Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants ("Customers") requested the Oklahoma Supreme Court reverse the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's ("Commission") Order Dismissing Cause and remand the underlying application to the Commission for a full hearing. Appellants were a group of six different individuals who were customers of the Defendant, Southwestern Bell Telephone d/b/a AT&T Oklahoma ("SWBT"). Customers filed their Application in 2015, asking the Commission to vacate or modify PUD 260 entered in 1989 in order "to redress the proven bribery and corruption perpetrated by Southwestern Bell Telephone Company [SWBT] that occurred in 1989 in relation to Oklahoma Corporation Commission's . . . Cause No. PUD (Public Utility Docket) 860000260 ("PUD 260")." The then-acting public utility division director for the Commission, initiated PUD 260 to determine how SWBT should distribute or utilize SWBT's surplus cash created by federal corporate tax reforms. Two of the three Commissioners approved the 1989 Order wherein it was determined that SWBT surplus revenue should not be refunded to its ratepayers. Commissioner Hopkins ("Hopkins"), was one of the two commissioners who voted in favor of the 1989 Order. Several years after the adoption of this Order, the public learned that Hopkins had accepted a bribe in exchange for assuring his favorable vote to the 1989 Order. Hopkins was indicted in 1993 and then later convicted for his criminal act. Commissioner Anthony announced in 1992 that he had been secretly acting as an investigator and informant in an ongoing FBI investigation concerning the conduct of his fellow commissioners and of SWBT. Following Hopkins' conviction, in 1997, Anthony, pro se, filed a document titled "Suggestion to the Court," advising the Supreme Court of the criminal misconduct of Hopkins and asked it Court to recall its mandate issued in Henry v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 825 P.2d 1305. The Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The case was remanded back to the Commission which determined the matter should be closed in its entirety. The Commission's order was not appealed. In January 2010, Anthony again filed a "Suggestion for Sua Sponte Recall of Mandate, Vacation of Opinion, and Remand of Cause to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission for Want of Appellate Jurisdiction with Brief in Support of Suggested Actions." The Oklahoma Supreme Court found it was bound to uphold the findings and conclusion of the Commission where they are "sustained by the law and substantial evidence." The Commission's Order Dismissing Cause contained overwhelming evidence and legal authority supporting its Order. The Order Dismissing Cause, Order No. 655899 was thus affirmed. View "Clements v. Southwestern Bell Telephone" on Justia Law

In this redevelopment case, the city of Anaheim, acting in its capacity as successor to the former Anaheim Redevelopment Agency, sought approval from the California Department of Finance (the department) to obtain money from the Redevelopment Property Tax Trust Fund (the fund or, the RPTTF) to pay back the city of Anaheim for payments the City of Anaheim made to a construction company to complete certain real property improvements that the former Anaheim Redevelopment Agency was obligated to provide on a particular redevelopment project (the packing district project). The city and the city-as-successor characterized the transaction between themselves as a loan, but the department ultimately denied the claim for money from the fund because the city did not disburse the loan proceeds to the city-as-successor, but instead paid the construction company directly, and because the city-as-successor did not obtain prior approval for the “loan” agreement with the city from the oversight board. Around the same time, the city-as-successor sought approval from the department to obtain money from the fund to make payments to the Anaheim Housing Authority (the authority) under a cooperation agreement between the agency and the authority, the purpose of which was to provide funding for the Avon/Dakota revitalization project, which was being carried out by a private developer -- The Related Companies of California, LLC (Related) -- pursuant to a contract with the authority. The department denied that claim because the 2011 law that dissolved the former redevelopment agencies rendered agreements between a former redevelopment agency and the city that created that agency (or, a closely affiliated entity like the authority) unenforceable. The city, the city-as-successor, and the authority sought mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief on both issues in the superior court, but the trial court denied the writ petition and dismissed the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding: (1) with respect to the packing district project, the fact that the city contracted directly with the construction company to construct the improvements the agency was legally obligated to provide at that project, and the fact that the city paid the company directly for its work, did not mean the agreement between the city and the city-as-successor with respect to the transaction was not a loan, as the department and the trial court concluded, also, the fact that the city-as-successor did not obtain prior approval from the oversight board to enter into a loan agreement with the city did not give the department a valid reason to deny the city as successor’s request for money from the fund to pay off the loan; and (2) as for the money from the fund claimed for the Avon/Dakota revitalization project, enforcing the provision of the dissolution law that renders unenforceable an agreement between a former redevelopment agency and the city that created it (or an affiliated entity like the authority) would, in this case, unconstitutionally impair Related’s contractual rights under its agreement with the authority. View "City of Anaheim v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Creed-21 appealed the dismissal of its petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief under the California Environmental Quality Act (Petition). The trial court imposed an issue sanction on standing, which terminated the action, for the misuse of the discovery process in response to a motion for sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 filed by real party in interest and respondent Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (Wal-Mart). The project being challenged was a 185,682 square foot Walmart retail complex (the Project) located in the City of Wildomar. On March 11, 2015, the City’s council approved the Project. Creed-21 alleged that the Project violated CEQA and other laws. Creed-21 alleged against the Wal-Mart and the City (collectively, the Wildomar Defendants) that they failed to prepare an adequate environmental impact report and they violated the planning and zoning law within the meaning of Government Code section 65860. Creed-21 sought to stop the Wildomar Defendants from taking any action on the Project until they complied with CEQA and the planning and zoning laws. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the terminating sanction. View "Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mahmoud Alzayat, on behalf of the People of the State of California, filed a qui tam action against his employer, Sunline Transit Agency, and his supervisor, Gerald Hebb, alleging a violation of the Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA or the Act). (Ins. Code, sec. 1871 et seq.) Alzayat alleged Hebb made false statements in an incident report submitted in response to Alzayat’s claim for workers’ compensation, and Hebb repeated those false statements in a deposition taken during the investigation into Alzayat’s claim for compensation. Hebb’s false statements resulted in Alzayat’s claim being initially denied. Defendants filed motions for judgment on the pleadings contending: (1) this lawsuit was based on allegedly false and fraudulent statements Hebb made in connection with a workers’ compensation proceeding and was, therefore, barred by the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b); and (2) Alzayat’s claim was barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. The superior court concluded the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule was inapplicable, but ruled the litigation privilege barred Alzayat’s claim. Alzayat appealed, contending the litigation privilege only applied to tort claims and not to statutory claims such as an action under the IFPA, and the IFPA was a specific statute that prevailed over the general litigation privilege. The Court of Appeal agreed with Alzayat that his lawsuit was not barred by the litigation privilege. Furthermore, the Court concluded this lawsuit was not barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. The trial court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings for defendants, so we reverse the judgment. View "California ex rel. Alzayat v. Hebb" on Justia Law

In Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates, 1 Cal.5th 749 (2016) ("Department of Finance"), the California Supreme Court upheld a Commission ruling that certain conditions a regional water quality control board imposed on a storm water discharge permit issued under federal and state law required subvention and were not federal mandates. The Supreme Court found no federal law, regulation, or administrative case authority expressly required the conditions; the federal requirement that the permit reduce pollution impacts to the “maximum extent practicable” was not a federal mandate, but rather vested the regional board with discretion to choose which conditions to impose to meet the standard. The permit conditions resulting from the exercise of that choice were state mandates. In this appeal, the Court of Appeal faced the same issue: the parties and the permit conditions were different, but the legal issue was the same - whether the Commission correctly determined that conditions imposed on a federal and state storm water permit by a regional water quality control board are state mandates. The Commission reached its decision by applying the standard the Supreme Court later adopted in "Department of Finance." The trial court, reviewing the case before "Department of Finance" was issued, concluded the Commission had applied the wrong standard, and it remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings. The Court of Appeal concluded here the Commission applied the correct standard and the permit requirements were state mandates. View "Dept. of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the regulations that implement The Unfair Insurance Practices Act (“Act 205”), an insured can appeal to the Insurance Commissioner (“Commissioner”) of Appellee Pennsylvania Insurance Department (“Department”) when an insurer decides to cancel or not renew the insured’s homeowners’ insurance policy. This matter went before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court regarding whether, in the context of such an appeal, an insurer was collaterally estopped from litigating issues that were previously discussed in an investigative report that Consumer Services supplied in an earlier and separate appeal involving the same parties, when the Commissioner never entered a final order in the earlier appeal. The Supreme Court held that, for purposes of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, an investigative report does not constitute a final adjudication on the merits of any issue. Accordingly, an insurer is not collaterally estopped from litigating issues in the scenario described here. View "Skotnicki v. Insurance Department" on Justia Law

The California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) appealed a decision granting the Yuba City Unified School District’s (District) petition for writ of mandate and setting aside CalSTRS’s decision to collect overpayments mistakenly made to some of the District’s retirees. The superior court held that the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Education Code section 22008(c) barred collection of the overpayments because a 2005 letter CalSTRS sent one of the retirees demonstrated actual notice of the payment issues. The Court of Appeal disagreed: the letter did not reflect actual notice of the specific payment issues raised in this proceeding. The Court concluded inquiry notice would have been sufficient to start the limitation period contained in section 22008(c). Whether CalSTRS had inquiry notice in this case is a question of fact that was not addressed at the administrative level or by the superior court. As such, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Yuba City Unified School Dist. v. Cal. State Teachers' Ret. System CA/3" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the narrow issue of whether sovereign immunity barred an award of attorney’s fees against a public entity. The trial court found that the Moffat County Department of Social Services (“the Department”) committed a discovery violation in the course of a dependency and neglect proceeding, and it awarded attorney’s fees to Petitioner C.K. pursuant to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 37. The court of appeals vacated the fee award, holding that it was barred by sovereign immunity. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed. There are two additional relevant, yet distinct, issues that remained to decide whether an award of attorney’s fees is proper in this case: (1) whether, under the facts of this case, C.R.C.P. 37 applied to proceedings governed by the Children’s Code, and, if it did, (2) whether C.R.C.P. 37 contained the express language required to authorize attorney’s fees against a public entity. While the Court discussed these issues briefly to give context to its holding, ultimate resolution was left to be addressed on remand. View "C.K. v. Colorado in the Interest of L.K." on Justia Law

Insane Clown Posse, a Michigan music group, performs songs with “harsh language and themes.” Its fans, “Juggalos,” wear distinctive tattoos, clothing, and insignia, including clown face paint and the “hatchetman” logo. The Attorney General’s National Gang Intelligence Center's (34 U.S.C. 41507) 2011 gang-activity report, described Juggalos as “a loosely-organized hybrid gang.” “Juggalo[] subsets exhibit gang-like behavior and engage in criminal activity and violence.” Although “Most crimes ... are sporadic, disorganized, individualistic,” and minor, “a small number of Juggalos are forming more organized subsets and engaging in more gang-like criminal activity, such as felony assaults, thefts, robberies, and drug sales.” Four states recognize Juggalos as a gang. Juggalos who allege that they do not knowingly affiliate with any criminal gang, but have suffered violations of their Fifth Amendment due-process rights and a chill in the exercise of their First Amendment expression and association rights due to the designation, sued under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(b). Some alleged that they had been detained; an Army Corporal with Juggalo tattoos alleges that he is “in imminent danger of suffering discipline or an involuntary discharge.” Local law enforcement caused a musical event to be canceled. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal; the designation was not reviewable because it was not a final agency action and was committed to agency discretion by law. View "Parsons v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

At issue was a decision of the Retirement Board of the Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Providence (City) to reduce the pension benefits of Frank Corrente after he was convicted of six felony counts in a federal district court. Specifically, the Board revoked a portion of Corrente’s pension benefits and ordered him to return a portion of the benefits that he had received. This appeal concerned three appeals - one by Corrente, another by intervenors the City Mayor and the City, and the third by the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in finding that the intervenors satisfied the requirements to intervene under Rule 24(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) the trial justice appropriately applied the standard of review set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act; (3) the Board’s decision to reduce, rather than revoke, Corrente’s pension benefits was not arbitrary, capricious, or affected by other errors or law; and (4) the trial justice did not err in confirming the retirement board’s decision to deny Corrente’s request for a tax credit on pension benefits that he had received but was required to return to the Board. View "Retirement Board of the Employees’ Retirement System of City of Providence v. Corrente" on Justia Law