Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Donald McCurdy appealed an order denying his petition for relief from the notice requirement of the Government Claims Act. McCurdy had submitted a claim for damages to the County of Riverside over a year after the Court of Appeal granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which found that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from a public defender during a probation revocation hearing. The County denied his claim, stating it was not presented within six months of accrual as required by section 911.2. McCurdy applied for leave to file a late claim, which the County also denied. He then filed a petition for relief from the notice requirement in the trial court, arguing his claim did not accrue until the remittitur issued on the writ of habeas corpus and that he had one year to present his claim. Alternatively, he argued that he was misadvised by three attorneys about the claim period.The Superior Court of Riverside denied McCurdy's petition, finding that his claim accrued when his probation was revoked and was therefore untimely under either the six-month or one-year period. The court also found that McCurdy failed to show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that McCurdy's claim arose in tort and fell under the six-month claims period in section 911.2. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. View "McCurdy v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Houston Police Department Officers Richard Corral and C. Goodman were involved in a high-speed chase of a suspect who had solicited an undercover detective and fled in a stolen vehicle. During the pursuit, Corral's patrol car hit a curb and collided with a pickup truck driven by Ruben Rodriguez and Frederick Okon. Corral claimed the accident occurred because his brakes did not stop him in time. Rodriguez and Okon sued the City of Houston, alleging Corral's negligent driving caused their injuries.The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Corral was protected by official immunity because he acted in good faith and that the emergency exception to the Tort Claims Act applied. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed, holding that a fact issue existed regarding whether Corral knew his brakes were not functioning properly, which precluded summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that Corral acted in good faith as a matter of law. The Court found that Corral's statement about the brakes not working did not reasonably support an inference that he had prior awareness of any defect. The Court emphasized that the summary-judgment evidence showed Corral's brakes were functional but did not stop him in time. The Court also held that the City conclusively established Corral's good faith in making the turn during the pursuit, and the plaintiffs failed to raise a fact issue to controvert this proof.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the case, holding that the City’s governmental immunity was not waived under the Tort Claims Act because Corral was protected by official immunity. View "CITY OF HOUSTON v. RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

Andrew J. Winterbottom, a veteran, was awarded a 30% disability rating for his service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which was later increased to 50%. He appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals seeking a higher rating. During a Board hearing in June 2021, the judge questioned Winterbottom about specific violent episodes, which he later claimed demonstrated judicial bias. In May 2022, the Board denied a higher rating, concluding that his violent behavior was not unprovoked.Winterbottom appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision and exhibited bias. The Veterans Court partially agreed, remanding the case because the Board did not adequately explain why it gave less weight to a private counselor's opinion. However, the court found no bias warranting reassignment, stating the judge's questions aimed to determine if the violent conduct was provoked.Winterbottom then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating it lacked jurisdiction to review non-final orders from the Veterans Court. The court noted that exceptions to the finality requirement, as outlined in Williams v. Principi, did not apply to Winterbottom's case. The court also declined to create a new exception for judicial bias claims, suggesting that such claims should be raised through a mandamus petition or after a final judgment. Thus, the appeal was dismissed. View "WINTERBOTTOM v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Steven M. Camburn, a former sales specialist for Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) and equivalent state and municipal laws. Camburn alleged that Novartis violated the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) by offering remuneration to physicians to induce them to prescribe its drug Gilenya, which treats multiple sclerosis. He claimed that Novartis used its peer-to-peer speaker program and other forms of illicit remuneration to influence physicians' prescribing practices.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Camburn's Third Amended Complaint (TAC) with prejudice, concluding that he had not pleaded his allegations with the particularity required under Rule 9(b) to support a strong inference of an AKS-based FCA violation. The court found that Camburn's allegations did not adequately demonstrate the existence of a kickback scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that a plaintiff states an AKS violation if they allege with particularity that at least one purpose of the purported scheme was to induce fraudulent conduct. The court found that Camburn had adequately pleaded certain categories of factual allegations that gave rise to a strong inference of an AKS violation. Specifically, Camburn sufficiently alleged that Novartis held sham speaker events with no legitimate attendees, excessively compensated physician speakers for canceled events, and selected and retained speakers to incentivize prescription-writing.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal in part but vacated the judgment and remanded the case in part. The court instructed the district court to evaluate whether Camburn had stated all the elements of an FCA claim with respect to the adequately pleaded AKS violations and to assess the adequacy of Camburn's claims under state and municipal law. View "Camburn v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation" on Justia Law

Dr. Judith Robinson, a former employee of HealthNet, a federally qualified health center in Indiana, brought a qui tam action against HealthNet, alleging fraudulent billing practices, including improper Medicaid billing for ultrasound readings. She claimed that HealthNet billed Medicaid for face-to-face encounters that did not occur. Dr. Robinson initially filed a suit in 2013 (Robinson I), which was settled in 2017, excluding the wrap-around claims. These claims were dismissed without prejudice, allowing for future litigation.In 2019, Dr. Robinson filed a new suit (Robinson II) to address the wrap-around claims. The United States declined to intervene, but Indiana did. Indiana moved to dismiss all claims except for the wrap-around claims from October 18, 2013, to February 28, 2015, as the rest were time-barred. The district court dismissed Count III of Dr. Robinson's complaint, which sought to enforce an alleged oral settlement agreement, due to lack of standing, as Dr. Robinson failed to provide competent proof of the agreement's existence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Count III, agreeing that Dr. Robinson lacked standing because she did not demonstrate any breach of the alleged oral agreement by HealthNet. The court also upheld the district court's approval of the settlement between Indiana and HealthNet, finding it fair, adequate, and reasonable. The court noted that the reduction in the relator’s share was due to Dr. Robinson's own actions, including the failure to obtain a tolling agreement, which led to many claims being time-barred. The court also agreed with the application of the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) in calculating the settlement amount. View "Robinson v. Healthnet, Inc." on Justia Law

CKY, Inc. entered into a fixed-price construction contract with the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) in October 2012. CKY encountered unexpected conditions, including heavy rainfall and undisclosed culverts, which led to additional expenses. CKY sought compensation for these expenses, but the Corps denied the requests. CKY then filed a claim under the Contract Disputes Act, seeking $1,146,226 for the additional costs incurred. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (Board) ruled in favor of CKY regarding the undisclosed culverts but denied compensation for other claims.The Board awarded CKY $185,000 plus interest for the expenses related to the undisclosed culverts. CKY then applied for attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The Board granted the application, concluding that the government’s position regarding the undisclosed culverts was not substantially justified. The Board limited its substantial-justification inquiry to the government’s litigation position on the specific claim where CKY prevailed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Board erred by categorically narrowing its substantial-justification inquiry to the government’s litigation position and to the specific claim on which CKY prevailed. The court emphasized that the substantial-justification inquiry should consider both the agency’s pre-litigation conduct and its litigation position, and should treat the case as an inclusive whole rather than focusing on individual claims. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration without the categorical limitations previously applied. View "In Re SECRETARY OF THE ARMY " on Justia Law

Port City Air Leasing, Inc. (Port City) leases land and buildings at Pease International Tradeport for aircraft-related services. Pease Aviation Partners LLC, doing business as Million Air Portsmouth (Million Air), proposed to lease adjacent land to build a similar facility and applied for a permit to dredge and fill wetlands to construct an access road. The New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) issued the permit in June 2022. Port City filed an administrative appeal with the New Hampshire Wetlands Council (Council), arguing that the permit issuance was unlawful and unreasonable. Million Air intervened and moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming Port City lacked standing.The Hearing Officer ruled that Port City lacked standing because it was not a "person aggrieved" under RSA 482-A:10, I, which includes the applicant and those entitled to notice by mail under RSA 482-A:8 and RSA 482-A:9. The Hearing Officer determined that Port City was not an "abutting landowner" entitled to notice. Port City's motion for reconsideration and rehearing was denied, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the Council's decision. The court held that Port City is not a "landowner" under RSA 482-A:9 because its lease does not grant interests equivalent to fee ownership. Consequently, Port City is not a "person aggrieved" with standing to appeal under RSA 482-A:10, I. The court also rejected Port City's due process claims, concluding that the absence of an administrative remedy does not violate its state or federal due process rights, as Port City still has potential legal remedies for any injuries. The court affirmed the dismissal of Port City's appeal. View "Appeal of Port City Air Leasing, Inc." on Justia Law

Troy Olhausen, a former Senior Vice President of Business Development and Marketing at Arriva Medical, LLC, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against his former employers, Arriva, Alere, Inc., and Abbott Laboratories, Inc. He alleged that the defendants submitted fraudulent claims to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for reimbursement. Specifically, Olhausen claimed that Arriva submitted claims without obtaining required assignment-of-benefits signatures and failed to disclose or accredit certain call-center locations that processed claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Olhausen’s third amended complaint, holding that he failed to plead with the particularity required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) that any fraudulent claims were actually submitted to the government. The district court found that Olhausen did not provide sufficient details to establish that false claims had been submitted, as he did not work in the billing department and lacked firsthand knowledge of the claim submissions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Olhausen adequately pled with particularity that allegedly false claims were submitted under Count II, which involved claims for heating pads that lacked assignment-of-benefits signatures. The court found that the internal audit allegations provided sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy Rule 9(b). However, the court upheld the dismissal of Count IV, which alleged that Arriva failed to disclose or accredit certain call-center locations, as Olhausen did not adequately allege that any claims involving these locations were actually submitted. Consequently, the court vacated the dismissal of Counts II and VI (conspiracy) and remanded them for further proceedings, while affirming the dismissal of Count IV. View "Olhausen v. Arriva Medical, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Larissa Marland, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Norman Marland, filed a medical malpractice claim against the University of Connecticut Health Center and related entities. The decedent had been treated at the hospital and was later admitted to the intensive care unit, where he fell and subsequently died. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital staff breached the standard of care owed to the decedent.The plaintiff filed a notice of claim with the claims commissioner, including a physician’s opinion letter. The claims commissioner failed to resolve the claim within the statutory two-year period and an additional one-year extension granted by the General Assembly. Despite this, the commissioner eventually authorized the plaintiff to sue the state. The plaintiff then filed the present action in the Superior Court.The state moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity was invalid because it was issued after the expiration of the one-year extension. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the commissioner did not have the authority to grant the waiver beyond the extension period.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s action. The court held that, once the claims commissioner authorizes suit and waives sovereign immunity, the state cannot challenge that decision in the Superior Court. The court emphasized that such challenges should be raised before the claims commissioner. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to deny the state’s motion to dismiss. View "Marland v. University of Connecticut Health Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when he lost control of his motorcycle on Lark Street in Albany, allegedly due to a road defect the City knew about but failed to repair. The case centers on whether reports submitted through the City's online system, SeeClickFix (SCF), constituted "written notice" of the defect and if those reports were "actually given" to the designated official.The Supreme Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, holding that SCF reports might constitute prior written notice but that factual issues precluded summary judgment. These issues included whether the complaints were based on verbal or written communications, whether the defects described were related to the accident, and whether the City's actions created or exacerbated the defect. The court also rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity.The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, agreeing that SCF complaints could be considered written notice and rejecting the City's immunity argument. The Appellate Division granted the City leave to appeal and certified the question of whether it erred in affirming the denial of the City's motion.The New York Court of Appeals held that SCF reports could constitute written notice and that the City's implementation of SCF meant the reports were "actually given" to the Commissioner of General Services. The court also found that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on whether the City's negligence created a dangerous condition and rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity, as the repair of the road was a proprietary function. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order and answered the certified question in the negative. View "Calabrese v City of Albany" on Justia Law