Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Neighbors appealed three Vermont Environmental Division rulings related to their appeal of the Agency of Natural Resources’ (ANR) decision to authorize Snowstone, LLC, to discharge stormwater at a proposed project site pursuant to a multi-sector general permit (MSGP). The court dismissed for lack of statutory standing most of neighbors’ questions on appeal and dismissed the remaining questions as not properly before the court. In addition, the court concluded that neighbors’ motion for a limited site visit was moot, given its dismissal of neighbors’ appeal. Finally, the court granted landowners Justin and Maureen Savage’s motion to intervene in the proceedings. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that neighbors had standing to appeal the ANR’s authorization to act under a MSGP, and that their motion for a limited site visit was not moot. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the court acted within its discretion to allow landowners to intervene. Accordingly, dismissal of neighbors’ appeal was reversed, as was the dismissal of the motion for a site visit, and the court’s decision to grant landowners intervention was affirmed. View "In re Snowstone Stormwater Discharge Authorization (Harrington et al., Appellants)" on Justia Law

Claimant Sadeta Zebic appealed the Commissioner of Labor’s decision not to certify a question for review to the superior court, arguing that the Commissioner had no discretion not to certify her proposed question. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because claimant previously appealed to the superior court, and the statutory scheme provided that a workers’ compensation claimant could appeal either to the superior court or directly to the Supreme Court. View "Zebic v. Rhino Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Lakeshore Camping, Gary Medler, and Shorewood Association petitioned for contested case hearings before an administrative-law judge (ALJ), to challenge permits and a special exception granted by the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (now the Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE)) to Dune Ridge SA LP. In February 2014, Dune Ridge, a real estate developer, had purchased a 130-acre plot of land along the shore of Lake Michigan located in a critical dune area and therefore was subject to certain regulations under the sand dunes protection and management act (SDPMA). EGLE issued the requisite permits and special exceptions needed for development of the property to Dune Ridge, and in October 2014, Lakeshore Camping, Medler, and Shorewood filed their petitions under MCL 324.35305(1). Around September 2015, other individuals moved to intervene in the case as aggrieved adjacent property owners. The ALJ also allowed Lakeshore Group, an unincorporated nonprofit association, to intervene after determining that it had “representational standing” through Charles Zolper, one of its members. The ALJ denied intervention to some of these parties and ultimately dismissed the matter, concluding that the remaining petitioners and intervenors lacked standing. Lakeshore Camping and other petitioners were eventually dismissed from the case, leaving Jane Underwood, Zolper, and Lakeshore Group as the sole remaining petitioners. Dune Ridge then moved for partial summary disposition, seeking to dismiss Underwood because she no longer owned property immediately adjacent to Dune Ridge’s property. In July 2016, the ALJ granted the motion. In September 2016, Dune Ridge sold 15 acres of its property, including the land immediately adjacent to Zolper’s property, to Vine Street Cottages, LLC. Dune Ridge then moved for summary disposition as to Zolper, and the ALJ dismissed Zolper and Lakeshore Group, finding that they no longer had standing because Zolper was no longer an immediately adjacent property owner. Underwood, Zolper, Lakeshore Group, and others appealed the ALJ’s decision to the circuit court. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the dismissed petitioners lost their eligibility for a contested hearing based on the facts presented. To this, the Supreme Court answered “no:” because the statute provides no means to deprive an eligible petitioner of a contested hearing, petitioners were entitled to a contested case hearing. Judgment was reversed and remanded to the administrative tribunal for a formal contested case hearing. View "Lakeshore Group v. Dept. of Enviro. Quality" on Justia Law

Tillman filed a petition for leave to file a taxpayer action under 735 ILCS 5/11-303, to enjoin the disbursement of public funds, alleging that certain general obligation bonds issued by the state in 2003 and 2017 were unconstitutional. He claimed the bonds violated article IX, section 9(b), of the Illinois Constitution on the ground that they were not issued for qualifying “specific purposes,” which, he argued, refers exclusively to “specific projects in the nature of capital improvements, such as roads, buildings, and bridges.” The 2003 “State pension funding” law authorized $10 billion in bonds to be issued “for the purpose of making contributions to the designated retirement systems.” The 2017 law authorized “Income Tax Proceed Bonds,” ($6 billion) “for the purpose of paying vouchers incurred by the State prior to July 1, 2017.”The circuit court denied the petition. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the judgment of the circuit court. the necessary elements for laches have been met in this case: “lack of due diligence by the party asserting the claim” and “prejudice to the opposing party.” There is no reasonable ground under section 11-303 of the Code for filing the petitioner’s proposed complaint View "Tillman v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG) sued defendant Julio Fonseca, the former superintendent of the San Ysidro School District (District), alleging Fonseca caused the illegal disbursement of District funds in a settlement between District and third-party Enrique Gonzalez, a former District employee. The court bifurcated the trial and, after an evidentiary hearing, found SDOG lacked standing under newly amended Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. To this, the Court of Appeal concluded SDOG did not meet the taxpayer requirements for standing under section 526a and affirmed the trial court. View "San Diegans for Open Government v. Fonseca" on Justia Law

St. Luke’s Meridian Medical Center (St. Luke’s) provided inpatient hospital care for an indigent patient from January 26, 2016, until March 9, 2016. St. Luke’s sought payment from the Board by submitting a medical indigency application. In September 2016, the Board issued an initial determination, only approving payment from January 26 through February 2, 2016. St. Luke’s appealed the denial. The Board amended its determination by only partially extending payment approval through February 18, 2016. St. Luke’s petitioned for judicial review. In October 2017, the district court affirmed the Board’s decision. St. Luke’s appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court held that the Board’s findings did not provide a reasoned analysis, as required by the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA). The case was remanded back to the Board for it to make the required findings of fact and conclusions of law. On remand, the Board entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, again denying payment and finding that the services provided were not the most cost-effective services as required under the Idaho Medical Indigency Act. St. Luke’s again filed a petition for judicial review, and the district court again affirmed the Board’s decision. Once more, St. Luke’s timely appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the Board’s decision reflected a misinterpretation of the definition of “medically necessary services;” the Board’s decision was set aside and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "St. Luke's Health System v. Board of Commissioners of Gem County" on Justia Law

An indigent patient was admitted to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (St. Alphonsus) on October 7, 2017, and continued to receive treatment in the hospital until she was discharged on January 12, 2018. During her stay, St. Alphonsus filed a third-party medical indigency application on her behalf, and later filed two additional requests for payment of services. The Board of Ada County Commissioners (the Board) approved payment for dates of service from October 7 until October 10, 2017, but denied payments for services provided from October 11 until December 31, 2017, relying on the opinion of the Ada County Medical Advisor that the services provided on those dates were not “medically necessary” under the definition in Idaho Code section 31-3502(18)A(e). St. Alphonsus appealed the Board’s initial determination, but the final determination upheld the denial for payment beyond October 11. Upon St. Alphonsus’ petition, a district court reversed the Board’s decision, finding that the services “currently available” to a patient were to be considered as a “necessary medical service.” The Board argued “there did exist options for the Patient to proceed to rehabilitation at a facility other than St. Alphonsus, but for the Patient’s lack of funding.” Furthermore, the Board asserted that Idaho Code section 31-3502(18)A(e) is unambiguous in that “[t]here is no wording in [sub]section (e) of the statute that limits the ‘most cost-effective services’ to services that the Patient can afford to pay for.” After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the Board exceeded its statutory authority in denying St. Alphonsus reimbursement for providing medically necessary services. “The Board’s denial of payment was not based on substantial evidence and prejudiced St. Alphonsus’ substantial right to compensation for services rendered to an indigent patient.” View "St. Alphonsus Regional Medical v. Ada County" on Justia Law

A cannery worker reported two injuries: one to his back and one to his shoulder. He suffered these injuries at different times but while working for the same employer. The employer paid some medical benefits for both injuries but eventually challenged its obligation to provide further care. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied the worker’s claim for more medical benefits, and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. The worker appealed pro se. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the Commission properly affirmed the Board’s decision as to the back injury, but that the Board’s findings as to the shoulder injury lacked adequate support in the record. The Commission’s decision was therefore reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Espindola v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court’s review centered on whether emails on a university’s server, sent between a professor and third-party entities, concerning the work of those entities, qualified as “public records” subject to public inspection. U.S. Right to Know (USRTK) appealed a superior court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the University of Vermont (UVM) after the court held that the emails USRTK requested from UVM were not public records. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that the emails at issue were not public records and accordingly affirmed. View "U.S. Right to Know v. University of Vermont" on Justia Law

Kevin Johnson, APLC, Kevin Johnson, and Jeanne MacKinnon (collectively, the attorney defendants) filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint on behalf of their clients Christian Clews (Christian), Barbara Clews (Barbara), and Clews Land & Livestock, LLC (CLL) (collectively, Clews Horse Ranch) challenging a decision of the City of San Diego (City) to approve the construction of a private secondary school adjacent to the Clews’ commercial horse ranch. The petition asserted the City’s approval of the project and adoption of a mitigated negative declaration for the project violated the California Environmental Quality Act, the San Diego Municipal Code, and the City’s land use plan. The trial court denied relief and, in Clews Land and Livestock, LLC v. City of San Diego, 19 Cal.App.5th 161 (2017), the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Jan Dunning, Cal Coast Academy RE Holdings, LLC, and North County Center for Educational Development, Inc. (collectively, Cal Coast), the developers of the project and real parties in interest in the CEQA Litigation, then filed this lawsuit against Clews Horse Ranch and the attorney defendants for malicious prosecution. Cal Coast asserted the defendants lacked probable cause and acted with malice when they pursued the CEQA Litigation. The attorney defendants filed a special motion to strike Cal Coast’s complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, to which the Clews Horse Ranch joined. The trial court denied the motion after finding that Cal Coast established a probability of prevailing on its malicious prosecution claim. Clews Horse Ranch and the attorney defendants appealed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal concluded Cal Coast established a probability of prevailing on its malicious prosecution claim against Clews Horse Ranch, but not against the attorney defendants. Therefore, the Court affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion as to Clews Horse Ranch, and reversed the order denying the anti- SLAPP motion as to the attorney defendants. View "Dunning v. Johnson" on Justia Law