Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

GASP, an Alabama nonprofit corporation, filed a petition for certiorari review by the Alabama Supreme Court to challenge a Court of Civil Appeals decision. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the Montgomery Circuit Court's dismissal of GASP's petition challenging a decision of the Jefferson County Board of Health ("the Board") to amend its rules under the under the Alabama Air Pollution Control Act of 1971, section 22-28-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the Air Control Act"). The Supreme Court granted GASP's petition for a writ of certiorari in order to evaluate, among other things, whether the Court of Civil Appeals correctly concluded that the rule-making procedures of the Air Control Act preempted any other rule-making procedures potentially applicable to the Board, particularly the rule-making procedures of the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act, section 41-22-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the AAPA"). The Supreme Court determined the Court of Civil Appeals erred in concluding that the Air Control Act preempted the administrative procedures provided in the AAPA. However, the Board was not an "agency" of the State as defined in section 41-22-3(1), Ala. Code 1975, of the AAPA, and therefore the Board was not subject to the procedural requirements of the AAPA. Thus, although the Supreme Court relied on different rationale than the Court of Civil Appeals, that court's judgment affirming the judgment of the circuit court was nevertheless affirmed. View "Ex parte GASP." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a historian, appealed the district court's order denying his petition to release grand jury records from the 1957 indictment of a former FBI agent. The court held that the district court has no authority outside Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) to disclose grand jury matter. In this case, plaintiff pointed to nothing in Rule 6(e)(3) that suggested that a district court has authority to order disclosure of grand jury matter outside the enumerated exceptions. Because the court held that the district court has no such authority, the court need not determine whether the district court abused its discretion denying plaintiff's petition as overbroad. View "McKeever v. Barr" on Justia Law

An association (plaintiff, Friends of Spring Street) filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief at superior court, challenging a determination by defendant Nevada City (the City) that real parties in interest Mollie Poe and Declan Hickey had the right to resume operation of a bed and breakfast facility in a residential district of the City despite the fact that, years earlier, voters had passed an initiative measure repealing the provisions in the City’s municipal code allowing such facilities. Plaintiff also challenged a 2015 City ordinance relating to the discontinuance of nonconforming uses subject to conditional use permits. The trial court upheld the City’s ruling with respect to the bed and breakfast and upheld the 2015 ordinance. In Friends I, the Court of Appeal concluded that "while the trial court did not err in upholding the 2015 ordinance, the court did err in upholding the [C]ity’s ruling with respect to the bed and breakfast." On remand, the trial court vacated its prior decision on the bed and breakfast issue and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on that issue with respect to its petition for writ of mandate. The trial court further directed the City to file a return to the writ, indicating it had set aside its challenged decision. The City complied. Plaintiff then moved for costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 and attorney fees under section 1021.5; the City and Real Parties opposed. The trial court granted the City’s and Real Parties’ motions to strike plaintiff’s memorandum of costs and denied plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees. Plaintiff appealed, but finding plaintiff was entitled to fees, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for : (1) a determination of the amount of costs to be awarded to plaintiff, if any, in accordance with section 1032 and the applicable legal principles; and (2) a determination whether the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement renders an attorney fee award appropriate and, if so, the amount to be awarded. View "Friends of Spring Street v. Nevada City" on Justia Law

Denise M. Ehrlich appealed an Idaho Industrial Commission (the Commission) order that determined she was ineligible for unemployment benefits. The Commission affirmed the determination of the Idaho Department of Labor and the Appeals Examiner that Ehrlich willfully underreported her weekly earnings. On appeal, Ehrlich contended the Commission’s finding that she willfully misrepresented her wages was clearly erroneous. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision. View "Ehrlich v. IDOL" on Justia Law

Pamela Russell injured her back in 2009 while working at a Wal-Mart store in Conway, South Carolina. The worker’s compensation commission found Russell suffered a 7% permanent partial disability, and awarded her twenty-one weeks of temporary total disability compensation. In 2011, Russell requested review of her award, claiming there had been a "change of condition caused by the original injury" pursuant to subsection 42-17-90(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015). An appellate panel of the commission remanded Russell's change of condition claim to a single commissioner for what was a third ruling on the same claim. Russell appealed the remand order to the court of appeals, which dismissed the appeal on the ground the order was not a final decision, and thus not immediately appealable. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the remand order was immediately appealable because the commission's unwarranted delay in making a final decision required immediate review to avoid leaving Russell with no adequate remedy on an appeal from a final decision. The Court reversed the court of appeals' order dismissing the appeal, reversed the appellate panel's remand order, and remanded to any appellate panel of the commission for an immediate and final review of the original commissioner's decision. View "Russell v. Wal-Mart" on Justia Law

A federal lawsuit, to which 49 states and the District of Columbia had joined, ended in a settlement agreement (the National Mortgage Settlement, or "NMS"), the terms of which the federal court formally entered as consent judgments in 2012. The NMS provided $2.5 billion to be paid to the states; California's share of the settlement funds was approximately $410 million. The California Legislature enacted Government Code section 12531, creating a special deposit in the treasury where 90 percent of the $410 million would be deposited. The director of finance received approval for various expenditures from the National Mortgage Special Deposit Fund “to offset General Fund costs of programs that support public protection, consumer fraud enforcement and litigation, and housing related programs” during specified fiscal years. In 2014, plaintiff community groups sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Governor, the director of finance, and the controller, seeking the immediate return of approximately $350 million they alleged was unlawfully diverted from the National Mortgage Special Deposit Fund to the General Fund in contravention of both section 12531 and the federal consent judgments. Rejecting defendants’ contention 12531(e) permitted the director of finance to use the National Mortgage Special Deposit Fund to offset General Fund expenditures, the trial court reasoned such a reading of the statute would “raise serious doubts about the legality of the statute, not only as to whether the Legislature may override a federal judgment, but also whether the Legislature constitutionally may delegate to an agency the authority to decide how millions of dollars of state funds shall be spent with virtually no guidance or direction from the Legislature.” The trial court concluded $331,044,084 was unlawfully appropriated from the National Mortgage Special Deposit Fund. Nevertheless, noting it lacked authority to order the Legislature to appropriate funds, the trial court declared an obligation to restore the unlawfully diverted funds. After the Court of Appeal issued its original opinion in this case, defendants petitioned the California Supreme Court for review. While that petition was pending, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 861 (2017 – 2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 331 (SB 861)), amending section 12531 to add subdivision (h). Thereafter, the Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of the new 12531(h). Having done so, and giving SB 861 all due consideration, the Court confirmed the conclusions reached in its original opinion. View "National Asian American Coalition v. Newsom" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Petitioners, Baltimore County taxpayers, lacked standing to challenge the County's operation of the Baltimore County Animal Shelter and alleged waste at the facility, holding that Petitioners demonstrated specific injury and thus possessed standing to pursue their claim against Baltimore County under the taxpayer standing doctrine.The circuit court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, holding that Petitioners' alleged pecuniary injury was not developed enough to survive summary judgment. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Petitioners possessed the requisite taxpayer standing to pursue their claim against the County because they established pecuniary harm derivative of waste and mismanagement, a nexus between that harm and the alleged illegal government act, and sufficiently quantified the alleged harm. View "George v. Baltimore County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Biestek, a former construction worker, applied for social security disability benefits, claiming he could no longer work due to physical and mental disabilities. To determine whether Biestek could successfully transition to less physically demanding work, the ALJ heard testimony from a vocational expert regarding the types of jobs Biestek could still perform and the number of such jobs that existed in the national economy. The statistics came from her own market surveys. The expert refused Biestek’s attorney's request to turn over the surveys. The ALJ denied Biestek benefits. An ALJ’s factual findings are “conclusive” if supported by “substantial evidence,” 42 U.S.C. 405(g).The Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court upheld the ALJ’s determination. A vocational expert’s refusal to provide private market-survey data upon the applicant’s request does not categorically preclude the testimony from counting as “substantial evidence.” In some cases, the refusal to disclose data, considered along with other shortcomings, will undercut an expert’s credibility and prevent a court from finding that “a reasonable mind” could accept the expert’s testimony; the refusal will sometimes interfere with effective cross-examination, which a reviewing court may consider in deciding how to credit an expert’s opinion. In other cases, even without supporting data, an applicant will be able to probe the expert’s testimony on cross-examination. The Court declined to establish a categorical rule, applying to every case in which a vocational expert refuses a request for underlying data. The inquiry remains case-by-case, taking into account all features of the expert’s testimony, with the rest of the record, and defers to the presiding ALJ. View "Biestek v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

Blue Valley Hospital, Inc., (“BVH”) appealed a district court’s dismissal of its action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) terminated BVH’s Medicare certification. The next day, BVH sought an administrative appeal before the HHS Departmental Appeals Board and brought this action. In this action, BVH sought an injunction to stay the termination of its Medicare certification and provider contracts pending its administrative appeal. The district court dismissed, holding the Medicare Act required BVH exhaust its administrative appeals before subject matter jurisdiction vested in the district court. BVH acknowledged that it did not exhaust administrative appeals with the Secretary of HHS prior to bringing this action, but argued: (1) the district court had federal question jurisdiction arising from BVH’s constitutional due process claim; (2) BVH’s due process claim presents a colorable and collateral constitutional claim for which jurisdictional exhaustion requirements are waived under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); and (3) the exhaustion requirements foreclosed the possibility of any judicial review and thus cannot deny jurisdiction under Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986). The Tenth Circuit disagreed and affirmed dismissal. View "Blue Valley Hospital v. Azar" on Justia Law

These appeals arose from five dismissals entered against plaintiffs Roger Gifford and Kimberly Olson on their separately initiated litigation under the Ralph M. Brown Act (the Act) against the Hornbrook Community Services District (the District) and the resulting costs and attorney fee awards to the District. They contended the District’s Board of Directors violated the Act by failing to adequately describe several items it acted on over the course of three District meetings and for unreasonably limiting public comment. Plaintiffs sought to invalidate the Board’s resulting actions pursuant to Government Code section 54960.1, and also to obtain a declaration to determine the applicability of the Act to the Board’s actions pursuant to section 54960. The District contended that because it substantially complied with the Act, plaintiffs were barred from relief. The Court of Appeal agreed with this standard but only for causes of action under section 54960.1 and not for those under section 54960. On the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, the Court agreed the court erred in dismissing all but one of their complaints. Furthermore, the Court agreed the court erred in awarding costs and attorney fees to the District in all cases. View "Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services Dist." on Justia Law