Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Florida PACE Funding Agency initiated a proceeding in the Second Judicial Circuit to validate the issuance of $5 billion in bonds for financing certain property improvements under the PACE Act. The agency complied with statutory notice requirements, and a hearing was held where State Attorneys from the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits were represented. No party objected to the entry of final judgment validating the bonds, and the judgment became final without any appeal. Over a year later, various governmental entities—including state attorneys, counties, and tax collectors (most of whom did not participate in the original proceedings)—filed motions under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, seeking relief from the judgment, raising arguments such as lack of jurisdiction, due process violations, and alleged surprise.The circuit court allowed discovery and held an evidentiary hearing, after which it denied all motions for relief from judgment. For the parties who had not appeared previously, the court found that rule 1.540 did not apply to bond validation judgments due to the strict finality requirements of chapter 75, Florida Statutes, and that the motions were untimely and insufficient. For the state attorneys who had participated, the court concluded they were procedurally barred from seeking relief under rule 1.540 because it could not substitute for appellate review.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed whether rule 1.540 applies to final judgments in bond validation proceedings under chapter 75. The court held that chapter 75’s finality language—specifically section 75.09—precludes the use of rule 1.540 to collaterally attack such judgments after the time for appeal has expired. The court concluded that the statutory scheme is exclusive, and the rules of civil procedure do not override the statute. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motions for relief from judgment. View "State Attorneys for the Second, Seventh and Ninth Judicial Circuits v. Florida Pace Funding Agency" on Justia Law

In this case, a motorist was stopped by state troopers for traffic infractions. The troopers observed signs of intoxication, and after the motorist failed a field sobriety test, he refused to take a chemical breath test, even after being warned multiple times about the consequences. Following his refusal, the troopers completed and signed sworn reports documenting the events, and his driver's license was automatically suspended pending a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) hearing to determine if it should be revoked for refusing the chemical test.At the DMV hearing, which was postponed once when the troopers failed to appear, the motorist again properly subpoenaed both troopers for the rescheduled hearing. When the troopers did not attend the second hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) acknowledged the validity of the subpoenas but proceeded with the hearing without further adjournment. The ALJ admitted the troopers’ sworn written reports and supporting depositions as evidence and, over the motorist’s objections, found that the elements required for license revocation were met. On administrative appeal, the DMV Appeals Board affirmed, and upon transfer, the Appellate Division confirmed the DMV’s decision, reasoning that the motorist had made a tactical choice not to seek judicial enforcement of the subpoenas or request another adjournment.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the matter. The court held that when a motorist properly subpoenas officers in a DMV license revocation hearing and the officers fail to appear, due process does not require dismissal of the charge or exclusion of their written reports unless the motorist first seeks judicial enforcement of the subpoenas pursuant to CPLR 2308(b). As the motorist in this case did not pursue enforcement or request an adjournment to do so, his due process rights were not violated. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. View "Monaghan v. Schroeder" on Justia Law

An 18-year-old named Elijah Henry was driving with friends in Pleasanton, California, when a police officer, Officer Harvey, entered a parking lot to check for vehicle break-ins. Seeing the officer, Henry and his friends got into their car and left. Officer Harvey, suspecting a burglary, began to follow Henry’s car without activating lights or siren, intending to perform a traffic stop but not initiating a formal pursuit as defined by Pleasanton’s police policy. Henry, fearful of police attention, accelerated and ran a red light, colliding with Melanie Gilliland’s car and causing her serious injuries. Henry was later convicted of felony DUI, but no evidence connected him or his friends to the suspected burglary.Gilliland sued both Henry and the City of Pleasanton for negligence. In Alameda County Superior Court, the City moved for summary judgment, arguing it was immune from liability under California Vehicle Code section 17004.7, which protects public entities from damages caused by suspects fleeing police if the entity has a compliant vehicular pursuit policy and provides regular training. The first judge denied summary judgment, finding neither an actual nor perceived pursuit occurred under the City’s policy. At a later bench trial before a different judge, the court found the City immune, reasoning Henry believed he was being “pursued” in the ordinary sense, even though no formal pursuit was initiated.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and held the trial court applied the wrong legal standard for immunity under section 17004.7. The appellate court determined that “pursued” must be defined according to the public entity’s vehicular pursuit policy, not by its ordinary meaning. Because the lower court failed to consider evidence that Henry did not believe he was pursued within the meaning of the policy, the judgment in favor of the City was reversed and remanded for application of the correct standard. View "Gilliland v. City of Pleasanton" on Justia Law

A municipal water and gas board entered into four contracts with a contractor to replace and expand gas lines in and around a city. The total project cost exceeded $4 million, and the contractor began work after being the sole bidder for each project phase. After paying the contractor over $2.8 million, the board ceased payments, leaving over $800,000 due for completed work. The board asserted it could not continue payments because the advertisement for sealed bids had not strictly complied with the version of the applicable Alabama statute in effect at the time the bids were solicited. The contractor then sued the board for breach of contract and other claims.The Franklin Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the board, finding, in effect, that strict compliance with the statutory advertising requirements was necessary and that the contracts were void due to noncompliance. The trial court denied the contractor’s postjudgment motion, and the contractor appealed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. It held that substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, with the advertising requirements for public works contracts under the relevant statute can satisfy the law’s objectives. The court distinguished this situation from prior precedent where there was a complete absence of competitive bidding and evidence of favoritism or corruption. Here, there was no such evidence, and the board had taken affirmative steps to advertise, including publication and online postings. The court concluded that the contractor presented substantial evidence of substantial compliance, creating a genuine issue of material fact. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pinpoint Locating, Inc. v. The Water Works and Gas Board of the City of Red Bay" on Justia Law

A group of homeowners, all over the age of 65, entered into contracts for energy efficiency improvements to their homes under California's Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) program. This program allows local governments to offer financing for such improvements, with repayment made through voluntary special assessments added to the homeowners’ property tax bills. Most local governments contracted private companies to administer these PACE loans. The homeowners alleged that these private administrators failed to comply with consumer protection and lending laws applicable to consumer lenders, such as providing required warnings and avoiding prohibited security interests. They filed suit under the Unfair Competition Law, seeking injunctive relief and restitution, including the return of assessment monies paid and prohibitions on future collection of delinquent assessments unless the assessments were removed from their properties.The San Diego County Superior Court sustained the defendants’ demurrers, concluding that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust administrative tax remedies before pursuing their claims in court. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that because PACE assessments are collected as part of property taxes and the relief sought would invalidate those assessments, plaintiffs first needed to pay the assessments and seek administrative relief through the established tax refund procedures.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine whether plaintiffs were required to follow statutory procedures for challenging taxes. The court held that when plaintiffs’ claims effectively seek to invalidate PACE assessments or prevent their future collection, they must first pay the assessments and pursue administrative tax remedies. However, the court also held that plaintiffs are not required to use tax challenge procedures for claims that do not directly or indirectly challenge a tax, such as those solely addressing the administration of the PACE program. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case remanded to consider whether plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaints to state only non-tax-related claims. View "Morgan v. Ygrene Energy Fund, Inc." on Justia Law

A homeowners association in San Diego, governed by the Davis-Stirling Act and its own bylaws, held a recall election to remove a board director. The association distributed recall ballot materials, including a candidate statement from the sole candidate seeking to replace the director if the recall succeeded. The sitting director sought to include her own statement in these materials to advocate against her removal but was denied by the elections inspector, who reasoned that only candidate statements were included. The association’s election rules defined “association media” to exclude candidate forms or statements attached to ballots.Previously, the Superior Court of San Diego County, in a separate action brought by the same director, found no violation of the statutory equal-access requirement for association media, concluding that all candidates had equal opportunity to submit statements using the association’s forms for regular board elections. Following the recall, the director filed a new petition and complaint challenging the association’s refusal to distribute her statement, alleging violations of Civil Code section 5105, various Corporations Code provisions, and negligence. After a bench trial, the Superior Court again ruled for the association and the inspector, finding the candidate statement was not “association media” under the relevant statute and that the recall vote met statutory requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed. It held that “association media” as used in Civil Code section 5105 does encompass ballot materials containing candidate statements distributed by the association during an election. The court concluded the director was entitled to equal access to these materials to advocate her position. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine, under Civil Code section 5145, whether the association’s failure to provide equal access affected the election outcome. The judgment was reversed and remanded with directions. View "Arroyo v. Pacific Ridge Neighborhood Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law

A former deputy executive director of a bi-state agency, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, was prosecuted in connection with the “Bridgegate” scandal. Although convicted, his convictions were ultimately vacated and the indictment dismissed. Having incurred approximately $4 million in legal expenses, he sought indemnification from the Port Authority under its bylaws, which provide for reimbursement of legal costs upon acquittal or dismissal of criminal charges, subject to certain notice and procedural requirements.After the Port Authority denied his request for indemnification, he commenced suit in New York state court. The Port Authority removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. There, the Port Authority argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had not satisfied a condition precedent for suit—specifically, timely delivery of the judgment of acquittal per the bylaws—meaning that the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity had not occurred. The district court agreed, dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and subsequently denying leave to amend the complaint as futile, finding that the plaintiff had failed to plead compliance with the condition precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the dismissal. It held that the Port Authority does not possess state sovereign immunity from suit in federal court, as established by the Supreme Court in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., and therefore a failure to plead waiver of sovereign immunity does not deprive the federal court of subject matter jurisdiction. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, overruling prior circuit precedent to the contrary. The court also vacated the denial of leave to amend, clarifying that compliance with contractual or statutory conditions is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional prerequisite. View "Baroni v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey" on Justia Law

An individual incarcerated at the Belmont Correctional Institution requested various records from the sheriff relating to the operation and administration of the county jail, including policies on inmate intake and booking, personnel employed during a specified period, and records-retention policies. When his attempts to submit the requests by hand delivery and certified mail failed—one being refused and the other returned as undeliverable—he sent the requests by fax. Additionally, a third party, claiming to be his agent, submitted similar requests via email. The sheriff provided some records, stated that others had already been given, and explained that many requested records were maintained by private entities that had operated the jail under contract during relevant periods.The inmate subsequently filed a mandamus action against the sheriff and the jail, but not against the private jail administrators. The Supreme Court of Ohio previously dismissed the claim against the jail as a non-legal entity, and granted a limited writ requiring the sheriff to obtain and provide certain records from the private entities or certify their nonexistence. The court deferred the issue of statutory damages until the sheriff complied. The sheriff requested the records from the private entities, forwarded what was provided to the inmate, and filed a notice of compliance.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the requests for statutory damages and for contempt and sanctions. The court held that the inmate had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that he successfully transmitted his records requests by hand delivery or certified mail, nor that he authorized the third party to submit requests as his agent by email. The court further found no evidence that the sheriff disobeyed or resisted the court’s prior order, noting that the sheriff acted to comply with the writ by seeking records from the private entities and forwarding their responses. The motions for statutory damages, contempt, and sanctions were therefore denied. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Columbiana Cty. Jail" on Justia Law

John Kenney, a resident of Florida, sought to obtain a retail cannabis license in Rhode Island as a social equity applicant. He argued that, as a recipient of a social equity cannabis license in the District of Columbia and someone with nonviolent marijuana convictions in Maryland and Nevada, he would otherwise qualify under Rhode Island’s Cannabis Act. Kenney challenged two provisions of the Act: the requirement that all license applicants must be Rhode Island residents or entities controlled by Rhode Island residents, and the definition of “social equity applicant,” which, according to Kenney, only recognizes nonviolent marijuana offenses eligible for expungement under Rhode Island law.After Kenney filed an amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On February 6, 2025, the district court dismissed the case on ripeness grounds, reasoning that the Cannabis Control Commission had not yet promulgated final rules for retail cannabis licenses, and thus the court could not adjudicate the claims. The case was dismissed without prejudice, and Kenney appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. Following the Commission’s issuance of final rules for retail cannabis licenses, effective May 1, 2025, the appellate court determined that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of ripeness. The First Circuit held that Kenney’s claims were not moot and that he had standing to pursue them. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for prompt consideration of the merits of Kenney’s constitutional challenges, instructing the district court to rule at least forty-five days before the Commission issues retail licenses. View "Kenney v. Rhode Island Cannabis Control Commission" on Justia Law

Riverdale Mills Corporation operates a wire mesh manufacturing facility in Northbridge, Massachusetts. In 2019, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) conducted two investigations at Riverdale’s facility, which resulted in citations alleging violations of safety and health standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Riverdale contested these citations, and after a consolidated hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) in 2021, the ALJ affirmed three citation items while vacating or withdrawing the others.Subsequently, in December 2023, Riverdale applied to the ALJ for recovery of attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). To establish eligibility for this recovery, Riverdale submitted its 2019 balance sheet as evidence, along with a motion to seal the document due to alleged confidential business information. The Secretary of Labor opposed the motion, arguing Riverdale had not demonstrated sufficient grounds for sealing. After considering submissions from both parties, the ALJ denied Riverdale’s motion to seal, applying balancing tests from D.C. Circuit and First Circuit case law and concluding Riverdale had not shown compelling reasons to overcome the presumption of public access. Riverdale attempted to appeal this denial to the OSHRC Commission, but the Commission automatically dismissed the appeal for lack of quorum.Riverdale then sought interlocutory review from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit assumed interlocutory jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and reviewed the ALJ’s denial for abuse of discretion. It held that Riverdale had waived certain arguments by not raising them earlier and determined the ALJ did not abuse her discretion in denying the motion to seal, finding Riverdale failed to meet its burden to justify sealing the balance sheet. The petition for review was denied. View "Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Chavez-DeRemer" on Justia Law