Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

New Public School District #8 appealed a judgment affirming the State Board of Public School Education's decision approving annexation of certain real properties to the Williston School District. New Public School District argued the State Board erred in approving the petition for annexation because the property to be annexed was not contiguous to the Williston School District before the petition was heard. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Public Sch. Dist. #8 v. North Dakota Bd. of Public Sch. Edu." on Justia Law

The issue raised by this appeal centered on whether power was invested in a school reform commission, under a statutory regime designed to facilitate rehabilitation of financially distressed school districts, to unilaterally alter terms and conditions of employment for teachers whose interests were represented by a bargaining unit. In December 2001, the Secretary of Education issued a declaration of financial distress pertaining to the District, and a school reform commission (SRC or “Commission”) was constituted and assumed responsibility for the District’s operations, management, and educational program, per Section 696 of the School Code. Throughout the ensuing years, the SRC and appellee Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, AFT, Local 3, AFL-CIO (the “Union”), negotiated several collective bargaining agreements. The SRC invoked Sections 693(a)(1) of the School Code, as incorporated into Section 696(i), to “make specific limited changes and to implement . . . modified economic terms and conditions for employees in the bargaining units represented by the [Union], consistent with economic terms proposed in negotiations, while maintaining all other existing terms and conditions to the extent required by law[.]” The Commission predicted that the changes would save about $44 million in 2014 through 2015 and $198 million over four years. Ultimately, the resolution purported to cancel the most recent collective bargaining agreement between the District and the Union, to the extent that it continued to govern the parties’ relations. The Commission, the District, and the Department of Education then filed a declaratory judgment action at the Commonwealth Court, asking the Court to uphold the imposition of the new economic terms and conditions as being authorized by applicable law. The Court found that the right of cancellation under Sections 693(a)(1) and 696(i) did not reach such agreements, and that on account of a prescription within Section 693 that “the special board of control shall have power to require the board of directors within sixty (60) days” to implement measures encompassing the cancellation power, the cancellation power could only have been exercised within 60 days after the December 2001 declaration of distress. The Supreme Court reviewed the Commonwealth Court's judgment, and affirmed the outcome, but on differing grounds. The Supreme Court held at least insofar as teachers were concerned, that collective bargaining agreements were “teachers’ contracts” which were excepted from a school reform commission’s cancellation powers. View "Phila. Fed. of Teachers v. SD of Phila." on Justia Law

The Board of Trustees of the Maine Public Employees Retirement System affirmed an administrative determination that Appellant was ineligible for disability retirement benefits. Appellant later filed an incomplete petition for review of final agency action in the superior court. The complete petition was required to be filed on or before April 7. Appellant did not file a complete petition under April 15. The superior court dismissed as untimely Appellant’s petition for review of the Board’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in dismissing the petition as untimely or in denying Appellant’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. View "Bastille v. Maine Pub. Employees Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and four of her neighbors appealed an order dismissing as an anti-SLAPP, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, action their complaint against the city council of Culver City and five of its council members for allegedly violating the state’s open meeting laws, Gov. Code, 54950 et seq. (the Brown Act). In this case, plaintiffs sought personal relief in the form of a halt to any attempts by the church to undo the long-standing parking restrictions. Therefore, the court concluded that the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP provisions does not apply. The court further concluded that plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing plaintiffs' action. View "Cruz v. City of Culver City" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's review called for the Court to determine the constitutionality of New Hampshire Administrative Rules, He-W 654.04(c). The rule required DHHS to include a child’s federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in the calculation of a family’s eligibility for benefits under the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF), as administered by the State’s Financial Assistance to Needy Families program (FANF). Plaintiffs Carrie Hendrick and Jamie Birmingham were mothers whose children received SSI and FANF benefits, and whose benefits were ultimately cut by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and their children, seeking a declaratory judgment that DHHS’s “inclusion of children’s SSI in FANF assistance group income is unlawful and void” pursuant to applicable federal law. In addition, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Rule He-W 654.04 “is invalid because it impairs [their] legal rights.” Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction enjoining DHHS from including children’s SSI in FANF assistance group income and an award of attorney’s fees “because this litigation will result in a substantial benefit to the public.” After requesting that the Solicitor General of the United States file an amicus brief in this matter, and after reviewing that brief, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the Supremacy Clause did not permit the State to redirect federal benefits as required by Rule He-W 654.04(c). The rule, by counting a disabled child’s SSI benefits as income available to the child’s “assistance group,” treated the child’s benefits as a source of income for the entire household. The rule, thereby, reduced a household’s TANF benefit by one dollar for every dollar in SSI that was received by a disabled child in the household. Because the rule “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” the New Hampshire Court held that Rule He-W 654.04(c) was preempted by federal law and, thus, invalid to the extent that it required inclusion of children’s SSI as income to the TANF assistance group for the purpose of determining eligibility for TANF benefits. View "Hendrick v. New Hampshire Dept. of Health & Human Svcs." on Justia Law

The property of Riverboat Corporation, an ad valorem taxpayer, was subject to assessment by the Harrison County Board of Supervisors (“the Board”) because Riverboat owned certain personal and real property in Harrison County. The Mississippi Supreme Court was asked "to abandon the common law of this state, pronouncements of this Court, and customs and practices of trial courts across this state, all dating back to the nineteenth century, under the guise that today’s issue has not yet been squarely before" it and to "overrule a learned trial judge who, [. . .] determined a jury trial should be had in an appeal of a county’s ad valorem tax assessment." When Riverboat appealed its tax assessment, the Board requested a jury trial. Riverboat then moved for a bench trial, averring that there was no right to a jury trial in tax appeals. The trial court denied Riverboat's motion. The Supreme Court declined to rule against Mississippi precedent, and affirmed the trial court's denial of Riverboat's motion. View "Riverboat Corporation of Mississippi v. Harrison County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Rembisz, an IRS investigator, did not obtain sought-after promotions. He filed an administrative charge of discrimination, claiming ongoing discrimination against his sex (male) and race (Caucasian) or color (white). The Treasury Department investigated and rejected the claim. Federal employees must file a civil action for discrimination “[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of final action,” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c). He filed suit on June 21, 2013, alleging that he received notice of the final agency decision on March 25, within the 90-day window. The Sixth Circuit rejected a motion to dismiss in 2014, stating that Rembisz would have to “come forward with evidence” to support his allegation concerning notice. On remand, he never did so. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. It is presumed that notice is given, “and hence the ninety-day limitations term begins running, on the fifth day following the [] mailing of [a right-to-sue] notification to the claimant[].” The agency served its notification by first class and certified mail on March 15, making March 20 the presumptive date that the limitations period began. Rembisz offered no evidence to the contrary. The government submitted a certified-mail receipt, showing that Rembisz received the notice on March 22, so that his complaint was one day late. View "Rembisz v. Lew" on Justia Law

Jonathan Garaas appeals after a district court entered a judgment of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In 2015, the Cass County Joint Water District ("District") ordered the establishment of an assessment district to fund the development, operation and maintenance of a Fargo-Moorhead flood risk management project. Garaas filed a notice of appeal of the decision with the district court. Thereafter, a Cass County deputy sheriff served Garaas' notice of appeal on the District's secretary-treasurer, Carol Harbeke Lewis. Lewis was not a member of the District's governing board. Attorneys from Ohnstad Twichell, P.C., served Garaas a notice of appearance in the case. The deputy sheriff's return was served on the District's attorneys and filed in the district court. The District then moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. A Cass County deputy sheriff served Garaas' notice of appeal on District board member, Mark Brodshaug. Then the district court dismissed Garaas' claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding he failed to perfect his appeal by properly serving the notice of appeal on a board member as required by N.D.C.C. 28-34-01. Garaas appealed the dismissal. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Garaas v. Cass County Joint Water Resource District" on Justia Law

The State of Washington sued more than 20 foreign electronics manufacturing companies (including petitioners) for price fixing. The State claimed the foreign companies conspired to fix prices by selling CRTs (cathode ray tubes) into international streams of commerce intending they be incorporated into products sold at inflated prices in large numbers in Washington State. The trial court dismissed on the pleadings, finding it did not have jurisdiction over the foreign companies. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the State alleged sufficient minimum contacts with Washington to satisfy both the long arm statute and the due process clause. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. LG Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

Historically, sovereigns were not subject to statutes of limitations without their explicit consent. Washington State consented to some statutes of limitations but not to others. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review in this case was whether Washington consented to a statute of limitations that would bar this antitrust suit filed by the Washington State attorney general on behalf of the State against more than 20 foreign electronics manufacturing companies. The State alleged that between at least March 1, 1995, through at least November 25, 2007, the defendants violated RCW 19.86.030, which prohibited any "contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce," by agreeing to raise prices and agreeing on production levels in the market for CRTs (cathode ray tubes) used in televisions and computer monitors before the advent of LCD (liquid crystal display) panels and plasma display technologies. Due to this unlawful conspiracy, the State alleges, Washington consumers and the State of Washington itself paid supracompetitive prices for CRT products. Ten of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the claims were time barred because Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA) must be brought within four years. The State responded that RCW 19.86.120's statute of limitations did not apply to its claims under RCW 19.86.080. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the State's action for injunctive relief and restitution was exempt from the statute of limitations in RCW 19.86.120 and from the general statutes of limitations in chapter 4.16 RCW. View "Washington v. LG Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law