Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

D.G. sued the Orange County Social Services Agency and the County of Orange for negligence, alleging that he was sexually abused by his foster father from the mid-1970s until he was a teenager. D.G. claimed he informed his social worker that "bad people are hurting me," but no action was taken. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing there was insufficient evidence that it was aware of any abuse or risk of abuse while D.G. was in the foster home. The trial court agreed, finding the information reported was insufficient to make the abuse foreseeable and that discretionary immunity applied.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that there was no duty to protect D.G. from the unforeseeable criminal conduct of his foster father and that the social worker was immune under Government Code section 820.2 for discretionary acts. D.G. appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the County failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that a duty of care did not exist and that discretionary act immunity did not apply. The court held that the failure to investigate potential abuse when indicators were present made the harm foreseeable, thus imposing a duty of care. Additionally, the court found no evidence that the social worker made a considered decision regarding the potential abuse. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "D.G. v. Orange County Social Services Agency" on Justia Law

Christopher Hamilton was convicted of federal felony possession of child pornography. After a federal district court terminated his federal sex offender registration requirement, the California Attorney General notified him of his lifetime obligation to register under California law, pursuant to Penal Code section 290.005(a). The Attorney General determined that the state law equivalent of Hamilton’s federal offense required lifetime registration, placing him in the highest tier of California’s three-tier scheme.Hamilton petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to terminate his state registration requirement. The Superior Court denied his petition and a subsequent amended motion. Hamilton appealed the denials, arguing violations of equal protection and due process.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the Attorney General’s classification of Hamilton’s offense as a felony with a lifetime registration requirement did not violate equal protection. The court reasoned that the federal offense’s classification as a felony, based on custodial exposure, justified the equivalent state offense’s classification as a felony. Additionally, the court found that the federal offense’s requirement of interstate or foreign commerce provided a rational basis for the different treatment.The court also rejected Hamilton’s due process challenge, concluding that he received notice and had opportunities to contest his tier designation through his petition and amended motion. Lastly, the court dismissed Hamilton’s vagueness challenge, finding that the term “equivalent” in section 290.005(a) was sufficiently clear when considered in context with other statutory provisions.The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court’s orders denying Hamilton’s petition and amended motion. View "People v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco County Transportation Authority challenged a decision by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to issue a phase I driverless autonomous vehicle (AV) deployment permit to Waymo, LLC for fared passenger service in San Francisco and parts of San Mateo County. The petitioners argued that the PUC failed to follow the law and disregarded significant public safety issues. However, the record showed that the PUC considered and responded to the safety concerns raised by the petitioners, noting that few incidents involved Waymo driverless AVs, each was minor, and none involved injuries.The PUC had previously issued a decision establishing a pilot program for the regulation of AV passenger carriers, which included both drivered and driverless AVs. The petitioners participated in these proceedings but did not challenge the decision at that time. Waymo submitted an advice letter in December 2022 seeking a phase I driverless AV deployment permit, which was protested by the San Francisco entities. The PUC's Consumer Protection and Enforcement Division circulated a draft resolution authorizing Waymo's permit, and after considering comments and holding meetings, the PUC issued a final resolution in August 2023, authorizing Waymo to provide fared driverless AV service.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and found that the PUC acted within its authority and did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that the PUC's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including data showing that Waymo driverless AVs had not been involved in any collisions resulting in injuries. The court also upheld the PUC's use of the advice letter process, as it was authorized by the PUC's prior decision. The court denied the relief requested by the petitioners, affirming the PUC's decision to issue the phase I driverless AV deployment permit to Waymo. View "City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to this parcel is via a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. JCCrandall objected to the use of its easement for cannabis transportation, citing federal law and the terms of the easement deed. Despite these objections, the County granted the CUP, and the County’s Board of Supervisors upheld this decision on appeal.JCCrandall then petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, challenging the County’s determination that the easement provided adequate access for the project. JCCrandall argued that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by federal law and the easement deed, that state law required its consent for such use, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County’s decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court should have applied the independent judgment standard because JCCrandall’s right to exclude unauthorized persons from its property is a fundamental vested right. The court further held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, JCCrandall cannot be forced to allow its property to be used for cannabis transportation. The court also found that the use of the easement for cannabis activities exceeded the scope of the easement, which was created when cannabis was illegal under both state and federal law. The judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall, LLC v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

A.D. Improvements, Inc. (ADI) leased property from the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and sought to purchase it under Streets and Highways Code section 118.1, which mandates that Caltrans offer to sell commercial real property deemed excess to the current occupant at fair market value. ADI used the property commercially and applied to purchase it after Caltrans designated it as excess. However, Caltrans denied the application, arguing that the property was not commercial when initially acquired. The trial court agreed with Caltrans and denied ADI's petition for a writ of mandate.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County found that ADI met the conditions of section 118.1, including leasing, occupying, and improving the property. However, it ruled that the statute applied only to property that was commercial when acquired by Caltrans, interpreting "acquired" as a past-tense verb.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the plain and contextual reading of section 118.1 requires the property to be commercial at the time it is deemed excess, not when it was acquired. The court found that the statute's language, legislative history, and Caltrans' own manuals support this interpretation. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions to issue a writ requiring Caltrans to offer to sell the property to ADI at fair market value. The court held that ADI is entitled to its costs on appeal. View "A.D. Improvements v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Lucky Chances, Inc. and its owners, Rommel and Ruell Medina, had their gambling licenses renewed by the California Gambling Control Commission with additional conditions. The Commission also imposed a 14-day suspension, stayed it, and ordered a monetary penalty based on findings that Rene Medina, a disqualified person, was materially involved in the gambling operation. The trial court issued a writ of administrative mandamus, ordering the Commission to reconsider the penalty, limiting it to $20,000 per violation.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found substantial evidence supporting the Commission's finding of Rene's material involvement but ruled that the monetary penalty exceeded statutory limits. The court ordered the Commission to set aside the penalty and reconsider it in light of the court's decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the Commission was authorized to impose additional license conditions based on its findings. However, it determined that the Commission could not use California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 12554, subdivision (d) to impose discipline because the Commission did not find that the Licensees violated any relevant law, regulation, or previously imposed license condition.The Court of Appeal modified the judgment to order the Commission to reconsider the discipline imposed under California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 12554, subdivision (d) in a manner consistent with its opinion. The judgment, as modified, was affirmed, and costs on appeal were awarded to Lucky Chances, Inc., Rommel Medina, and Ruell Medina. View "Lucky Chances, Inc. v. Cal. Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to the parcel is through a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. The County's fire and public works departments deemed the road adequate for the project. Despite JCCrandall's objections, the County granted the CUP, and the Board of Supervisors upheld this decision.JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, arguing that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by the easement deed and federal law, that state law required their consent for such activities, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County's decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court determined that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence standard instead of the independent judgment standard, as JCCrandall's right to exclude unauthorized persons from their property is a fundamental vested right. The appellate court held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, the use of the easement for cannabis transportation exceeds the scope of the easement. The court also found that the County's reliance on Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b), which deems cannabis activities lawful under California law, defies the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Consequently, the judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lorenza Maksimow slipped and fell on a patch of ice in a public parking lot in the City of South Lake Tahoe. She sued the City, alleging the ice patch was a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code sections 830 and 835. The City moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, entering judgment in favor of the City. Maksimow appealed, arguing there were triable issues of material fact regarding the City’s actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.The Superior Court of El Dorado County granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Maksimow failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition. The court sustained the City’s objections to certain evidence presented by Maksimow, including climatological data and expert testimony, and found no evidence that the City had actual or constructive notice of the ice patch.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that there was no triable issue of material fact regarding the City’s actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The court found that while City employees may have had general knowledge of snowfall and the presence of the Mitsubishi, there was no evidence they had actual notice of the specific ice patch that caused Maksimow’s fall. Additionally, the court concluded that the evidence did not support an inference that the ice patch existed for a sufficient period of time to impute constructive notice to the City. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Maksimow v. City of South Lake Tahoe" on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. During the investigation, the prosecution informed the defense that one of the investigating officers had a sustained finding of dishonesty, and the officer’s department intended to release related records under Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The defense counsel requested these records under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). Concurrently, the petitioner filed a Pitchess motion seeking additional Brady material from the officer’s personnel file. The trial court, after an in-camera review, found no additional Brady material and ordered the disclosure of the records related to the officer’s dishonesty, but issued a protective order limiting their dissemination.The petitioner sought an extraordinary writ of mandate to vacate the protective order, arguing that the records were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The trial court had issued the protective order under Evidence Code section 1045(e), which restricts the use of disclosed records to the court proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court noted that Senate Bill No. 1421 amended sections 832.7 and 832.8 to make certain law enforcement personnel records, including those involving sustained findings of dishonesty, nonconfidential and subject to public disclosure. The court held that the trial court should not have issued a protective order for records that are nonconfidential under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). Consequently, the appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its protective order concerning the records of the officer’s sustained finding of dishonesty. View "Banuelos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 1996, the City of Perris disbanded its police department and contracted with Riverside County for law enforcement services, leading to the hiring of former Perris PD officers as deputies in the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department. The plaintiffs, former Perris PD officers or their surviving spouses, argued that this transition constituted a merger under Government Code section 20508, entitling them to more favorable pension benefits from the County and CalPERS.The Superior Court of Riverside County ruled that section 20508 only applies when there is a merger of contracts between successive employing agencies and CalPERS. The court found no such merger occurred because Riverside County did not assume any municipal functions of the City of Perris. Consequently, the service pensions for the former Perris PD officers and the Sheriff’s Department deputies were calculated separately under the distinct contracts each entity had with CalPERS.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that section 20508 requires an actual merger of CalPERS contracts, which did not happen in this case. The County did not assume the City’s municipal functions, and no steps were taken to merge the contracts. Therefore, the County and CalPERS were not required to treat the former Perris PD officers’ service as service with the Sheriff’s Department. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, concluding that the requirements for a contract merger under section 20508 were not met. View "Petree v. Pub. Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law