Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a customer service representative, was in an automobile accident in 2011, after which she used a cane and limped. She was fired in 2012, allegedly because of a perceived disability that had required her to take time off and to use her health insurance. Represented by counsel, she filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, citing failure to submit a charge of discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the 300-day statutory deadline, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1). Six months after being fired she had filed with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) a “Complainant Information Sheet” (CIS). A charge filed with IDHR is automatically cross-filed with EEOC. Despite the EEOC amicus curiae brief, arguing that the CIS was the equivalent of a charge, the court concluded that it was not. A charge is the administrative equivalent of a judicial complaint; a CIS is not unless it asks for relief. Without such a request the CIS is a pre-charge screening form, which does not prompt IDHR to notify the employer, launch an investigation, or sponsor mediation. Although the CIS form does say that IDHR will cross-file the complainant’s “charge of discrimination” with EEOC, it also says “THIS IS NOT A CHARGE,” followed by the statement that “if IDHR accepts your claim, we will send you a charge form for signature.” View "Carlson v. Christian Brothers Services" on Justia Law

For some period of time before March 2015, the Agricultural Labor Relations Board had delegated plenary authority to seek injunctive relief under Labor Code section 1160.4 to general counsel. In March 2015, the board decided to change that delegation by requiring general counsel to obtain case-specific approval from the board for every request for injunctive relief. In May 2015, general counsel asked the board to approve a proceeding for injunctive relief against Gerawan Farming, Inc. (Gerawan). The board gave its conditional approval to that proceeding. When Gerawan asked the board to disclose the communications between the board and general counsel regarding the matter under the California Public Records Act, the board refused, claiming privilege. Gerawan brought a writ proceeding in Sacramento County Superior Court seeking to force the board to disclose the requested communications, and the court ordered disclosure. The board brought the present writ proceeding to the Court of Appeals to challenge the superior court’s ruling. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded the superior court erred in ordering disclosure of the communications between the board and general counsel relating to the decision to seek injunctive relief against Gerawan because those communications were indeed protected by the attorney-client privilege. "[E]ven if due process concerns with respect to the pending administrative proceeding against Gerawan are raised by the communications at issue, those concerns do not preclude the attorney-client privilege from attaching to those communications, and because the communications are privileged, they are exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act." Accordingly, the Court directed that a writ of mandate issue ordering the superior court to vacate its order requiring disclosure of those communications and enter a new order denying Gerawan’s request for disclosure. View "Agricultural Labor etc. Bd. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The "Agreement Regarding Real Property (TOT)" (TOT Agreement) was an agreement between the City of Oceanside and S.D. Malkin Properties, Inc. For its part, Malkin agreed to develop, in two phases, a 360 room luxury hotel on land owned by the successor to the city's former redevelopment agency; the city agreed to pay Malkin a total subsidy of $11,335,250,5 from transient occupancy taxes (TOT) generated by the hotel. Under the TOT Agreement, the hotel would be developed in two phases, and, for the first four years after each phase was complete, 100 percent of TOT's generated by each phase would be paid to Malkin. Thereafter smaller percentages of TOT's generated by the hotel would be paid to Malkin. The city council put the TOT Agreement, and items closely related to the hotel development, on its agenda for its September 10, 2014 meeting. According to plaintiff and appellant San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), there was no serious opposition to the hotel project at the city council meeting. At the meeting, the city council adopted a resolution approving the TOT Agreement and the subsidy report. SDOG filed an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and a petition for writ of mandate against the city in 2015, alleging violations of the Brown Act, the subsidy reporting provisions of Gov. Code section 53803, and the California Constitution. The trial court heard the matter on the merits on October 23, 2015 and found in the city's favor. Thereafter, it entered judgment in favor of the city, and SDOG filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, SDOG again asserted the city violated the Brown Act and section 53803. Finding no violation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. View "San Diegans for Open Government v. City of Oceanside" on Justia Law

Tulsa Airports Improvement Trust (TAIT) sought reimbursement for amounts it paid to a third-party contractor in furtherance of a noise abatement program funded primarily by grants from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Because its petition for review of agency action was not timely filed, The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the action. View "Tulsa Airports Improv. Trust v. FAA" on Justia Law

In 2002 the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California (Enterprise Tribe) submitted a request to the United States Department of the Interior (Department) to acquire a site in Yuba County for the purpose of establishing a casino/hotel resort complex. Pursuant to statute, the Secretary was authorized to acquire land, within or without an existing reservation, for the purpose of providing land for Indians. Land so acquired after October 17, 1988, could not, with some exceptions, be used for gaming. The exception at issue here was where the Secretary “after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination.” The Governor indicated his official concurrence with the Assistant Secretary’s determination. Plaintiff Auburn Tribe owned and operated the Thunder Valley Resort and Casino, approximately 20 miles from the Yuba County site. The Auburn Tribe filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief, alleging: (1) the Governor was required to comply with California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) before concurring in the Secretary’s decision to take lands into trust for the Enterprise Tribe; and (2) the Governor performed a legislative act when he concurred with the Secretary and when he negotiated and executed the compact with the Enterprise Tribe, in violation of the constitutional mandate of separation of powers. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded the CEQA did not apply here, and that the Governor’s concurrence did not violate the separation of powers clause. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Brown" on Justia Law

A police dog bit a police officer during a nighttime search for a burglary suspect in an abandoned building. Dog owners are usually strictly liable for dog bite damages. However, there is a statutory exception to strict liability for dog bites caused by the "lawful application of a police dog." At issue in this case was whether the County was strictly liable for an on-duty police dog biting an on-duty police officer. The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances of this case, the County was not subject to strict liability. View "Finch v. Thurston County" on Justia Law

Petitioner Thomas Hilton suffered an admittedly compensable injury as the result of an insect or spider bite. The present dispute centered on whether he required further medical treatment to reach maximum medical improvement (MMI). The single commissioner agreed with Hilton on the merits, finding he had not reached MMI, and further that any misrepresentations he had made during the life of his claim were a result of a serious cognitive deficit from a previous brain injury. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an order of the Court of Appeals dismissing Hilton's appeal of an admittedly interlocutory order of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's Appellate Panel (the Commission). Hilton argued the Commission's interlocutory order vacating and remanding the Workers' Compensation Commission's single commissioner's order was immediately appealable pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A) (Supp. 2015). The Supreme Court agreed, under these unusual facts, that review of the final agency decision would not provide Hilton with an adequate remedy, and he was therefore entitled to an immediate appeal. Determining whether review of the final agency decision would give Hilton an adequate remedy required the Court to reach the underlying merits of the Commission's order, and since it concluded that the order could not stand, the Court of Appeals' order was vacated and the case remanded back to the Commission. View "Hilton v. Flakeboard America Limited" on Justia Law

Petitioner State of Wyoming (the State) filed suit against the federal Department of the Interior, the Secretary of the Department, and the acting director of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) seeking judicial review of what the State claimed was their failure to comply with non-discretionary obligations imposed upon them by the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. Specifically, the State alleged that respondents were statutorily obligated, but had failed, to properly manage the overpopulation of wild horses on seven areas of public land in Wyoming. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted respondents’ motion and dismissed the action. The State appealed. Of particular relevance here, subsection (b) of Section 3 of the Act outlined the Secretary’s duties with respect to inventorying wild horses and dealing with overpopulation issues. The State argued that the subsection served as grounds for the Secretary to act. The Tenth Circuit found that subsection (b)(1)’s use of the phrase “whether action should be taken to remove excess animals” afforded the BLM with discretion to decide whether or not to remove excess animals. "[I]t is indisputable that only the first of these statutory requirements has been met, i.e., the determination of an overpopulation in each of the seven HMAs. Importantly, the second requirement has not been satisfied because the BLM has not determined that action is necessary to remove the excess animals. Consequently, the State cannot establish that the BLM has 'unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed' action that it was required to take under Section 3 of the Act, and thus has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the APA." View "State of Wyoming v. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

The focus of this appeal centered on the validity of HB 2630; 2014 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 375 (effective November 1, 2014). HB 2630 created the Retirement Freedom Act (74 O.S. Supp. 2014, sec. 935.1 et seq.), with the stated purpose as creating a new defined contribution system within the Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System (OPERS) for persons who initially became a member of OPERS on or after November 1, 2015 (this included most state employees hired on or after this date). Plaintiffs-appellants filed a Petition for Declaratory and Supplemental Relief challenging the validity of HB 2630, claiming HB 2630 was void because it was passed by the Legislature in violation of the Oklahoma Pension Legislation Actuarial Analysis Act (OPLAA). Both parties filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendants-appellees' motion for summary judgment and the appellants appealed. Agreeing with the trial court that the OPLAA had not been violated, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in defendants' favor. View "Stevens v. Fox" on Justia Law

Charles Breland, Jr., and Breland Corporation (collectively, "Breland") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the City of Fairhope in Breland's declaratory action based on alleged negligent conduct by Fairhope in relation to real property owned by Breland. In 2000, Breland filed applications for permits and certifications from the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") in order to fill approximately 10.5 acres of wetlands on the property. Fairhope opposed the fill project. Breland purchased the mitigation credits required by the Corps permit, and hired engineers and consultants for the project sometime before he began actual filling activity. Eight years later, actual work on the fill project began, but the City issued a stop-work order that halted operations. Because his Corps permit would expire in late 2008, Breland sued Fairhope for declaratory relief and an injunction against the effects of multiple City ordinances passed in attempts to stop Breland's work. Fairhope moved to dismiss the complaint. Charles Breland testified that he dismissed his lawsuit against Fairhope when both his Corps permit had been extended (to 2013), and that "there [were] conversations that the city [initiated] about buying the property." According to Breland, by late 2011, he got the impression that Fairhope had been negotiating with him to buy the remainder of the property under false pretenses and that Fairhope actually was trying to delay Breland from resuming the fill project until the Corps permit expired. In early 2013, Breland sued again seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Fairhope's attempts to stop the fill project. The trial court dismissed Breland's case on statute of limitations grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that each time Fairhope enforced its ordinances to stop Breland from filling activity on his property, Fairhope committed a new act that served as a basis for a new claim. Fairhope's last stop-work order was issued in November 2011; Breland filed this action on August 7, 2013. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations did not bar a claim for damages stemming from the 2011 stop-work order. View "Breland v. City of Fairhope" on Justia Law