Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, appellee Neil Bayles was arrested and charged with driving under the influence. He timely requested an administrative hearing, at the conclusion of which, an administrative hearing officer suspended Bayles' driving privileges for ninety-one days. The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court judgment reversing the administrative hearing officer's decision suspending Bayles' driving privilege because the Department failed to timely file the hearing transcript within the twenty-day period under N.D.C.C. 39-20-06. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding the district court erred as a matter of law by summarily reversing the hearing officer's decision based on noncompliance with the statute, and because Bayles failed to show prejudice caused by the claimed delay or demonstrate the Department systemically disregarded the requirements of the law. View "Bayles v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Defendants are national securities exchanges registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and operate as self‐regulatory organizations that regulate markets in conformance with securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a. Plaintiffs are securities firms and members of the defendant exchanges. They compete for customer order flow by displaying buy and sell quotations for particular stocks. Between at least January 2004 and June 2011, each defendant charged “payment for order flow” (PFOF) fees. Each defendant exchange imposes PFOF fees when a trade is made for a customer; however, these fees are not imposed for proprietary “house trades,” where a firm trades on its own behalf. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ suit, in which they sought to recover PFOF fees they claim were improperly charged. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the SEC. View "Citadel Sec., LLC v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned for judicial review of a decision by the City Development Board approving the annexation of certain land. The district court affirmed. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to appeal, claiming that the annexation was improper. The Board filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the time to file a notice of appeal in an electronically filed case begins on the day the notice of filing is electronically submitted or on the day the court order from which the appeal is taken has been electronically filed. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal, holding (1) the notice of appeal from a final judgment or order of the district court must be filed within thirty days of the date the judgment or order was electronically filed, rather than the date of the notice of filing; and (2) the notice of appeal in this case was untimely filed. View "Concerned Citizens of Southeast Polk Sch. Dist. v. City Dev. Bd. of Iowa" on Justia Law

Respondents Mesiti Development, Inc., JVL Construction Company, Inc., and Brook Hollow Corporation, appealed a superior court order dismissing their counterclaims against petitioner Town of Londonderry. In 2012, the Town filed a bill of interpleader to determine whether $264,517.02 in surplus impact fees collected under the Town’s impact fee ordinance should have been refunded to the developers who paid the impact fees or to the current owners of the properties for which the fees had been paid. Although the Town’s impact fee ordinance specifies that the current owners are entitled to the refunds, the Town sought to confirm that the ordinance is consistent with the impact fee statute. The bill listed seventeen properties and their respective impact fee payors and current owners. Additional parties intervened thereafter. Several parties, including the respondents, moved to add counterclaims alleging, among other things: (1) violations of RSA 674:21, V; (2) negligence; (3) violation of fiduciary duties owed to impact fee payors; (4) violation of the public trust in government; and (5) violation of the municipal budget law. The Town filed a motion to dismiss these counterclaims, which the trial court granted. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in the order dismissing these claims, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Londonderry v. Mesiti Development, Inc." on Justia Law

Christopher Williamson appealed a district court order affirming the Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision to suspend his driving privileges for two years. Officer Travis Martinson stopped Williamson after he drove over a fire hose at a fire scene. Martinson smelled alcohol in Williamson's vehicle and noticed Williamson had bloodshot, watery eyes and slurred speech. Williamson refused field sobriety tests but consented to perform an onsite screening test. The onsite test estimated Williamson's blood alcohol content was greater than permitted for operating a vehicle and Martinson arrested Williamson. Martinson took Williamson to the Williams County Correctional Center and Sergeant Randy Haugenoe administered an Intoxilyzer 8000 chemical test. The Intoxilyzer reported Williamson had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.231 percent by weight. A hearing officer introduced the Intoxilyzer report at an administrative hearing. Williamson objected, alleging the statutory requirements were not met and the report was inadmissible for lack of foundation. The hearing officer concluded the test was fairly administered, the objection was overruled and the hearing officer's suspension of Williamson's driving privileges for two years was not in error. The district court affirmed the decision. Williamson appealed, arguing the district court erred by receiving evidence that was not adequately authenticated. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Williamson v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Secretary issued regulations setting out reasonable cost limits (RCLs) for specified medical services and establishing certain exceptions to those limits. Canonsburg claimed that the Secretary has violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., because her method of calculation is inconsistent with governing regulations and was promulgated without notice and comment. In light of Canonsburg I, the district court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that issue preclusion barred Canonsburg’s suit. The court concluded that the Secretary did not waive her issue preclusion affirmative defense by not raising it at the administrative stage. Moreover, the Secretary asserted it, expressly and properly, in district court and the court is free to affirm the district court's application of the doctrine to Canonsburg's complaint. In light of the Supreme Court's plain language in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I and II), the court's own construction of the Chenery doctrine and no persuasive case law to the contrary, the court concluded that the Chenery doctrine does not prohibit raising issue preclusion as an affirmative defense in district court even if the party raising the defense was not a party to the administrative proceeding or was otherwise unable to assert the defense at the administrative stage. Finally, the court rejected Canonsburg's claims of equitable considerations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Canonsburg General Hosp. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

An inmate was attacked by another inmate and died from his injuries. Plaintiffs, the victim’s mother and sister, applied for compensation from Defendant, the Office of Victim Services. Defendant declined to compensate Plaintiffs. After a hearing, the Victim Compensation Commissioner denied Plaintiffs’ request for review. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the Commissioner’s decision. More than four years later, shortly before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ appeal on the ground that it was untimely filed. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Plaintiffs did not timely appeal in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-211a. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of section 54-211a by properly serving a writ of summons and a complaint on Defendant within thirty days of the Commissioner’s decision. View "Cales v. Office of Victim Servs." on Justia Law

The members of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PPUC) and Core Communications, Inc., appealed a District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AT&T Corp. Core billed AT&T for terminating phone calls from AT&T’s customers to Core’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) customers from 2004 to 2009. When AT&T refused to pay, Core filed a complaint with the PPUC, which ruled in Core’s favor. AT&T then filed suit in federal court seeking an injunction on the ground that the PPUC lacked jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic because such traffic is the exclusive province of the Federal Communications Commission. After review of the matter, the Third Circuit found that the FCC’s jurisdiction over local ISP-bound traffic was not exclusive and the PPUC orders did not conflict with federal law. As such, the Court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded this case for entry of judgment in favor of Core and the members of the PPUC. View "AT&T Corp v. Core Communications Inc" on Justia Law

Pilkington North America, Inc. entered into a social contract with Toledo Edison Company under which Toledo provided one of Pilkington’s facilities with discounted electric service. The Public Utilities Commission approved the special contract. Pilkington later filed a complaint alleging that Toledo Edison had unlawfully terminated the special contract. Five other companies that also had special contracts with the utility also filed complaints against Toledo Edison. The Commission consolidated the six complaints and dismissed them. With the exception of Pilkington, each of the industrial customers appealed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s order, concluding that Toledo Edison had prematurely terminated the special contracts. Pilkington subsequently filed a Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment with the Commission seeking relief from the Commission’s order dismissing its complaint and its order denying the application for rehearing that the other five complainants filed. The Commission denied Pilkington’s motion, concluding that Pilkington may not use Rule 60(B) as a substitute for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Pilkington did not appeal the Commission’s adverse judgment, that judgment is final, and res judicata precludes the use of Rule 60(B) to obtain relief from that final judgment. View "In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

In October 2014, the California State Lands Commission (SLC) approved the San Francisco Bay and Delta Sand Mining Project, which authorized real parties in interest Hanson Marine Operations, Inc., Morris Tug & Barge, Inc. and Suisun Associates (collectively, Hanson) to continue dredge mining sand from sovereign lands under the San Francisco Bay pursuant to 10-year mineral extraction leases. San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge the SLC’s decision to approve the project, which the trial court denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Baykeeper argued: (1) the SLC failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA); and (2) the mineral leases authorized by the SLC’s approval of the project violated the common law public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeal granted the petition, finding that the SLC’s environmental review of the mining project complied with CEQA, but it failed to consider whether the sand mining leases were a proper use of public trust property. The trial court was directed to mandate that the SLC to address this issue. View "S.F. Baykeeper v. Cal. State Lands Com." on Justia Law