Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2021, the United States seized over 700,000 barrels of crude oil from two tankers in the Mediterranean Sea. The government alleged that the oil belonged to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), an entity it claimed materially supported the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The government further asserted that NIOC’s activities included supplying, transporting, and selling oil to benefit the IRGC, which used these resources to fund terrorist activities targeting the United States. A Turkish commodities trading company, Aspan Petrokimya Co., claimed ownership of the seized oil and sought to recover the proceeds from its sale.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the government’s forfeiture complaints without prejudice, finding that the government had not adequately pled that NIOC’s sale of oil affected foreign commerce. The government then filed an Amended Complaint consolidating the cases and providing additional factual detail. The district court denied Aspan’s renewed motion to dismiss, concluding that the amended allegations sufficiently addressed the jurisdictional element and all other statutory requirements. To expedite appellate review, Aspan admitted the complaint’s factual allegations, consented to judgment on the pleadings, and appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss de novo. The appellate court held that the government needed only to allege NIOC’s ownership of the property at the time of the offense, not at the time of seizure. The court also found that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleged that NIOC’s material support of the IRGC substantially affected foreign commerce, and that NIOC’s actions were calculated to influence the U.S. government. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. All Petroleum-Product Cargo Onboard the M/T Arina" on Justia Law

A police officer employed by the Metropolitan Police Department experienced a data breach that exposed sensitive information of numerous employees. In response, the officer filed a putative class action in Superior Court for the District of Columbia, naming the District, certain government entities, and several private technology contractors as defendants. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to safeguard employees’ data.During the proceedings, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed certain contractor defendants without prejudice, leaving the government defendants and a few contractors. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted the District’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the Metropolitan Police Department and the Office of the Chief Technology Officer could not be sued as unincorporated government bodies, and that sovereign immunity barred the claims against the District. The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Subsequently, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed without prejudice the remaining private contractor defendants and asked the Superior Court to close the case. The Superior Court closed the case, prompting the plaintiff to appeal both the dismissal of her claims against the District and the denial of reconsideration.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that because the plaintiff dismissed her claims against the final contractor defendants without prejudice, the trial court’s order was not final as to all parties and claims. The court explained that dismissals without prejudice do not resolve the merits and thus do not confer appellate jurisdiction, except in rare circumstances. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the order below was not a final, appealable order. View "Moore v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

A county board created a port authority in 2003 to encourage economic development, administering a business park on contaminated land formerly operated by a lumber company. In 2022, the port authority entered into agreements with a private company to clean up and potentially develop the property, culminating in the sale of 105 acres for $1.6 million, with a credit for cleanup costs. The plaintiff alleged that between May 2022 and April 2025, the port authority failed to provide adequate public notice of its meetings or opportunities for public participation regarding the land transactions, in violation of Montana’s open meeting and right to participate laws.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, reviewed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to halt any actions pursuant to the port authority’s decisions during the contested period and to void the land sale and related contracts. The District Court denied the injunction, reasoning that the relief sought would not merely enforce open meeting laws but would invalidate completed transactions and disrupt the property’s new ownership and development. The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, particularly given the significant passage of time and changes to the property. The court did not resolve contested factual issues about notice or participation, nor did it make any final rulings on the underlying claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion because the plaintiff failed to establish all required elements for preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court emphasized that the lower court had not decided the merits of the open meeting law claims and left those questions for future proceedings. View "Torgison v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

A U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent was denied boarding an international flight in 2019 and subsequently learned, after following the Department of Homeland Security’s redress process, that he was listed on the federal government’s No Fly List. He then sought to challenge his inclusion both on the No Fly List and the broader Terrorist Watchlist, which contains the names of individuals reasonably suspected of terrorism. Placement on the No Fly List is dependent on inclusion in the Terrorist Watchlist. The individual alleged ongoing travel and immigration-related harms due to his watchlist designations.He filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising constitutional and statutory claims and seeking removal from both lists. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the No Fly List claims due to the statutory requirement that such challenges proceed in the circuit court under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, and transferred those claims accordingly. The district court retained the Terrorist Watchlist claims under general federal question jurisdiction. After further briefing, the district court dismissed the remaining Terrorist Watchlist claims for lack of Article III standing, finding it could not redress the alleged injuries because removing the plaintiff from the Terrorist Watchlist would necessarily set aside the TSA Administrator’s order keeping him on the No Fly List—an action reserved for the circuit court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that while the plaintiff suffered concrete injuries from his inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist, the district court lacked authority to redress those injuries because any effective remedy would encroach on the circuit court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review and set aside TSA No Fly List orders under § 46110. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of standing. View "Khalid v. Blanche" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was injured after tripping over the base of a removed bus stop sign on a public sidewalk in Manitou Springs, Colorado, on August 26, 2021. The injured party promptly notified Manitou Springs of her injury as required by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), which mandates notice to the liable public entity within 182 days of discovering the injury. Manitou Springs did not disclose its lack of responsibility for the sidewalk until April 2023, well after the statutory period had expired, when it told the claimant that Colorado Springs was responsible under an intergovernmental agreement. The claimant then notified Colorado Springs forty days later, but this notice was well outside the 182-day window.After the claimant brought suit against both cities for premises liability and negligence, Colorado Springs moved to dismiss, arguing that the notice was untimely under the CGIA and that equitable defenses were unavailable. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the notice period should have started when the claimant learned of Colorado Springs’ potential liability, not on the date of injury. The District Court reasoned that the claimant could not have known about the intergovernmental agreement without disclosure from Manitou Springs and thus had acted diligently.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the CGIA’s 182-day notice period is jurisdictional, cannot be tolled or waived, and begins when the injury is discovered, regardless of knowledge of the liable public entity. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed this judgment, holding that strict compliance with the notice provision was required and that the notice period began on the date of injury. Because the claimant’s notice to Colorado Springs was untimely, dismissal was required. View "Mostellar v. City of Colo. Springs" on Justia Law

In this matter, a member of the University of Alabama’s men’s basketball team, Kai Spears, brought suit against The New York Times Company after it published articles erroneously identifying him as the unidentified passenger in a car at the scene of a high-profile shooting. The Times based its reporting on information from two confidential sources. Spears, who was not in the car, alleges that The Times failed to use reasonable care in publishing false and damaging statements about him. During litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Spears sought discovery to uncover the identities of the sources and related information. The Times resisted, invoking Alabama’s “shield statute,” which protects journalists from being compelled to reveal confidential sources.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Alabama concerning the scope of the state’s shield statute. The first question asked whether the statute protects the identity of a source when information is published online. However, as Spears conceded that the print publication of the article triggered the statute’s application, the Supreme Court of Alabama declined to answer this question, finding it irrelevant to the case.The Supreme Court of Alabama addressed the second certified question, which asked whether the shield statute protects any and all information that could reasonably lead to the identification of a protected source. The Court held that Alabama’s shield statute does not extend so broadly. Instead, it protects only information that would inevitably reveal the identity of a confidential source. Thus, information that could merely “reasonably lead” to the identification of a source is not covered. The Court declined to expand the statute’s protections beyond its plain language and expressly limited the privilege to “source-identifying” information whose disclosure would make identifying the source unavoidable. View "The New York Times Company v. Spears" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, three organizations representing millions of Americans, challenged the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) decision to grant personnel from the newly created U.S. DOGE Service access to non-anonymized, highly sensitive personal information held by the SSA. This access was authorized following an executive order charging DOGE with improving government technology. Career officials at the SSA resigned in protest, and a new acting administrator approved DOGE’s access. The plaintiffs argued that merely providing this access, regardless of actual misuse or disclosure, was itself unlawful and an intrusion upon the privacy of their members.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland conducted extensive hearings and granted a preliminary injunction blocking DOGE’s access to the data. The Supreme Court subsequently stayed this injunction, pending appellate and possible further Supreme Court review. The case came before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, as the unauthorized access to their sensitive information closely resembled the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion. However, the Fourth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs had not established that they were likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, as required by the second factor of the Winter test for preliminary injunctions. The court reasoned that monetary damages and reparative permanent injunctions were potentially available remedies, and the record did not show that new or additional irreparable harm would occur during the litigation. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The main holding is that the preliminary injunction was vacated because the plaintiffs did not show likely irreparable harm. View "American Federation of State, County and Municipal v. Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

An Irish company leased two airplanes to an Indian airline under agreements designating English courts as the forum for resolving disputes. After the airline failed to keep up with lease payments, the lessor sued in England and secured a monetary judgment. Seeking to enforce that judgment in Washington, the lessor filed a recognition action in King County Superior Court, claiming the airline had interests in personal property within the state but did not identify specific assets.The airline challenged the action in King County Superior Court, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because it had no contacts, assets, or business in Washington. The superior court denied the airline’s motion to dismiss, holding that jurisdiction was not required to recognize a foreign-country judgment under Washington’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. The court ultimately entered summary judgment recognizing the English judgment and ordering payment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that neither statute nor constitutional law required the creditor to show personal jurisdiction or a property nexus for recognition of such a judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted review and reversed the lower courts. The court held that, under chapter 6.40A RCW, a judgment creditor must establish either general or specific jurisdiction over the debtor or, in the absence of such jurisdiction, demonstrate that the debtor has property within Washington before a foreign-country money judgment may be recognized. The court found that recognition actions under the Act are not purely ministerial and require adjudicative jurisdiction. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the debtor has property in Washington sufficient to support jurisdiction. View "Alterna Aircraft V B Ltd. v. SpiceJet Ltd." on Justia Law

A former mortgage underwriter sued her employer under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company submitted false certifications in a federal mortgage insurance program. The government declined to intervene and unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the case. After years of litigation, the parties reached a settlement: the employer agreed to pay $38.5 million, with a portion going to the plaintiff and the remainder to the United States Treasury. The settlement specifically excluded the plaintiff’s claims for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs, leaving them unresolved.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California approved the settlement in January 2023, dismissing the substantive claims but expressly keeping the attorneys’ fees issue pending. Months of disputes ensued over the amount of attorneys’ fees. In May 2024, the district court awarded the plaintiff over $8.5 million in attorneys’ fees and approximately $89,000 in expenses. The plaintiff argued that postjudgment interest on these amounts should accrue from the date of the settlement approval, since her entitlement to fees was established then. The district court disagreed, holding that interest should only begin to accrue from the date the fees were actually awarded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that postjudgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) accrues only from the entry of a “money judgment,” which requires both identification of the parties and a definite, ascertainable amount owed. Because the district court’s earlier order approving the settlement did not specify the amount of attorneys’ fees, it was not a “money judgment.” Therefore, interest begins accruing only from the order that set the fee amount. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "THROWER V. ACADEMY MORTGAGE CORPORATION" on Justia Law

A private individual brought a qui tam action under the California False Claims Act (CFCA) against two construction-related entities, alleging they submitted false claims to local government agencies in connection with airport construction projects. The plaintiff followed the statutory procedure by filing the complaint under seal in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and mailing a copy to the Attorney General, as required by the CFCA. The complaint involved local (political subdivision) funds. The Attorney General, however, did not forward the complaint to the relevant local authorities and took no steps to intervene or extend the seal. After the 60-day sealing period expired without government action, the plaintiff served the defendants.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, holding that the plaintiff failed to comply with the CFCA’s sealing and service requirements. The trial court concluded the complaint should have remained under seal until the government notified the court of its decision to intervene, and that the plaintiff’s actions in unsealing and serving the complaint were premature. The court entered judgment dismissing the action with prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that a qui tam plaintiff is not required to allege compliance with the CFCA’s sealing and service requirements to state a cause of action, nor does failure to comply automatically require dismissal. The court further held that the statutory scheme creates a default 60-day seal period, which lifts automatically unless the government requests an extension. Because the plaintiff filed the complaint under seal, served the Attorney General, and waited until after the seal lifted to serve the defendants, the plaintiff complied with the statute. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer. View "Albarghouti v. LA Gateway Partners, LLC" on Justia Law