Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

An individual incarcerated at the Belmont Correctional Institution requested various records from the sheriff relating to the operation and administration of the county jail, including policies on inmate intake and booking, personnel employed during a specified period, and records-retention policies. When his attempts to submit the requests by hand delivery and certified mail failed—one being refused and the other returned as undeliverable—he sent the requests by fax. Additionally, a third party, claiming to be his agent, submitted similar requests via email. The sheriff provided some records, stated that others had already been given, and explained that many requested records were maintained by private entities that had operated the jail under contract during relevant periods.The inmate subsequently filed a mandamus action against the sheriff and the jail, but not against the private jail administrators. The Supreme Court of Ohio previously dismissed the claim against the jail as a non-legal entity, and granted a limited writ requiring the sheriff to obtain and provide certain records from the private entities or certify their nonexistence. The court deferred the issue of statutory damages until the sheriff complied. The sheriff requested the records from the private entities, forwarded what was provided to the inmate, and filed a notice of compliance.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the requests for statutory damages and for contempt and sanctions. The court held that the inmate had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that he successfully transmitted his records requests by hand delivery or certified mail, nor that he authorized the third party to submit requests as his agent by email. The court further found no evidence that the sheriff disobeyed or resisted the court’s prior order, noting that the sheriff acted to comply with the writ by seeking records from the private entities and forwarding their responses. The motions for statutory damages, contempt, and sanctions were therefore denied. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Columbiana Cty. Jail" on Justia Law

John Kenney, a resident of Florida, sought to obtain a retail cannabis license in Rhode Island as a social equity applicant. He argued that, as a recipient of a social equity cannabis license in the District of Columbia and someone with nonviolent marijuana convictions in Maryland and Nevada, he would otherwise qualify under Rhode Island’s Cannabis Act. Kenney challenged two provisions of the Act: the requirement that all license applicants must be Rhode Island residents or entities controlled by Rhode Island residents, and the definition of “social equity applicant,” which, according to Kenney, only recognizes nonviolent marijuana offenses eligible for expungement under Rhode Island law.After Kenney filed an amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On February 6, 2025, the district court dismissed the case on ripeness grounds, reasoning that the Cannabis Control Commission had not yet promulgated final rules for retail cannabis licenses, and thus the court could not adjudicate the claims. The case was dismissed without prejudice, and Kenney appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. Following the Commission’s issuance of final rules for retail cannabis licenses, effective May 1, 2025, the appellate court determined that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of ripeness. The First Circuit held that Kenney’s claims were not moot and that he had standing to pursue them. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for prompt consideration of the merits of Kenney’s constitutional challenges, instructing the district court to rule at least forty-five days before the Commission issues retail licenses. View "Kenney v. Rhode Island Cannabis Control Commission" on Justia Law

Riverdale Mills Corporation operates a wire mesh manufacturing facility in Northbridge, Massachusetts. In 2019, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) conducted two investigations at Riverdale’s facility, which resulted in citations alleging violations of safety and health standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Riverdale contested these citations, and after a consolidated hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) in 2021, the ALJ affirmed three citation items while vacating or withdrawing the others.Subsequently, in December 2023, Riverdale applied to the ALJ for recovery of attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). To establish eligibility for this recovery, Riverdale submitted its 2019 balance sheet as evidence, along with a motion to seal the document due to alleged confidential business information. The Secretary of Labor opposed the motion, arguing Riverdale had not demonstrated sufficient grounds for sealing. After considering submissions from both parties, the ALJ denied Riverdale’s motion to seal, applying balancing tests from D.C. Circuit and First Circuit case law and concluding Riverdale had not shown compelling reasons to overcome the presumption of public access. Riverdale attempted to appeal this denial to the OSHRC Commission, but the Commission automatically dismissed the appeal for lack of quorum.Riverdale then sought interlocutory review from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit assumed interlocutory jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and reviewed the ALJ’s denial for abuse of discretion. It held that Riverdale had waived certain arguments by not raising them earlier and determined the ALJ did not abuse her discretion in denying the motion to seal, finding Riverdale failed to meet its burden to justify sealing the balance sheet. The petition for review was denied. View "Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Chavez-DeRemer" on Justia Law

Two private-citizen members of a federally created commission, along with several federal officials, were involved in planning the United States’ 250th anniversary celebrations. The commission was established by Congress and included both federal officials and private citizens appointed by congressional leaders. After a dispute over leadership and the selection of an administrative secretariat, three commission members made public statements criticizing the commission’s Chairperson and Executive Director, alleging mismanagement and other misconduct. The Chairperson and Executive Director claimed these statements damaged their reputations and led to their removal, prompting them to file a tort action—including defamation and related claims—against the three members in Pennsylvania state court.After the complaint was filed, the Attorney General certified that the defendants were acting within the scope of their federal employment, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and substituted the United States as the defendant under the Westfall Act. The District Court determined that the commission members qualified as federal employees, that their statements were made within the scope of their employment, and that discovery was unnecessary. The court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, as the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not waive sovereign immunity for defamation claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Third Circuit held that the commission is a federal agency under the FTCA and Westfall Act, and that its private-citizen members are “employees of the government” for purposes of those statutes. The court further held that the defendants’ statements were made within the scope of their employment and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery. The dismissal was affirmed because sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs’ claims. View "Giordano v. Hohns" on Justia Law

A state agency, the Department of Family and Community Services (DFCS), leased office space from JBG Memorial (JBG) in Anchorage under a fifteen-year agreement set to expire in February 2023, with options to renew. As the lease neared expiration, DFCS applied for and received a waiver from the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOT&PF) commissioner to procure new office space through a single source process, bypassing the usual competitive bidding. DFCS informed JBG that it would not renew the lease and would vacate, but did not provide details about the new lease. JBG requested public records but did not receive them before the lease expired. DFCS remained in the property on a month-to-month basis until it entered a new lease at Anchorage Business Park. JBG received the requested records only after the new lease was signed.JBG filed suit in the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, seeking to enjoin the termination of its lease, void the new lease, and require proper bid procedures. JBG also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent DFCS from vacating. The State moved to dismiss, arguing JBG had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. JBG admitted it had not done so but claimed exhaustion was excused due to lack of meaningful access, bias, futility, and irreparable harm. The superior court dismissed the complaint, finding JBG had not pled facts sufficient to excuse exhaustion, and awarded attorney’s fees to the State as the prevailing party.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The court held that JBG was required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review and failed to establish any valid excuse for not doing so. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the State. View "JBG Memorial, LLC v. State of Alaska, Department of Transportation and Public Services" on Justia Law

A cannabis cultivation business was licensed to operate in Vermont but became the subject of regulatory action after laboratory testing detected myclobutanil, a prohibited pesticide, in its products. The business had previously entered into a corrective action plan with the regulatory board following similar violations in 2023, agreeing to remediation, penalties, and compliance measures. In 2024, after further detections of myclobutanil in both retail and on-site samples, the regulatory board issued a notice of violation with immediate effect, including a stop-sale order for all of the business’s products, a recall requirement, and a proposed license revocation.The business contested the notice and requested a hearing before the Cannabis Control Board. At the hearing, it raised several arguments, including challenges to the Board’s authority under the Vermont Constitution, claims of bias by the Board chair, and alleged due process violations. The Board chair denied a motion for recusal, and after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, the Board found that the business had violated its corrective action plan and used unauthorized pesticides. The Board dismissed one violation as duplicative but upheld others, ultimately revoking the business’s license. The business appealed to an appellate officer, who affirmed the Board’s decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, applying a standard that precludes reweighing factual findings unless clearly erroneous or affected by legal error. The Court held that the Board acted within its statutory authority in issuing a stop-sale order for all products, that the Board’s interpretation of its regulations was reasonable, and that the business failed to preserve or adequately brief its constitutional and evidentiary arguments. The Court also found no due process violation regarding the impartiality of the Board chair, as the business did not make an evidentiary record to support its claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the revocation of the business’s license. View "In re Holland Cannabis, LLC" on Justia Law

Several individuals challenged the validity of the District of Columbia’s Anti-SLAPP Act, which provides defendants in certain lawsuits—those deemed “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (SLAPPs)—with a special motion to dismiss and limits discovery in those cases. The challengers argued that the D.C. Council exceeded its authority under the Home Rule Act by enacting the Anti-SLAPP Act, claiming that its discovery-limiting provisions impermissibly intruded on the procedural rules governing the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, which are set by Title 11 of the D.C. Code.A division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals previously agreed with the challengers, holding that the Anti-SLAPP Act’s discovery provisions violated the Home Rule Act by interfering with Title 11’s mandate that the Superior Court follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except as modified by the courts themselves. The division’s decision was subsequently vacated when the full court granted en banc review.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the division’s decision. The court held that the D.C. Council did not exceed its authority under the Home Rule Act by passing the Anti-SLAPP Act. The court reasoned that the Act does not amend Title 11, does not alter the organization or jurisdiction of the District’s courts, does not divest the courts of their rulemaking authority, and does not fundamentally change the court system. Instead, the Act supplements procedures for a limited subset of cases in a manner consistent with Title 11. The court concluded that the Council’s broad legislative authority includes the power to enact such laws, and that the Anti-SLAPP Act does not violate the Home Rule Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Banks v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

Elisabeth Koletas, who was four months pregnant, requested a pat-down instead of passing through a body scanner at Southwest Florida International Airport due to concerns about radiation. During the pat-down, Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Sarno conducted a prolonged probe of Koletas’s vaginal area, focusing on material in her underwear. Koletas explained it was toilet paper used to stem pregnancy-related bleeding. Sarno, skeptical, moved Koletas to a private room and brought in Supervising TSO Shane, who further probed Koletas’s underwear and vaginal area. Shane directed Koletas to lift her dress and ultimately removed the toilet paper, finding no prohibited items. Koletas experienced psychological and physical distress from the encounter.After exhausting administrative remedies, Koletas filed suit against the United States in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. The United States moved to dismiss, arguing that the FTCA’s intentional tort exception preserved sovereign immunity for the alleged battery and false imprisonment. The district court agreed, relying solely on an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision, and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that TSOs are “officers of the United States” empowered by law to execute searches under the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso, which waives sovereign immunity for certain intentional torts committed by such officers. The court found the statutory language unambiguous and joined five other circuits in this interpretation. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits. View "Koletas v. USA" on Justia Law

A Saudi military officer, Mohammed Saeed Al-Shamrani, who was a member of the Royal Saudi Air Force, carried out a mass shooting at the Pensacola Naval Air Station in Florida in December 2019, resulting in the deaths of three U.S. servicemembers and injuries to several others. The officer had a documented history of expressing extremist and anti-American views on social media prior to his arrival in the United States for flight training, which was part of a broader U.S.-Saudi military training program. The victims and their families brought suit against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, alleging various tort and contract claims, including gross negligence in vetting and sending Al-Shamrani to the U.S., failure to supervise, vicarious liability for his actions, support for terrorism, and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida dismissed all claims, finding that the plaintiffs’ allegations were facially insufficient to overcome Saudi Arabia’s sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA). The district court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery, concluding that the complaint did not plausibly allege facts that would support an exception to sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that most claims were properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as they either involved discretionary functions, acts of omission, or failed to establish proximate cause or a waiver of immunity. However, the court found that the plaintiffs’ claims based on grossly negligent acts of commission by Saudi Arabia in vetting, hiring, and sending Al-Shamrani to the United States were facially sufficient under JASTA to survive a jurisdictional challenge. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these claims. View "Watson v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" on Justia Law

A corporation owned by a federally recognized Indian tribe, along with several tribal officials, was alleged by the State of California to have violated state cigarette tax laws and regulations. The corporation manufactured and distributed cigarettes in California, including to non-tribal consumers, without collecting or remitting required state excise taxes or payments under the Master Settlement Agreement. California claimed that the corporation and its officials distributed contraband cigarettes not listed on the state’s approved directory and failed to comply with shipping, recordkeeping, and tax collection requirements under the federal Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT Act). Despite warnings and being placed on a federal non-compliance list, the corporation continued its operations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the corporation, as an arm of the tribe, was shielded by tribal sovereign immunity and dismissed claims against it. However, the court allowed claims for injunctive relief against the individual tribal officials in their official capacities to proceed, holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine permitted such relief under the PACT Act. The court also denied the officials’ claims of qualified immunity for personal capacity claims, reasoning that qualified immunity did not apply to enforcement actions brought by a state under a federal statute.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that the PACT Act does not preclude Ex parte Young actions for prospective injunctive relief against tribal officials, as the Act does not limit who may be sued or the types of relief available, nor does it contain a sufficiently detailed remedial scheme to displace Ex parte Young. The court also held that qualified immunity does not shield tribal officials from California’s claims for civil penalties and money damages under the PACT Act. View "STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. DEL ROSA" on Justia Law