Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The State redesigned the dental insurance plan offered to public retirees in 2014, narrowing coverage but also decreasing premiums paid by retirees. The Retired Public Employees of Alaska challenged the redesign. After a bench trial the superior court concluded that the new plan unconstitutionally diminished retirees’ accrued benefits. The State appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by determining the dental plan was a constitutionally protected “accrued benefit” and by refusing to consider premium rates for retirees as relevant to the diminishment analysis. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the State on the second point only: "The Alaska Constitution does protect public retirees’ option to purchase dental insurance as an accrued benefit, but both coverage for retirees and price to retirees influence the value of this option." The Court therefore vacated and remanded for the superior court to reevaluate the plan changes and incorporate premium pricing into its analysis. View "Tshibaka v. Retired Public Employees of Alaska, Inc." on Justia Law

Divide County, North Dakota appealed judgments dismissing its complaints against Stateline Services, Inc., Power Energy Logistics, LLC, and five individuals (collectively, “Defendants”), which alleged they operated overweight vehicles on restricted roads. In 2019, Divide County imposed certain weight restrictions on county and township roads due to wet conditions. Truck drivers for Stateline Services and Power Energy Logistics were pulled over on township roads and cited for operating overweight vehicles. The County filed this civil action against the Defendants for statutory damages under N.D.C.C. 39-12- 17. After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the complaints, concluding the County failed to provide sufficient public notice of the weight restrictions through a uniform county permit system, and failed to erect and maintain signs at each end of the highway. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Divide County v. Stateline Service, et al." on Justia Law

After a sinkhole formed on the leasehold of Jad Khalaf, the Pearl River Valley Water Supply District (District) filed a complaint against Khalaf to recoup the costs of repairing the sinkhole and for other relief. Khalaf moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the chancery court granted. The District appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed dismissal. View "Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. Khalaf" on Justia Law

Two cases were consolidated for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review. In the first appeal, Singing River MOB, LLC (MOB), argued that the leases between itself and Singing River Health System (SRHS) and the lease between Jackson County, Mississippi (County), and SRHS were valid and that the chancery court erred by finding the leases invalid under Mississippi’s “minutes rule.” In the second appeal, Jackson County and SRHS contended the chancery court erred by fashioning its own equitable relief as a result of the first ruling. MOB also raised its own objection as to the manner in which the equitable relief was fashioned. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the partial summary-judgment order as to the first appeal (No. 2019-IA-01630-SCT); however, the Court reversed and remanded that order as to the second appeal (No. 2019-IA-01653-SCT). View "Singing River MOB, LLC v. Jackson County" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Chenard appealed a superior court ruling that he operated or maintained a junk yard in violation of RSA 236:114. Plaintiff Town of Lincoln (town) cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its request for costs and attorney’s fees. Defendant owned the property at issue, consisting of four lots located in the town's "General Use" zoning district, which allowed junk yards only by special exception. The properties contained “large amounts of personal belongings” stored “both outdoors and in a number of sheds, which are generally in a dilapidated condition.” During its view of the properties, the court observed “old or used scrap metal including numerous machine or automotive parts, tires, wheels, cables and wiring, woodstoves, snowplows, construction debris, steel drums, plastic barrels, and other detritus.” In addition, the court observed “several automobiles that did not appear to be in working order, as well as old snowmobiles, lawnmowers, and ATVs, an old boat, and two semi-trailers.” All of the materials stored on defendant’s properties belonged to him and were stored there for his personal use. Defendant did not have a license to operate a junk yard business, nor did he have a special exception from the town. The superior court ultimately ordered defendant to end his violation of RSA 236:114 and abate the nuisance by a certain date and, if he failed to do so, authorized the town to impose a civil penalty of up to $50 per day for every day the nuisance continued and until such time as the nuisance was abated to the town’s satisfaction. The trial court denied the town’s request for costs and attorney’s fees. Finding that the trial court did not err in finding that provisions of RSA 236:111-:129 applied to defendant’s properties, and that defendant was operating or maintaining a junk yard in violation of RSA 236:114, and that the town was not entitled to attorney's fees, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Lincoln v. Joseph Chenard" on Justia Law

Childs leased military family housing at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, which was owned by SDFH, a public-private venture created by statute, in which the U.S. Navy is a minority LLC member. Lincoln managed the property. Childs reported water and mold problems to SDFH and Lincoln. The problems were not resolved. SDFH and Lincoln moved to dismiss Childs's subsequent lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing they were government contractors acting at the direction of the federal government, and therefore had derivative sovereign immunity. The district court denied their motion.The Ninth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The district court’s order was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, under which an order that does not terminate the litigation is nonetheless treated as final if it conclusively determines the disputed question, resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. While the first two prongs were satisfied, the denial of derivative sovereign immunity was not effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment because denying an immediate appeal would not imperil a substantial public interest. The public interest underlying derivative sovereign immunity is extending the federal government’s immunity from liability, in narrow circumstances, to government agents carrying out the federal government’s directions. That interest could be vindicated after trial. View "Childs v. San Diego Family Housing LLC" on Justia Law

Landowner Daniel Banyai appealed an Environmental Division decision upholding a notice of violation, granting a permanent injunction, and assessing $46,600 in fines, relating to alleged zoning violations and the construction of a firearms training facility in the Town of Pawlet. Banyai argued he had a valid permit, certain exhibits were improperly admitted at the merits hearing, and the fines were excessive. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. View "Town of Pawlet v. Banyai" on Justia Law

In 2010, real parties in interest applied to the City of Santa Cruz to construct a 40-unit development on a parcel of land located at 1930 Ocean Street Extension. Following an initial mitigated negative declaration and years of litigation surrounding the impact of the nearby crematory at Santa Cruz Memorial Park, in 2016, the real parties in interest renewed their interest in moving forward with their project. As required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the project applicant and the City of Santa Cruz prepared and circulated the initial study, the draft environmental impact report (EIR), the partially recirculated draft EIR, and the final EIR. Following a public hearing, the city council adopted a resolution to certify the EIR and to adopt Alternative 3, a 32-unit housing project. The Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Association (OSENA) filed a petition for writ of mandamus, alleging the City of Santa Cruz and its city council violated CEQA and the Santa Cruz Municipal Code in approving the project. The trial court concluded the City had complied with CEQA, but it determined the City violated the municipal code, and it issued a limited writ prohibiting the City from allowing the project to proceed unless and until it followed the municipal code and the court was satisfied with its compliance. Following entry of judgment, OSENA appealed, arguing the court erred by concluding the City complied with CEQA’s requirements. OSENA contended the City violated CEQA by: (1) insufficiently addressing potentially significant biological impacts and mitigation measures in the initial study rather than in the EIR directly; (2) establishing improperly narrow and unreasonable objectives so that alternative options could not be considered meaningfully; and (3) failing to address cumulative impacts adequately. The City cross-appealed, contending the court incorrectly concluded it violated the municipal code by granting a planned development permit without also requiring the project applicant to comply with the slope modifications regulations After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City, and affirmed that portion of the trial court's order and judgment concluding it complied with CEQA. The Court reversed the portion of the order and judgment concluding the City violated its municipal code. View "Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood etc. v. City of Santa Cruz" on Justia Law

Trackside was a proposed mixed-use building project in the City of Davis, California, between the Downtown Core and Old East Davis, an older neighborhood. After the city council approved Trackside, plaintiff Old East Davis Neighborhood Association (“the Association”) petitioned for a writ of mandate, and the trial court found insufficient evidence supported the City’s finding that Trackside was consistent with applicable planning documents. The court specifically cited the lack of evidence that Trackside served as a “transition” from the Downtown Core to Old East Davis. On appeal, defendants City of Davis and City Council, along with real party in interest Trackside Center, LLC (“the City” and “Trackside”) challenged that ruling, contending the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating consistency with planning documents, and that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that Trackside was consistent with applicable planning requirements and guidelines. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the City’s approval, and the Association’s contentions on cross-appeal lacked merit. The Court therefore reversed the judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate. View "Old East Davis Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Davis" on Justia Law

In 2017 and 2018, the California Legislature enacted two statutes, Government Code sections 17581.96 and 17581.97, in part to fulfill the state’s obligation to reimburse school districts under article XIII B, section 6 of the state constitution. Both statutes provided one-time funding to school districts in a certain year, either in fiscal year 2017-2018 or 2018-2019, and both stated that the provided funds “shall first satisfy any outstanding” amounts owed to the school districts under article XIII B, section 6. Appellants were nine school districts that objected to these two statutes in a suit against the State and the State Controller. In their view, article XIII B, section 6 prohibited the state from reimbursing school districts in the manner that sections 17581.96 and 17581.97 allowed. The trial court, however, disagreed, finding no merit to Appellants’ claim. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "San Diego Unified School Dist. v. State of Cal." on Justia Law