Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

GreenPower Motor Company Inc. (GreenPower) and San Joaquin Valley Equipment Leasing, Inc. (San Joaquin Leasing) were involved in the California Hybrid and Zero-Emissions Truck and Bus Voucher Incentive Project (HVIP), which subsidizes the price of qualifying electric vehicles (EVs). GreenPower's participation in the HVIP program was suspended following an investigation by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) into their compliance with HVIP requirements. Subsequently, the Attorney General's Office began investigating potential violations of the HVIP program and issued subpoenas to GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing for documents related to their compliance with HVIP.GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing filed a petition for writ of mandate in Sacramento County Superior Court to compel CARB to issue vouchers for their EVs. Meanwhile, the Attorney General issued subpoenas as part of a separate investigation. When GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing did not comply, the Attorney General filed a petition in the City and County of San Francisco Superior Court to enforce the subpoenas. The trial court ordered GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing to show cause for their non-compliance and eventually required them to produce the requested documents.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce the subpoenas and that the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction did not apply because the issues in the Sacramento action and the present proceeding were factually and legally distinct. The court also found that the subpoenas were valid, specific, and relevant to the Attorney General's investigation into potential violations of the HVIP program and the California False Claims Act. The order requiring compliance with the subpoenas was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Bonta v. Greenpower Motor Co." on Justia Law

In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 57, which amended the California Constitution to allow the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the department) to award credits for good behavior and rehabilitative or educational achievements. The department adopted regulations to award credits beyond statutory limits and to use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates. The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation and several family members of crime victims challenged these regulations through a petition for writ of mandate.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the writ in part and granted it in part, invalidating the department’s regulations to the extent they allowed the use of credits to advance an indeterminately-sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date. Both the department and the petitioners appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Proposition 57 properly removed statutory restraints on the department’s authority to award credits, allowing the regulations to supersede contrary statutes. However, the court also held that the department may use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates only if permitted by existing law, as Proposition 57 is silent on this issue. The court remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to modify the writ of mandate and enter a modified judgment. View "Criminal Justice Legal Foundation v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

In 2022, the City of Sacramento proposed a new storm drainage fee to fund repairs, maintenance, and improvements to its storm drainage system. The fee was calculated based on parcel size and land use, expected to generate approximately $20 million annually, with City-owned properties contributing about $496,000. The City conducted an election, mailing ballots to property owners, including itself, as it owned one percent of the properties. The fee was approved with 22,178 votes in favor and 20,229 against. Without the City's votes, the fee would not have passed.Dessins LLC, a property owner who voted against the fee, filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint against the City and the City Council, arguing that the City's votes should not have counted. The Superior Court of Sacramento County ruled in favor of the City, concluding that the City was entitled to vote in the election. Dessins then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the City, as a property owner of properties subject to the fee, was entitled to vote under article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution. The court found that the plain language of the provision allowed the City to vote and that the City's vote did not subvert the purposes of Proposition 218. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, allowing the storm drainage fee to stand. View "Dessins v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

Kheloud Allos filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Poway Unified School District (PUSD), alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code. Allos claimed that PUSD's refusal to allow her to work exclusively from home during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in an interactive process, associational discrimination, and retaliation. She also alleged that PUSD failed to maintain a safe and healthy workplace and retaliated against her in violation of the Labor Code.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted PUSD's motion for summary judgment, finding that Allos's claims were barred by Government Code section 855.4, which provides immunity to public entities for decisions related to preventing disease or controlling its spread. The court also found that Allos failed to establish a triable issue of fact regarding her disability, the essential functions of her job, and whether she experienced an adverse employment action. The court noted that PUSD had engaged in multiple interactive meetings with Allos and provided various accommodations.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that section 855.4 provided immunity to PUSD for its decisions related to COVID-19 safety measures. The court also found that Allos failed to present evidence of a qualifying disability under FEHA, as her alleged vaccine allergy and other health conditions did not constitute a disability. Additionally, the court held that PUSD's interactive process and accommodations were reasonable and that Allos did not suffer an adverse employment action, as she voluntarily retired. The court concluded that Allos's claims for associational discrimination, retaliation, and Labor Code violations were without merit. View "Allos v. Poway Unified School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Steve Rogers filed a lawsuit against the City of Redlands, alleging that the rates for the City’s solid waste collection included a surcharge for a City program to repair roads, which he claimed violated Vehicle Code section 9400.8. The trial was bifurcated into two phases. In phase one, the trial court determined that section 9400.8 was violated. In phase two, the court ruled that refunds were limited to those who paid under protest pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 5472. Both the City and Rogers appealed these rulings.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County initially reviewed the case. In phase one, the court found that the surcharge for the City’s pavement accelerated repair implementation strategy (PARIS) program constituted a charge for the privilege of using the City’s streets, thus violating section 9400.8. In phase two, the court concluded that Health and Safety Code section 5472 limited refunds to those who paid under protest, denying Rogers the retrospective remedies he sought.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s rulings. It agreed that the surcharge for the PARIS program was indeed a charge for the privilege of using the City’s streets, prohibited by section 9400.8. The court also upheld the trial court’s application of Health and Safety Code section 5472, which limited refunds to those who paid under protest. The appellate court found no error in the trial court’s decisions and affirmed the judgment in its entirety. View "Rogers v. City of Redlands" on Justia Law

In 2020, allegations emerged that certain officers in the Vallejo Police Department were bending the points of their badges after using potentially lethal force. The department hired an independent investigator to look into these claims but did not release the investigation's findings. The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California (ACLU) requested records related to the investigation under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). The department released some records but withheld the investigative report, claiming it was a confidential personnel record.The ACLU filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Solano County Superior Court, challenging the department's response. The court ordered the disclosure of parts of the investigative report and related materials, with redactions to protect the identities of officers, witnesses, and their families. Both parties sought writ review of this decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the documents sought by the ACLU were not confidential personnel records but were subject to public disclosure under section 832.7, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code. This section pertains to records relating to the report, investigation, or findings of incidents involving the discharge of a firearm by a peace officer. The court also found that the redaction of officer names could not be sustained on the grounds relied upon by the superior court. However, due to the extensive volume of potentially disclosable materials and minimal briefing on redaction issues, the court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding redactions. View "City of Vallejo v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Sacramento Television Stations Inc. (Sac TV) sought additional audio and video recordings from the City of Roseville (City) under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) related to an incident on April 6, 2023, where Roseville Police Department (Roseville PD) officers discharged firearms at a suspect, Eric J. Abril. The City provided limited footage, arguing that further disclosure would interfere with an active investigation. Sac TV filed a petition for writ of mandate to compel the City to release more recordings.The Superior Court of Placer County denied Sac TV's petition, finding that the City had shown by clear and convincing evidence that further disclosure would substantially interfere with an active investigation, specifically Abril's ongoing criminal case. The court acknowledged that more footage was required under CPRA but did not determine the extent due to the active investigation exemption.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the Superior Court's finding of an active investigation was not supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that a pending criminal prosecution alone does not constitute an active investigation under CPRA. The court also found that the City’s interpretation of the required disclosure was too narrow and that more context was needed to understand the incident involving the discharge of a firearm.The Court of Appeal vacated the Superior Court's ruling and directed it to hold further proceedings, including an in camera review of the City’s recordings, to determine the extent of additional disclosure required. The court emphasized the importance of providing sufficient context to fully understand the events captured in the recordings. The petition for rehearing was denied, and the judgment remained unchanged. View "Sacramento Television Stations Inc. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Rhonna Tindall slipped on a layer of ice in a parking lot owned by the County of Nevada and injured her knee. She sued the County, alleging that the icy parking lot was a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code sections 830 and 835. The County moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under section 831, which provides that a public entity is not liable for injuries caused by weather conditions affecting the use of streets and highways.The trial court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the parking lot was a “street” or “highway” within the meaning of section 831, and that the County was entitled to “weather immunity.” The court also found that a reasonably careful person would have anticipated the potential existence of slippery ice in the parking lot. Tindall appealed, arguing that section 831 immunity does not apply to parking lots, that the dangerous condition resulted from a combination of weather and other factors, and that the County did not meet its burden to show that a reasonably careful person would have anticipated the ice.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the parking lot is a “street” within the meaning of section 831, largely based on the Vehicle Code’s definition of “street” as a publicly maintained place open to the public for vehicular travel. The court found Tindall’s arguments unpersuasive and determined that the County was not liable for her injury caused by the weather condition. The court also held that Tindall’s arguments regarding the combination of weather with other factors and the reasonably careful person standard were forfeited on appeal. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Tindall v. County of Nevada" on Justia Law

A student, E.I., attended El Segundo Middle School during the 2017-2018 school year and experienced bullying from classmates, particularly Skylar. Despite E.I. and her parents repeatedly reporting the bullying to school officials, including the principal and counselor, the school failed to take effective action. The bullying included verbal harassment, social media abuse, and physical aggression, which led E.I. to self-harm and develop PTSD and depression. The school’s anti-bullying policies were not adequately followed by the staff.The case was initially reviewed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, where a jury found the El Segundo Unified School District negligent and awarded E.I. $1 million in damages. The District moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, both of which were denied by the court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The District argued several points on appeal, including errors in allowing reliance on certain Education Code provisions, claims of immunity under Government Code section 820.2, insufficient evidence of causation, improper consideration of a negligent training and supervision theory, admission of expert testimony, and attorney misconduct during closing arguments. The appellate court found that many of the District’s arguments were either waived or lacked merit. The court held that the District was not immune from liability under Government Code section 820.2, as the actions in question were operational rather than policy decisions. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s causation finding and determined that any potential errors were not prejudicial. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of E.I. View "E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

A charter city in California entered into an agreement with a private developer to revitalize a nearly vacant mall into a multipurpose development. The city contributed approximately $51.36 million in local funds for public improvements, while the developer invested $143 million of its own funds and obtained additional loans. The developer selected the contractors and paid workers less than the prevailing wage, relying on a city ordinance exempting the project from the Prevailing Wage Law (PWL).The Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) determined that the project was subject to the PWL, as it involved public funds. The developer challenged this determination, but the Superior Court of Riverside County affirmed the DIR's decision, concluding that the project was not a municipal affair exempt from the PWL.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the project was not a municipal affair under the home rule provision of the California Constitution. The court distinguished this case from others where charter cities directly managed and funded public works projects. Here, the developer controlled the construction, selected contractors, and bore the majority of the financial burden. The court concluded that the primary purpose of the project was to benefit the developer, not the city, and thus, the PWL applied. The judgment was affirmed, and the DIR was awarded costs on appeal. View "Palm Springs Promenade, LLC v. Dept. of Industrial Relations" on Justia Law