Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, the City of Gulfport filed an eminent domain complaint against Dedeaux Utility Company. Gulfport did not take physical control of the utility until December 20, 2004, after a jury awarded Dedeaux $3,634,757. Dedeaux appealed that verdict and Gulfport cross-appealed. In the first in a series of cases between these parties, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, and the second jury awarded Dedeaux $5,131,676 for the taking. Dedeaux again appealed, and Gulfport again cross-appealed. The Supreme Court again reversed and remanded in “Dedeaux II,” and the case was tried a third time, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of Dedeaux totaling $8,063,981. The jury found that the fair market value of Dedeaux as of December 3, 1996, when the complaint was filed, was $7,082,778. It found that the fair market value of tangible assets added to Dedeaux from December 3, 1996, to December 20, 2004, when Gulfport took physical control, was $981,203. Based on payments already made by Gulfport to Dedeaux, the trial court found that Gulfport owed Dedeaux $1,951,102 plus interest on the amount of $7,082,778, and that it owed Dedeaux $728,117 plus interest on the amount of $981,203. Gulfport appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on all issues except interest: the trial court had determined that Mississippi Code Section 75-17-1 applied and mandated that it award eight-percent interest. The Supreme Court determined that Mississippi Code Section 75-17-7 applied, which charged the trial court to set an interest rate. The Court then remanded “for the limited purpose of determining a reasonable rate of interest and issuing an order for payment of that interest.” In the fourth appeal, the only issue was whether the interest rate on the judgment was appropriate. Because the trial court failed to follow the Mississippi Supreme Court’s mandate to set an interest rate, it reversed and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with the evidence presented. View "City of Gulfport v. Dedeaux Utility Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District (TriMet), sought a declaration that planned, future collective bargaining sessions between TriMet’s bargaining team and the bargaining team for defendant Amalgamated Transit Union Local 757 (ATU) would not be “meetings” subject to the open meetings requirements of Oregon’s Public Meetings Law, ORS 192.610 to ORS 192.695. ATU opposed the declaration, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court agreed with TriMet and granted its motion, but the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded, reasoning that, even if the bargaining sessions were not “meetings” as that term was defined in the Public Meetings Law, ORS 192.610(5), when the TriMet team participates in the sessions, it may be subject to the prohibition in ORS 192.630(2) that, generally: “A quorum of a governing body may not meet in private for the purpose of deciding on or deliberating toward a decision on any matter[.]” The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals’ construction of that statute was correct, and TriMet failed to establish, on this summary judgment record, that no “quorum” of the TriMet team would “meet” during the negotiations; thus, TriMet failed to establish as a matter of law that the bargaining sessions at issue will not be subject to ORS 192.630(2). Finally, the Supreme Court rejected ATU’s proposal that another provision of the Public Meetings Law, ORS 192.660(3), required that all bargaining sessions of a public body be conducted in an “open meeting” unless both parties consent to private meetings. View "TriMet v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 757" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District (TriMet), sought a declaration that planned, future collective bargaining sessions between TriMet’s bargaining team and the bargaining team for defendant Amalgamated Transit Union Local 757 (ATU) would not be “meetings” subject to the open meetings requirements of Oregon’s Public Meetings Law, ORS 192.610 to ORS 192.695. ATU opposed the declaration, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court agreed with TriMet and granted its motion, but the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded, reasoning that, even if the bargaining sessions were not “meetings” as that term was defined in the Public Meetings Law, ORS 192.610(5), when the TriMet team participates in the sessions, it may be subject to the prohibition in ORS 192.630(2) that, generally: “A quorum of a governing body may not meet in private for the purpose of deciding on or deliberating toward a decision on any matter[.]” The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals’ construction of that statute was correct, and TriMet failed to establish, on this summary judgment record, that no “quorum” of the TriMet team would “meet” during the negotiations; thus, TriMet failed to establish as a matter of law that the bargaining sessions at issue will not be subject to ORS 192.630(2). Finally, the Supreme Court rejected ATU’s proposal that another provision of the Public Meetings Law, ORS 192.660(3), required that all bargaining sessions of a public body be conducted in an “open meeting” unless both parties consent to private meetings. View "TriMet v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 757" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Banking Department (Department) initiated an adjudicative proceeding against CashCall, Inc. (CashCall), WS Funding, LLC (WS Funding), and John Paul Reddam, for violations of RSA chapter 399-A (2006 & Supp. 2012) (repealed and reenacted 2015). Reddam is the president and chief executive officer of CashCall, a lending and loan services corporation headquartered and incorporated in California. Reddam owned all of CashCall’s corporate stock. Reddam was also the president of WS Funding, a wholly owned subsidiary of CashCall. WS Funding was a Delaware limited liability company with a principal place of business in California. CashCall appeared to be engaged in the business of purchasing and servicing small loans or “payday loans” in association with Western Sky Financial. Neither Reddam, CashCall, nor WS Funding was licensed under RSA chapter 399-A to issue small loans in New Hampshire. In June 2013, after analyzing and reviewing CashCall’s responses to an administrative subpoena duces tecum and reviewing the business relationships among CashCall, WS Funding, and Western Sky Financial, the Department issued a cease and desist order to CashCall, WS Funding, and Reddam. In the cease and desist order, the Department found that either CashCall, or WS Funding, was the “actual” or “de facto” lender for the payday and small loans, and that Western Sky Financial was a front for the respondents’ unlicensed activities. Reddam challenged the Department’s denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the Department made a prima facie showings that: (1) Reddam’s contacts related to the Department’s cause of action; (2) he purposefully availed himself of the protection of New Hampshire law; and (3) it was fair and reasonable to require him to defend suit in New Hampshire. The Court therefore found no due process violation in the Department’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Reddam. View "Petition of John Paul Reddam" on Justia Law

This case involved a challenge to the California Department of Justice’s (DOJ) policy that individuals who possess a federal license to collect “curio and relic” firearms could not, by virtue of possessing that license, purchase more than one non-curio or relic handgun in a 30-day period. DOJ’s position was challenged by two licensed firearms collectors, who alleged DOJ failed to comply with the California Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in adopting this policy, and also sought a declaration of rights. The trial court granted defendants-respondents Attorney General Xavier Becerra and Chief of the Bureau of Firearms Stephen J. Lindley’s motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs-appellants Alvin Doe and Paul A. Gladden’s cross-motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory relief. The trial court ruled that DOJ’s position embodied the only legally tenable interpretation of Penal Code section 27535. On appeal, plaintiffs argued the interpretation DOJ announced in 2014 was void because: (1) it was inconsistent with section 27535; and (2) it was not adopted in compliance with the APA. We agree with plaintiffs and address their arguments in reverse order. Regarding their second argument, the Court of Appeal concluded DOJ’s policy was not exempt from being promulgated under the APA because it did not embody “the only legally tenable interpretation” of the statute. (Gov. Code, sec. 11340.9, subd. (f).) Having decided that DOJ’s 2014 interpretation of section 27535 was void for failure to comply with the APA, the Court resolved any ambiguity regarding the proper construction of the statute and construed it as allowing individuals with the designated federal license, and certificate of eligibility, to purchase more than one handgun within 30 days regardless of the type of handgun being purchased. View "Doe v. Becerra" on Justia Law

In 2005, the child who was the focus of this proceeding was born. He had an autism spectrum disorder, developmental delays, including speech delays, and other significant health issues. In 2010, when the child was five years old, his mother and father divorced. Mother had been his primary caretaker, and she was awarded sole legal custody. In 2015, when the child was 10 years old, the Oregon Department of Human Services investigated reports that mother was neglecting the child’s basic needs and risking his safety by allowing him to have contact with her significant other, L. The department issued a “founded disposition” based on its administrative determination that mother had neglected the child through a “[l]ack of supervision and protection.” The department then filed a petition to obtain dependency jurisdiction over the child. When a parent appeals a jurisdictional judgment making the Department the legal custodian of the parent’s child and that wardship is subsequently terminated, the department may file a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. In this case, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded termination of such a wardship did not necessarily render the appeal moot; whether dismissal is appropriate will depend on the particular circumstances presented. In this case, the Supreme Court concluded the department met its burden to prove that a jurisdictional judgment would have no practical effect on the rights of the parties and was therefore moot. View "Dept. of Human Services v. A. B." on Justia Law

Spring Creek Coal Company (Spring Creek) petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of a decision by the Department of Labor (DOL) awarding survivors’ benefits to Susan McLean under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. sections 901-944. The DOL concluded that Bradford McLean became disabled and died from his exposure to coal dust during the course of his employment at Spring Creek’s surface coal mine. The BLBA adopts several presumptions that apply for purposes of determining whether a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and whether the death of a miner was due to pneumoconiosis. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1)-(5). One of those presumptions, the fifteen-year presumption, is central to the outcome in this case. The ALJ, after concluding that Mr. McLean was entitled to the statutory/regulatory presumption of pneumoconiosis, in turn analyzed the medical evidence to determine whether Spring Creek had rebutted that presumption. The Tenth Circuit determined the ALJ’s findings and decision in this case were case-specific and confined to the specific flaws in the testimony of Spring Creek’s medical experts, thus concluding Spring Creek did not rebut the presumption. Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded the ALJ did not err in his analysis of the proffered medical opinions, and that there was no need to remand this case for further proceedings. Spring Creek’s petition for review was denied. View "Spring Creek Coal Company v. McLean" on Justia Law

Spring Creek Coal Company (Spring Creek) petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of a decision by the Department of Labor (DOL) awarding survivors’ benefits to Susan McLean under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. sections 901-944. The DOL concluded that Bradford McLean became disabled and died from his exposure to coal dust during the course of his employment at Spring Creek’s surface coal mine. The BLBA adopts several presumptions that apply for purposes of determining whether a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and whether the death of a miner was due to pneumoconiosis. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1)-(5). One of those presumptions, the fifteen-year presumption, is central to the outcome in this case. The ALJ, after concluding that Mr. McLean was entitled to the statutory/regulatory presumption of pneumoconiosis, in turn analyzed the medical evidence to determine whether Spring Creek had rebutted that presumption. The Tenth Circuit determined the ALJ’s findings and decision in this case were case-specific and confined to the specific flaws in the testimony of Spring Creek’s medical experts, thus concluding Spring Creek did not rebut the presumption. Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded the ALJ did not err in his analysis of the proffered medical opinions, and that there was no need to remand this case for further proceedings. Spring Creek’s petition for review was denied. View "Spring Creek Coal Company v. McLean" on Justia Law

Petitioners Smokebrush Foundation, Katherine Tudor, and Donald Herbert Goede, III (collectively, “Smokebrush”) owned property on which the non-profit foundation operated a wellness center in the City of Colorado Springs. Smokebrush sued the City, contending that Smokebrush’s property had been contaminated by pollutants from an adjacent property owned by the City. The City moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming governmental immunity from suit under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”). Smokebrush responded that the City had waived immunity under the Act, section 24-10-106(1)(c) and section 24-10-106(1)(f). The district court agreed with Smokebrush and denied the City’s motion to dismiss. In a unanimous, published opinion, however, a division of the court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the City’s motion. The Colorado Supreme Court granted Smokebrush’s petition for certiorari and affirmed in part and reversed in part the division’s judgment. With respect to Smokebrush’s claims regarding airborne asbestos released during the 2013 demolition activities, the Supreme Court concluded the City did not waive immunity under section 24-10-106(1)(c)’s dangerous condition of a public building exception. With respect to Smokebrush’s claims regarding the coal tar contamination, the Supreme Court concluded that under the plain language of section 24-10-106(1)(f), the City waived its immunity for such claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Smokebrush Foundation v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

Petitioners Smokebrush Foundation, Katherine Tudor, and Donald Herbert Goede, III (collectively, “Smokebrush”) owned property on which the non-profit foundation operated a wellness center in the City of Colorado Springs. Smokebrush sued the City, contending that Smokebrush’s property had been contaminated by pollutants from an adjacent property owned by the City. The City moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming governmental immunity from suit under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”). Smokebrush responded that the City had waived immunity under the Act, section 24-10-106(1)(c) and section 24-10-106(1)(f). The district court agreed with Smokebrush and denied the City’s motion to dismiss. In a unanimous, published opinion, however, a division of the court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the City’s motion. The Colorado Supreme Court granted Smokebrush’s petition for certiorari and affirmed in part and reversed in part the division’s judgment. With respect to Smokebrush’s claims regarding airborne asbestos released during the 2013 demolition activities, the Supreme Court concluded the City did not waive immunity under section 24-10-106(1)(c)’s dangerous condition of a public building exception. With respect to Smokebrush’s claims regarding the coal tar contamination, the Supreme Court concluded that under the plain language of section 24-10-106(1)(f), the City waived its immunity for such claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Smokebrush Foundation v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law