department's response. The court ordered the disclosure of parts of the investigative report and related materials, with redactions to protect the identities of officers, witnesses, and their families. Both parties sought writ review of this decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the documents sought by the ACLU were not confidential personnel records but were subject to public disclosure under section 832.7, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code. This section pertains to records relating to the report, investigation, or findings of incidents involving the discharge of a firearm by a peace officer. The court also found that the redaction of officer names could not be sustained on the grounds relied upon by the superior court. However, due to the extensive volume of potentially disclosable materials and minimal briefing on redaction issues, the court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding redactions. View "City of Vallejo v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Sacramento Television Stations Inc. (Sac TV) sought additional audio and video recordings from the City of Roseville (City) under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) related to an incident on April 6, 2023, where Roseville Police Department (Roseville PD) officers discharged firearms at a suspect, Eric J. Abril. The City provided limited footage, arguing that further disclosure would interfere with an active investigation. Sac TV filed a petition for writ of mandate to compel the City to release more recordings.The Superior Court of Placer County denied Sac TV's petition, finding that the City had shown by clear and convincing evidence that further disclosure would substantially interfere with an active investigation, specifically Abril's ongoing criminal case. The court acknowledged that more footage was required under CPRA but did not determine the extent due to the active investigation exemption.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the Superior Court's finding of an active investigation was not supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that a pending criminal prosecution alone does not constitute an active investigation under CPRA. The court also found that the City’s interpretation of the required disclosure was too narrow and that more context was needed to understand the incident involving the discharge of a firearm.The Court of Appeal vacated the Superior Court's ruling and directed it to hold further proceedings, including an in camera review of the City’s recordings, to determine the extent of additional disclosure required. The court emphasized the importance of providing sufficient context to fully understand the events captured in the recordings. The petition for rehearing was denied, and the judgment remained unchanged. View "Sacramento Television Stations Inc. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law