Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
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Plaintiff-Appellant Creed-21 appealed the dismissal of its petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief under the California Environmental Quality Act (Petition). The trial court imposed an issue sanction on standing, which terminated the action, for the misuse of the discovery process in response to a motion for sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 filed by real party in interest and respondent Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (Wal-Mart). The project being challenged was a 185,682 square foot Walmart retail complex (the Project) located in the City of Wildomar. On March 11, 2015, the City’s council approved the Project. Creed-21 alleged that the Project violated CEQA and other laws. Creed-21 alleged against the Wal-Mart and the City (collectively, the Wildomar Defendants) that they failed to prepare an adequate environmental impact report and they violated the planning and zoning law within the meaning of Government Code section 65860. Creed-21 sought to stop the Wildomar Defendants from taking any action on the Project until they complied with CEQA and the planning and zoning laws. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the terminating sanction. View "Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Mahmoud Alzayat, on behalf of the People of the State of California, filed a qui tam action against his employer, Sunline Transit Agency, and his supervisor, Gerald Hebb, alleging a violation of the Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA or the Act). (Ins. Code, sec. 1871 et seq.) Alzayat alleged Hebb made false statements in an incident report submitted in response to Alzayat’s claim for workers’ compensation, and Hebb repeated those false statements in a deposition taken during the investigation into Alzayat’s claim for compensation. Hebb’s false statements resulted in Alzayat’s claim being initially denied. Defendants filed motions for judgment on the pleadings contending: (1) this lawsuit was based on allegedly false and fraudulent statements Hebb made in connection with a workers’ compensation proceeding and was, therefore, barred by the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b); and (2) Alzayat’s claim was barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. The superior court concluded the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule was inapplicable, but ruled the litigation privilege barred Alzayat’s claim. Alzayat appealed, contending the litigation privilege only applied to tort claims and not to statutory claims such as an action under the IFPA, and the IFPA was a specific statute that prevailed over the general litigation privilege. The Court of Appeal agreed with Alzayat that his lawsuit was not barred by the litigation privilege. Furthermore, the Court concluded this lawsuit was not barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. The trial court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings for defendants, so we reverse the judgment. View "California ex rel. Alzayat v. Hebb" on Justia Law

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In Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates, 1 Cal.5th 749 (2016) ("Department of Finance"), the California Supreme Court upheld a Commission ruling that certain conditions a regional water quality control board imposed on a storm water discharge permit issued under federal and state law required subvention and were not federal mandates. The Supreme Court found no federal law, regulation, or administrative case authority expressly required the conditions; the federal requirement that the permit reduce pollution impacts to the “maximum extent practicable” was not a federal mandate, but rather vested the regional board with discretion to choose which conditions to impose to meet the standard. The permit conditions resulting from the exercise of that choice were state mandates. In this appeal, the Court of Appeal faced the same issue: the parties and the permit conditions were different, but the legal issue was the same - whether the Commission correctly determined that conditions imposed on a federal and state storm water permit by a regional water quality control board are state mandates. The Commission reached its decision by applying the standard the Supreme Court later adopted in "Department of Finance." The trial court, reviewing the case before "Department of Finance" was issued, concluded the Commission had applied the wrong standard, and it remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings. The Court of Appeal concluded here the Commission applied the correct standard and the permit requirements were state mandates. View "Dept. of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates" on Justia Law

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The California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) appealed a decision granting the Yuba City Unified School District’s (District) petition for writ of mandate and setting aside CalSTRS’s decision to collect overpayments mistakenly made to some of the District’s retirees. The superior court held that the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Education Code section 22008(c) barred collection of the overpayments because a 2005 letter CalSTRS sent one of the retirees demonstrated actual notice of the payment issues. The Court of Appeal disagreed: the letter did not reflect actual notice of the specific payment issues raised in this proceeding. The Court concluded inquiry notice would have been sufficient to start the limitation period contained in section 22008(c). Whether CalSTRS had inquiry notice in this case is a question of fact that was not addressed at the administrative level or by the superior court. As such, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Yuba City Unified School Dist. v. Cal. State Teachers' Ret. System CA/3" on Justia Law

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A CVS clerk sold a can of beer to a minor decoy working for the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (the Department). The sole issue before the Court of Appeal in this matter was whether the minor made a face-to-face identification of the seller as required by California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 141 (hereafter Rule 141), subdivision (b)(5). The Department suspended Garfield Beach CVS, LLC and Longs Drug Stores California, LLC doing business as CVS Pharmacy Store 9376 (CVS)’s liquor license for 10 days, but CVS appealed and the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (the Appeals Board) reversed, finding that an in-store identification of the clerk to the peace officer from about 10 feet away did not constitute a face-to-face identification. The Court of Appeal disagreed and annulled the Appeals Board's decision. View "Dept. of Alcoholic Bev. Control v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals" on Justia Law

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Appellants-defendants San Diego County Office of Education (Office) and Randolph Ward appealed a judgment in favor of plaintiff-respondent Rodger Hartnett that reinstated his employment and awarded him $306,954.99 in back pay, benefits, and prejudgment interest. Defendants contended: (1) collateral estoppel precluded the trial court from granting Hartnett's requested relief; (2) the court misinterpreted Education Code section 45306 in its decision; and (3) the court improperly determined the amount of Hartnett's back pay without remanding that issue to the Office's personnel commission (the commission), for the commission to make factual findings on the issue. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court's sole ground for granting Hartnett's petition, that the commission did not proceed in a manner required by law because it did not conduct an investigation, was not supported by section 45306. Office and Ward were entitled to judgment in their favor. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter judgment in defendants’ favor. View "Hartnett v. San Diego County Office of Education" on Justia Law

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Teachers retired from the Salinas Unified High School District disputed attempts by the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) to recoup retirement benefit overpayments caused by the District's years-long miscalculation, arguing that the statute of limitations barred recoupment of prior overpayments and reduction of future monthly benefits. An ALJ upheld CalSTRS’s conclusions, rejecting the statute of limitations defense. Teachers obtained a peremptory writ of administrative mandamus compelling CalSTRS to resume payments at the original amounts. The court of appeal reversed. Education Code section 22008(c) provides a three-year statute of limitations applicable for CalSTRS to bring an action to recoup the overpayments, commencing with its “discovery of the incorrect payment.” Discovery means the date CalSTRS actually discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the incorrect payment. August 18, 2005 was the date on which CalSTRS had inquiry notice of the overpayment issue; the action was commenced on July 6, 2012. Under the continuous accrual theory, the statute of limitations for periodic payments commenced with the due date of each payment. Only payments due more than three years prior to CalSTRS’s commencement of the action on July 6, 2012, were subject to the statute of limitations defense. View "Baxter v. California State Teachers' Retirement System" on Justia Law

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In 2013, the juvenile court declared defendant-appellant, R.G. (Minor, born in April 2000), a dependent of the court. In 2016, while Minor remained a dependent of the juvenile court, the State filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging Minor had committed misdemeanor battery. After denying Minor’s request to refer the matter for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.12 assessment and report, Minor admitted the allegation that she had committed misdemeanor battery. The court declared Minor a ward of the court, placed her on formal probation, placed her in the custody of Children and Family Services (CFS), and scheduled the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 241.1. After subsequently receiving a section 241.1 report, the court again declared Minor a ward of the court with “CFS lead jurisdiction.” On appeal, Minor contended the juvenile court prejudicially erred by refusing to refer the matter for a section 241.1 assessment, report, and hearing prior to taking jurisdiction, resulting in violations of Minor’s statutory and due process rights. Moreover, Minor argued the subsequent section 241.1 report and hearing were statutorily inadequate. CFS countered Minor forfeited any contention the section 241.1 report was untimely or inadequate and that any error was harmless. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the court erred by refusing to refer the matter for a section 241.1 report prior to making a determination of Minor’s status and holding the jurisdictional hearing. Furthermore, the subsequent section 241.1 report was inadequate to overcome the court’s initial error, and this error was not harmless. View "In re R.G." on Justia Law

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Cal Fire’s investigation of the 2007 Moonlight Fire determined that the fire started on property owned by landowner defendants and managed by Beaty. Sierra Pacific purchased the standing timber on the property, and contracted with Howell, a licensed timber operator, to cut the timber. On the day the Moonlight Fire began, two of Howell’s employees, Bush and Crismon, were working on the property installing water bars. Cal Fire’s investigators concluded the fire began when the bulldozer Crismon was operating struck a rock or rocks, causing superheated metal fragments from the bulldozer’s track to splinter off and eventually to ignite surrounding plant matter, and that the fire was permitted to spread when Bush and Crismon failed to timely complete a required inspection of the area where they had been working that day. On the eve of trial in July 2013, consolidated actions were dismissed following a hearing after the trial court concluded Cal Fire could not as a matter of law state a claim against Sierra Pacific, Beaty, or landowner defendants, and that no plaintiff had presented a prima facie case against any defendant. After judgment was entered, the trial court awarded defendants costs without apportionment amongst plaintiffs. It also ordered Cal Fire to pay to defendants attorney fees and expert fees totaling more than $28 million because defendants as prevailing parties were entitled to recover attorney fees on either a contractual basis or as private attorneys general, or alternatively as discovery sanctions. The trial court additionally imposed terminating sanctions against Cal Fire. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging both the judgment of dismissal (case No. C074879) and the postjudgment awards (case No. C076008). Plaintiffs also requested that any hearings on remand be conducted by a different judge. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s order dismissing the case as to all plaintiffs based on their failure to present a prima facie case at a pretrial hearing should have been reversed because the hearing was fundamentally unfair: Plaintiffs were not provided adequate notice of the issues on which they would be asked to present their prima facie case. However, the Court concluded the trial court did properly award judgment on the pleadings against Cal Fire. In light of these conclusions, in the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court found the trial court’s award of costs to defendants as prevailing parties as to any plaintiff but Cal Fire was vacated, and because the trial court did not apportion costs, the costs award was remanded to determine which costs Sierra Pacific, Beaty, and landowner defendants could recover from Cal Fire. Furthermore, the Court determined the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to the prevailing parties, and that the award of monetary discovery sanctions should have been reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The imposition of terminating sanctions against Cal Fire was affirmed. Plaintiffs' requests for a new judge was rejected. View "Dept. of Forestry and Fire Protection v. Howell" on Justia Law

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Monterey County Water Resources Agency (MCWRA) is a flood control and water agency. Coastkeeper sued, alleging that MCWRA had violated the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (Wat. Code 13000) by failing to report to the regional water quality board its discharges of agricultural pollutants into the Reclamation Ditch and the Blanco Drain and breach of fiduciary duty under the public trust doctrine. The trial court granted the petition as to the claim of failure to report waste discharge and denied it as to breach of fiduciary duty, commanding MCWRA “to prepare and file a report of waste discharge ... with the Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board.” The court of appeal reversed, finding that Coastkeeper failed to exhaust its administrative remedy under the Act, which provides that any person aggrieved by a regional water board’s action or failure to act is entitled to administrative review by the State Water Board, and then by petition for administrative mandamus in the superior court. The regional board was apparently investigating MCWRA's actions; Coastkeeper failed to file a petition for review with the State Water Board of the regional board’s action or failure to act with regard to MCWRA’s alleged waste discharges. View "Monterey Coastkeeper v. Monterey County Water Resources Agency" on Justia Law