Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs-Appellants Blake Brown, Dean Biggs, Jacqueline Deherrera, Ruth Ann Head, Marlene Mason, Roxanne McFall, Richard Medlock, and Bernadette Smith appealed a summary judgment order upholding Defendants-Appellees Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, and the Office of Workers Compensation’s (“OWC”) (collectively, “the agency”) redactions to documents they provided to Plaintiffs pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, (“FOIA”). Plaintiffs were former federal civilian employees eligible to receive federal workers compensation benefits. If there was a disagreement between a worker’s treating physician and the second-opinion physician hired by the OWC, an impartial “referee” physician was selected to resolve the conflict. The referee’s opinion was frequently dispositive of the benefits decision. To ensure impartiality, it is the OWC’s official policy to use a software program to schedule referee appointments on a rotational basis from a list of Board-certified physicians. Plaintiffs suspected that the OWC did not adhere to its official policy, but instead always hired the same “select few” referee physicians, who were financially beholden (and presumably sympathetic) to the agency. To investigate their suspicions, Plaintiffs filed FOIA requests for agency records pertaining to the referee selection process. Because the Tenth Circuit found that the FOIA exemptions invoked by the agency raise genuine disputes of material fact, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brown v. Perez" on Justia Law

The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (the Department or the State) terminated the employment of seafood inspector Ernest Thomas following a contentious airport inspection that resulted in complaints by a seafood processor and an airline. Thomas contended his termination was actually in retaliation for an ethics complaint he had filed over a year earlier against the agency’s director. The superior court decided most of the inspector’s claims against him on summary judgment but allowed one claim, alleging a violation of his free speech rights, to go to trial. The jury found that the ethics complaint was not a substantial or motivating factor in the inspector’s termination, and the superior court entered final judgment for the agency. On appeal, Thomas argued the superior court erred in granting summary judgment, in denying his motion for a new trial based on allegations of jury misconduct, and in awarding attorney’s fees to the agency. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thomas v. Dept. of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

Joan and Shane Tangedal appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their negligence claim against the Lake Region District Health Unit and denying their motion to amend their complaint to add a Lake Region employee, Allen McKay, as a defendant to their lawsuit. In September 2014, the Tangedals sued William and Mavis Mertens, Lake Region, and the Ramsey County Board of Commissioners for damages resulting from the January 2014 collapse of a septic tank on land the Tangedals had purchased from the Mertens in 2009. The Tangedals alleged the Mertens failed to disclose that in 2000 they built an addition to the residence on the land on top of the septic system in violation of applicable state and county regulations. The Tangedals also alleged that, as part of the purchase and as required under North Dakota law and Ramsey County regulations, McKay, the Environmental Health Supervisor for Lake Region, inspected the septic system and negligently certified it as "expected to function satisfactorily and . . . not likely to create an insanitary condition." Lake Region and the Ramsey County Board answered, denying liability and alleging governmental immunity in the performance of a public duty. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Lake Region and McKay had immunity for their alleged acts under N.D.C.C. section 32-12.1-03(3). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Tangedals' motion to amend their complaint and did not err in granting summary judgment dismissal of their claim against Lake Region. View "Tangedal v. Mertens" on Justia Law

Charles Wimberly filed an application for disability retirement benefits with the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KERS). A hearing officer recommended that Wimberly's application be denied and, before KERS could render a final decision, Wimberly filed a second application pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 61.600(2). Following the recommendation of another hearing officer, KERS denied that application. Wimberly sought judicial review; the circuit court reversed KERS. KERS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review to address the parties' arguments regarding the application of the doctrine of res judicata and to determine whether the consumption of alcohol was or could be a pre-existing condition. Having reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Wimberly" on Justia Law

Dianne Carson first filed an application for retirement disability benefits in November 2007. Based on the recommendation of a hearing officer, the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KERS) denied Carson's claim. Carson did not seek judicial review of KERS's order, choosing instead to file a second application in October 2009. Based on a recommendation of a different hearing officer, KERS again denied Carson's claim. Carson sought judicial review and the circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for KERS to consider all of the medical evidence Carson submitted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. KERS argued that Carson's second application should have been dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata. "If res judicata applied to this action, Carson would have been barred from filing a second application that was based on the same claim as her first application. However, KRS 61.600(2) requires KERS to accept an employee's timely filed "reapplication based on the same claim of incapacity" and to reconsider the claim 'for disability if accompanied by new objective medical evidence.'" This case was remanded for KERS to undertake the correct review of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Kentycky Retirement Systems v. Carson" on Justia Law

Hugo Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for adjustment of status in reliance on the Tenth Circuit's decision in "Padilla-Caldera I" in the period it was valid law. Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for relief during the period after the BIA’s announcement of its contrary interpretation in "Briones" yet before "Padilla-Caldera II" declared "Briones" controlling and "Padilla-Caldera I" effectively overruled. The BIA suggested this factual distinction made all the legal difference. "But we fail to see how. Indeed, the government’s position in this appeal seems to us clearly inconsistent with both the rule and reasoning of De Niz Robles." In 2009 the law expressly gave Gutierrez-Brizuela two options: he could seek an adjustment of status pursuant to "Padilla-Caldera I" or accept a ten-year waiting period outside the country. "Relying on binding circuit precedent, he chose the former path. Yet the BIA now seeks to apply a new law to block that path at a time when it’s too late for Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela to alter his conduct. Meaning that, if we allowed the BIA to apply Briones here, Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela would lose the seven years he could’ve spent complying with the BIA’s ten year waiting period and instead have to start that waiting period now. The due process concerns are obvious: when Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela made his choice, he had no notice of the law the BIA now seeks to apply. And the equal protection problems are obvious too: if the agency were free to change the law retroactively based on shifting political winds, it could use that power to punish politically disfavored groups or individuals for conduct they can no longer alter." This case was remanded back to the BIA for reconsideration of Gutierrez-Brizuela's application based on the law in effect at the time of his application. View "Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Goldmans, proceeding before an arbitration panel operating under the auspices of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), alleged that their financial advisor and Citigroup had violated federal securities law in their management of the Goldmans’ brokerage accounts. The district court dismissed their motion to vacate an adverse award for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, stating the Goldmans’ motion failed to raise a substantial federal question. The Third Circuit affirmed. Nothing about the Goldmans’ case is likely to affect the securities markets broadly. That the allegedly-misbehaving arbitration panel happened to be affiliated with a self-regulatory organization does not meaningfully distinguish this case from any other suit alleging arbitrator partiality in a securities dispute. The court noted “the flood of cases that would enter federal courts if the involvement of a self-regulatory organization were itself sufficient to support jurisdiction.” View "Goldman v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc" on Justia Law

Mary Herrera, when acting as the Secretary of State, terminated the employment of two employees of the Secretary of State’s office, James Flores and Manny Vildasol. In separate actions, Flores and Vildasol each asserted a Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) claim against Herrera in her individual capacity. Herrera left office; nevertheless, Flores and Vildasol sought to proceed with their individual-capacity WPA claims against her. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the WPA would allow for a state employee to assert a claim against a state officer in that officer's individual capacity. The Court of Appeals concluded that the WPA allowed the employees to continue their suit, but the Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the Court of Appeals. On remand, the Supreme Court instructed the courts to dismiss Flores’s individual-capacity claim against Herrera and, with respect to Flores’s official-capacity claim against Herrera, to enter a substitution order. InVildasol’s case, the Court instructed the trial court to dismiss Vildasol’s individual-capacity claim against Herrera and to proceed with Vildasol’s claim against the Secretary of State’s office. View "Flores v. Herrera" on Justia Law

Henry Kinney filed several record requests under the Public Records Act regarding Leonard Bentz II's selection as Southern Mississippi Planning and Development District’s (District) executive director; however, some of Kinney’s requests were never fulfilled. As a result, Kinney filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the District be declared a public agency subject to the Mississippi Public Records Act, Mississippi Public Procurement laws, Open Meetings laws, Mississippi law regarding salaries/compensation of public officials, Mississippi Ethics in Government laws, Mississippi auditing requirements, Mississippi laws regarding removal of officers from public office, and other general provisions applicable to public office. Kinney also sought the selection of Bentz to be deemed invalid because it did not comply with Mississippi’s laws governing public agencies. As a result of Kinney’s suit, the District, joined by the Mississippi Association of Planning and Development District, Inc. (MAPDD), who intervened in the suit, filed motions for summary judgment. The chancery court granted the motions for summary judgment. Kinney appealed the chancery court’s decision. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s decision in the case. View "Kinney v. So. Mississippi Planning & Development District, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Jackson was unable to serve notice to Willie Jordan by certified mail that his property was subject to condemnation and demolition. The City tried notice by publication, and set a hearing for twelve days after the first publication date. The applicable statute required two weeks’ notice. Jordan did not appear at the condemnation hearing. The property was declared condemned, and the house on the property was ordered demolished. After the house was demolished, Jordan filed a notice of tort claim with the city. When he filed his complaint, he alternatively asserted a constitutional claim for deprivation of property without due process. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded Jordan $12,513.53. The city appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Jackson v. Jordan" on Justia Law