Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The question of first impression presented by these consolidated appeals was whether housing authorities that assume the housing functions of their former redevelopment agencies, when a city or county purportedly elect not to, were eligible for the housing entity administrative cost allowance the city or county was not eligible to receive. The parties conceded that the entities involved in these appeals were a reporting entity of the city or county, a component of the city or county, or are controlled by the city or county. In City of Montclair et al. v. Michael Cohen, Director of the Department of Finance, et al. (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, 2014, No. 34-2014-80001948-CU-WM-GDS) (City of Montclair), the trial court found the housing authority was eligible for the allowance; but in Successor Agency to the Redevelopment Agency of the City of Santa Rosa et al. v. Michael Cohen, Director of the Department of Finance, et al. (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, 2015, No. 34-2015- 80002051-CU-WM-GDS) (City of Santa Rosa), the trial court found the statutory scheme rendered the housing authorities ineligible for the allowance. In construing the statutes de novo, the Court of Appeal concluded the cities and county did not transfer the housing assets and functions to housing authorities unrelated to the cities and counties, and therefore, the Legislature determined that these housing successors were not entitled to the housing allowance in the same way that the cities and counties, of which they are a part, were ineligible for the allowance. The Court therefore reversed the judgment in City of Montclair, granting the housing authority’s petition for a writ of mandate, and affirmed the judgment in City of Santa Rosa, denying four housing authorities’ petition for a writ of mandate. View "City of Montclair v. Cohen" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Board adopted proposed modifications to the Truck and Bus Regulation, extending certain deadlines for small fleet operators to comply with the regulations. Respondents filed a writ petition against the Board and others, alleging that the 2014 modifications were improper under both the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and California's Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Court of Appeal held that the trial court correctly determined that the Board's actions violated CEQA, but that the violations were narrower than found by the trial court. The court also found that the Board's conduct violated the APA, voiding the modified regulations. View "John R. Lawson Rock & Oil, Inc. v. State Air Resources Bd." on Justia Law

In a challenge to an update of the City's general plan, which included an update to areas designated "Neighborhood Commercial," plaintiff claimed that the City violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by failing to analyze the potential for the land use policy to cause a phenomenon called urban decay. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment denying plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandate, holding that plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence from which a fair argument could be made that there was a reasonable possibility physical urban decay would result from the general plan; the general plan was not intentionally inconsistent; and the City did not violate the planning and zoning law by failing to provide 10 days notice of the October 14 meeting. View "Visalia Retail, LP v. City of Visalia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against Uber for providing unlicensed transportation services that appropriated passengers and income from licensed taxicab drivers. Plaintiffs alleged Uber failed to comply with the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) licensing requirements for charter-party carriers. Uber argued the court lacked jurisdiction under Public Utilities Code section 1759 due to ongoing rulemaking by the CPUC. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the amended complaint, stating that the CPUC has authority to adopt regulatory policies concerning transportation companies and has exercised that authority. A finding of liability against Uber in this action would hinder or interfere with the CPUC’s exercise of its regulatory authority by requiring the trial court to make factual findings regarding whether Uber falls within the charter-party carrier definition and, if so, which regulations would apply to its operations. View "Goncharov v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against Uber for providing unlicensed transportation services that appropriated passengers and income from licensed taxicab drivers. Plaintiffs alleged Uber failed to comply with the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) licensing requirements for charter-party carriers. Uber argued the court lacked jurisdiction under Public Utilities Code section 1759 due to ongoing rulemaking by the CPUC. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the amended complaint, stating that the CPUC has authority to adopt regulatory policies concerning transportation companies and has exercised that authority. A finding of liability against Uber in this action would hinder or interfere with the CPUC’s exercise of its regulatory authority by requiring the trial court to make factual findings regarding whether Uber falls within the charter-party carrier definition and, if so, which regulations would apply to its operations. View "Goncharov v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Machavia filed suit against the County for a refund of property taxes on two aircraft. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendants, holding that Machavia had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing suit. The court rejected Machavia's contention that it did exhaust its administrative remedies by filing appeals with the Assessment Appeals Board; no exception to the exhaustion requirement applied in Machavia's case; and Machavia failed to show that equitable estoppel should bar the County from asserting Machavia's failure to exhaust administrative remedies as a defense. View "Machavia, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Under California’s workers’ compensation law, effective in 2013, an injured worker may challenge a decision denying medical treatment by requesting a determination of medical necessity from an independent medical review (IMR) organization. (Labor Code 139.5, 4610.5.1) The IMR organization, which is regulated by the Division of Workers’ Compensation and operates under contract with the Division, designates one or more medical professionals to review pertinent medical records, determine whether the disputed treatment is medically necessary, and prepare a written report including statutorily-required findings. The IMR organization is required to describe the qualifications of the medical professionals who prepare the determination of medical necessity and to keep the names of the reviewers confidential in all communications outside the IMR organization. The determination of the IMR organization is deemed to be the determination of the administrative director and is binding on all parties, subject to appeal on narrow statutory grounds. Zuniga availed himself of the IMR process and then petitioned the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board to disclose the names of the reviewers. The Board declined to do so. The court of appeal upheld that decision. IMR determinations are not testimonial in character; IMR reviewers are not workers’ adversaries and are not subject to cross-examination. View "Zuniga v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Lippman owns Oakland rental property. The Building Services Department cited Lippman for blight and substandard living conditions. He sought administrative review. A hearing officer found that Lippman was in violation of ordinances for each citation; that testimony supported a finding that the property was blighted and abatement did not occur until after fees were assessed; and that testimony supported a finding that the substandard living conditions inside the property had not been abated. Lippman’s appeals were denied. Lippman claimed that his appeals should have been heard before the city council or an appeals board instead of a single hearing examiner. The trial court found that state law did not prohibit the use of a single hearing examiner and granted relief as to the blight citations. The city noticed a new administrative hearing. As to the substandard living conditions citation, the writ was denied. Lippman appealed, seeking to compel the city to hear administrative appeals before the city council or an appeals board pursuant to the Building Code. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the city’s current administrative appeal process for deciding appeals from Building Services citations conflicts with the Building Code and is contrary to the plain language of the State Housing Law. View "Lippman v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

Land Partners, LLC, and Los Alisos Ranch Company (collectively, Land Partners) appealed a postjudgment order denying their motion for attorney fees brought pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 5152. Although the court had found the County of Orange Assessor (Assessor) used a constitutionally invalid methodology in valuing Land Partners’ property for property tax purposes, the court determined there was no evidence the Assessor’s actions were due to his subjective belief that a certain constitutional provision, statute, rule or regulation was invalid or unconstitutional. Because the court concluded proof of the latter was a statutory prerequisite to recovery of fees under the statute, it held Land Partners was not entitled to attorney fees. Land Partners argued on appeal the court erred in interpreting section 5152. It argued proof of the Assessor’s subjective mindset was not required; instead showing a violation of well-established and unambiguous law was sufficient for recovery of attorney fees. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Land Partners’ premise and affirmed the order. View "Land Partners, LLC v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

School Boards sued, alleging that Government Code 17557(d)(2)(B)) and Education Code 42238.24 and 56523(f) “implemented . . . broad changes in mandate law that were intended to eliminate or reduce the State’s mandate reimbursement obligations” and shifted the cost of the Behavioral Intervention Plans Mandate ($65 million annually) and the Graduation Requirements mandate ($250 million annually), to districts and county offices of education. Plaintiffs claimed violation of California Constitution article XIII B, section 6 or article III, section 3; that Government Code 17557(d)(2)(B) “impermissibly burdens the constitutional right to reimbursement guaranteed by article XIII B, section 6 and is invalid to the extent it allows the State to reduce or eliminate mandate claims by claiming ‘offsetting revenues’ that do not represent new or additional funding . . . as reflected in the Legislature’s directives in Education Code sections [42238.24] and 56523.” The court of appeal affirmed the rejection of the claims, in part. Government Code 17557(d)(2)(B), as applied in Education Code 42238.24 and 56523(f), does not violate the state’s constitutional obligation to reimburse local governments for the costs of mandated programs and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. It is constitutional for the legislature to designate funding it already provides as offsetting revenue when reimbursing them for new state-mandated programs where the legislation operates prospectively only. View "California School Boards Association v. State of California" on Justia Law