Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this second appeal, challenging the environmental impact report (EIR) and related project approvals for two natural resource plans for the proposed Newhall Ranch development, the Court of Appeal affirmed the post-remand judgment and accompanying writ. The court held that both actions were legally permissible under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), and rejected plaintiffs' claim that Public Resources Code section 21168.9 prohibits partial decertification of an EIR, and that the same section prohibits leaving project approvals in place while decertifying an EIR. The court held that a trial court has authority to partially decertify an EIR; a trial court has the power to leave some project approvals in place after partial decertification of an EIR; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the limited writ; and the writ provided an adequate remedy for a Fish and Game Code section 5515 violation. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. California Department of Fish and Wildlife" on Justia Law

Appellant Dr. Robert Fettgather appealed a trial court order denying his petition for writ of administrative mandamus. His petition challenged the revocation of his license to practice psychology by Respondent California Board of Psychology. The trial court denied Fettgather’s petition on the ground that the only relevant inquiry before the Board was whether Fettgather failed to comply with an order for an examination under Business and Professions Code section 820. The trial court also found that “[t]he evidence in the record unquestionably establishes that petitioner failed to submit to the examination that had been ordered in this case.” Fettgather argued he should have been permitted to challenge the merits of the section 820 order before he was required to comply with it. He also argued that revocation of his license pursuant to section 821 for his failure to undergo a section 820 examination was unlawful. After review, the Court of Appeal held the Board was not required to show good cause for a section 820 order nor was a licensee entitled to challenge the basis for the order before submitting to the required examination. "It follows that the question of good cause supporting such an order is not relevant to a revocation of Fettgather’s license for noncompliance with the section 820 order. This strikes the appropriate balance between the public and private interests." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Fettgather v. Board of Psychology" on Justia Law

H.C. a nonminor dependent of the juvenile court, appealed an order terminating her dependency case, contending the court erred by determining that H.C.'s marriage rendered her ineligible for nonminor dependency jurisdiction. H.C. contended the court erred by terminating her nonminor dependency case based on her marriage. The Court of Appeal found neither of the applicable statutes, state or federal, mentioned marriage. Rather, the statutes covered only a nonminor dependent's age, his or her relationship to the Agency, and his or her transitional living plan. A nonminor dependent's marriage does not necessarily affect any of those eligibility criteria. View "In re H.C." on Justia Law

The Elem Indian Colony Pomo Tribe’s “Brown faction” sued the Tribe’s “Garcia Council” over allegedly defamatory statements published in a notification that warned they would be disenrolled if the Tribe’s General Council found them guilty of specified crimes. The trial court ruled the lawsuit was barred by sovereign immunity and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court misapplied the law when it considered whether defendants issued the alleged defamatory statements in the scope of their official capacities and whether allowing the case to proceed in state court would interfere with tribal administration because they sued defendants in their individual, not tribal, capacities. Substantial evidence established that defendants were tribal officials at the time of the alleged defamation and that they were acting within the scope of their tribal authority when they determined that, for the reasons stated in the allegedly defamatory Order of Disenrollment, plaintiffs should be disenrolled from the Tribe pursuant to a validly enacted tribal ordinance. A tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community. View "Brown v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit asserting its right to an administrative hearing to determine whether its chemicals constitute hazardous waste. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the divisions' anti-SLAPP motion to strike the petition and complaint. The court held that the division made a prima facie showing that plaintiff's cause of action arose from an act in furtherance of its right of free speech in connection with a public issue. In this case, plaintiff claimed that the division's decision and notice that Petromax was hazardous waste, by themselves, were causing plaintiff harm even without an enforcement action. The court also held that plaintiff failed to carry its burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on its claim. View "Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. County of Ventura Environmental Health Division" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's second amended complaint (SAC) against the school district, holding that plaintiff's grievance, filed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, did not satisfy the claim filing requirements of the Government Claims Act. In this case, it was undisputed that plaintiff never filed a claim with the school district on a government claim form. The court held that the trial court properly sustained the school district's demurrer to the SAC on the basis that plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of the Government Claims Act and plaintiff's noncompliance was not excused based on substantial compliance, the instant matter involving a "claim as presented," and futility. View "Olson v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District" on Justia Law

If a municipality imposes a sales tax, the State Board of Equalization (BOE) has the statutory authority to collect and then remit the tax back to the municipality, to determine where sales of personal property occur, and to designate the municipality that will receive any local sales tax that is being collected. Following an internal reorganization of an existing seller, the BOE decided that local sales tax which had been remitted to Fontana and Lathrop would be “reallocated” to Ontario. The trial court set aside the decision. The court of appeal reversed. There is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the BOE decision; the manner in which the BOE determined where the taxable event occurred was well within its administrative expertise and its discretionary authority to make such a determination. View "City of Fontana v. California Department of Tax and Fee Administration" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the City violated certain ordinances and selectively applied others in issuing the permit for a fence separating two neighbors while denying plaintiffs' permit for a deck they had built. The City filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute), because plaintiffs' complaint targeted "protected speech" where the City's decisions followed official government proceedings. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the special motion, holding that section 425.16 does not protect a governmental entity's decisions to issue or deny permits. The court agreed with the trial court that granting a special motion to strike in these circumstances would chill citizens' attempts to challenge government action. View "Shahbazian v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes" on Justia Law

In a case arising out of the “Great Dissolution” of redevelopment agencies (RDAs) in California the City of Grass Valley (City) appealed a judgment denying in part its petition for writ of mandate. The City, which was also the successor agency for its former RDA, sought to compel the Department of Finance (Department) to recognize the enforceability of certain agreements involving that RDA. The Department cross-appealed a part of the judgment commanding it to consider whether certain expenditures fell under a “goods and services” provision, claiming the City’s failure to raise this issue in an administrative forum precludes the relief granted by the trial court. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Department on that point and reversed with directions to recall the writ granting the City partial relief. However, based on the retrospective application of postjudgment legislation, the Court directed the trial court to issue a new writ commanding the Department to consider the City’s claim regarding a highway project agreement. The Court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "City of Grass Valley v. Cohen" on Justia Law

After the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) certified an environmental impact report (EIR) for its 2050 Regional Transportation Plan/Sustainable Communities Strategy (transportation plan), CREED-21 and Affordable Housing Coalition of San Diego filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the EIR's adequacy under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Cleveland National Forest Foundation and the Center for Biological Diversity filed a similar petition, in which Sierra Club and the State later joined. The superior court granted the petitions in part, finding the EIR failed to carry out its role as an informational document because it did not analyze the inconsistency between the state's policy goals reflected in Executive Order S-3-05 (Executive Order) and the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts after 2020. The court also found the EIR failed to adequately address mitigation measures for the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts. The California Supreme Court granted review on the sole issue of whether the EIR should have analyzed the transportation plan's impacts against the greenhouse gas emission reduction goals in the Executive Order and reversed the Court of Appeal "insofar as it determined that the [EIR's] analysis of greenhouse gas emission impacts rendered the EIR inadequate and required revision." Cleveland and the State requested the Court of Appeal keep the remainder of its decision substantially intact and publish it as revised. SANDAG asserted the case was moot because the EIR and the transportation plan have been superseded by more recent versions, which Cleveland and the State did not challenge. The Court of Appeal agreed with Cleveland and the State that SANDAG did not establish this case was moot. The Court exercised its discretion and reversed to the extent the superior court determined the EIR failed to adequately analyze the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts. The judgment was affirmed to the extent the superior court determined the EIR failed to adequately address the mitigation measures for the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts. The judgment was modified to incorporate this court's decision on the cross-appeals. The matter was remanded to the superior court with directions to enter a modified judgment and order the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate conforming to the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland II and to this court's decision on remand. View "Cleveland Nat. Forest Foundation v. San Diego Assn. etc." on Justia Law