Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The district court declared a vacancy in the Adams County School District 12 Director District 4 school board director position because defendant-appellee Amy Speers was elected but unqualified to serve. An issue arose when the two candidates signed affidavits affirming that they met all the requisite qualifications to hold the office, but unbeknownst to Speers, the School District had redrawn the director districts in 2012, and had placed Speers' home outside of Director District 4. The School District's designated election officer was also unaware that Speers no longer met the residency requirement, and deemed both petitions sufficient. Neither the sufficiency of Speers' petition nor her certification to the ballot was challenged within the five-day window (under C.R.S. 1-4-909(1) (2014)). The election officer's certification of both candidates to the ballot was therefore valid. In a final attempt to effectively withdraw Speers from the election, the Secretary of State issued an emergency rule at the end of the final day of the election that instructed the clerks not to count the ballots cast for Speers. A district court invalidated this rule as incompatible with Colorado's election code, and we upheld that court's decision in "Hanlen v. Gessler," (333 P.3d 41 2014)) because "questions regarding a certified candidate's eligibility [must] be determined by a court, not an election official." On remand, the district court considered plaintiff-appellant Enrico Figueroa's claims that Speers was not eligible to hold office, that the votes cast for her were invalid, and this he was legally elected to the Director District 4 position. The district court concluded that because neither Figueroa nor any other party sought any judicial intervention whatsoever prior to the election, Figueroa had "slept on his rights" and thus Speers had won the election. Regarding Speers, the court found that there was no dispute that she was ineligible to hold the office for which she was elected and because she had not sought to take the oath of office and did not intend to cure the residency defect, her election was voided. The court then declared a vacancy in the Director District 4 position. Figueroa appealed directly to the Colorado Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court held that, though Speers was unqualified to serve, no court declared her to be unqualified until after the voting had been completed. In this situation, the legally elected party is the party who receives the most legal votes. Thus, Speers was legally elected because she received the most legal votes, meaning Figueroa was not legally elected. The district court therefore correctly voided her election and declared a vacancy under the provisions of Colorado' selection code, and its judgment was affirmed. View "Figueroa v. Speers" on Justia Law

In August 2012, the United States filed a civil suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., alleging that the failure of the Florida to provide a kosher diet program to all of its prisoners with sincere religious grounds for keeping kosher was a substantial burden on those prisoners' religious exercise. The complaint requested both injunctive and declaratory relief under the statute. After the district court denied Florida's motion to dismiss the complaint, the State issued a new policy in March 2013, formally titled "Procedure 503.006" and informally referred to as "the Religious Diet Program." In addition to outlining the contents of the meals, Procedure 503.006 contains a number of provisions that determine a prisoner's eligibility for the program. When the United States learned about Procedure 503.006 in April 2013, it filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction the court entered required Florida to provide the kosher diet, and prevented the State from enforcing the eligibility provisions of Procedure 503.006. The court's order did not, however, mention the need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria for preliminary injunctions established by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). While this interlocutory appeal was pending, the district court held monthly status conferences between the parties. But the court did not make any need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings regarding the preliminary injunction, nor did it issue an order finalizing the preliminary injunction. As a result, the preliminary injunction expired by operation of law on Thursday, March 6, 2014. "The preliminary injunction in the present case passed on to injunction heaven [. . .] And with it died this appeal," unless there existed an exception to the mootness doctrine. Finding no exception, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the mooted issue, and vacated the portion of the district court's order that addressed it. View "United States v. Sec'y, Florida Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham ("the Board") petitions for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order granting the motion filed by the Alabama Surface Mining Commission ("ASMC") seeking to transfer the underlying action to Walker County. Shepherd Bend, LLC, joined ASMC's transfer motion. Upon review of the briefs submitted in this case, the Supreme Court concluded the Board demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief it sought; venue was indeed proper in Jefferson County. Therefore, the Court granted the petition and issued the writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order transferring the action to Walker County. View "Ex parte Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham." on Justia Law

The City of Florence, the Civil Service Board of the City of Florence ("the CSB") and Keith McDaniel appealed separately a circuit court judgment after a jury rendered its verdict in favor of William T. Ezell. In mid 2011, two positions for promotion to the job of battalion chief became available within the Florence Fire and Rescue Department. Benjamin Cochran, Melvin Brown, Tim Clanton, John T. Muse, McDaniel, and Ezell applied for the positions. The CSB conducted interviews with the candidates on September 1, 2011. Afterward, it promoted Cochran and McDaniel to the two battalion-chief positions. On September 12, 2011, Ezell filed a two-count complaint against the City and the CSB in the Lauderdale Circuit Court. A month later, the City and the CSB filed an answer in which they denied Ezell's allegations. They also asserted that Ezell had failed to join certain indispensable parties. The City and CSB simultaneously filed a motion to dismiss count 1 of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that all six applicants were indispensable parties. They then asked that count 1 of the complaint be dismissed or that Ezell be required to add Cochran, Brown, Clanton, Muse, and McDaniel as defendants. The trial court ordered Ezell to amend his complaint to make Cochran, Brown, Clanton, Muse, and McDaniel parties to the suit. Ezell amended count 1 of his complaint and also added the other applicants as defendants. The City and the CSB filed an answer to the amended complaint in which they denied Ezell's allegations and argued that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The jury returned the following verdict: "We are not reasonably satisfied that the decision of the [CSB] was correct and we find that the following 2 individuals should be promoted to Battalion Chief (pick two) ... Benjamin Cochran ... William Ezell." The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict and ordered that the status quo be maintained during the pendency of any appellate proceedings. The City, the CSB, and McDaniel filed posttrial motions, which the trial court denied. McDaniel appealed to the Supreme Court (docketed as case no. 1130372). The City and the CSB also appealed to the Supreme Court (docketed as case no. 1130373). Because Ezell failed to demonstrate that he had a right to appeal the CSB's decision, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed these appeals with instructions to the trial court to vacate its judgment. View "City of Florence v. Ezell" on Justia Law

Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation ("AMIC") appealed the trial court's order certifying a class in the action filed by the City of Vernon and a class of similarly situated entities that had purchased uninsured motorist/underinsured-motorist coverage ("UM/UIM coverage") from AMIC. Vernon was the original class representative; however, after AMIC filed its notice of appeal of the class-certification order, Vernon settled its claims against AMIC and withdrew as the class representative. Because there was no longer a representative to "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for a new class representative to be substituted for Vernon. The City of Fairfield substituted for Vernon as the class representative. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the underlying dispute: the Court concluded that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispute. Initial jurisdiction over this dispute was with the Alabama Department of Insurance and its commissioner. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's class-certification order, and remanded for dismissal. View "Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

The State appealed an order that dismissed a forfeiture action that sought condemnation of certain devices, currency and other property. In 2011, the State executed a search warrant and seized the devices, currency and property from the premises of Greenetrack, Inc. Greentrack moved for the return of the seized property. The State electronically filed its complaint, with the signature lines for the government deputy attorneys general as "/s/ ________." The certificate of service had similar electronic signature lines. A few days later after these pleadings were filed, the State filed amended petitions, and again, the signature blocks lacked any text on each line following the "/s/." The trial court noted that the petitions appeared to lack signatures. After the hearing, the State amended its filings with typewritten names following the "/s/." The certificate of service listed the same counsel as the second amended petition, but no summons accompanied the second amended petition in the trial court record. The trial court ruled for the return of Greenetrack's property, currency and devices. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that though the State's petitions did not strictly conform with the stated rules, it did not require striking the State's petitions. "The failure to properly sign the petitions caused no identified prejudice to Greenetrack. … To conclude otherwise would be contrary to the principles of [the Rule] and would elevate form over substance." View "Alabama v. $93,917.50 & 376 Gambling Devices" on Justia Law

The Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners filed an administrative complaint against Appellant, a physician, alleging that Appellant aided a third party in the unauthorized practice of medicine. When Appellant failed to comply with a Board-issued subpoena, the Board petitioned the Second Judicial District Court, located in Washoe County, for an order compelling compliance with its administrative subpoena. Appellant filed a motion to change the venue of the subpoena contempt petition to the Eighth Judicial District Court, located in Clark County, on the basis that she resided and practiced medicine in Clark County. The district court denied Appellant’s motion for a change of venue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of the statute governing venue for contempt petitions brought by the Board providing that venue is proper in “the district court of the county in which the proceeding is being conducted” means that venue lies in the county where the work of the Board takes place rather than the county where the conduct being investigated occurred. View "Jones v. State, Bd. of Med. Exam'rs" on Justia Law

Best, a Hong Kong manufacturer, produces Metalized Yarn from polyester chips melted with metal nanopowders to form monofilament yarns. Best sought a pre-importation ruling concerning proper tariff classification in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTSUS), attaching a laboratory report describing the yarn as having a fiber content of 100% polyester, with 0.7%- 0.74% metal by weight. Customs classified the yarn as metalized yarn, HTSUS 5605.00.90, dutiable at 13.2%, stating “yarn combined with metal in the form of powder is considered a metalized yarn.” Best then sought a ruing regarding a “Johnny Collar” garment made of its yarn, asserting the garment was classifiable under HTSUS 6105.90.8030 as a shirt of other textile materials (duty rate 5.6%), not HTSUS 6110.30.3053 for polyester shirts (duty rate 32%). Based on trace amounts of metal and a label that stated “100% polyester,” Customs classified the sample as man-made non-metalized fibers under HTSUS 6110.30.3053. Customs subsequently revoked the Yarn Ruling, reclassifying the yarn as a polyester yarn under HTSUS 5402.47.90 (duty rate 8%). Customs also revoked the Johnny Collar Ruling as conflicting with the Yarn Ruling, but continued to classify the garment under 6110.30.30. Best challenged the Yarn Ruling Revocation, but not the Johnny Collar revocation. The Trade Court sustained the Revocation. The Federal Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Best sought reversal of a Revocation, the effect of which would be to increase Best ’s own duty rate while benefiting manufacturers of products made from its yarn. The statute does not provide jurisdiction over such requests View "Best Key Textiles Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1996 Ritzhoff was injured while working as a banquet server. He sustained permanent injuries to his ankle and injured his hand and back. His treating psychiatrist initially evaluated Ritzhoff in 2001 and noted that Ritzhoff demonstrated diminished cognitive functioning, had severe depression, suicidal ideation, severe anxiety, and total neuroticism. The doctor found Ritzhoff temporarily totally disabled on a psychiatric basis and in need of emotional treatment. His employer made temporary disability payments until 2006. Ritzhoff admitted working from time-to-time since his injury. At a third hearing in 2013, Ritzhoff refused to respond to cross-examination. The workers’ compensation judge found Ritzhoff totally permanently disabled on a psychiatric basis, originating in the orthopedic injury. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. The court of appeal annulled the determination. That the decision was supported by substantial evidence is beside the point. The appeals board exceeded its powers when it adopted a decision as its own that was flawed by a denial of due process with respect to cross-examination. View "Ogden Entm't Servs. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the City misreported charges under the Texas Driver Responsibility Program to plaintiffs and that the State overcharged plaintiffs as a result. On appeal, defendant, the Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety, challenged the district court's partial denial of his motion to dismiss the case against him for want of jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiff Fontenot lacks standing to sue; plaintiffs Miller and Zamarron have no live controversy with the State for correction of driving records, and therefore the class action claim for similar relief is moot and nonjusticiable; the refund claims to recover surcharges are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity; and the court found it unnecessary to discuss the State's jurisdictional defense. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying state sovereign immunity and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction. View "Fontenot v. McCraw" on Justia Law