Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Hampton Hall Club, Inc. was a nonprofit organization in Beaufort County. Respondent Brad Lightner was a member of Hampton Hall, and filed this action individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated against Defendants, alleging Defendants wrongfully collected and retained an admissions tax on its members' club and golf dues. After Respondent filed a motion for class certification, the State and the SCDOR ("Petitioners") filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, or, in the alternative, to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f), SCRCP, to dismiss the State as a party and to stay discovery. In so moving, Petitioners asserted, inter alia, Respondent was required to exhaust the administrative remedies under the South Carolina Revenue Procedures Act ("Act") and was prohibited from proceeding as a class action against the SCDOR. The circuit court determined the Act was inapplicable to this case because the General Assembly intended to limit the Act's application to disputes with the SCDOR concerning property taxes, which both parties conceded were not at issue. Thus, contrary to Petitioners' assertions, Respondent was not required to exhaust the administrative remedies under the Act in order to proceed individually against all Defendants. The court, however, granted Petitioners' motion to dismiss the class action allegations, finding the Act, which it determined was inapplicable to this dispute, nevertheless prohibited Respondent from bringing a class action lawsuit against Petitioners. In sum, we hold the circuit court erred in finding the Act's application is limited to disputes with the SCDOR concerning property taxes. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Because the Act was applicable to this case, Respondent was required to follow the administrative remedies under the Act and was prohibited from proceeding as a class action against Petitioners. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lightner v. Hampton Hall Club, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2013, a golf ball struck Miguel Leyva in the eye while he and his wife, Socorro Leyva, walked along a public path adjacent to the Bonita Golf Club. The Leyvas appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Crockett and Company, Inc., the owner and operator of the Club. The Leyvas contended Crockett was not entitled to summary judgment because the immunities designated in Government Code section 831.41 and Civil Code section 846 did not apply to their tort claims. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded section 831.4 barred their action, therefore affirming the trial court’s judgment. View "Leyva v. Crockett & Co." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) appealed a Superior Court judgment holding that section 6111.1(g)(2) of the Uniform Firearms Act, which provided for review by a court of common pleas of a request for the expungement of the PSP’s records of an individual’s involuntary civil commitment under section 7302 (“302”) of the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”), required a de novo hearing at which clear and convincing evidence must be presented in support of the 302 commitment. The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court erred, as the plain language of section 6111.1(g)(2) required a court of common pleas to review only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 302 commitment, limited to the information available to the physician at the time he or she made the decision to commit the individual, viewed in the light most favorable to the physician as the original decision-maker to determine whether his or her findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the Superior Court reviewed the trial court’s decision through an "improper lens," the Supreme Court vacated its decision and remanded this case back to that court for further proceedings. View "In Re Vencil" on Justia Law

On January 30, 2016, the Town of Deerfield held a deliberative session. During the session, two petitioned warrant articles, titled Article 16 and Article 17, were considered and amended. Following the amendment of the two articles, petitioner Harriet Cady filed a petition for injunctive relief against the Town requesting an immediate hearing on the grounds that the alterations violated RSA 40:13, IV(c). The Town objected and moved to dismiss. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition, concluding that the amendments to Articles 16 and 17 did not “remove or eradicate the subject matter of the original articles” and thus did not violate RSA 40:13, IV(c). Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cady v. Town of Deerfield" on Justia Law

The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) is a federally-chartered corporation that participates in the secondary mortgage market, with authority “to sue and to be sued, and to complain and to defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal,” 12 U.S.C. 1723a(a). Plaintiffs filed suit in state court alleging deficiencies in the refinancing, foreclosure, and sale of their home. Fannie Mae removed the case to federal court, relying on its sue-and-be-sued clause as the basis for federal jurisdiction. The district court denied a motion to remand the case to state court and later entered judgment against plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The clause does not grant federal courts jurisdiction over all cases involving Fannie Mae. Distinguishing cases in which a sue-and-be-sued clause was held to confer jurisdiction, the Court noted that Fannie Mae’s clause adds the qualification “any court of competent jurisdiction.” A court of competent jurisdiction is a court with an existing source of subject-matter jurisdiction; the clause does not grant federal court subject-matter jurisdiction, but confers only a general right to sue. View "Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leticia Bareno appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants San Diego Miramar College (the College), San Diego Community College District, and San Diego Community College District Administrative Facilities Corporation. In early 2013, Bareno was disciplined by her employer, the College, in relation to her employment as an administrative assistant. Thereafter, Bareno required medical treatment and accompanying leave from work, and she requested medical leave from her supervisor. Bareno provided medical certification for this request for leave. After the time frame specified in Bareno's initial request for leave had ended, Bareno continued to be absent from work. Bareno had attempted to e-mail her supervisor a recertification of her need for additional medical leave, but the College claimed that Bareno's supervisor did not receive any such request from Bareno for additional leave. As a result, after Bareno continued to be absent from work for an additional five consecutive days, the College took the position that she had "voluntarily resigned." After Bareno learned that the College considered her to have voluntarily resigned, she attempted to provide the College with information regarding the medical necessity of the leave that she had taken. The College refused to reconsider its position. Bareno filed suit against all three defendants, alleging that in effectively terminating her employment, defendants retaliated against her for taking medical leave, in violation of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA). Defendants moved for summary judgment on Bareno's sole claim for retaliation under CFRA, and the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, Bareno argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there remain triable issues of material fact in dispute. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed, reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Bareno v. San Diego Community College Dist." on Justia Law

Petitioner Alyne Fortgang filed a request for documents concerning the elephants at the Woodland Park Zoo (Zoo). She filed a request under the Public Records Act (PRA), which required every government "agency" to make records "available for [public] inspection and copying." Petitioner filed her request with the Woodland Park Zoo Society (WPZS), the private nonprofit that runs the Zoo. WPZS argued that the PRA did not apply to it as a private entity. The Court of Appeals interpreted the statutory word "agency" to include private entities when they act as the functional equivalent of government agencies. Under the Telford analysis, the appellate court concluded WPZS was not the functional equivalent of a government agency, and did not have to produce the records. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo" on Justia Law

Clark County Councilor Thomas Mielke filed recall charges essentially alleging that three fellow council members improperly held a vote in executive session, improperly designated The Columbian as the newspaper of record, and did not prevent the county executive from dissolving a county department. The superior court judge dismissed the charges as legally and factually insufficient, which Mielke appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "In re Recall of Boldt" on Justia Law

Between fiscal years 2006 and 2011, Congress prohibited the use of funds for inspection, thereby preventing commercial equine slaughter. In fiscal year 2012, Congress lifted the ban on funding and Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) received several applications for inspection. The agency issued grants of inspection to two commercial equine slaughter facilities: Valley Meat Company, LLC and Responsible Transportation, LLC. Front Range Equine Rescue, the Humane Society of the United States, and several other individuals and organizations (collectively, "Front Range") sued officials of the USDA, seeking a declaration that grants of inspection generally violated the National Environmental Policy Act and requesting that the court set aside the specific grants of inspection. Front Range also moved to enjoin the Federal Defendants from authorizing equine slaughter during the pendency of the claims. The district court granted Front Range's motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), prohibiting the Federal Defendants from sending inspectors to the equine slaughterhouses of, or otherwise providing equine inspection services. The court additionally sua sponte enjoined Valley Meat and Responsible Transportation from engaging in commercial equine slaughter. Valley Meat opposed Front Range's motion, arguing that it should be restrained and Front Range should be required to post a bond because an injunction against the Federal Defendants effectively also enjoined its operations. The district court never ruled on Front Range's motion, but denied Front Range's request for a permanent injunction and dismissed the action. Front Range immediately appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit temporarily enjoined the Federal Defendants from sending inspectors but did not enjoin Valley Meat or Responsible Transportation. Then, the Court dismissed the appeal as moot: (1) because Congress once again made it unlawful to engage in commercial equine slaughter for human consumption; and (2) while the appeal was pending, Valley Meat "decided to abandon all plans to slaughter equines and asked FSIS to withdraw its grant of inspection." The Tenth Circuit then vacated the district court's order denying a permanent injunction, "based on the underlying equitable principle that a party should not have to bear the consequences of an adverse ruling when frustrated by the vagaries of the circumstances." Valley Meat and Responsible Transportation moved to recover an injunction bond. A magistrate judge recommended that the motion be denied, and the district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation in full. Valley Meat appealed the denial of damages on the injunction bond. To this point, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying recovery against the injunction bond because there was never a ruling that Valley Meat was wrongfully enjoined. "This conclusion alone is enough to affirm the district court's decision." View "Front Range Equine Rescue v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Multiple cases were consolidated cases in this opinion, all stemming from a 2007 flood of the Chehalis River in Lewis County. In its first review, the Washington Supreme Court considered the trial court's orders dismissing the cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; a majority of the Court held that "RCW 4.12.010 relates to venue, not jurisdiction" and therefore "reverse[d] and remand[ed] for further proceedings." the respondents promptly moved to transfer venue to Lewis County in each case. Over the petitioners' objections, the trial court granted the respondents' motions. Those transfer orders were at issue here. The Supreme Court held that respondents did not waive their objections to proper venue for these actions, but that as a matter of statutory interpretation, RCW 4.12.010(1) did not provide for exclusive proper venue in Lewis County. King County was another possible proper venue in accordance with RCW 4.12.020(3) and 4.12.025(3). The Court therefore reversed the trial court's orders transferring venue to Lewis County to the extent those orders were based solely on exclusive proper venue. It was unclear from the record if the trial court considered whether venue should be transferred to Lewis County for the convenience to the witnesses, so the Court remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion on that issue in a manner consistent with its decision here. View "Ralph v. Weyerhaeuser Co." on Justia Law