Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Alternative Medicine Maryland, LLC (AMM) sued the Natalie M. LaPrade Medical Cannabis Commission, its members, and the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene after AMM applied for, but did not receive, pre-approval for a medical cannabis grower license. AMM sought a declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, arguing that the Commission failed to follow applicable law with respect to the requirement to consider racial and ethnic diversity of potential medical cannabis grower licensees and requested that the Commission be required to reconnect the pre-approval process. Relevant to this appeal, the circuit court denied a motion to intervene filed by medical cannabis growers that had received pre-approvals for medical cannabis grower licenses, a coalition and trade association that advocate for the use of medical cannabis, and patients who would potentially receive medical cannabis as treatment for illnesses. The Supreme Court held (1) the growers were entitled to intervention as of right and permissive intervention; but (2) the circuit court did not err in denying intervention as of right or permissive intervention as to the patients and the trade association petitioners. View "Doe v. Alternative Medicine Maryland, LLC" on Justia Law

The Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC") petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to enter an order dismissing, on the ground of sovereign immunity the claims asserted against it by Jean and Scott Clowers. Jean Clowers sued ADOC, Isabella Cowan, and fictitiously named parties, seeking to recover damages for injuries she alleges she sustained as a result of a collision between a vehicle she was driving and an ADOC van driven by Cowan, who, at the time of the accident, was a work-release inmate in the custody of ADOC. Clowers alleged in her complaint that ADOC was vicariously liable for Cowan's alleged negligence and/or wantonness in running a red light and thus causing the accident. Clowers's husband, Scott, joined the action, claiming damages for loss of consortium. The Alabama Supreme Court determined ADOC established a clear legal right to the relief requested. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the circuit court to dismiss the claims against ADOC based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. View "Ex parte Alabama Department of Corrections." on Justia Law

The circuit court ruled Enoch Oliver could proceed to trial with his malicious-prosecution claim against University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) and two of its law-enforcement officers, Syrone McBeath and David Stewart. Oliver was charged with three misdemeanors: disorderly conduct for failure to comply with the commands of a police officer, resisting arrest, and carrying a concealed weapon. A nol-pros order was signed by the trial court and charges were ultimately dropped against Oliver. Oliver sued civilly, and UMMC, McBeath, and Stewart were served with process; several other officers were not. UMMC, McBeath, and Stewart filed a motion to dismiss, which was joined by the unserved defendants, who specially appeared. The served defendants argued Oliver’s claims were governed by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and its one-year statute of limitations. The lone exception was the malicious prosecution of the felony claim, because the one-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until that charge was nol-prossed. The unserved defendants’ motion was granted, leaving the remaining claim against the served defendants as the malicious-prosecution claim based on the felony charge. Three-and-a-half years later, UMMC, McBeath, and Stewart filed a motion for summary judgment. UMMC argued, as a state agency, it had not waived sovereign immunity for a malice-based claim; McBeath and Stewart argued Oliver lacked proof they maliciously prosecuted him. Alternatively, all defendants cited the MTCA’s police-protection and discretionary-function immunity. The circuit court denied the defendants’ motion. UMMC, McBeath, and Stewart filed this interlocutory appeal, claiming they were entitled to summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined as a matter of law, malice-based torts did not fall under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act’s sovereign-immunity waiver. So Oliver had no malicious-prosecution claim against UMMC or its employees in their official capacity. Oliver also brought malicious-prosecution claims against the UMMC officers in their individual capacity, but the record showed Oliver failed to put forth any evidence the officers acted with malice or lacked probable cause. The Court thus reversed the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment and rendered a final judgment in defendants’ favor. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Oliver" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled Shamrock Coal Co. v. Taylor, 697 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. App. 1985), which holds that a complaint that exhibits “a clear attempt at verification” is sufficiently compliant with Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.450(1) to authorize judicial review.At issue in this case was whether Appellee had substantially complied with the verification requirement of section 341.450(1) when he filed a complaint seeking judicial review of an adverse decision of the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (KUIC). The circuit court dismissed the complaint based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, 382 S.W.3d 826 (Ky. 2012). The Court of Appeals reversed, citing Shamrock. The Supreme Court reversed after overruling Shamrock, holding that the complaint in this case failed to satisfy the verification requirement of section 341.450(1). View "Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The failure of Terry Scott and Damon Fleming to appeal the denial of their respective grievances against the Kentucky State Police (KSP) by the Personnel Cabinet precluded their subsequent action filed in the circuit court. The trial court dismissed most of Scott’s and Fleming’s claims but nevertheless permitted the case to go forward. After a trial, the court held that Scott and Fleming had met their burden of showing a prima facie case of an equal protection violation, entitling them to equitable relief. The court of appeals affirmed, thus rejecting KSP’s argument that Scott and Fleming had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Scott’s and Fleming’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies barred their direct action in the circuit court. View "Kentucky State Police v. Scott" on Justia Law

The administrative law judge (ALJ) in this case did not err in failing to give effect to a settlement agreement reached after the issuance of its order and opinion and raised in a petition to reconsider.This case arose from Appellant’s filing of a claim alleging work-related injuries against his employer. An ALJ issued an opinion and award denying Appellant permanent partial disability, permanent total disability, and future medical benefits. Appellant filed a petition for reconsideration based on a settlement reached prior to receipt of the opinion. The ALJ denied the petition. The Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the alleged terms of the settlement were never properly brought before the ALJ, Appellant did not properly raise the issue, and the ALJ did not err in declining to review the agreement. View "Kidd v. Crossrock Drilling, LLC" on Justia Law

Kolton deposited money into an interest-bearing bank account in Illinois. Years passed without activity in the account, so the bank transferred Kolton’s money to the state as the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act requires. The Act is not an escheat statute; it gives Illinois custody, not ownership, of “presumed abandoned” property. Most such property gets invested, with any income that accrues earmarked for Illinois’s pensioners. Owners may file a claim for return of their property, but the Act limits the Treasurer to returning the amount received into custody. Kolton brought a purported class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the Takings Clause, which protects the time value of money just as much as it does money itself. The judge dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction, stating that under the Supreme Court’s “Williamson” holding, a plaintiff usually must try to obtain compensation under state law before litigating a takings suit. Kolton filed neither a claim with the Treasurer nor a lawsuit in state court seeking just compensation. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that Section 1983 does not create a cause of action against the state and the Treasurer, personally, did not deprive Kolton of his money. Williamson was not concerned with jurisdiction. View "Kolton v. Frerichs" on Justia Law

Prime Hospitals provide inpatient services under the Medicare program, submitting payment claims to private contractors, who make initial reimbursement determinations. Prime alleged that many short-stay claims were subject to post-payment review and denied. Prime appealed through the Medicare appeal process. Prime alleged short-stay claims audits were part of a larger initiative that substantially increased claim denials and that the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) was overwhelmed by the number of appeals. CMS began offering partial payment (68 percent) in exchange for dismissal of appeals. Prime alleged that it executed CMS's administrative settlement agreement so that CMS was contractually required to pay their 5,079 Medicare appeals ($23,205,245). CMS ultimately refused to allow the Prime to participate because it was aware of ongoing False Claims Act cases or investigations involving the facilities. Prime alleged that the settlement agreement did not authorize that exclusion. The district court denied a motion to dismiss Prime’s suit but transferred it to the Court of Federal Claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. The breach of contract claim is fundamentally a suit to enforce a contract and does not arise under the Medicare Act, so the Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491. That court does not have jurisdiction, however, over Prime’s alternative claims seeking declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief from an alleged secret and illegal policy to prevent and delay Prime from exhausting administrative remedies. View "Alvarado Hospital, LLC v. Cochran" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dennis Ponte demanded defendant County of Calaveras (County) to pay him over $150,000 to reimburse him for work purportedly performed on the County’s behalf pursuant to an oral contract. The contract did not contain any fixed payment, and no bid was submitted nor approved pursuant to relevant county ordinances governing public contracts. Ponte disregarded opportunities to abandon his claims after the County provided him with pertinent legal authority demonstrating that his claims lacked merit. After multiple sustained demurrers, the trial court granted summary judgment to the County on Ponte’s third amended complaint. The court later awarded substantial attorney fees, finding Ponte’s claims, including those based on promissory estoppel, were not brought or maintained in both subjective and objective good faith. Ponte appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Ponte v. County of Calaveras" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Aleksei Sviridov was terminated as a police officer for the City of San Diego. In the first appeal, Sviridov challenged an order denying his petition for administrative mandamus in which he sought a determination by the Civil Service Commission of the City on the merits of his challenge to his first termination. The Court of Appeal concluded Sviridov's administrative claim was moot in light of the decision to reinstate Sviridov and to pay his back pay and benefits. In a second appeal, the Court affirmed summary judgment on Sviridov's third amended complaint asserting claims for wrongful termination stemming from his second termination (among others). The Cout reversed the trial court's order sustaining defendants' demurrer to Sviridov's ninth breach of contract cause of action and remanded the matter with directions to grant Sviridov leave to amend his complaint to state a cause of actin under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act ("POBRA") or to seek mandamus relief. Following remand, Sviridov filed a fourth amended complaint seeking relief under POBRA without pursuing a writ of mandate. The court entered judgment after a bench trial ordering Sviridov's reinstatement as a police officer and awarding him back pay and benefits. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in "Sviridov III" concluding Sviridov was not entitled to POBRA relief because Sviridov did not timely appeal his termination with the office of the chief of police as required by a memorandum of understanding with the San Diego Police Officers' Association. The matter was remanded again with directions to enter judgment in favor of the City and stated the City was entitled to costs on appeal. In the present appeal, Sviridov appealed the award of costs to the City, arguing the City was not entitled to costs based upon Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4th 97, (2015), which held that in actions based upon the California Fair Employment and Housing Act costs should not be awarded under Government Code section 12965(b), to a defendant against an unsuccessful FEHA plaintiff "unless the plaintiff brought or continued litigating the action without an objective basis for believing it had potential merit." Sviridov also argued POBRA prohibited an award of costs for the defense of his POBRA claim unless the action was frivolous or brought in bad faith. The City argued neither of these statutes applied because the City was entitled to its costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 9981 since Sviridov rejected multiple statutory settlement offers and did not obtain a more favorable result. The Court of Appeal agreed with the City and affirmed the cost award. View "Sviridov v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law