Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on whether a truck driver (claimant) who sustained injuries while driving a truck that he leased directly from a trucking company, with restrictions that prohibited him from driving the truck for the use of any other company, was a “subject worker” within the meaning of ORS 656.027 such that the trucking company was required to provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage for claimant’s injuries. SAIF and Robert Murray, the owner of Bob Murray Trucking (BMT), a for-hire carrier, sought review of the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming the final order of the Workers’ Compensation Board: that claimant was a subject worker of BMT under the workers’ compensation laws and did not qualify for the exemption to “subject worker” status contained in ORS 656.027(15)(c). To this the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Workers’ Compensation Board’s final order. View "SAIF v. Ward" on Justia Law

Nancy Michaels worked for more than one year as a Data Processing Manager II (DPM II) before her employer, California’s Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), voided her appointment at the direction of the State Personnel Board (SPB). After the SPB issued a decision rejecting Michaels’s appeal of the voiding of her appointment, she filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior court. The superior court found that Michaels had served more than one year in her position and directed the SPB to vacate its decision. CalPERS appealed, contending: (1) because Government Code section 19257.5 did not define the date of “appointment,” that term had to refer to when a new hire starts working in a new position for a state employer; (2) interpreting Government Code section 18525 to refer to the dates of offer and acceptance of a employment offer “undermines California’s civil-service law;” (3) the trial court’s definition of “appointment” date yielded an “absurd result” that conflicted with the SPB’s constitutional mandate to ensure uniform application of state civil service law; (4) the application of offer-and-acceptance principles derived from contract law “introduces uncertainty” into the state civil service hiring process; and (5) Michaels was not prejudiced by having her DPM II position voided. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly determined that the express language of section 18525 defined the term “appointment” to refer to the dates of offer and acceptance. As to CalPERS’s contentions regarding the wisdom of using the dates of offer and acceptance for determining the start of the one-year limitations period for voiding an appointment, the arguments concerned considerations of policy that were better addressed to the Legislature. As to CalPERS’s prejudice argument, the Court concluded its two contentions lack merit: (1) even if Michaels had notice of the possibility that her position would be voided, that notice did not allow CalPERS to act in an untimely manner; and (2) CalPERS’s assertion that Michaels could not avail herself of the statutes governing the limitations period for voiding an appointment would render the governing statutes a mere nullity. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Michaels v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

The Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (“the Tribe”) temporarily banished Angelita Chegup, Tara Amboh, Mary Jenkins, and Lynda Kozlowicz (“the banished members”). The banished members did not challenge their temporary banishment in a tribal forum, but instead sought relief in federal court by filing a petition for habeas corpus. The banished members contended that, because they were excluded from the reservation by virtue of their banishment, they were “detained” within the meaning of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”). The district court disagreed and dismissed the suit without considering the Tribe’s alternative position: that the court could not consider the claims at all because the banished members failed to exhaust their tribal remedies. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred with the district court: "Even though tribal exhaustion is non-jurisdictional, and courts may often choose between threshold grounds for denying relief, we think that under the unique circumstances of this case there was a right choice." Because the district court neither began its analysis with tribal exhaustion nor reached that issue in the alternative, the Tenth Circuit remanded for it to be decided in the first instance. View "Chegup, et al. v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah, et al." on Justia Law

The City of Trussville ("the City") appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Personnel Board of Jefferson County ("the Board") in the City's action seeking a judgment declaring that it had the authority to create and operate its own civil-service system. In 2018, the City requested that the Alabama attorney general issue an opinion regarding whether, once it had annexed land in St. Clair County, it was subject to being governed by the Board or could form its own civil- service system. The attorney general concluded that the City was not subject to the Board's civil-service system and, therefore, had the authority to establish its own civil-service system. However, the Alabama Supreme Court determined the attorney general did not consider what effect the settlement agreement, and the consent judgment ratifying that settlement agreement, entered in a 1991 action had on the question presented by the City for consideration. On April 23, 2019, the City passed Ordinance No. 2019-020-ADM, creating a civil-service system for City employees. The Board took the position that the City lacks the authority to form its own civil-service system and that the City is bound to continue under the jurisdiction of the Board. The Supreme Court was not persuaded by the legal grounds the City presented to support its appeal. The Court found the same cause of action was presented in both the 1991 action and here, and that the theory upon which the City sought to litigate the present action could have been litigated in the 1991 action, but was not. Accordingly, the City's present action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. View "City of Trussville v. Personnel Board of Jefferson County" on Justia Law

In October 2017, plaintiffs Sadie Boyd (a student at Twin Valley Middle High School in Whitingham, Vermont) Madeleine Klein (a resident and property owner in Whitingham), and the Town of Whitingham filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant State of Vermont, arguing that the education funding and property taxation system set forth in 16 V.S.A. ch. 133 and 32 V.S.A. ch. 135 violated the Education Clause, the Proportional Contribution Clause, and the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. They claimed that the system was unconstitutional because it deprived plaintiff Boyd of an equal educational opportunity, required plaintiff Klein to contribute disproportionately to education funding, and compelled the Town to collect an unconstitutional tax. The civil division granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the alleged inequities were caused by the statutes in question or that the education property taxation system lacked a rational basis. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boyd, et al. v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Williams County and Williams County Commission (collectively, “County”) appealed a judgment in favor of Twin City Technical LLC, Three Horns Energy, LLC, Prairie of the South LLC, and Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. (collectively, “Companies”) on their claim of unjust enrichment and adverse orders granting a bench trial, compelling discovery, and awarding expenses and attorney’s fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the County was barred from relitigating unjust enrichment and raising the defenses of waiver and unclean hands; and the district court did not err in finding laches did not bar the Companies’ unjust enrichment claim, awarding prejudgment interest beginning from September 2015, ordering a bench trial, granting the Companies’ motion to compel, and awarding expenses and attorney’s fees. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed, but the Supreme Court modified the order awarding expenses and attorney’s fees, subtracting the legal research expense. View "Twin City Technical, et al. v. Williams Cty, et al." on Justia Law

North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund (“NDIRF”) appealed a judgment and orders granting Lance Hagen’s amended petition for a writ of mandamus requiring NDIRF to disclose documents under the open records law. NDIRF argued: (1) the amended petition was untimely; (2) NDIRF was not a public entity subject to open records requests; and (3) the documents sought were protected from disclosure under North Dakota court rules. Hagen cross appealed, arguing the district court erred by not requiring NDIRF to disclose all of the documents he sought and by denying him costs and attorney’s fees. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, concluding the amended petition was timely, NDIRF was a public entity for purposes of the open records law, and the records sought were not exempt from disclosure. The Court reversed the part of the judgment and orders excluding records from disclosure, and remanded to the district court to review in camera those previously excluded records and those records identified in Appellant’s Brief to determine whether they were exempt from disclosure under the potential liability exception in N.D.C.C. 44-04-19.1(8). The Court affirmed the denial of costs and attorney’s fees. View "Hagen v. North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund" on Justia Law

J.O. and M.B. married in 2007 and for more than 15 years also have been in what they describe as a committed, polyamorous relationship with appellant. In 2018, appellant, J.O., and M.B. decided to have a child together. They agreed J.O. and M.B. would be the child’s biological parents, appellant would adopt the child, and J.O. and M.B. would maintain their parental rights. Together, the three of them would share equally in parenting rights and responsibilities. After E.B. was born, appellant began adoption proceedings. Consistent with the requirements for an independent adoption, California’s State Department of Social Services (CDSS) conducted an investigation and concluded the adoption was in E.B.’s best interest. Accordingly, CDSS recommended the uncontested adoption be granted. Rejecting CDSS’s recommendation, the trial court denied appellant’s petition to adopt E.B. Relying on Family Code section 7612, the trial court found appellant had not yet fulfilled E.B.’s needs for a substantial period of time, and there was no likelihood that E.B. would be taken from appellant, resulting in detriment to the child. Appellant moved the court to vacate its order. The trial court denied that motion too. To the Court of Appeals, appellant and CDSS argued the trial court applied the incorrect law to appellant’s adoption petition and, under the correct law, section 8617, the petition to adopt E.B. should have been granted. The Court agreed the trial court applied the incorrect law and remanded the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under the applicable statute. View "Adoption of E.B." on Justia Law

The Idaho Industrial Commission appealed the dismissal of motion to renew a restitution order in a criminal case. The Owyhee County Prosecuting Attorney obtained an order of restitution against Malinda Poe in 2005, which required Poe to pay $2,346 to the Industrial Commission’s Crime Victims Compensation Program. In 2010, the Industrial Commission sought an order renewing the order of restitution, which was granted by the magistrate court. Five years later, the Industrial Commission sought another order renewing the order of restitution, which was also granted at that time by the magistrate court. In 2020, the Industrial Commission sought a third order renewing the order of restitution. This time, however, the magistrate court denied the request, finding that the Industrial Commission lacked standing to seek a renewal of the restitution order. The Industrial Commission appealed to the district court, which, sitting in its intermediate appellate capacity, also concluded the Commission lacked standing, and further concluded that the order of restitution was not subject to renewal pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1110. The Industrial Commission appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Poe" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Robin Thornton and Michael Lucero alleged defendants Tyson Foods, Inc., Cargill Meat Solutions, Corp., JBS USA Food Company, and National Beef Packing Company, LLC, used deceptive and misleading labels on their beef products. In particular, plaintiffs contended the “Product of the U.S.A.” label on defendants’ beef products was misleading and deceptive in violation of New Mexico law because the beef products did not originate from cattle born and raised in the United States. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the federal agency tasked with ensuring the labels were not misleading or deceptive preapproved the labels at issue here. In seeking to establish that defendants’ federally approved labels were nevertheless misleading and deceptive under state law, plaintiffs sought to impose labeling requirements that were different than or in addition to the federal requirements. The Tenth Circuit concluded plaintiffs’ deceptive-labeling claims were expressly preempted by federal law. Further, the Court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for false advertising. View "Thornton, et al. v. Tyson Foods, et al." on Justia Law