Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, appellant Iziah Smith applied to appellee Harry James, III, Judge of the Probate Court of Richmond County, for a renewal Georgia weapons carry license; he requested the issuance of a temporary renewal license as well. At that time, Smith had fewer than 90 days remaining before his carry license expired. Although Smith initially was refused a temporary renewal license, he was issued a weapons carry license within 30 days of the filing of his application for a license, and before his previously issued license expired. Several weeks later, Smith and appellant GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. (“GCO”) brought this mandamus action against James in the Superior Court of Richmond County, alleging James was wrongly refusing to issue temporary renewal licenses. James answered, denying the material allegations of the complaint. Appellants then filed a motion for recusal, asserting that a Richmond County Superior Court Judge should not be presiding over a case in which the Richmond County Probate Court Judge was named as the defendant. The trial court denied the motion to recuse. Following discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment. Recognizing that, at some point, James had begun issuing temporary renewal licenses to other applicants, appellants acknowledged they were no longer entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. They asserted, nevertheless, that they were entitled to costs and attorney’s fees as the “prevailing party” in the lawsuit. The trial court granted James’ summary judgment motion and denied appellants’ summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court found that It follows that GCO lacked standing to recover costs and attorney fees pursuant to Georgia law. Because Smith’s claim was moot and GCO lacked standing, it was incumbent upon the trial court to enter an order dismissing appellants’ claims. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case to the trial court with direction that it vacate the grant of summary judgment to James and enter an order of dismissal. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Georgiacarry.org v. James" on Justia Law

Kathy Seacrist and her son, John McDonald sued Southern California Edison (Edison); the City of Palm Desert; J.R. Roberts; and Does 5 through 100. Seacrist owned a home near an Edison substation. Plaintiffs Seacrist and McDonald alleged stray electrical currents from the substation were causing them to suffer various medical issues. The Fourth Amended Complaint included seven causes of action against Edison: (a) negligence; (b) nuisance; (c) trespass; (d) strict liability/products liability; (e) strict liability/implied warranty of fitness; (f) strict liability/ultra hazardous activity; and (g) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court sustained Edison’s demurrer without leave to amend, concluding “Plaintiffs claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the California Public Utilities Commission,” and thus, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the dispute with Edison. The Court of Appeal held previously that the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) did not have exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving injuries resulting from stray electrical currents from a substation. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the trial court erred by sustaining Edison’s demurrer because the PUC did not have exclusive jurisdiction over claims related to injuries from stray electrical currents. Edison asserts, among other things, that controlling case law was wrongly decided. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Seacrist v. So. Cal. Edison" on Justia Law

In this appeal, Mary DiFebo argued that the Superior Court erred by dismissing her amended petition seeking review of a Board of Adjustment decision that granted a variance application for two land plots located near DiFebo's home to be subdivided into four flag lots. The Superior Court had two related reasons for dismissing the amended petition: (1) that DiFebo had not named the owners of the two properties that were the subject of the Board's proceeding within the thirty-day statute of limitations for commencing a petition challenging a Board decision, and for that reason alone she was foreclosed from proceeding; (2) alternatively, the court found that DiFebo had not met the requirements for relation back under Superior Court Civil Rule 15(c)(3). The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court correctly determined that DiFebo did not satisfy all of Rule 15(c)(3)'s requirements to have her amended petition relate back to her initial filing. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of DiFebo's amended petition. View "DiFebo v. Board of Adjustment of New Castle County, et al." on Justia Law

Richard and Betty B. Chesnut petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion affirming the Madison Circuit Court's summary judgments in favor of the City of Huntsville, the Board of Zoning Adjustment of the City of Huntsville, Denton-Niemitz Realty, LLC, and Guild Building and Remodeling, LLC. In 1983, the Chesnuts purchased a house and the adjacent lot to the east of their house, which was in a Huntsville neighborhood that had been established in 1908. The neighborhood was zoned as a 'Resident 1-B' district. In October 2012, Denton-Niemitz purchased the house on the west side of the Chesnuts' house. Subsequently, Denton-Niemitz obtained a permit to raze the house it purchased. Denton-Niemitz hired Guild Building & Remodeling, LLC to demolish the Denton-Niemitz house. The city issued the permits and construction began on the new house. Richard Chesnut was concerned the new house did not comply with the applicable set-back line requirement, and requested the zoning code be enforced. When no action was taken, the Chesnuts filed suit. The Chesnuts argued that the Circuit Court erred in entering a summary judgment in the civil action because, they said, Jim McGuffey (the zoning-enforcement coordinator for the City) incorrectly interpreted Articles 12.2.4 and 73.7.4 of the City's zoning code; that, when McGuffey issued the permits, he used an "extralegal dictionary definition" of "developed" and "undeveloped"; that McGuffey ignored a mandate of the Huntsville City Council that he did not have the power to permit construction that did not conform with the zoning code; and that McGuffey and the City ignored well established rules of statutory construction and ignored their statutory mandate to administer ordinances according to their literal terms. After review, the Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals because the zoning enforcement coordinator's interpretation of the zoning ordinance was unreasonable. The Supreme Court affirmed in part the appellate court's judgment because the summary judgment and the Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance of that judgment was appropriate, not because the Chesnuts' appeal was untimely but because the Chesnuts' administrative appeal was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Richard and Betty Chesnut." on Justia Law

On May 8, 2014, petitioner City of San Diego (City) denied the application of Jeri Dines, the real party in interest, for leave to file a late claim filed pursuant to the California Government Claims Act. Dines did not file a petition with the trial court for an order relieving her from the claims presentation requirements until November 13, 2014 (i.e., more than six months after the City denied her application). Dines alleged former City Mayor Bob Filner inappropriately touched her. However, citing section 915.2, subdivision (b) of the Act that extends by five days the period for a recipient of a mailed notice to respond to the notice, the trial court granted her petition, concluding section 915.2, subdivision (b), gave her an additional five days to file her section 946.6 petition. The City filed a petition for writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal, challenging the trial court's order. The City argued section 915.2, subdivision (b), was inapplicable to, and did not extend, the Act's section 946.6's six-month limitations period for filing a petition with the court. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City and granted the requested relief. View "City of San Diego v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

International Boundary and Water Commissioner Ruth hired McCarthy as an attorney in 2009. Within months, McCarthy had prepared four legal memoranda challenging Commission activities as “gross mismanagement,” contrary to existing law, and characterizing certain officers as lacking “core competencies.” McCarthy submitted a report: “Disclosures of Alleged Fraud, Waste and Abuse” to the Office of Inspector General (OIG), and other federal agencies and informed Ruth of his reports. Ruth terminated McCarthy’s employment, citing McCarthy’s failure to support the executive staff in a constructive manner. McCarthy filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), alleging whistleblower retaliation, citing his report to OIG, but not the legal memoranda, as protected activity. Existing precedent held that reports made in the course of an employee’s normal duties and reports made to a supervisor about a supervisor’s conduct were not protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 103 Stat. 16. The administrative judge found no retaliation. The Merit Systems Protection Board and Federal Circuit affirmed in 2012. While McCarthy’s petition was pending, Congress enacted the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, 126 Stat. 1465-76, under which McCarthy’s legal memoranda could be protected disclosures. The Act can be applied retroactively to pending cases. McCarthy did not raise the change in law while his petition for rehearing was pending. The Federal Circuit affirmed MSPB’s refusal to reopen his case. McCarthy has not exhausted OSC remedies with respect to the memoranda, rendering the MSPB without jurisdiction. View "McCarthy v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law

GA entered into a blanket purchase agreement (BPA 218), with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in June 2011, to furnish trained service dogs for disabled veterans. A year later, the contracting officer sent an email questioning GA's performance. On August 31, 2012, the officer sent notice terminating BPA 218 for default and suspending open orders, informing GA that it had the right to appeal under the disputes clause of the contract. On December 21, 2012, GA sent a letter to the VA’s Rehabilitation Research & Development Service, arguing that it had fulfilled its duties and that the default termination should be converted to a termination for the convenience of the government. On February 28, 2013, GA sent the contracting officer a “formal demand.” On March 21, the officer sent a letter stating that she had received the claim but needed supporting documentation. GA began compiling documentation, but on May 3, the officer sent another letter, stating that she would not reconsider her decision, but that GA could appeal under 41 U.S.C. 7104(b). On January 7, 2014, GA filed suit. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, finding the claim time-barred because, while the February 2013 letter qualified as a request for reconsideration, the officer did not reconsider, so the statute of limitations never tolled. The Federal Circuit reversed. The 12-month statutory appeal period did not begin to run until the officer rejected the request for reconsideration on May 3. View "Guardian Angels Med. Serv. Dogs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Askins filed a citizen suit alleging that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Ohio EPA, and the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) violated the Clean Water Act’s permitting procedures with respect to controlling water pollution caused by certain animal feeding operations, 33 U.S.C. 1251. They alleged that the Ohio EPA failed to inform the EPA that it transferred authority over part of the state’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination (NPDES) permit program to ODA until five years after it had done so; that ODA administered part of the state-NPDES Program without approval from the EPA; that the EPA permitted Ohio EPA to transfer part of the state-NPDES program without its approval; and that the EPA allowed ODA to administer part of the state-NPDES program without its approval. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Clean Water Act does not permit suits against regulators for regulatory functions. View "Askins v. Ohio Dep't of Agric." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were descendants of the victims of the 1864 Sand Creek Massacre and brought suit for an accounting of the amounts they alleged the U.S. government held in trust for payment of reparations to their ancestors. Because the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Flute v. United States" on Justia Law

Maurice Thill appealed a district court order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. Thill argued that the district court's order was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the findings were inadequate. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court determined the district court did not make sufficient findings enabling the Court to review the appeal. The district court did not identify the facts on which it relied in determining Thill's likelihood to engage in further sexual predatory conduct or the facts on which it relied in determining Thill had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. "These conclusory, general findings do not comply with N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a)." The case was remanded for specific findings of fact. View "Interest of Thill" on Justia Law