Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A drug manufacturer cannot distribute a drug in interstate commerce without obtaining the FDA’s approval for the uses listed on the drug’s official label, 21 U.S.C. 355(a). The Act does not prohibit doctors from prescribing FDA-approved drugs for “off-label” use but leaves the regulation of doctors to the states. Hydroxychloroquine is approved to treat malaria, lupus, and arthritis but not to treat COVID-19. In 2020, the FDA relied on then-available data and issued an Emergency Use Authorization, permitting hydroxychloroquine in the federal government’s strategic stockpile to be distributed to treat COVID-19 patients in limited circumstances.The Association, a nonprofit organization with physician members, sued, challenging restrictions barring use of hydroxychloroquine to treat COVID-19 except for hospitalized patients. The Association alleged that these restrictions violated the implied equal-protection guarantee in the Fifth Amendment; violated the First Amendment right to associate by limiting access to medication useful for meeting in groups; and violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The Association alleged an injury to itself: it was considering canceling a conference purportedly due to the restrictions. It also invoked associational standing on behalf of its physician members who could not prescribe hydroxychloroquine for COVID-19.The district court held that none of these injuries plausibly pleaded the Association’s standing to challenge the Authorization. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Associaiton failed to plausibly plead that any member has been injured by the FDA’s actions. View "Association of American Physicians & Surgeons v. United States Food & Drug Administration" on Justia Law

Portland Street Solar LLC appealed a Public Utility Commission order denying Portland Street’s petition for a certificate of public good (CPG) to install and operate a 500-kW solar group net-metering system adjacent to a previously permitted solar array owned by Golden Solar, LLC. Interpreting the definition of “plant” set forth in 30 V.S.A. 8002(18), the Commission determined that the proposed Portland Street project would be part of a single plant along with the already-approved adjacent Golden Solar project and thus would exceed the 500-kw energy-generating-capacity limit applicable in the net-metering program. On appeal, Portland Street argued the Commission’s decision was inconsistent with the Vermont Supreme Court’s controlling precedent, as well as prior Commission decisions involving similar cases, and that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by expansively construing the component parts of section 8002(18) that defined the characteristics of a single plant. Applying the appropriate deferential standard of review, the Supreme Court concluded the Commission’s self-described expanded and refined interpretation of what constituted a single plant under section 8002(18) was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory and did not amount to compelling error that would require the Court to intervene in matters the Legislature has delegated to the Commission’s expertise. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commission’s decision denying Portland Street’s petition for a CPG to install and operate its proposed facility under the net-metering program. View "In re Petition of Portland Street Solar LLC" on Justia Law

Between 2010 and 2015, pursuant to a contract with the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC), Wellpath, LLC assumed responsibility for providing medical care to every person in state custody within Vermont. Pursuant to the Vermont’s Public Records Act (PRA), plaintiff Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) requested from Wellpath any records relating to legal actions and settlements arising from this care. Wellpath declined to furnish the requested records, arguing that, as a private contractor, it was not subject to the PRA’s disclosure requirements. HRDC brought the instant suit, and the trial court entered judgment for Wellpath. The Vermont Supreme Court found the language of the PRA was unambiguous: "where the state contracts with a private entity to discharge the entirety of a fundamental and uniquely governmental obligation owed to its citizens, that entity acts as an 'instrumentality' of the State. ... But because here, for five years, Wellpath was the sole means through which the constitutional imperative that the DOC provide healthcare to those it incarcerates was carried out, Wellpath became an 'instrumentality' of the state, and was thus subject to the disclosure obligations of the PRA." Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Human Rights Defense Center v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC et al." on Justia Law

The Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Commission denied an individual’s request for a hearing regarding a reported natural gas leak and whether the leak constituted “waste” under Alaska law. The agency concluded it had no jurisdiction over the matter because it previously had investigated and had concluded the leak did not constitute “waste.” The individual appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the agency’s decision. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, finding the individual's request for a hearing was improperly denied: "The Commission has jurisdiction over waste determinations, and substantial evidence does not support its assertion that it investigated and concluded this leak was not waste." View "French v. Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Commission" on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act applied a two-year limitations period to claims for “compensation for disability.” In 1988, the legislature reconfigured one type of compensation — for permanent partial disability — as compensation for permanent partial impairment. The claimant here argued this amendment exempted claims for impairment compensation from the statute of limitations. The Alaska Supreme Court disagreed: because the statutory text contains ambiguity and the legislative history evinced no intent to exempt impairment claims from the statute of limitations, the Court ruled that claims for impairment compensation were subject to the Act’s two-year limitations period. A secondary issue in this case was whether the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board properly denied paralegal costs for work related to other claims. The applicable regulation required a claim for paralegal costs be supported by the paralegal’s own affidavit attesting to the work performed. To this, the Supreme Court rejected the claimant’s argument that this regulation was contrary to statute and the constitution. View "Murphy v. Fairbanks North Star Borough" on Justia Law

The Utilities Board of the City of Roanoke ("the Utilities Board") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate an order purporting to reinstate a case that the circuit court had previously disposed of. Because the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to issue the order purporting to reinstate the case, it granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Utilities Board of the City of Roanoke." on Justia Law

Amy Williamson petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in her favor based on State-agent immunity. Twenty-year-old Re.W. was a student in the CrossingPoints program, a collaborative program between the University of Alabama, the Tuscaloosa City Board of Education, and the Tuscaloosa County Board of Education that served college-aged students with mental disabilities. Williamson was a teacher in the program and an employee of the Tuscaloosa City Board of Education, and Amy Burnett was a "para-educator" with the program. In 2015, Williamson and Burnett transported Re.W. and three other students to various businesses to submit job applications. While Williamson and Burnett took two students into a Lowe's home-improvement store to submit applications, Re.W. and a male student stayed in the CrossingPoints van. Re.W. stated that, during the short time that the others were inside the store, the male student touched her on her breast and between her legs. In 2019, Re.W., by and through her parents and next friends, Ro.W. and V.W., sued Williamson on counts of negligent, wanton, and/or willful failure to perform ministerial acts and the tort of outrage. Williamson filed an answer to the complaint denying the material allegations and asserted multiple affirmative defenses. Williamson later moved for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that Re.W.'s claims were barred by the doctrine of State-agent immunity. Because the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Williamson established that, at the time of the incident, she was performing a discretionary function, and because the Court concluded Re.W. did not present any evidence to establish that an exception to State-agent immunity applied, Williamson established that she was entitled to State-agent immunity. Accordingly, the petition for the writ of mandamus was granted and the trial court directed to vacate its order denying Williamson's motion for a summary judgment, and directed to enter a summary judgment for Williamson. View "Ex parte Amy Williamson." on Justia Law

Tillman Infrastructure, LLC, sought to build a 290-foot tower in Marshall County, Mississippi on a plot designated an agricultural zone. Tillman applied for a special exception through the Marshall County Planning Commission, and the request was approved. American Tower Corporation owns an existing wireless-telecommunications tower that is approximately a quarter of a mile from Tillman’s proposed tower. American Tower opposed Tillman’s request for a special exception. Tillman’s application was considered at the November 18, 2019 meeting of the Marshall County Board of Supervisors. American Tower argued that Tillman could not satisfy the standards for a special exception. The board unanimously approved Tillman’s request for a special exception. American Tower appealed to the Marshall County Circuit Court. Marshall County filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Marshall County claimed that American Tower failed to provide notice to the board president of the board of supervisors as required by Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75. Tillman joined the motion and also argued that American Tower lacked standing to prosecute its appeal. The circuit court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss. In this appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court considered the dismissal of an appeal of a decision by a board of supervisors under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2019), and whether American Tower properly perfected its appeal. The Supreme Court found that under Section 11-51-75, as revised, it was the filing of the notice of appeal that established appellate jurisdiction to the circuit court. "We acknowledge that American Tower did not deliver a copy of the notice of appeal to the president of the board of supervisors. However, we find this defect is procedural and may be remedied." Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "American Tower Asset Sub, LLC d/b/a American Tower Corporation v. Tillman Infrastructure, LLC et al." on Justia Law

Guam’s Department of Revenue concluded that Guerrero owes approximately $3.7 million in unpaid taxes because he did not pay his full tax liability for the tax years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 after belatedly filing his returns for these years. The parties dispute when the Department assessed Guerrero’s taxes because the official records are missing, likely due to water, mold, and termite damage at the storage facility. Guam filed tax liens on real property that Guerrero owns with his former spouse in joint tenancy, then filed suit to collect Guerrero’s tax deficiencies through foreclosure. Guerrero argued that the Department cannot prove that it timely assessed his taxes, timely levied the tax liens, nor timely commenced its action, 26 U.S.C. 6501(a), 6502(a)(1). Guam invoked the presumption of regularity based on the Department’s standard procedure and internal documents to establish that Guam acted within the statute of limitations.The district court partially ruled in favor of Guam, on the issues of the presumption of regularity and the timeliness of the Department’s actions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The presumption of regularity applied and Guerrero failed to rebut it. Guam established the timeliness of its assessment of Guerrero’s unpaid taxes, its filing of the tax lien, and its commencement of this action through the internal documents and testimony from the Department’s employees. View "Government of Guam v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

In 2018, a Sacramento Police Department administrative penalty of $137,500 was imposed on plaintiffs Zuhu Wang and Xiaoyan Yue based on the number of marijuana plants that were found on property they owned in excess of what was permitted under Sacramento City Code (City Code) section 8.132.040(B). Plaintiffs filed an administrative appeal with the City of Sacramento. After a hearing, a hearing examiner found the penalty was properly issued. The examiner relied in part on City Code section 8.08.050(A), which stated that “[e]very owner of real property within the city is required to manage the property in a manner so as not to violate the provisions of this code and the owner remains liable for violations thereof regardless of any contract or agreement with any third party regarding the property.” The examiner found “[t]he property owner in good faith entrusted the management of his property to an established property management company that failed to adequately follow through with background research on the tenant, and to conduct adequate inspections of the property.” The examiner reduced the administrative penalty to $35,000 “in consideration of the evidence and testimony presented.” The question presented by this appeal was whether a de novo appeal to a superior court pursuant to Government Code section 53069.4 was unavailable to challenge an administrative penalty that exceeds $25,000. The Court of Appeal determined that because the statute contained no such limitation, it reversed the judgment dismissing the de novo appeal brought by plaintiffs, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wang v. City of Sacramento Police Dept." on Justia Law