Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Meridian Service Metropolitan District (Meridian) appealed a district court order finding that Meridian sought to appropriate designated ground water that was subject to the jurisdiction of the Colorado Ground Water Commission. Meridian petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to decide whether storm runoff could be classified as “designated ground water” subject to administration and adjudication by the Commission, or whether such water was in or tributary to a natural stream (vesting jurisdiction in the local water court). The Supreme Court concluded that because this case presented a question of whether the water at issue here met a statutory definition of “designated ground water,” the Commission had jurisdiction to make the initial determination. View "Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist. v. Ground Water Comm'n" on Justia Law

Mokdad, a naturalized U.S. citizen, alleges that he has been denied boarding on commercial airline flights between the U.S. and his native country, Lebanon because he was on the No Fly List. Mokdad applied for redress under the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP). Mokdad received a letter that did not confirm or deny whether he was on the List but informed him that “we have conducted a review of any applicable records in consultation with other federal agencies ... no changes or corrections are warranted at this time.” The letter notified him of his right to file administrative appeal with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within 30 days, that the TRIP determination would become final if he did not, and that final determinations are reviewable by the Court of Appeals under 49 U.S.C. 46110. Mokdad did not file a TSA administrative appeal or a petition with the Court of Appeals but filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Michigan against the Attorney General, the FBI, and the Director of the Terrorist Screening Center. Mokdad did not name TSA or any TSA officer. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal, finding that the district court had jurisdiction, but declined to address the challenge to the adequacy of procedures to contest inclusion on the No Fly List, for failure to join a necessary party. View "Mokdad v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2014, two people were killed when a Seattle news helicopter crashed. The National Transportation Safety Board investigated, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(1), “to ascertain measures that would best tend to prevent similar accidents or incidents in the future.” NTSB “does not engage in traditional agency adjudications, nor does it promulgate or enforce any air safety regulations. Rather, it simply analyzes accidents and recommends ways to prevent similar accidents.” No part of an NTSB accident report may be admitted into evidence or used in a civil action for damages. In 2015, the Board released a Factual Report concerning its investigation of the Seattle crash; it has not yet released an analysis of the likely cause of the accident. The Illinois company that owned and operated the helicopter involved in the crash asserted that the Report “omits significant information that will make it impossible for the Board to reach an accurate determination of Probable Cause” and unsuccessfully requested that NTSB rescind the Report and refrain from releasing its Probable Cause Report until “errors in the Factual Report are addressed.” The Seventh Circuit dismissed a petition seeking an order requiring NTSB to rescind or withhold reports. The court concluded that the Board’s reports are not final orders subject to review. View "Helicopters, Inc. v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd." on Justia Law

Herr bought waterfront property on Crooked Lake in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan and planned to use their gas-powered motorboat on it. The U.S. Forest Service threatened to enforce a regulation (36 C.F.R. 293.6) that bans non-electric motorboats from the 95 percent of the lake that falls within the Sylvania National Wilderness Area. Herr sought and injunction on the ground that the Forest Service’s authority over Crooked Lake is “[s]ubject to valid existing rights,” Michigan Wilderness Act, 101 Stat. 1274, 1275. The district court held that a six-year time bar on the action was jurisdictional and that Herr had waited too long to file this lawsuit. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing a 2015 Supreme Court decision, United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, and stating that the statute contains no language suggesting that the limitations period starts when a plaintiff’s predecessor in interest could first file a lawsuit. When a party first becomes aggrieved by a regulation that exceeds an agency’s statutory authority more than six years after the regulation was promulgated, that party may challenge the regulation without waiting for enforcement proceedings. View "Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv." on Justia Law

In this case, the Citizens Alliance for Property Rights Legal Fund (CAPR) sought to invalidate several ordinances passed by San Juan County, alleging violations of Washington's Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA). Specifically, CAPR contended that four ordinances passed as part of a state-mandated update of the County's critical area ordinances (CAO) should have been voided because the ordinances had first been discussed by an informal group of county officials and employees (CAO Team) in meetings that did not comply with the OPMA. After review of the trial court record, the Washington Supreme Court rejected CAPR's arguments because: (1) none of the CAO team meetings constituted "meetings" of the San Juan County Council under the OPMA; (2) the CAO Team itself was not a "committee" of the Council; and (3) the CAO Team never acted on behalf of the Council. View "Citizens All. for Prop. Rights Legal Fund v. San Juan County" on Justia Law

In September 2003, Christopher B. entered a plea of no contest to stalking his ex-wife's former husband, and for possessing a billy club. From 2005 through 2007, Christopher B. was found to be a mentally disordered offender and placed in a state hospital. He would not accept the diagnosis that he had a delusional disorder, and refused voluntary treatment. By February 2008, Christopher B. had been under commitment for the full length of the prison term for his offense, and the state hospital released him. Following his release, Christopher B. harassed his ex-wife and his stepdaughter, resulting in a June 2009 complaint alleging criminal threats, stalking, and being a felon in possession of a gun After a hearing, the criminal court found Christopher B. was not competent to stand trial; the criminal proceedings were suspended, and in September 2009 the court ordered his transfer to the custody of a state hospital. At the conclusion of the three-year maximum period of commitment, the state hospital found that Christopher B. could not be restored to competency because he refused voluntary treatment under his ongoing belief that he does not have any mental disorder. The state hospital recommended institution of a "Murphy conservatorship." Christopher B. appealed a probate court order granting the petition of the Placer County Public Guardian to establish a conservatorship over the his person and estate. Christopher B. argued there was insufficient evidence of a pending indictment in underlying criminal proceedings, a jurisdictional prerequisite for his “Murphy conservatorship” under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. Christopher B. also contended the evidence did not support imposition of a restriction on his right to enter into contracts. The Public Guardian cross-appealed, contending the probate court imposed an incorrect termination date for the renewed conservatorship. After review of the procedural history of this case, as well as the probate court record, the Court of Appeal vacated the order imposing the conservatorship with directions to dismiss the petition. This disposition mooted the issue of a contractual restriction and the cross-appeal. View "Conservatorship of Christopher B." on Justia Law

On August 13, 2013, the Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL) mailed two Determinations of Overpayment and an Eligibility Determination to Mitchell Kennedy at the address he had provided when filing for unemployment benefits. The Determinations informed Kennedy that he had the right to appeal, or protest, the Determinations and that the last day to do so was August 27, 2013. On August 21, 2013, Kennedy moved to a new residence. He changed his address with the U.S. Postal Service. Kennedy received the Determinations on August 24, 2013, three days before the deadline. He did not read them until either August 26 or 27. The Industrial Commission made no specific finding as to when Kennedy read the letters but did find that “Claimant did not closely review the Determination to realize the applicable appeal dates due to work and other personal priorities.” Kennedy faxed his protest to IDOL on August 29, 2013, two days after the deadline. In the transmission of that protest, Kennedy informed IDOL of his new address. The appeals examiner found that Kennedy’s request for an appeals hearing was not timely and therefore the examiner had no jurisdiction to hear Kennedy’s appeal. Kennedy appealed, and the Commission affirmed the examiner’s decision. Kennedy then requested reconsideration from the Commission. Finding that Kennedy had not presented any further argument on the relevant issues, the Commission denied the motion. Kennedy timely filed this appeal under Idaho Code section 72-1368(9) and Idaho Appellate Rules 11(d) and 14(b). But finding no reversible error in the Commission's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kennedy v. Hagadone Hospitality Co." on Justia Law

The Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority ("ACIFA") and its ex officio vice president Kim Thomas appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding $5 million in compensatory damages to Albert Wilson, Donald Simmons, Rufus Barnes, Bryan Gavins, Joseph Danzey, and a class of current and former nonexempt correctional officers ("the correctional officers") employed by the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC"). The correctional officers originally filed suit alleging that ADOC was violating its own regulations and state law in the manner in which it: (1) compensated correctional officers for overtime; (2) restricted the way correctional officers were allowed to use earned leave; and (3) paid correctional officers the daily subsistence allowance provided by law. The plaintiffs also sought class certification on behalf of all other similarly situated correctional officers employed by ADOC and requested injunctive relief, as well as money damages, to include backpay with interest, punitive damages, and litigation costs and expenses, including attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment entered on the jury's verdict: "Suffice to say, [the correctional officers] failed to present substantial evidence of a connection between ACIFA and the supervision of the correctional officers or how the correctional officers are paid. Without evidence indicating that ACIFA had anything to do with the personnel policies at issue or how correctional officers' pay is determined and distributed or the funds that are used to pay correctional officers, ACIFA cannot be held liable for the harms the correctional officers allege they suffered. Because of the lack of substantial evidence in support of the claims made by the correctional officers against ACIFA and against Thomas as ex officio vice president of ACIFA, the defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on those claims." View "Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority v. Wilson" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization constructed a granite memorial on the Juneau waterfront and each spring conducted a ceremonial blessing of the fleet as the fishing boats passed by. The City and Borough of Juneau decided to build a large dock on the same stretch of waterfront. The City asked the State of Alaska to transfer the State-owned submerged lands necessary to complete the project, and the organization filed suit to enjoin construction of the dock before the land was transferred. The superior court denied the organization’s motions for injunctive and declaratory relief, denied motions to amend and for a continuance to conduct discovery, and granted the City’s motion to dismiss the organization’s claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court was correct in ruling that the organization failed to allege an actual controversy and that the organization’s proposed amendment to its complaint was futile. View "Alaska Commercial Fishermen's Memorial in Juneau v. City & Borough Juneau" on Justia Law

"Adam" was born in early 2015 addicted to narcotics. Adam was eventually released to his parents, David Hunt and Carey Land. A few months later, Adam was found unconscious and unresponsive. He was transported to the hospital. The parents offered no explanation as to why Adam had been found unresponsive or unconscious. Though they were home when emergency personnel arrived, neither parent accompanied the child to the hospital. Due to the seriousness of the child's condition, he was transported to a trauma center. Medical personnel determined the child had sustained multiple trauma caused by "unexplained abusive trauma." In addition to multiple fractures, Adam's other diagnoses included chronic bilateral subdural hematomas, destruction of brain tissue, seizures, respiratory failure, malnourishment and splitting of the layers of the retina in his left eye. Emergency custody would ultimately be awarded to the Department of Family Services. This expedited proceeding was the parents' appeal of a Family Court decision granting the attorney guardian ad litem's motion to instruct Adam's medical providers to de-escalate intervention and place a do-not re-intubate order and a do-not-resuscitate order and a "comfort measures" order on Adam's medical chart. The appeal presented four issues for the Delaware Supreme Court's review: (1) whether the Family Court had jurisdiction to de-escalate medical care, a no re-intubate order and do not resuscitate order on the minor's chart; (2) whether the Family Court had authority to allow such orders when the parental rights have not been terminated; (3) whether the Family Court violated the parents' procedural due process rights by not providing the parents adequate notice and process prior to issuing the orders; and (4) were the parents' due process rights violated without receiving evidence from an independent medical expert. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Family Court's decision, and affirmed. View "Hunt v. DFS & Office of the Child Advocate" on Justia Law