Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Litigation
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Madeline Nelson and 25 other individuals formerly employed as nontenured teachers or probationary classified employees in the Mobile County Public School System appealed the dismissal of their action against the members of the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County -- Ken Megginson, Judy P. Stout, Reginald A. Crenshaw, Levon C. Manzie, and William Foster -- and against the superintendent of the school system, Martha Peek. In 2009, the plaintiffs filed an action against the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County which was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice three years later in light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County v. Weaver," (99 So. 3d 1210 (Ala. 2012)). In 2012, the plaintiffs refiled their action , alleging that their employment was terminated "pursuant to a reduction-in-force implemented by Defendants in response to alleged financial constraints." The plaintiffs further alleged that the failure to rehire them by the conclusion of the following school year was a violation of a written policy of the school system. The circuit court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint: "[t]his action was brought more than three (3) years from the date of accrual. All of the Plaintiffs' claims for mandamus, declaratory or injunctive relief would be barred by the two (2) year statute of limitations set out in 6-2-38(l). Finally, any of the Plaintiffs' claims for backpay or other monetary relief would be barred by the same two (2) [year] statute of limitations under 6-2-38(m)." On appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiffs primarily contended that the circuit court erred in concluding that their claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations because they stated a breach-of-contract claim, which had a six-year statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs stated a claim of breach of contract and that therefore their claim was subject to a six-year, rather than a two-year, statute of limitations. Accordingly, the circuit court's dismissal was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Nelson v. Megginson" on Justia Law

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This appeal was the second appeal in a dispute between Taxpayer-appellant J. Clark Bundren, M.D. and appellees City of Tulsa and Tulsa Hills, LLC. The two issues in that case were: (1) whether Taxpayer should have been allowed to intervene in a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the legality of certain public expenditures and financing; and (2) whether the appeal was moot because the appellees, Tulsa Industrial Authority, City of Tulsa Oklahoma, and Tulsa Hills, L.L.C. (TIA, City, and TH, respectively), obtained a declaratory judgment after Taxpayer was prohibited by the trial court from intervening. The Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal for mootness and held that Taxpayer's claim for equitable relief presented by a motion to intervene was not made moot by the judgment rendered during the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order that denied Taxpayer's motion to intervene as a qui tam plaintiff, but reversed the trial court's order denying a motion to intervene in which Taxpayer sought equitable relief. The case what then remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court ordered Taxpayer to file his "Petition in Intervention" on or before August 16, 2012. On August 15, 2012, Taxpayer complied with the order by filing the petition. On September 14, 2012, the appellees each filed separate motions to dismiss, and asserted that the bondholders were necessary parties. Several months later, the trial court granted the motions to dismiss and allowed Taxpayer twenty days to file an amended petition. The court included the requirement that if Taxpayer filed an amended petition seeking to enjoin the City from making payments to the bondholders who purchased the bonds used to finance the underlying transaction, then the Taxpayer must provide notice of the amended petition to the bondholders and file proof of such notice with the court. Taxpayer filed an amended petition, and the appellees responded with separate motions to dismiss. The trial court again dismissed Taxpayer's petition on the basis that Taxpayer did not provide notice to bondholders as necessary parties to the lawsuit, and that Taxpayer did not state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court found that the bondholders were necessary parties to the action and if not joined, the present parties to the action would face a substantial risk of incurring multiple and potentially inconsistent obligations. The court again dismissed without prejudice the causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief for failure to comply with the court's prior order and for failure to join all parties necessary "to a just adjudication of this matter." The court allowed Taxpayer twenty days to file an amended petition, and ordered that if Taxpayer did not amend the petition within that time, the action would be dismissed with prejudice to all the claims. Instead of amending the petition, Taxpayer filed an Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Mandamus to the Supreme Court. The trial court entered a final order of dismissal. The dispositive issue of this matter was whether Taxpayer had to include bondholders as necessary parties to this case. The Supreme Court concluded he did, and affirmed the trial court. View "Tulsa Industrial Authority v. City of Tulsa" on Justia Law

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In this case, a jury determined that two New Jersey public entities, South Jersey Transportation Authority and the New Jersey State Police, were liable for injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of a multi-vehicle pile-up on the Atlantic City Expressway during a 2005 heavy snowstorm. Plaintiff alleged that the public entities were negligent in failing to adhere to standard operating procedures with respect to competing 9-1-1 calls for motorist assistance. The jury found no negligence on the part of plaintiff or the owners or drivers of the other vehicles involved in the several collisions. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the liability verdict against the public-entity defendants based on errors in the jury instructions with respect to the liability of the public entities for discretionary versus ministerial acts. The Appellate Division determined the trial court erred in failing to allow the jury to determine predicate facts that resolved whether ministerial or discretionary acts were involved. The Appellate Division remanded the matter for retrial only with respect to the liability of the public-entity defendants. The public-entity defendants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that, at the retrial, the second jury should decide anew the liability of all parties. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. View "Henebema v. South Jersey Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

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San Diego County approved a "Remedial Action Plan" (RAP) for a remediation project at the former Otay Skeet and Trap Shooting Range (Project) in Chula Vista, and adopted a "Final Mitigated Negative Declaration" (MND). The Project involved "investigation and remediation of surface and subsurface areas impacted from historic shooting range activities" and included "remediation of soil impacted by lead and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), removal of 'White Material['], as well as the removal of target debris and wood debris from the site." The Otay Ranch, Sky Communities, and Sky Vista (collectively, Otay Ranch parties) were the former owners of the shooting range. They filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging the County: (1) did not comply with the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when it approved and adopted the MND and RAP without preparing an environmental impact report; and (2) did not comply with Health and Safety Code in approving the RAP. The Otay Ranch parties also sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Real party in interest, Flat Rock Land Company, LLC was the current owner of the shooting range property and project applicant, which undertook voluntary remediation of the site before future development. The central issue in this appeal was whether, after a voluntary dismissal of a petition for writ of mandate, the trial court erred by allowing the County to recover actual labor costs incurred for an attorney and paralegals to prepare an administrative record. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order and judgment. Preliminarily, however, the Court dismissed the appeals of The Otay Ranch (a cancelled limited partnership), and Sky Communities, Inc. (a suspended corporation), for lack of capacity. The Court of Appeal denied the motion to dismissed the appeal of the remaining appellant, Sky Vista, Inc. (Sky Vista), which was an active corporation. View "Otay Ranch, L.P. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

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Sara Crossfield appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Limestone County Commission in her action to reverse the Commission's decision to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road in Limestone County. In early 2013, the Commission proposed to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road. Crossfield's property did not abut the portion of Dogwood Flats Road proposed to be vacated; it abutted Dogwood Flats Road approximately 400 feet north of the portion of the road that the Commission proposed to vacate. At a hearing on the matter, Crossfield alleged that she was a "party affected by the vacation of a portion of Dogwood Flat[s] Road" and asked the trial court to set aside the vacation of the road. Crossfield alleged, among other things, that the Commission had obstructed her access to Piney Creek, east and south of Crossfield's property. The Commission moved to dismiss, arguing Crossfield was not affected by the vacation and therefore lacked standing to appeal the Commission's decision regarding Dogwood Flats. The trial court granted the Commission's motion for a summary judgment and dismissed Crossfield's appeal. Crossfield's evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to her as the nonmovant, did not create a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude a summary judgment for the Commission. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Commission. View "Crossfield v. Limestone County Commission " on Justia Law

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Slepicka, a resident of a Cook County skilled nursing facility, received a notice of involuntary transfer or discharge. A Department of Public Health ALJ held a hearing at the facility. The Department approved the involuntary discharge of Slepicka unless the amount owed was paid in full. The order was mailed from a Sangamon County post office. Slepicka sought judicial review in Sangamon County. The facility moved to dismiss or transfer, arguing that Cook County was the only proper venue. The circuit court ruled that Sangamon County was a proper venue and upheld the order allowing involuntary discharge. The appellate court held that Sangamon County was not a proper venue under Administrative Review Law section 3-104, but rejected a claim that filing the action in an improper venue constituted a jurisdictional defect. The court did not decide the merits, but vacated and remanded with directions to transfer the cause to Cook County. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that Sangamon County was not a permissible venue, but held that circumstance did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction to review the Department’s decision. Stating that it would be a waste of resources to require the Cook County court to review the decision again, the court vacated the portion of the judgment that vacated the Sangamon County decision and remanded to the appellate court for decision on the merits.View "Slepicka v. IL Dep't of Pub. Health" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Alberta Major fell and sustained an ankle injury while walking across an unpaved area of an intersection, which was owned and maintained by respondent City of Hartsville. Petitioner asserted her injury was a result of a rut in the ground created by vehicles frequently driving over the unpaved area. Petitioner brought suit against respondent alleging negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton conduct. Prior to trial, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment contending it was not liable under the South Carolina Torts Claims Act (SCTCA) because it was not on notice of any rut at the location where petitioner allegedly sustained her injury. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of respondent, finding respondent's knowledge of vehicles cutting the unpaved corner at the intersection did not create a continual condition and did not place respondent on constructive notice of the actual rut. The Court of Appeals affirmed, referring to the SCTCA and finding although petitioner presented evidence that respondent had notice of circumstances it knew would eventually lead to a rut, there was no evidence respondent had notice of the specific rut petitioner alleged caused her injury. The Court of Appeals further found there was no continual condition sufficient to establish constructive notice and impute liability to respondent. Based on the testimony presented at the summary judgment hearing, the Supreme Court found, however, that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether respondent should have been charged with constructive notice on the basis that the rut existed for such a period of time that respondent, in the use of reasonable care, should have discovered it. Furthermore, the Court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the recurring nature of the defect created a continual condition giving rise to constructive notice. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Major v. City of Hartsville" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff alleged, in a council form complaint, causes for negligence and a dangerous condition on public property. The Council sought to compel summary judgment, arguing that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff failed to present a government claim to the Secretariat of the Judicial Council. The court issued a writ of mandate directing that the Council's summary judgment motion be granted because there was no proper presentation of plaintiff's government claim.View "Judicial Council v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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Neighbor and owner of property near the Palmer Municipal Airport brought an inverse condemnation claim against the City of Palmer, arguing that the airport operation diminished his property value. The superior court entered summary judgment for the City of Palmer because the property owner failed to submit any expert testimony regarding damages. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's decision because Alaska law permits property owners to testify about their opinion of the property's value before and after an alleged taking. View "Briggs v. City of Palmer" on Justia Law

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A public employee filed a complaint with the Commission for Human Rights in 2007 alleging employment discrimination and filed another complaint with the superior court in 2012. Upon learning of the 2012 complaint, the executive director dismissed the 2007 complaint, citing AS 18.80.112(b)(4). Alaska Statute 18.80.112(b)(4) gives the executive director of the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights discretion to dismiss a complaint of employment discrimination if the complainant initiates an action in another forum "based on the same facts." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the executive director had a proper statutory basis for dismissal because the 2012 civil complaint was "based on the same facts" as those alleged in the 2007 complaint.View "Grundberg v. Alaska State Communication for Human Rights" on Justia Law