Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Empower Oversight Whistleblowers & Research, a nonprofit organization, filed a motion to intervene in a closed grand jury proceeding and sought to unseal Department of Justice applications for non-disclosure orders related to a 2017 grand jury subpoena for Google account records. At the time of the subpoena, Jason Foster, Empower’s founder, was the Chief Investigative Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, investigating alleged misconduct at the Department. Google notified Foster in 2023 that a subpoena and non-disclosure order had been issued and extended multiple times. Empower argued that the applications should be unsealed, claiming they were judicial records subject to public access under common law and the First Amendment, and that grand jury secrecy had been waived due to public disclosures.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia permitted Empower to intervene but granted only partial unsealing. It held that the applications were ancillary grand jury records protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6), limiting unsealing to jurisdictional and legal standard sections. The court found no waiver of secrecy, as disclosures were not sufficiently public to meet the threshold established by precedent. Most of the documents remained sealed, and Empower appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the applications were covered by Rule 6(e)(6), which displaces any common law or First Amendment right of access, and that grand jury secrecy had not been waived by the disclosures identified by Empower. The court also declined to review new evidence (the December 2024 OIG report) not presented to the district court but remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether to allow Empower to amend its motion and supplement the record with the OIG report. View "In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)" on Justia Law

In this case, the central issue arose during a countervailing duty investigation into phosphate fertilizers imported from Morocco and Russia. The International Trade Commission (Commission) collected information through questionnaires sent to various parties, including domestic and foreign producers. The Commission’s longstanding practice was to automatically designate all questionnaire responses as confidential, regardless of whether the submitting party requested confidentiality or whether the information would qualify for such treatment under the relevant statute. This led to heavy redactions in the administrative record when the investigation was challenged in court.A Moroccan producer, OCP S.A., sought review of the Commission’s injury determination in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT initially remanded the injury determination due to insufficient evidentiary support. When the remand record again included substantial redactions, the CIT held a hearing to scrutinize the Commission’s confidentiality designations. After reviewing arguments from the Commission and affected parties, the CIT concluded that the Commission’s practice of automatically treating all questionnaire responses as confidential was unauthorized by law. The CIT found that much of the redacted information was either publicly available, generalized, or outdated, and thus not entitled to confidential treatment, with only a small portion warranting protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s Confidentiality Opinion and Order. The Federal Circuit held that the governing statute does not abrogate the common law right of public access to judicial records and that the Commission’s blanket confidentiality rule conflicts with statutory requirements, which demand public disclosure of non-confidential information and proper justification for confidentiality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s order that required the Commission to comply with statutory standards for confidentiality and to cease automatic confidential designation of questionnaire responses. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

In a dispute concerning antidumping and countervailing duties on mattresses imported from several countries, the U.S. International Trade Commission determined that domestic industry suffered material injury from imports sold at less than fair value and from subsidized imports. The Commission treated certain information submitted in response to its questionnaires as confidential. After the Court of International Trade issued a public opinion sustaining the Commission’s injury determination, it did not redact information the Commission had deemed confidential. The Commission requested retraction of the public opinion and sought redactions for specific company names and numerical data, arguing these deserved confidential treatment.The parties jointly moved for redaction, relying on the Commission’s practice of treating questionnaire data as confidential and citing statutory provisions. The Court of International Trade denied the motion, reasoning that the information was either publicly available or not linked to specific entities, and that some claims of confidentiality had been waived due to procedural oversight. The court also emphasized the common law right of access and transparency, but did not specifically address the statutory authority for disclosure.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the denial of the joint motion. The court found the case moot because the allegedly confidential information had already been publicly disclosed more than two years earlier, rendering any relief unavailable. The Federal Circuit held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as the companion case decided that day resolved the same confidentiality issues. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

Several newly elected members joined a school district’s board of education in late 2021. Their priority was to make Merit Academy a charter school within the district. After previous unsuccessful attempts, the board moved forward with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to streamline the process. The agenda for the January 26, 2022, meeting where the MOU was discussed did not clearly indicate this topic, being labeled only as "BOARD HOUSEKEEPING." The board approved the MOU at this meeting. Subsequent meetings in February and April further addressed the MOU, with the April meeting involving a detailed discussion and statements from each board member.After the January meeting, a community member, Erin O’Connell, filed suit alleging a violation of Colorado’s Open Meetings Law (COML) due to insufficient public notice. The District Court initially granted an injunction requiring the board to provide clearer agendas. Later, upon summary judgment, the District Court found that the board cured the COML violation at the April meeting, which was properly noticed and involved substantive reconsideration. The court held O’Connell was not a prevailing party and denied her request for attorney fees.On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed most of the district court’s rulings. It upheld the “cure doctrine,” allowing public bodies to remedy prior open meetings violations by holding a subsequent compliant meeting, provided it is not a mere “rubber stamp.” The Court of Appeals also found that the doctrine does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional violations and that the April meeting cured the earlier violation. It denied O’Connell costs and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed that the cure doctrine is consistent with the COML and longstanding precedent, and applies regardless of the violation’s intent. However, it reversed regarding attorney fees, holding that because O’Connell proved a violation that was not cured until after suit was filed, she is the prevailing party and entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. The case was remanded for determination and award of such fees. View "O'Connell v. Woodland Park Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Two sisters, aged twelve and nine, were sexually abused by their tutor during sessions at public libraries owned by two Alabama municipalities in 2017. The abuse was witnessed by library employees who allegedly failed to intervene or report the misconduct. The sisters disclosed the abuse to their mother later that year, prompting a police report. In 2023, the tutor was convicted of sexual abuse. In 2024, the sisters and their mother sued the municipalities, asserting negligence in failing to respond to the abuse.The initial complaint named nonprofit corporations associated with the libraries as defendants but was amended to substitute the municipalities themselves. Prior to filing the amended complaint, the plaintiffs served notices of claim to each municipality, but these were submitted more than six years after the alleged tortious conduct. Both the City of Irondale and the City of Birmingham moved to dismiss, arguing noncompliance with Alabama Code § 11-47-23, which requires notice of claim against a municipality within six months of claim accrual. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted their motions, dismissing the claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered whether minors are exempt from the six-month notice requirement under § 11-47-23. The plaintiffs argued that minority status should toll the notice period, referencing statutory provisions that extend the time for filing suit by minors. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that § 11-47-23 contains no exception for minors and that the statutory tolling provision applies only to statutes of limitations, not notice-of-claim statutes. The court affirmed the Jefferson Circuit Court's dismissal of the claims against both municipalities, holding that minors are subject to the same notice requirements as adults under Alabama law. View "A.G.R. v. The City of Irondale" on Justia Law

A political action committee comprised of residents and registered voters in Richland, Washington, submitted a valid petition in October 2024 to amend the city charter. The proposed amendment would change the composition of the city council to be partly elected by district and partly at large. The Benton County Auditor, upon receiving the petition, scheduled the proposed amendment for the November 2025 general election ballot. The committee, however, sought to have the measure placed on a special election ballot in either February or April 2025.The committee filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in Benton County Superior Court, seeking an order to compel the auditor to place the amendment on the special election ballot. The superior court judge denied the writ, ruling that the amendment would appear on the November 2025 general election ballot instead. The committee obtained direct review of this decision by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington unanimously concluded that the case was moot because the relevant special election dates had passed. Nonetheless, the court exercised its discretion to address the issue as one of continuing and substantial public interest. The majority of justices held that the phrase “next regular municipal election” in RCW 35.22.120 includes both special and general elections. However, a majority also agreed that mandamus was not appropriate in this case because the petitioner did not establish a nondiscretionary duty requiring the auditor to call a special election. The court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the writ of mandamus. View "A Better Richland v. Chilton" on Justia Law

The case involves an individual, B.K., who has schizophrenia and has been under a conservatorship pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act since 2019. The conservatorship was initially established after B.K. was found to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, and it has been renewed annually following court hearings. In several renewal proceedings, B.K. expressed her desire to contest the conservatorship, at times requesting either a court or jury trial. At the most recent renewal proceeding, B.K. initially requested a jury trial but later, after consulting with her attorney, chose to proceed with a court trial instead. B.K. confirmed this choice in open court.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County conducted the court trial, during which expert testimony and B.K.’s own statements supported a finding that she remained gravely disabled and unable to care for herself due to her mental illness. The court renewed the conservatorship for another year. B.K. appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to adequately advise her of her right to a jury trial or to ensure that her waiver of that right was knowing and intelligent.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. Applying de novo review to statutory claims and substantial evidence review to the trial court’s implied finding, the Court of Appeal concluded that B.K. was aware of her right to a jury trial and that, under the totality of the circumstances, her waiver—made through counsel and confirmed in court—was knowing and intelligent. The appellate court held that direct advisement or a personal waiver was not required under the LPS Act when counsel confers with the conservatee and there is no indication of lack of authority or client understanding. The court affirmed the ruling, finding no reversible error. View "Conservatorship of B.K." on Justia Law

A family that inherited a renowned art collection in Hungary prior to World War II sought to recover dozens of valuable artworks seized by the Hungarian government and its Nazi collaborators during the Holocaust. The heirs, who became citizens of the United States and other countries, alleged that the majority of the collection was confiscated during the Nazi occupation and dispersed across Europe and later deposited at Hungarian institutions. Some pieces were returned to the family after the war, only to be retaken by the government under various circumstances, including criminal forfeiture and postwar policies.The heirs initially pursued their claims in Hungarian courts without success. In 2010, they sued the Republic of Hungary and several Hungarian museums in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, invoking the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation and commercial activity exceptions. The district court partly dismissed the claims on international comity grounds but retained jurisdiction over most artworks. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the comity dismissal and affirmed jurisdiction on different grounds. Subsequent rulings narrowed the scope of claims, particularly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, which clarified the FSIA’s expropriation exception and incorporated the domestic-takings rule, limiting jurisdiction over property taken from a sovereign’s own nationals.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over the family’s claims. The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish that the seizure of their artwork violated the international law of expropriation, as required by the FSIA. It found no international authority supporting jurisdiction for wartime or stateless-person takings, and that treaties and the domestic-takings rule further barred the claims. The court affirmed the district court’s complete dismissal of the litigation. View "De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary" on Justia Law

A licensed sidewalk vendor who had operated outside Petco Park in San Diego since 2009 was cited multiple times in mid-2024 under newly enacted city ordinances regulating sidewalk vending. On two occasions, city officials also impounded his merchandise and, in one instance, his sales proceeds. The vendor, who holds a valid city vending permit, alleged that the new ordinances, particularly those related to impoundment and restrictions on vending during certain hours and events, conflicted with state law enacted in 2018 designed to protect the rights of sidewalk vendors. He sought a writ of mandate, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of these local provisions.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied the vendor’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court acknowledged the negative impact on the vendor’s livelihood but found there was a minimal probability of success on the merits, reasoning that the city’s restrictions were permissible under the state law’s allowance for regulations related to health, safety, or welfare. The court concluded that the balance of harms favored the city, given public interest considerations, and thus refused to enjoin enforcement of the challenged ordinances.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, examined both the factual record and the legal questions concerning the interplay between the municipal code and state law. The appellate court held that the city’s ordinances authorizing impoundment of vending equipment and restricting vending hours in nonresidential areas more stringently than for other businesses are in direct conflict with state law. The court found the trial court erred by not adequately considering these conflicts. The appellate court reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to apply the correct legal standards and further develop the record as needed. View "Mustaqeem v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Texas LNG, a company seeking to construct a liquid natural gas terminal in Brownsville, Texas, received a permit from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to build its facility. The company faced delays due to litigation and the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in three successive extensions of its construction deadline granted by TCEQ’s executive director. The South Texas Environmental Justice Network (STEJN), an environmental advocacy group, moved to overturn the third extension, arguing that Texas LNG did not meet the requirements under Texas law to receive it and that the executive director lacked authority to grant the extension.Prior to the current appeal, both federal and state agencies reviewed Texas LNG’s permit. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and TCEQ initially granted the necessary permits, but subsequent legal challenges led to a remand by the D.C. Circuit to FERC (which ultimately reaffirmed the permit) and a dismissal by the Third Court of Appeals in Austin for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction regarding the TCEQ permit. TCEQ’s Office of Public Interest recommended granting the motion to overturn on the basis of updated air quality standards, but TCEQ did not issue a decision, resulting in a denial of STEJN’s motion by operation of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed STEJN’s direct petition for review of TCEQ’s denial. Applying de novo review under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act, the Fifth Circuit held that STEJN had standing but found that TCEQ’s executive director had the authority under section 116.120 of the Texas Administrative Code to grant the third extension. The court determined that Texas LNG met the regulatory requirements for a third extension, and substantial evidence supported TCEQ’s decision. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit denied STEJN’s petition for review. View "S Texas Environmental Justice v. Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law