Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Entergy filed a reverse-Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, suit against EPA to prevent the disclosure of documents requested by Sierra Club via a FOIA request. Sierra Club appealed the district court's denial of its motion to intervene. The court concluded that adversity of interest exists between Sierra Club and EPA because Sierra Club’s interests diverge from EPA’s interests in manners germane to this case. Because adversity of interest exists, any same-ultimate-objective presumption of adequate representation is overcome, and the requirement that Sierra Club’s interests be inadequately represented by EPA is satisfied. Accordingly, the court concluded that Sierra Club is entitled to intervene of right. The court reversed and remanded. View "Entergy Gulf States LA, LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

Karen Dixon, recently substituted as appellant for her deceased husband Donald, and appealed a Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) decision dismissing her appeal based on a nonjurisdictional timeliness defense that Secretary of Veterans Affairs Robert McDonald waived. Mr. Dixon was diagnosed in 2003 with sarcoidosis of the lungs and transverse myelitis. He filed a claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) seeking benefits for his sarcoidosis, which he alleged was connected to his service. A VA regional office denied Mr. Dixon’s claim, and the Board of Veterans Appeals affirmed. Acting pro se, Mr. Dixon filed a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court sixty days beyond the 120-day filing deadline set out in 38 U.S.C. 7266(a). The Veterans Court denied Mr. Dixon equitable tolling. He obtained pro bono counsel and filed a request for reconsideration of this denial, but the Veterans Court denied that request too. Mr. Dixon appealed, but then he died of his medical conditions while his appeal was pending. The Federal Circuit reversed because the Veterans Court’s denial of an extension of time had effectively denied Mr. Dixon’s new pro bono counsel access to evidence he would need to prove his claim. On remand, the Veterans Court substituted Mrs. Dixon and requested briefing from the parties on whether equitable tolling excused Mr. Dixon’s late filing. The Secretary responded by waiving his objection. Because the Veterans Court did not have the sua sponte authority to grant the Secretary relief on a defense he waived, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of Mrs. Dixon’s appeal and remanded for consideration on the merits. View "Dixon v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Developers obtained a conditional use permit to build a dairy on Owner’s property in Brookings County. The City of Hendricks and others (collectively, City) filed a petition for writ of certiorari in circuit court challenging the permit. The circuit court affirmed the grant of the permit. City appealed. Developers filed a notice of review to challenge City’s standing but did not serve their notice of review on Owner. City moved to dismiss Developers’ notice of review/cross-appeal, arguing that Owner was a party required to be served with the notice of review. The affirmed, holding (1) Owner was a party required to be served with Developers’ notice of review, and Developers’ failure to serve Owner required dismissal of their notice of review/cross-appeal; and (2) neither S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-5(a) nor Developers’ alleged alignment of interests with Owner excused Developers’ failure to serve Owner. View "Lake Hendricks Improvement Ass’n v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

In June 2015, the State began this civil action against Patricia Goodale, contending that her home was a public nuisance. The Walsh County sheriff's office personally served Goodale with the summons and complaint. On August 5, 2015, after several weeks without receiving an answer from Goodale, the State filed with the district court an affidavit of default and proof for judgment; proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for abatement; and a proposed judgment. On August 7, 2015, the district court signed the findings and order, and a default judgment for abatement of nuisance was entered. Goodale was served notice of the judgment. Goodale did not seek relief from the default judgment in the district court under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b), but instead appealed directly to the North Dakota Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Goodale" on Justia Law

The City of Williston shut down a man camp because of the lack of a fire protection system. Black Gold Oil Field Services applied and received multiple extensions for time to install the system, and finally got approved for a water tank (first step in the installation). At a City meeting, the City fire chief recommended shutting down the camp because it didn't seem like much progress was being made to install the system. The City accepted recommendation and shut down the camp. Black Gold filed for an injunction to stop the City from shutting its camp. The Supreme Court concluded that Black Gold failed to establish a substantial probability of succeeding on the merits of its underlying lawsuit against Williston and the City Commission and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Black Gold's request for a preliminary injunction. View "Black Gold Oil Field Services, LLC v. City of Williston" on Justia Law

Glenn Hampton suffered a work-related injury during his employment with Flav-O-Rich. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Hampton to be permanently totally disabled and awarded him permanent total disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded, finding that the ALJ’s summary of the evidence and findings of fact were not sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. Hampton filed a petition for review with the court of appeals. The court dismissed the petition as prematurely filed from a non-final Board opinion, concluding that because the Board’s opinion did not divest Hampton of a vested right and did not direct or authorize the ALJ to enter a different award on remand, it was not final and appealable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding under the test from Davis v. Island Creek Coal Co., the Board’s opinion was final and appealable. View "Hampton v. Flav-O-Rich Dairies" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former special agent with the FBI, filed suit against the DOJ under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), alleging that the Deputy Attorney General’s decision affirming the OARM's finding that she had not been constructively discharged and denying her back pay was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Plaintiff had previously filed a suit in district court alleging that OPR had not conducted its investigation as required by the applicable regulations and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the APA. The court concluded that both of plaintiff's suits relied on the same basis of subject matter jurisdiction and so the issues are the same for collateral estoppel purposes. Factual differences between the two underlying causes of action are immaterial, because those differences do not affect the common question, namely, whether Congress intended the CSRA to proscribe unique and exclusive remedial procedures for FBI employees alleging retaliation. Even if the court were to construe application of different sections of the APA as raising potentially different issues, collateral estoppel would still bar the action because both actions involve application of the same legal standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Turner v. DOJ" on Justia Law

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was a narrow one of appellate jurisdiction of an agency decision and the appropriate response by an appellate tribunal when it encounters on its calendar an interlocutory order from which leave to appeal was neither sought nor granted. A school principal was returned to teaching due to a reduction-in-force (RIF), which included elimination of all vice-principal positions throughout the school district. The principal filed a petition with the Commissioner of Education to establish her tenure and seniority rights as a vice-principal. Her employer, the Board of Education of the City of Elizabeth, challenged the validity of her principal certification, which challenge, if successful, affected her tenure and seniority rights. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) adopted the Elizabeth Board's position, but the Commissioner rejected the Initial Decision and remanded the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for calculation of the principal's tenure and seniority rights. The ALJ complied, the Commissioner adopted the Initial Decision, and the Elizabeth Board appealed. The Appellate Division held that the Commissioner's first decision was a final order from which the Elizabeth Board could have filed an appeal as of right. Having failed to do so, the panel concluded that the Elizabeth Board waived its right to appeal the Commissioner's first decision. The appellate panel raised the issue of the timeliness of the appeal sua sponte and determined that the Commissioner's first decision rejecting the ALJ s Initial Decision was a final order from which the employer should have taken an appeal. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the Commissioner's order became a final decision from which an appeal could be filed as of right only when the Commissioner adopted the decision of the ALJ following the remand proceedings. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Education of the City of Elizabeth" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court considered when a municipal agency’s decision constitutes a final action subject to immediate judicial review. The owner of the Camden Harbour Inn applied to the Town of Camden for authorization to increase the number of guest rooms and parking spaces for the Inn and to reduce the number of seats at the Inn’s restaurant. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) granted a special exception permit subject to conditions and allowed the Inn to proceed to the Planning Board for site plan review. Susan Bryant, an abutter, appealed the ZBA’s decision to the superior court before site plan review could occur. The superior court affirmed the ZBA’s decision. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for dismissal of Bryant’s complaint, holding that, while the Town’s Zoning Ordinance expressly provided for Bryant’s appeal from the grant of the preliminary special permit, the ZBA’s decision was not a final action subject to appellate review in the courts because additional process was required by the Town’s Ordinance before a final decision on the Inn’s proposed changes is reached. View "Bryant v. Town of Camden" on Justia Law

Trumbull County has provided sewer service to General Motors’ Lordstown Assembly Plant since 1964. In the mid-2000s, the County borrowed $3.4 million from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to maintain and improve its sewer lines. That loan obligation triggered the protections of 7 U.S.C. 1926(b), under which sewer providers that owe money to the Department are protected from competition with other sewer providers. The County claims that the Village of Lordstown violated section 1926(b) when the Village built sewer lines that could one day serve GM’s Plant. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding on the merits that the Village’s mere construction of sewer lines did not curtail or limit the County’s service. The Sixth Circuit vacated, reaching the same result on grounds of lack of standing. While the County still owes a balance, section 1926(b) affords it a legally protected interest in freedom from competition, but it has shown not any actual or imminent invasion of that interest. Sewer lines can last for decades, so the mere fact of their construction does not show that the Village intends to compete with the County anytime soon. View "Trumbull Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Village of Lordstown" on Justia Law