Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A reverse validation action was brought by petitioners Bonnie Wolstoncroft, William Unkel, and Michael Wilkes against the County of Yolo (County) to challenge the County’s plan to continue water service to 95 residences within the North Davis Meadows County Service Area (County Service Area) by replacing two aging groundwater wells with the City of Davis’s (City) water supply. Under this plan, North Davis Meadows residents would pay substantially higher water rates to pay for the project. The County considered the increased water rates to be property-related fees and noticed a Proposition 218 (as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996)) hearing. More than five months after the County adopted its resolution, but before the deadline contemplated by the parties’ tolling agreement, petitioners filed their action in superior court. The trial court rejected petitioners’ argument that the increased levy constituted an assessment for which majority approval was required by Proposition 218. The trial court also rejected petitioners’ contentions that the County wrongfully rejected protest votes it claimed not to have received or received in an untimely manner. After review of petitioners' arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly determined that the levy constituted a property-related fee under Proposition 218. "The fact that maintaining adequate water supply requires switching water sources does not turn the fee into an assessment. Thus, the County properly employed the majority protest procedure under article XIII D, section 6." Further, the Court concluded that even if the trial court erred in denying petitioners’ motion to augment the record with declarations regarding two mailed protest votes, petitioners’ evidence would not prove timely compliance with the protest procedure. Without the protest votes for which only evidence of mailing was tendered, the protest lacked a majority. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was affirmed. View "Wolstoncroft v. County of Yolo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Wendy McKenzie was injured by a falling tree branch while jogging in Lower Bidwell Park, a municipal park owned by the City of Chico, California. She and her husband, Leslie McKenzie, real parties in interest, sued the City for personal injuries. The City sought a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial of its motion for summary judgment and to grant the motion, arguing the trial court, in denying the motion, failed to recognize the City was immune from liability for injuries caused by a natural condition of unimproved public property, under Government Code section 831.2. The Court of Appeal concurred with the City and issued the requested writ. View "City of Chico v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Zyszkiewicz, a prisoner and a medical cannabis patient, wrote a one-page letter to the DEA, seeking the rescheduling of marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801, which places federally-regulated substances into one of five schedules depending on “potential for abuse,” “medical use,” “safety,” and the likelihood of “dependence.” The DEA responded that the letter was not in the proper format for a petition but that it welcomed the opportunity to respond to his concerns. The DEA’s letter gave reasons for having denied an earlier rescheduling petition filed by Governors Chafee of Rhode Island and Gregoire of Washington State. Zyszkiewicz treated the DEA’s answer as a denial of his petition and unsuccessfully sought judicial review.Dr. Sisley, her associated institutions, and veterans (Petitioners) sought judicial review of the DEA’s response but did not seek to intervene in Zyszkiewicz’s petition before the DEA, nor have they filed a DEA petition of their own. The arguments Petitioners sought to raise were not made in Zyszkiewicz’s petition.The Ninth Circuit held that the Petitioners satisfy Article III standing requirements, but that they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the CSA and dismissed their petition for review. Petitioners alleged direct and particularized harms due to the misclassification of cannabis. Dr. Sisley and her associated institutions contend that the misclassification impedes their research efforts, and the veterans contend that it forecloses their access to medical treatment with cannabis through the VA. View "Sisley v. United States Drug Enforcement Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberly Olson appealed a trial court’s denial of her motion for preliminary injunction. Olson sought to enjoin defendant Hornbrook Community Services District (district) from having its employee, defendant Clint Dingman, perform “certain water-related duties (such as adding Chlorine to the [district’s] water, operating the Chlorination equipment, and doing water testing), or being paid to do so.” Olson asserted Dingman was required to be certified by the State Water Resources Control Board (board) under the operator certification program (program) as both a water treatment plant operator and a water distribution system operator to perform such duties and, because he was not certified as such, the district and Dingman (collectively defendants) violated several provisions of the Health and Safety Code. She further claimed “Dingman’s illegal operation of the [district’s] facilities ha[s] resulted in toxic and offensive water, resulting in public and private nuisances, and waste of taxpayer funds.” The trial court denied the preliminary injunction motion because Olson failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits, the injunction would not maintain the status quo, and the balance of hardships tipped in favor of Dingman. Olson appealed, arguing largely that the trial court erred in its decision. The Court of Appeal did not reach the merits of Olson’s arguments because the Court concluded judicial abstention was appropriate under the facts of this case. The preliminary injunction Olson sought would have required the court to assume the functions of the board. The Court thus affirmed the order denying her preliminary injunction motion. View "Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ryan Holman sued the County of Butte, California, the County of Butte Health and Human Services Department (Health and Human Services), and the County of Butte Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff’s Office) (collectively County) for negligence under a theory Health and Human Services and the Sheriff’s Office failed to perform mandatory duties under Government Code section 815.6 related to the investigation and reporting of allegations of child abuse perpetrated against plaintiff by his parents. The County demurred, contending plaintiff’s allegations were time barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The question before the trial court was, and on appeal was whether the discovery was available to plaintiff to excuse his filing of his complaint after the statute of limitation had expired. The trial court agreed with the County that the discovery rule was unavailable when section 338(a) was the applicable statute of limitations. The Court of Appeal reversed: “The problem with the County’s argument is that, whether diligent or not, plaintiff brought his claim within three years of the triggering event, thus falling within the statute of limitations when the discovery rule is applied. The discovery rule postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. Once the cause of action accrues, the injured party still has the statute of limitations period to investigate the parameters of his or her claim. Because plaintiff filed his action within three years from when he had reason to know of his causes of action, his suit is timely.” View "Holman v. County of Butte" on Justia Law

In 2003, Golden sought to construct a hotel and casino. Golden’s proposed development, located within St. Croix’s coastal zone, required a major Coastal Zone Management (CZM) permit. The CZM Committee held the statutorily required public hearing on January 8, 2004. VICS, an environmental group, appeared and submitted comments. On January 20, Golden wrote a formal request for an extension to respond to comments. The Committee construed the letter as “waiv[ing] [Golden’s] right to a decision" within 30 days. By the time Golden replied, disputing that position, that statutory period had elapsed. The Committee had difficulty meeting its quorum requirements and held the decisional meeting in May, concluding that its failure to act before the deadline meant that it had granted Golden a default permit. The Committee later rescinded the default permit but the Board of Land Use Appeals issued the permit.VICS filed a petition with the Superior Court, which affirmed the Board’s decision. In 2020, the Appellate Division affirmed the Superior Court’s 2006 decision that affirmed the Board’s grant of a default permit, without reaching the merits of VICS’s petition.The Third Circuit remanded an appeal. A party appealing from the decision of a territorial court must establish Article III standing when invoking federal circuit court jurisdiction, even though Article III standing is not required before the territorial courts. The record was insufficient to determine whether VICS has Article III standing; the Superior Court must supplement the record. View "Virgin Islands Conservation Society, Inc. v. Virgin Islands Board of Land Use Appeals" on Justia Law

At issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court in this case was whether the Civil Service Commission for the City of Jackson (Commission) sufficiently and clearly certified its findings when it affirmed the Jackson Police Department’s termination of Officer Justin Roberts. The Supreme Court found that because the Commission failed to set forth with sufficient clarity and specificity its reasons for affirming Roberts’s termination, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court were reversed, and the matter remanded to the Commission to comply with the Supreme Court's directive to certify in writing and to set forth with sufficient clarity and specificity its factual findings. View "Roberts v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

Debra Turner, formerly a director and president of the Conrad Prebys Foundation (Foundation), appealed judgments of dismissal in favor of the Foundation and its directors, following orders sustaining demurrers to her probate and civil actions. In those actions, Turner alleged the other Foundation directors breached their fiduciary duties in preapproving a settlement range for Laurie Victoria, who served both as a Foundation director and as the trustee of the Conrad Prebys Trust (Trust), to negotiate a settlement of a trust challenge by a disinherited heir. Turner also challenged Victoria’s actions as trustee. Several months after commencing her action, Turner’s term as a Foundation director and officer expired when she was not reelected to her positions during the annual election process. The civil and probate courts determined that Turner lost standing to maintain her causes of action. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether a director of a nonprofit public benefit corporation who brings an action on behalf of the nonprofit public benefit corporation could lose standing to pursue its claims if the director was not reelected during the litigation. The Court of Appeal concluded the statutory scheme and public policy considerations required a continuous relationship with the public benefit corporation that was special and definite to ensure the litigation was pursued in good faith for the benefit of the corporation. "If a plaintiff does not maintain such a relationship, the statutory scheme provides the nonprofit public benefit corporation with protection through the Attorney General, who may pursue any necessary action either directly or by granting an individual relator status." Because Turner lost standing to pursue her causes of action, the Court affirmed the judgments of dismissal as to Turner acting in her capacity as a former director and officer. The case was remanded, however, with directions for the civil and probate courts to grant 60 days leave to amend, limited to the issue of whether a proper plaintiff could be substituted to pursue the existing claims. The Attorney General could consider during that 60-day period whether granting relator status to Turner, or another individual, for these claims was appropriate. View "Turner v. Victoria" on Justia Law

The Randolph-Sheppard Act (RSA) gives licensed blind individuals priority to operate vending facilities on federal property, 20 U.S.C. 107(b). The Secretary of Education promulgates implementing regulations and designates state agencies to administer the program. The RSA includes a grievance scheme for vendors to challenge a state’s operation of its Randolph-Sheppard program through the state licensing agency. A licensee dissatisfied with the results of the state’s hearing may seek further review before the Secretary, who must “convene a panel to arbitrate the dispute.” In the District of Columbia, the designated licensing agency is the Rehabilitation Services Administration.The plaintiffs, current and former vendors in the District’s Randolph-Sheppard program, claim that the District discriminated against them, based on their blindness, specifically by discriminatory inspections of vending facilities and failing to provide aids such as human or electronic readers. The plaintiffs did not pursue the Randolph-Sheppard grievance procedure but filed a lawsuit, claiming disability-based discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. The district court dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs had to proceed through the RSA grievance procedure before pursuing their discrimination claims in court; no futility exception could apply here. View "Patten v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

California Labor Code section 1197.1 (b) authorized the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (the Division) to issue a citation to an employer if the Division “determines that a person has paid or caused to be paid a wage less than the minimum under applicable law.” The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether certain employers, farm labor contractor Jaime Zepeda Labor Contracting, Inc. (Zepeda), and Zepeda’s “client employers,” Anthony Vineyards, Inc. (AVI) and Richard Bagdasarian, Inc. (RBI) (collectively “Employers”), committed minimum wage violations that would support the Division’s issuance of section 1197.1 citations. It was undisputed that the Employers paid all of the employees at issue at least the minimum wage by payday. Nevertheless, the Division contended it properly issued section 1197.1 minimum wage citations because the Employers did not promptly pay the final wages of the employees who were purportedly discharged or deemed by the Division to have quit in accordance with the prompt payment mandates of Labor Code sections 201, 202 and 203. The Division contended that the failure to pay wages on the dates that the employees were discharged or within 72 hours of when they quit subjected the Employers to waiting time penalties under section 203, and constituted independent minimum wage violations that supported the issuance of section 1197.1 citations, even though the Employers paid final wages that were at or above the minimum wage on or before payday, in accordance with the minimum wage law. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Division improperly issued the section 1197.1 minimum wage citations to the Employers. Therefore, the the superior court properly issued a peremptory writ of administrative mandate directing the Division to dismiss the citations with prejudice. View "Jamie Zepeda Labor Contracting v. Dept. of Industrial Relations etc." on Justia Law