Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Taxpayer Level 3 Communications, LLC (Level 3) challenged the Oregon Tax Court’s determination of the real market value of its tangible and intangible property for the 2014-15, 2015-16, and 2016-17 tax years. Level 3 argued that the Tax Court held that the central assessment statutory scheme permitted taxation of the entire enterprise value of the company, contrary to the wording of applicable statutes that permit taxation only of a centrally assessed corporation’s property. According to Level 3, the Tax Court applied that erroneous holding to incorrectly accept the Department of Revenue’s (the department’s) valuations of Level 3’s property for the relevant tax years. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded Level 3 misconstrued the Tax Court’s decision, and the Tax Court did not err by accepting the department’s valuations. Accordingly, the Tax Court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Level 3 Communications, LLC v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

In a workers’ compensation case, the issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on the scope of an employer’s obligation under ORS 656.262(7)(c) to reopen a closed claim for processing if a “condition is found compensable after claim closure.” The closed claim at issue here was claimant Randy Simi's accepted right rotator cuff tear, and the conditions giving rise to the dispute were supraspinatus and infraspinatus tendon tears, which claimant asked employer to accept as “new or omitted” conditions. Employer issued a denial specifying that the conditions were not compensable, but, without withdrawing the denial, employer later took the position that the tendon tears were “encompassed” within the originally accepted rotator cuff tear. That change of position caused an administrative law judge (ALJ) to determine that the tendon conditions were compensable and to set aside employer’s denial. According to claimant, that ALJ order triggered employer’s obligation under ORS 656.262(7)(c) to reopen the claim. Employer contended, however, that the legislature did not require reopening if the compensable condition at issue was “encompassed within” the already-accepted conditions, even if the employer also had denied that the condition was compensable. A majority of the Workers’ Compensation Board and a majority of the Court of Appeals panel agreed with employer, and the Supreme Court allowed review to consider this disputed question of statutory interpretation. Based on its examination of the statutory text and context, the Supreme Court concluded the legislature intended employers to reopen compensable claims for processing when a compensability denial was set aside after claim closure, including under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' decision was reversed. View "Simi v. LTI Inc. - Lynden Inc." on Justia Law

In June 2008, Scot Decker sustained work related injuries while he was working for Cyclone Drilling, Inc. in Mountrail County, North Dakota. WSI accepted liability and Decker received more than $1,250,000 in benefits from WSI. In June 2014, Decker signed a third party notice of legal representation advising WSI that he retained an attorney and planned to bring an action against a third party for the work related injuries. The notice stated Decker would act as a trustee for WSI’s subrogated interest. The notice also included a lien notice, advising that WSI had a lien in the full amount it paid in all benefits for Decker’s claim and that WSI could sue if Decker received any money related to the claim from a third party and WSI did not receive payment of its lien within 30 days of the third party’s payment to Decker. Decker brought an action against I.E. Miller Services, Inc., received a favorable verdict, and was awarded $2,045,972.60 in damages. In December 2018, WSI issued a subrogation order, finding it paid Decker for his work related injury and Decker failed to pay WSI’s subrogation interest and lien within 30 days. Decker requested a hearing before an ALJ. Decker alleged WSI incorrectly applied the law, it inappropriately included in the subrogation order benefits paid related to medical negligence which is the subject of a separate third-party action, and it did not properly determine the amount of its lien. Decker also argued WSI did not have a right to recovery of its lien before attorney’s fees and litigation expenses were paid. The ALJ ruled in favor of WSI, and Decker appealed. Decker argued the district court erred in concluding it does not have jurisdiction and dismissing his appeal. The North Dakota Supreme Court found Decker brought his appeal in Burleigh County District Court, and it was undisputed that Decker did not reside in Burleigh County and that his injuries did not occur in Burleigh County. Because N.D.C.C. 65-10-01 applied and required Decker to bring the appeal in the county where he resided or the county where the injury was inflicted, the Burleigh County district court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal. Dismissal was affirmed. View "Decker v. WSI" on Justia Law

Thirteen nationally registered stock exchanges sought review of four orders issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning national market system plans that govern the collection, processing, and distribution of stock quotation and transaction information. Under the Securities Exchange Act, a final order of the Commission must be challenged “within sixty days after the entry of the order,” 15 U.S.C. 78y(a)(1).The exchanges filed their challenges 65 days after the orders were entered, arguing that the challenged orders are not actually orders but rather rules, which are subject to a different filing deadline. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petitions as untimely. Instead of focusing on the amendment’s substance or the procedure used to effectuate it, the court gave conclusive weight to the Commission’s designation. Construing section 78y(a)(1)’s use of “order” to mean “order identified as such” promotes predictability and clarity. Deferring to the Commission’s designation affects only the deadline by which the Amendments can be challenged, not the Amendments’ judicial reviewability or the substantive legal standard applicable to their merits. View "New York Stock Exchange LLC v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

Farrar began working for NASA in 2010. When NASA fired him five months later, he filed an administrative action alleging disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791 –794g. For the most part, Farrar prevailed. NASA awarded him compensatory damages, costs, and fees of about $13,000. Farrar appealed to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which increased the award to about $35,000 and ordered NASA to pay Farrar within 60 days. Farrar could either accept the Commission’s disposition or file a civil action within 90 days. After NASA paid him, Farrar filed a civil action. Because Farrar accepted the money from NASA, the district court dismissed his case.The D.C. Circuit reinstated the suit, finding no statute or regulation that required Farrar to return, or offer to return, the money before filing suit. A federal employee cannot bind the government to an administrative finding of liability and then litigate only the remedy in court but that rule does not address whether a federal employee who has retained an administrative remedy must disgorge, or offer to disgorge, the award upon filing a de novo lawsuit. The Commission’s regulations show it is aware that it sometimes orders agencies to pay an employee’s damages before the employee files a civil action but nevertheless retained discretion to order payment before 120 days. View "Farrar v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In 2017, the City of Farmington (Defendant) adopted an ordinance that imposed additional charges on customers who generate their own electricity. Defendant argued that change reflected the true cost imposed by these customers on the electric grid; Plaintiffs argued the charges amounted to price discrimination in violation of FERC rules. Defendant moved to dismiss Vote Solar and several other plaintiffs for lack of standing. Sua sponte, the district court requested supplemental briefing concerning its statutory subject-matter jurisdiction. The parties, operating under the assumption that the "as-implemented" versus "as-applied" framework governed subject-matter jurisdiction: Plaintiffs argued they were lodging an as-implemented claim and Defendant characterized the claim as as-applied. Due to its interpretation of PURPA’s jurisdictional provisions, the district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that because Plaintiffs did not argue Defendant had made no effort to implement FERC’s price discrimination rules, its claim did not fall within the district court’s jurisdiction. It also deemed Defendant’s motion regarding standing moot. Plaintiffs appealed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that this case was one of an “as-implemented” claim. "In this case, the district court rejected that established distinction, introducing a particularized and novel interpretation of PURPA’s jurisdictional scheme under which federal courts have jurisdiction only if a utility fails to make any reasonable effort to implement a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rule." The Tenth Circuit declined to adopt the district court's decision in this case. View "Vote Solar v. City of Farmington" on Justia Law

Appellants owned beachfront mobilehomes in Capistrano Shores Mobile Home Park located in the City of San Clemente. Each of their mobilehomes was a single-story residence. Between 2011 and 2013, appellants each applied for, and received, a permit from the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) to remodel their respective mobilehome. Appellants also applied for coastal development permits from the Coastal Commission. Their applications expressly indicated they were not addressing any component of the remodels for which they obtained HCD permits, including the addition of second stories. Rather, their coastal development permit applications concerned desired renovations on the grounds surrounding the mobilehome structures, including items such as carports, patio covers, and barbeques. Appellants completed their remodels at various times between 2011 and 2014. The parties disputed whether appellants received, prior to completion of construction, any communication from the Coastal Commission concerning the need for a coastal development permit for their projects.In February 2014, the Coastal Commission issued notices to appellants that the then-complete renovation of their residential structures was unauthorized and illegal without a coastal development permit. Faced with a potential need to demolish, at minimum, completed second-story additions to their mobilehomes, appellants unsuccessfully petitioned for a writ of mandate declaring that the coastal development permits were deemed approved by operation of law under the Permit Streamlining Act. In denying the petition, the trial court concluded the Coastal Commission had jurisdiction to require appellants to obtain coastal development permits and the prerequisite public notice to deemed approval under the Streamlining Act did not occur. Appellants contended on appeal that the trial court erred in both respects. The Court of Appeal concluded appellants’ writ petition should have been granted. "The Coastal Commission has concurrent jurisdiction with the California Department of Housing and Community Development over mobilehomes located in the coastal zone. Thus, even though appellants obtained a permit from the latter, they were also required to obtain a permit from the former. The Coastal Commission’s failure to act on appellants’ applications for costal development permits, however, resulted in the applications being deemed approved under the Streamlining Act." Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the matter with directions to the trial court to vacate the existing judgment and enter a new judgment granting appellants’ petition. View "Linovitz Capo Shores LLC v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a years-long dispute between Robert Elgee and the Retirement Board of the Public Employee Retirement System of Idaho (“PERSI”) regarding the payment of retirement benefits accrued during Elgee’s service as a magistrate judge. Elgee became eligible for PERSI benefits in 2010, but operating under an erroneous interpretation of the statutes it administers, PERSI maintained Elgee was not then entitled to receive benefits. Eleven years, numerous administrative determinations, and two judicial review actions later, the parties continued to disagree on issues relating to the calculation of benefits, the interest due on benefits, and whether Elgee was entitled to damages for the tax consequences of receiving a lump sum payment of retroactive benefits. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court as to the applicable rate of interest, reversed as to the remaining issues, and remanded for entry of judgment. On remand the district court was directed to enter judgment that reflected: (1) the PERSI Board’s determination that Elgee was due interest at the regular rate of interest under the PERSI statutes was affirmed; (2) the PERSI Board’s determination that Elgee was due interest from 2013, rather than 2010, was set aside; (3) the PERSI Board’s determination that Elgee was due benefits under the contingent annuitant option, rather than the regular retirement option was affirmed; (4) the PERSI Board’s determination that Elgee failed to prove his tax loss claim in 2018 was set aside; and (5) the PERSI Board’s determination that tax loss damages were not available under the PERSI statutes was affirmed. View "Elgee v. Retirement Brd. of the Public Employee (PERSI)" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants, Craig Immel, Terry Young, Herb Beattie, and Ray Pearcey (collectively, "Taxpayers"), sought a declaratory judgment that Defendants-appellees, Tulsa Public Facilities Authority (TPFA) and the City of Tulsa (City), could not sell 8.8 acres of park land to a private developer for the construction of a commercial shopping center because the land was held in a public trust expressly as a park for the people. All parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the TPFA and the City's joint motion for summary judgment as to all claims. Taxpayers appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held: (1) Taxpayers had standing; (2) the TPFA and the City could not sell the 8.8 acres of park land to a private developer for construction of a commercial shopping center because the land was indeed held in a public trust for the people, unless it was abandoned and/or was no longer fit for its intended use as a public park; (3) there were disputed material facts as to whether the TPFA and the City lawfully abandoned the 8.8 acres of park land; and (4) there were disputed material facts as to whether the expenditure met the public purpose requirement under the Oklahoma Constitution. The trial court's order granting the TPFA and the City's joint motion for summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Immel et al. v. Tulsa Public Facilities Authority" on Justia Law

In December 2014, Steve Tenny sustained a right-sided lumbar disc herniation injury during the course of his employment with Loomis Armored US (Loomis). He immediately began treatment, receiving a series of right-sided steroid injections in his back. At some point shortly after the second injection, Tenny began to complain of increasing left hip and groin pain and underwent testing and treatment for these symptoms. However, the worker’s compensation insurance surety, Ace American Insurance Co., ultimately denied payment for treatment related to the left-side groin pain. Following the matter going to hearing, the Referee recommended that the Industrial Commission find that the left-sided symptoms were causally related to Tenny’s December 2014 industrial accident. The Industrial Commission adopted the Referee’s findings, and after unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration, the employer and surety (collectively, "Defendants") appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. At issue before the Supreme Court was the question of causation: Was the left-side groin pain experienced by Tenny causally related to his industrial accident? Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's decision. View "Tenny v. Loomis Armored US, LLC" on Justia Law