Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Planning Director of the County of Hawaii approved the application of Michael Pruglo to consolidate and resubdivide the pre-existing lots on his forty-nine-acre parcel of land. Mark Kellberg, who owned land adjacent to the subject property, objected to the approval. Kellberg brought suit against the Planning Director and the County of Hawaii seeking to have the subdivision declared void. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) ruled that the Planning Director’s approval of Pruglo’s subdivision was invalid because it increased the number of lots. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA, holding that the ICA erred in ruling on the merits of Kellberg’s claims without addressing whether the owners of the lots within the subject property were required to be joined as parties under Haw. R. Civ. P. 19. Because the lot owners were necessary parties under Rule 19(a), the Court remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to order the joinder of the lot owners under Rule 19. View "Kellberg v. Yuen" on Justia Law

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) creates “navigators,” to assist consumers in purchasing health insurance from exchanges, 42 U.S.C. 18031(i), and authorizes the Department of Health and Human Services to establish standards for navigators and exchanges. HHS regulations recognize: federal navigators, certified application counselors (CACs), and non-navigator assistance personnel. They conduct many of the same activities, but federal navigators have more extensive duties. Plaintiffs, federally-certified counselor designated organizations, employ CACs. The federal government established a Missouri Federally Facilitated Exchange. The Health Insurance Marketplace Innovation Act (HIMIA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 376.2000, regulates “person[s] that, for compensation, provide[] information or services in connection with eligibility, enrollment, or program specifications of any health benefit exchange.” Regulatory provisions dictate what state navigators and cannot do. Plaintiffs challenged: the definition of state navigators; three substantive provisions; and penalty provisions. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the ACA preempted HIMIA. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, finding likelihood of success in challenges to HIMIA requirements that: state navigators refrain from providing information about health insurance plans not offered by the exchange; that in some circumstances, the navigator must advise consultation with a licensed insurance producer regarding private coverage; and that CACs provide information about different health insurance plans and clarify the distinctions. The court vacated the preliminary injunction, holding that ACA does not entirely preempt HIMIA. View "St. Louis Effort For AIDS v. Huff" on Justia Law

This appeal centered on an environmental challenge to a federal agency's decision to grant inspection services for the slaughter and processing of horses and other equines at three slaughterhouses. The district court affirmed the agency's grants of inspection. Plaintiffs, various organizations and individuals opposed to horse slaughter, appealed. One slaughterhouse subsequently withdrew its application for inspection; a second slaughterhouse surrendered its grant of equine inspection in order to obtain a grant of inspection for cattle slaughter, and the third slaughterhouse failed to successfully challenge a state permitting decision to allow only non-equine slaughter at the facility. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit found that the then-current congressional appropriations act prohibited funding for equine slaughter inspections. The Tenth Circuit therefore dismissed this appeal and vacated the district court's decision for mootness. View "Front Range Equine v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Exela petitioned the Patent and Trademark Office to “reconsider and withdraw” its revival of the national stage application and to cancel the 218 patent, assigned to SCR Pharmatop. The PTO declined to consider Exela’s petition, stating that no law or regulation authorizes non-party challenge to a PTO ruling to accept a tardy filing. Exela then brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that the PTO’s action was ultra vires and that Exela’s petition should have been considered and favorably decided. The district court, on reconsideration and in view of new Fourth Circuit precedent, dismissed Exela’s complaint for failing to meet the statute of limitations for claims filed against the United States, including APA claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal, on the ground that PTO revival rulings are not subject to third party collateral challenge, thereby precluding review regardless of whether Exela’s claims were time-barred. View "Exela Pharma Sciences, LLC v. Lee" on Justia Law

Paul Stavenjord, a Buddhist inmate, asked to receive a Kosher diet and to be permitted to purchase a prayer shawl. Prison officials at the Alaska Department of Corrections denied his requests. Stavenjord filed a complaint alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and various constitutional provisions. The superior court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Stavenjord had failed to demonstrate: (1) that a Kosher diet and prayer shawl were necessary for the practice of his religion; (2) that he was sincere in his requests for religious accommodation; and (3) that the Department's lack of accommodations substantially burdened the practice of his religion. Under Alaska's summary judgment standard, the initial burden falls on the moving party: the Department. Furthermore, religious necessity was not an element of RLUIPA. Because summary judgment was granted by placing the initial burden on the non-moving party and by focusing on Stavenjord's failure to make an evidentiary showing not required under RLUIPA, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stavenjord v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

The California State Personnel Board upheld Telish’s dismissal from his position with the California Department of Justice based on findings that he intimidated, threatened to release sexually explicit photographs of, and physically assaulted a subordinate employee with whom he had a consensual relationship. The essential issue was the admissibility of recorded telephone conversations between Telish and his former girlfriend and subordinate employee, L.D., which was received at the administrative hearing. The court of appeal affirmed denial of relief. A participant may properly record a telephone conversation at the direction of a law enforcement officer, acting within the course of his or her authority, in the course of a criminal investigation (Pen. Code 633). Section 633 does not limit the use of duly recorded communications to criminal proceedings. Although Telish contends the criminal investigation was a “sham,” the Board determined L.D. duly recorded the telephone conversations pursuant to the direction of DOJ in connection with a criminal investigation, and the Board’s finding was supported by substantial evidence. View "Telish v. Cal. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

The California Dump Truck Owners Association (Truck Association) initiated a federal preemption challenge to a California environmental regulation. The district court dismissed the suit, finding that the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) approval of the regulation as part of California’s state implementation plan (SIP) divested the court of jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act (CAA). The Truck Association appealed, contending that it was challenging only the regulation and not the SIP, and therefore, the CAA did not apply. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Truck Association’s suit, as a practical matter, challenged the the EPA’s approval of a provision of California’s SIP; and (2) because the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over such challenges, the district court lacked jurisdiction. View "Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Nichols" on Justia Law

The district court declared a vacancy in the Adams County School District 12 Director District 4 school board director position because defendant-appellee Amy Speers was elected but unqualified to serve. An issue arose when the two candidates signed affidavits affirming that they met all the requisite qualifications to hold the office, but unbeknownst to Speers, the School District had redrawn the director districts in 2012, and had placed Speers' home outside of Director District 4. The School District's designated election officer was also unaware that Speers no longer met the residency requirement, and deemed both petitions sufficient. Neither the sufficiency of Speers' petition nor her certification to the ballot was challenged within the five-day window (under C.R.S. 1-4-909(1) (2014)). The election officer's certification of both candidates to the ballot was therefore valid. In a final attempt to effectively withdraw Speers from the election, the Secretary of State issued an emergency rule at the end of the final day of the election that instructed the clerks not to count the ballots cast for Speers. A district court invalidated this rule as incompatible with Colorado's election code, and we upheld that court's decision in "Hanlen v. Gessler," (333 P.3d 41 2014)) because "questions regarding a certified candidate's eligibility [must] be determined by a court, not an election official." On remand, the district court considered plaintiff-appellant Enrico Figueroa's claims that Speers was not eligible to hold office, that the votes cast for her were invalid, and this he was legally elected to the Director District 4 position. The district court concluded that because neither Figueroa nor any other party sought any judicial intervention whatsoever prior to the election, Figueroa had "slept on his rights" and thus Speers had won the election. Regarding Speers, the court found that there was no dispute that she was ineligible to hold the office for which she was elected and because she had not sought to take the oath of office and did not intend to cure the residency defect, her election was voided. The court then declared a vacancy in the Director District 4 position. Figueroa appealed directly to the Colorado Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court held that, though Speers was unqualified to serve, no court declared her to be unqualified until after the voting had been completed. In this situation, the legally elected party is the party who receives the most legal votes. Thus, Speers was legally elected because she received the most legal votes, meaning Figueroa was not legally elected. The district court therefore correctly voided her election and declared a vacancy under the provisions of Colorado' selection code, and its judgment was affirmed. View "Figueroa v. Speers" on Justia Law

In August 2012, the United States filed a civil suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., alleging that the failure of the Florida to provide a kosher diet program to all of its prisoners with sincere religious grounds for keeping kosher was a substantial burden on those prisoners' religious exercise. The complaint requested both injunctive and declaratory relief under the statute. After the district court denied Florida's motion to dismiss the complaint, the State issued a new policy in March 2013, formally titled "Procedure 503.006" and informally referred to as "the Religious Diet Program." In addition to outlining the contents of the meals, Procedure 503.006 contains a number of provisions that determine a prisoner's eligibility for the program. When the United States learned about Procedure 503.006 in April 2013, it filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction the court entered required Florida to provide the kosher diet, and prevented the State from enforcing the eligibility provisions of Procedure 503.006. The court's order did not, however, mention the need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria for preliminary injunctions established by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). While this interlocutory appeal was pending, the district court held monthly status conferences between the parties. But the court did not make any need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings regarding the preliminary injunction, nor did it issue an order finalizing the preliminary injunction. As a result, the preliminary injunction expired by operation of law on Thursday, March 6, 2014. "The preliminary injunction in the present case passed on to injunction heaven [. . .] And with it died this appeal," unless there existed an exception to the mootness doctrine. Finding no exception, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the mooted issue, and vacated the portion of the district court's order that addressed it. View "United States v. Sec'y, Florida Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham ("the Board") petitions for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order granting the motion filed by the Alabama Surface Mining Commission ("ASMC") seeking to transfer the underlying action to Walker County. Shepherd Bend, LLC, joined ASMC's transfer motion. Upon review of the briefs submitted in this case, the Supreme Court concluded the Board demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief it sought; venue was indeed proper in Jefferson County. Therefore, the Court granted the petition and issued the writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order transferring the action to Walker County. View "Ex parte Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham." on Justia Law