Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, the Kansas Board of Education (the “Board”) adopted curriculum standards establishing performance expectations for science instruction in kindergarten through twelfth grade. Appellants, Citizens for Objective Public Education, Kansas parents, and school children (collectively, “COPE”), contended that although the standards purported to further science education, their concealed aim was to teach students to answer questions about the cause and nature of life with only nonreligious explanations. COPE also claimed two plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers who objected to their tax dollars being used to implement the Standards. The district court disagreed, and dismissed the suit without prejudice for lack of standing. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded all of COPE's theories of injury failed, and affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "COPE v. KS State Board of Education" on Justia Law

"This appeal is heavy, very heavy, on procedure." Plaintiff-appellee Peggy Walton worked in the New Mexico State Land Office. She was a political appointee of the elected Republican Land Commissioner, Patrick Lyons. Lyons’s decision not to seek reelection for a third term put plaintiff's job at risk: as a political appointee, a new administration could easily dismiss her. To see that she remained employed with the state, Lyons appointed plaintiff to a senior civil service job where she’d be protected by state law against removal for political reasons. A local television reporter ran a report titled “[c]ronies move up as officials move out” - a report highly critical of Lyons and plaintiff. Another reporter introducing the story aired his view that plaintiff was “distinctly unqualified” for her new job and claimed the hiring was “rigged.” Ray Powell, the newly elected Democratic candidate, dismissed plaintiff. Eight days after making the decision to dismiss her but before announcing it publicly, Powell held a meeting with the land office’s advisory board; "glared across the conference table" at plaintiff, spoke of the television news report denouncing her appointment; and, referring to her in all but name, said he “was concerned about . . . ‘protected employees’” who “for some reason didn’t have to meet the leadership criteria” for their appointments. Plaintiff sued when she was dismissed, arguing that she was a protected civil service employee, and under New Mexico Law, Powell had unlawfully retaliated against her for exercising her right to free political association in violation of the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In reply and at summary judgment. Powell claimed qualified immunity. But the district court denied the motion and set the case for trial. Powell appealed, and finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed denial of summary judgment. View "Walton v. NM State Land Office" on Justia Law

Wasatch Equality and four snowboarders (collectively, Wasatch) sued to challenge a snowboard ban at Alta Ski Area in Utah. In its complaint, Wasatch alleged the ban unconstitutionally discriminated against snowboarders and denied them equal protection of the law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Recognizing that private action won’t sustain a civil rights complaint, Wasatch further alleged the ban constituted “state action” because Alta operated its ski resort on federal land via a permit issued by the United States Forest Service. The district court disagreed, and dismissed this case for failure to identify a state action. Because the Tenth Circuit agreed Wasatch hadn't plausibly established that the snowboard ban constituted state action, the Court affirmed. View "Wasatch Equality v. Alta Ski Lifts" on Justia Law

Keneisha Kendrick appeals from a summary judgment entered against her and in favor of the City of Midfield ("the City") and one of its police officers, Joseph Wordell, in her action for damages based on personal injuries she sustained as a result of a car accident. Wordell had been dispatched in response to a domestic-disturbance call; he was traveling south on Highway 11 in his City-owned, police-outfitted Ford Crown Victoria automobile. Wordell testified that, upon receiving the dispatch, he turned on his emergency lights and siren and began proceeding toward the scene of the domestic disturbance. Kendrick was on her way to work and was traveling eastward on Woodward Road toward Highway 11 in a Ford Freestyle sport-utility vehicle owned by her mother. Kendrick was planning to turn left onto Highway 11. The front of Kendrick's vehicle collided with the right front passenger side of Wordell's vehicle. The impact of the crash rendered Kendrick unconscious. The impact of the collision caused Wordell's vehicle to veer across the median and two lanes of traffic in the opposite direction on Highway 11 and to collide head-on with a third vehicle. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded there remained disputed facts in the record, for which granting summary judgment was inappropriate. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kendrick v. City of Midfield" on Justia Law

Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting (MFBH) is a Maine ballot question committee that was a proponent of November 2014 Ballot Question 1 concerning bear hunting and trapping. As early as September 2013, the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife used agency resources to communicate with the public in opposition to Question 1. MFBH filed a complaint against the Department alleging that the Department’s campaign activities constituted an ultra vires expenditure of public funds. In November 2014, Maine voters defeated the ballot question. The Department subsequently filed a motion to dismiss MFBH’s complaint on the grounds of mootness and standing. In March 2015, the superior court dismissed the complaint as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the case is moot and that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. View "Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

In 2005, Crossroads Investors, L.P. borrowed $9 million subject to a promissory note. The note was secured by a deed of trust recorded against an apartment building Crossroads owned in Woodland. Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was the beneficiary of the deed. The note imposed on Crossroads a prepayment premium should Crossroads pay the unpaid principal before the note’s maturity date or should Crossroads default and Fannie Mae accelerate the loan. Crossroads defaulted on the note in late 2010. Fannie Mae served Crossroads with a notice of default, and accelerated the loan. In February 2011, Fannie Mae initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. In April 2011, Crossroads entered into a contract to sell the property to Ezralow Company, LLC (Ezralow) for $10.95 million. A few weeks later, Crossroads and Ezralow proposed to Fannie Mae that Ezralow would assume Crossroads’ obligations and pay off the loan on Fannie Mae’s agreeing to waive the prepayment premium. Fannie Mae refused to waive the prepayment premium and rejected the proposal. By June, Fannie Mae recorded a notice of trustee’s sale against the property, stating the total unpaid amount of Crossroad’s obligations was estimated at more than $10.5 million. The day before the property was scheduled to be sold, Crossroads filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection to protect its interest in the property. In its petition, Crossroads asserted it owed Fannie Mae $8.7 million. Fannie Mae sold the property after it was granted relief from the bankruptcy stay. Crossroads then sued Fannie Mae for wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, fraud, and other tort and contract actions. Fannie Mae filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending the actions on which Crossroads based its complaint were Fannie Mae’s statements in its papers filed in the bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. This appeal challenged the trial court’s denial of Fannie Mae's special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. "The principal thrust of Crossroads’ action was to recover for violations of state nonjudicial foreclosure law, not for any exercise of speech or petition rights by Fannie Mae. Even if protected activity was not merely incidental to the unprotected activity, Crossroads established a prima facie case showing it was likely to succeed on its causes of action." View "Crossroads Investors v. Federal National Mortgage Assn." on Justia Law

Kelly Dennis was allegedly injured in the course of his employment with The Salvation Army. Dennis filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, but The Salvation Army and its insurer (collectively, Relators) denied liability. The compensation judge awarded Dennis benefits, and the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed. Within thirty days, Relators filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the clerk of the appellate courts. Relators, however, failed to serve a cost bond on the WCCA as required by Minn. Stat. 176.471. Relators subsequently served an untimely cost bond on the WCCA. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether timely service of the cost bond was mandatory to have the WCCA order reviewed by the Supreme Court on certiorari. The Supreme Court discharged the writ of certiorari and dismissed the appeal, holding that Relators’ failure to file the cost bond within the thirty-day period to appeal was fatal to their appeal. View "Dennis v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether state legislators have standing to intervene in a challenge to the issuance of an executive order concerning direct care health workers. In early 2015, Governor Tom Wolf issued Executive Order 2015-05, “Participant-Directed Home Care Services,” which focused on individuals who received, and workers who provided, in-home medical and personal care. The Executive Order established, inter alia, an advisory group to ensure the quality of long-term personal assistance services to seniors and persons with disabilities, and a process by which workers who provide such care, and who were employed by the individuals they serve, could obtain a designated representative for discussions with the Secretary of Human Resources regarding various matters (namely wages, and health and retirement benefits). Petitioners filed suit arguing that Executive Order 2015-05 established organizational labor rights for domestic home care workers, but was issued without authorization and conflicted with existing Commonwealth labor laws, specifically the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, and the Public Employe Relations Act. The Commonwealth Court conducted a hearing on Petitioners’ request for a preliminary injunction, initially rejecting rejected Appellants’ attempt to directly intervene at the preliminary injunction stage. However, the court issued an order enjoining Governor Wolf from entering into any memorandum of understanding pursuant to Executive Order 2015-05 until disposition of the matter on the merits, establishing an expedited schedule for the filing of briefs on preliminary objections and cross-motions for summary relief, and listing the matter for en banc argument. Appellants' Application to Intervene was denied, giving rise to this appeal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that in these circumstances, Appellants did not have standing to intervene because the legislators’ interests purportedly impacted by the executive order did not involve unique legislative prerogatives, but, rather, were interests common to the general citizenry which only remotely impact the legislators’ right to act as legislators. Thus, the Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court denying the legislators’ request to intervene. View "Markham v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

Although these two cases arose separately, they posed a singular legal issue for the Supreme Court’s review, and thus were addressed in the same opinion. In S15G0887, Akeem Washington, who was on probation for speeding, sued Shannon Rivera, a probation officer, and her administrative assistant, alleging that they failed to perform their ministerial duties when they swore out a warrant for Washington’s arrest for failure to pay a fine that Washington already had paid in fulfillment of the conditions of his probation. Rivera moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing she was immune from liability in Washington’s suit because her alleged actions were protected by either quasi-judicial immunity or sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that it was possible that facts could be shown in discovery that would establish that neither quasi-judicial immunity nor sovereign immunity applied. Rivera did not attempt to file an application for interlocutory appeal from that order but filed a notice of appeal, asserting that she had authority to file a direct appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. In S15G0912, Dan and Arlene Appelrouth sued their neighbors, Cesar and Janice Rodriguez, also naming Forsyth County and other unknown persons as defendants. The Appelrouths alleged that actions taken on the Rodriguezes’ property, as well as on the County’s road right of way and associated drainage ditch, caused water damage to the Appelrouths’ property, and raised claims of, inter alia, breach of legal duty, negligence per se, trespass, nuisance, and inverse condemnation. The Rodriguezes filed a cross-claim against the County, which filed motions to dismiss both the complaint and cross-claim, asserting sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motions, ruling that it was possible that evidence could be established which would allow the Appelrouths and the Rodriguezes to prevail against the County’s claim of sovereign immunity. The County, like Rivera did not seek interlocutory appeal, and again the Court of Appeals dismissed on direct appeal, citing the collateral order doctrine as grounds for dismissal. Although the Court of Appeals applied incorrect analyses in these cases, the Supreme Court concluded it reached the correct results in dismissing the direct appeals filed by Rivera and Forsyth County. View "Rivera v. Washington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the award of costs against it in a False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, case, arguing that the district court improperly ordered it to pay defendants the costs of deposition transcripts under FRCP 54(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. 190. Because "costs" and "expenses" have distinct meanings under Rule 54(d), section 1920, and the FCA, the court concluded that 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(4) does not preclude the award of the costs for deposition transcripts. Plaintiff forfeited its argument under 28 U.S.C. 1920; and, even if appropriately presented, the argument has no merit where the court has stated clearly that section 1920 permits the taxation of deposition expenses, when necessarily incurred for use of the deposition in the case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Associates Against Outlier Fraud v. Huron" on Justia Law