Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Brooks Keel, president of Georgia Southern University, terminated the employment contract of tenured professor Lorne Wolfe for violation of University policies, and the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia denied Wolfe’s application for review of his termination. Wolfe then filed a complaint for breach of contract and mandamus against the Board and Keel seeking reinstatement and other relief. The superior court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, and Wolfe again appealed. The Supreme Court found that this appeal fell within the scope of OCGA 5-6-35 (a) (1), and an application to appeal was therefore required. Because Wolfe did not file a discretionary application, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of his case. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Wolfe v. Regents of the University Sys. of Georgia" on Justia Law

Petitioner received a one-year driver’s license revocation and suspension for failure to submit to chemical testing. The Department of Transportation (DOT) affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Petitioner sought judicial review of the DOT’s ruling. On the thirtieth day after the DOT issued its final decision, the law firm representing Petitioner electronically submitted a petition for judicial review that was received by the Iowa Judicial Branch electronic data management system (EDMS). The next morning, the clerk’s office returned the petition because Petitioner’s address was missing from the electronic cover sheet and the filing had not been described as a “civil-administrative appeal” on that same cover sheet. The law firm resubmitted the petition after correcting the errors. Upon the motion of the DOT, however, the district court dismissed the petition as untimely because it was one day late. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, for purposes of meeting a deadline, a filing may relate back to the original date it was received by the EDMS when the filing party demonstrates certain conditions are met. Remanded. View "Jacobs v. Iowa Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 2014, the IRS attempted to collect $244,464 in unpaid taxes and penalties from Adolphson for tax years 2002 and 2006-2010. Adolphson claims he was unaware of the IRS’s collection efforts until the agency levied on his funds held by third parties (26 U.S.C. 6330). Rather than challenge the levies with the IRS, Adolphson filed a pro se petition, asking the tax court to enjoin the collection efforts and refund amounts already collected. Adolphson argued that the IRS had not mailed him the required Final Notice of Intent to Levy, so that he was deprived of a “collection due process hearing” (CDP) before the IRS Office of Appeals. Adolphson cited tax court decisions in which the tax court asserted that it lacked jurisdiction without an IRS notice of determination, yet nevertheless invalidated levies after finding that the taxpayer was prevented from requesting a CDP by failure to mail a Final Notice to the proper address. The IRS was unable to say “with certainty” whether the Final Notices were sent to proper addresses. Exhibits corroborated the dates on which the Final Notices were issued but did not show where the notices were mailed. The tax court dismissed, reasoning that it lacked authority to grant relief without a notice of determination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Adolphson’s case is indistinguishable from the tax court precedent he cited, those decisions were unsound and reflect an improper extension of the tax court’s jurisdiction. View "Adolphson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

All parties to this matter appealed a district court’s judgment. Orange County Social Services Department (SSA) sought to remove Z.G. and I.L. from their parents’ custody, C.G. (Mother) and H.L. (Father), after Children’s sibling, H.L., Jr. (Junior), died. The juvenile court found Parents’ “neglect” was a cause of Junior’s death. Despite the Parents essentially doing nothing to move the family towards reunification, the court found reunification was in the “best interest” of Children. The Parents appealed the jurisdiction and disposition orders and argued there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding their neglect was a cause of Junior’s death. Thus, they contend the court erred by concluding Children were subject to jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (f), and that Parents were subject to the reunification services bypass provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4). The Children appealed the disposition order and contended there was insufficient evidence to support the finding reunification with Parents is in the best interest of Children. Hence, they argued, the court abused its discretion by ordering reunification services for Parents under section 361.5, subdivision (c). SSA joined the Children’s argument. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding Parents’ neglect was a cause of Junior’s death, but there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding reunification with Parents was in Children’s best interest. Therefore the court abused its discretion by ordering reunification services for Parents. Consequently, the Court reversed that portion of the disposition order, but affirmed the jurisdiction and disposition orders in all other respects. View "In re Z.G." on Justia Law

Mason Companies, Inc., a company based in Wisconsin, appealed from the imposition of Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (CAT) on revenue it earned from its sales of goods through orders received via telephone, mail, and the Internet. Mason challenged the imposition of the CAT assessments based on its being operated outside Ohio, employing no personnel in Ohio, and maintaining no facilities in Ohio. The Supreme Court upheld the CAT assessments against Mason, holding that, after applying the holding in Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, the lack of Mason’s physical presence within Ohio was not a necessary condition for imposing the obligations of the CAT law given that the $500,000 sales-receipts threshold adequately assured that Mason’s nexus with Ohio was substantial. View "Mason Cos., Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

In this companion case to Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, the Supreme Court considered Newegg, Inc.’s appeal from the imposition of Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (CAT) on revenue it earned from sales of computer-related products that it shipped into the state of Ohio. Newegg contested its CAT assessments based on its being operated outside Ohio, employing no personnel in Ohio, and maintaining no facilities in Ohio. In Crutchfield, the Supreme Court held that, under the Commerce Clause, the physical presence of an interstate business within Ohio is not a necessary condition for imposing the obligations of the CAT law given that the $500,000 sales receipts threshold adequately assures that the taxpayer’s nexus with Ohio is substantial. After applying Crutchfield’s holding in this case, the Supreme Court upheld the CAT assessments against Newegg. View "Newegg, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The tax commissioner issued commercial-activity tax (CAT) assessments against the Crutchfield Corporation on revenue it earned from sales of electronic products that it shipped from the state of Ohio. Crutchfield, whose business in Ohio consisted solely of shipping goods from outside the state to its consumers in Ohio using the United States Postal Service or common-carrier delivery services, challenged the issuance of CAT assessments against it, arguing that Ohio may not impose a tax on the gross receipts associated with its sales to Ohio consumers because Crutchfield lacks a “substantial nexus” with Ohio. Citing case law interpreting this substantial-nexus requirement, Crutchfield argued that its nexus to Ohio was not sufficiently substantial because it lacked a “physical presence” in Ohio. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the assessments issued by the tax commissioner. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA and upheld the CAT assessments against Crutchfield, holding (1) the physical presence requirement recognized by the United States Supreme Court for purposes of use-tax collection does not extend to business-privileges taxes such as the CAT; and (2) the statutory threshold of $500,000 of Ohio sales constitutes a sufficient guarantee of the substantiality of an Ohio nexus for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Washington corporation and casino operator, brought an action in Oregon against the city of Portland under the Oregon Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, seeking a declaration that certain practices the city had approved through its “social gaming” permitting system were contrary to Oregon law. Plaintiff asserted that it was adversely affected by the city’s issuance of permits to engage in those gaming practices to establishments in Portland, in that persons who previously had patronized its casino in Washington were choosing to gamble in city-permitted card rooms in Portland instead. The city moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing, and the trial court granted the motion, reasoning that, insofar as plaintiff’s Washington casino was not subject to the “legal system” that was the object of the declaratory judgment action, plaintiff had no “rights, status [or] other legal relations” that could be adversely affected. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that, to establish standing under the declaratory judgment act, a plaintiff must be subject to the laws it asks the court to construe or must, at least, do business or own property in Oregon. But on appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, the city argued that the Oregon Court should have limited standing in a declaratory judgment action to those persons who could demonstrate that their interests were within the “zone of interests” that the relevant statute sought to protect. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' reasoning and affirmed its judgment. View "MT&M Gaming, Inc. v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

In cases consolidated for review, the issues presented for the Supreme Court involved the scope of the State’s authority to regulate so-called “payday loans” pursuant to OCGA 16-17-1, et seq., known as the Payday Lending Act. Pursuant to the statute, the State filed suit alleging that CashCall, Inc. (“CashCall”), Delbert Services Corporation (“Delbert Services”), Western Sky Financial, LLC (“Western Sky”), and Martin A. Webb (collectively “Defendants”) violated OCGA 16-17-2 (a) by engaging in a small-dollar lending enterprise that collected illegal usurious interest from Georgia borrowers. Defendants operated outside the State of Georgia and their dealings with Georgia borrowers occurred telephonically or over the Internet, and when a loan is funded, the funds are transferred to the borrower via electronic transfer to the borrower’s bank account. The State sought civil penalties and injunctive and other equitable relief. Defendants filed motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss the action. The trial court referred the case to a special master who recommended the case be dismissed, but the trial court rejected the special master’s recommendation and denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the State’s claim was not barred by the language of OCGA 16-17-1 (d). Because the trial court found a substantial likelihood that the State would prevail on the merits of the claim at trial, and found a substantial threat existed that the State would suffer irreparable injury in that there might not be sufficient funds available to satisfy a judgment should the State prevail at trial, the trial court ordered Defendants to deposit a $15 million sum into the court’s registry and to make quarterly deposits of any additional amounts that could be collected from Georgia borrowers in the future. The trial court, however, agreed to stay the granted relief during an appeal, upon the Defendants’ deposit of an additional $1 million into the escrow account created following entry of the consent order requiring the deposit of $200,000. In a separate order, the trial court denied the State’s motion to add as defendants J. Paul Reddam and WS Funding, LLC (“WS Funding”). Defendants filed a notice of appeal and the State filed a notice of cross-appeal. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, affirmed the modification of the injunction order, and reversed the order denying the State’s motion to add defendants. View "Western Sky Financial, LLC v. Georgia" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the passage of two weapons related bills passed by the Georgia General Assembly during the 2013-2014 legislative session. Appellant GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., (“GCO”) filed a complaint against the Code Revision Commission and its members, David Ralston, in his official capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives of Georgia, Lowell Cagle, in his official capacity as President of the Senate of Georgia, and Governor Nathan Deal, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Code Revision Commission (CRC) to amend the text of OCGA 16-11-127.1 and a judgment declaring that it was not a crime for a person with a weapons carry license to carry a firearm within a school safety zone. After motions to dismiss filed by both the Governor and CRC were granted in separate orders, GCO appealed the order granting CRC’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court found that GCO was not entitled to relief under "any state of provable facts" alleged in its amended complaint, there was no actual controversy which would have authorized a declaratory judgment, and the trial did not err in granting CRC's motion to dismiss. View "Georgiacarry.org v. Code Revision Comm'n" on Justia Law