Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Texas filed suit seeking a declaration that an Enforcement Guidance document from the EEOC regarding the hiring of persons with criminal backgrounds violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701–06. On appeal, the State challenged the district court’s order dismissing the action under FRCP 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that Texas has constitutional standing to challenge the Enforcement Guidance under the APA where Texas is an object of the Guidance and, taking the complaint’s allegations as true, has alleged a sufficient injury in fact - the Guidance forces Texas to alter its hiring policies or incur significant costs; the “flexible” and “pragmatic” approach to assessing the finality of agency action, leads to the conclusion that the Guidance is “final agency action” under section 704 of the APA; the EEOC erred in relying on AT&T Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to suggest that agency actions are “final” under the APA only when federal courts are later bound to give deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statute at issue; and it is also sufficient that the Enforcement Guidance has the immediate effect of altering the rights and obligations of the “regulated community” by offering them a detailed and conclusive means to avoid an adverse EEOC finding, and, by extension, agency referral and a government-backed enforcement action. The Guidance is an agency determination in its final form and is applicable to all employers nation-wide; it is not an intermediate step in a specific enforcement action that may or may not lead to concrete injury. Because the district court erred in dismissing this action on justiciability and subject matter jurisdiction grounds, the court reversed and remanded. View "State of Texas v. EEOC" on Justia Law

U.S., the presumed father of five-year-old Robert S. and three-year-old Miguel S., and J.V., Robert’s biological father, each appealed the termination of their respective parental rights to the children. U.S. and J.V. argued insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) did not apply in this case, and further argued the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to comply with its obligations under ICWA. U.S. and J.V. also argued the juvenile court erred by finding the children adoptable and terminating parental rights while a child abuse report investigation was pending. The Court of Appeal granted SSA’s unopposed motion to take additional evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 909, which shows the juvenile court concluded the child abuse report was unfounded and the home study for Miguel and Robert’s prospective adoptive parents was completed and approved by SSA. That evidence mooted U.S.’s and J.V.’s challenges to the order terminating parental rights based on the pendency of the child abuse report investigation at the time of the permanency hearing. As for U.S.’s and J.V.’s ICWA challenges, although SSA was informed the children were both eligible to enroll in two different Chippewa tribes, the record did not show that any further efforts on the part of SSA or the juvenile court were made before SSA proposed that the court find that ICWA did not apply and the juvenile court made that finding. The Court of Appeal therefore reversed the order terminating parental rights for the limited purpose of allowing SSA to make active efforts necessary to secure tribal membership for the children, in compliance with rules 5.482(c) and 5.484(c)(2) of the California Rules of Court. View "In re Miguel S." on Justia Law

Zabrocki began receiving Teachers Retirement System (TRS) retirement benefits in 2007. In 2012 TRS notified Zabrocki that he did not qualify for those benefits and was liable to reimburse TRS for the amounts it paid. Zabrocki requested administrative review. The TRS Board affirmed. Zabrocki requested a contested case hearing. TRS appointed a hearing examiner who issued a proposed order granting TRS's motion for summary judgment. Zabrocki filed exceptions. The Board heard argument on February 21, 2014; the chair stated that a final decision would be adopted at a subsequent meeting. On May 16, the Board issued its order, finding disputes as to material facts precluding summary judgment, and remanded to the hearing examiner. Zabrocki sought judicial review, contending that TRS violated MCA 2-4-623(1)(a), which requires that a final decision in a contested case be issued within “90 days after a contested case is considered to be submitted for a final decision.” The district court agreed that the May 16 order was not a final order, noted that a denial of summary judgment is not a final decision for purposes of appeal, and determined that on May 16 the Board decided “the issues raised on summary judgment” and not the entire dispute, so that “there is more to be done at the agency level.” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, in favor of TRS. The Board did not violate the final agency decision requirement of MCA 2-4-623(1)(a). View "Zabrocki v. Teachers Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether an injured worker had to provide actual notice of secondary employment in connection with a workers' compensation claims process or whether the employer’s preexisting knowledge of that employment could be imputed to the insurer to satisfy the notice requirement of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A). The Oregon Supreme Court held that the correct interpretation of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A) required a claimant to prove that the insurer received actual notice of the claimant’s secondary employment within 30 days of the insurer’s receipt of the initial claim. View "DCBS v. Muliro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG) submitted a public records request to City of San Diego for all e-mail communications pertaining to City's official business sent to or from the San Diego City Attorney Jan Goldsmith's personal e-mail account during certain time periods. City refused to produce any e-mail communications, stating they did not qualify as public records. SDOG filed this verified action after confirming City would not produce any responsive records. The operative pleading claimed a violation of the California Public Records Act and sought declaratory relief against defendants to compel disclosure of the e-mails. SDOG also alleged a cause of action under section Government Code 526a for taxpayer waste. SDOG ultimately dismissed the waste cause of action with prejudice. The trial court issued a judgment in favor of SDOG on its claim under the Act and granted SDOG declaratory relief against City. Third party, League of California Cities, subsequently petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate under the Act challenging the trial court's order. The Court of Appeal granted the petition and remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court determined SDOG to be the prevailing party under the Act and awarded it attorney fees and costs. The court also denied City's request for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. City timely appealed both orders. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the current version of section 128.5 applied to any case pending as of its effective date; a party filing a sanctions motion under section 128.5 did not need to comply with section 128.7, subdivision (c)(1) (the safe harbor waiting period); and (3) the legal standard in evaluating a request for sanctions under section 128.5 was whether the challenged conduct was objectively unreasonable. The Court reversed the trial court's order denying sanctions and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the trial court's order finding plaintiff to be the prevailing party and awarding it attorney fees and costs. View "San Diegans for Open Govt. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Himmelreich, a federal prisoner, sued the United States, alleging that he was severely beaten by a fellow inmate as the result of negligence by prison officials. The government treated the suit as a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b). The court granted the defendants summary judgment on the ground that the claim fell into the exception for “[a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance . . . [of] a discretionary function,” namely, deciding where to house inmates. While the motion was pending, Himmelreich filed a second suit: a constitutional tort suit against individual Bureau of Prison employees, again alleging that his beating was the result of officials’ negligence. After the dismissal of Himmelreich’s first suit, the court dismissed the second suit as foreclosed by the FTCA’s judgment bar provision. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed. The FTCA “Exceptions” section’s plain text dictates that the judgment bar does “not apply” to cases that, like Himmelreich’s first suit, are based on the performance of a discretionary function. Had the court dismissed Himmelreich’s first suit because, e.g., the employees were not negligent, it would make sense that the judgment bar provision would prevent a second suit against the employees. Where an FTCA claim is dismissed because it falls within one of the “Exceptions,” the dismissal signals merely that the United States cannot be held liable for the claim; it has no logical bearing on whether an employee can be liable instead. View "Simmons v. Himmelreich" on Justia Law

Andrews, a senior property manager of a public housing complex, challenged the termination of her employment with the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA) through RRHA’s grievance procedure. A hearing officer ordered her reinstatement snf advised that, under the terms of RRHA’s Grievance Policy, “[e]ither party may . . . appeal the decision to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia.” The circuit court reversed that decision as “‘contradictory to law’” under Code 2.2-3006. The Supreme Court of Virginia reinstated the hearing officer’s decision, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear RRHA’s appeal. Either party may appeal a hearing officer’s decision to a circuit court for review on grounds that it is “contradictory to law,” Code 2.2-3006(B), but no such right is available when the challenge to the decision presents a question whether it is“consistent with policy,” RRHA did not make a prima facie showing for invoking judicial review of the hearing officer’s decision under Code 2.2-3006(B) because the substance of RRHA’s appeal challenged only the hearing officer’s interpretation and application of RRHA’s policies. View "Andrews v. Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs New Hampshire Right to Life and Jackie Pelletier, appealed superior court orders granting in part and denying in part their petition for an order requiring defendants the Director, Charitable Trusts Unit (CTU), the Office of the New Hampshire Attorney General (AG), the New Hampshire Board of Pharmacy (Board of Pharmacy), and the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), collectively referred to as “the State,” to produce, under the Right-to-Know Law, without redaction, all documents and other materials responsive to plaintiffs’ prior requests. The trial court ordered the State to produce certain documents, but upheld the State’s withholding or redactions of other documents because it determined that they were exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that in so deciding and in denying their associated requests for attorney’s fees and costs, the trial court erred. At issue were three Right-to-Know requests that plaintiffs made of the State in July 2014 and September 2014 for documents and materials related to Planned Parenthood of Northern New England (PPNNE) and/or its New Hampshire clinics. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order upholding the State's decision to withhold certain DVDs from disclosure, and remanded for the trial court to conduct additional fact finding. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "New Hampshire Right to Life v. Director, New Hampshire Charitable Trusts Unit" on Justia Law

Petitioners Scott Bach and the Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs, Inc. (ANJRPC), appealed a superior court decision entering summary judgment in favor of respondent, the New Hampshire Department of Safety (Department). Petitioners had challenged, as ultra vires and invalid, Department administrative rules that required nonresidents applying for a concealed-carry license in New Hampshire to provide proof of a “resident state license” to carry a concealed weapon. The trial court concluded that the administrative rules were valid. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the rules at issue were indeed ultra vires, it reversed and remanded. View "Bach v. New Hampshire Dept. of Safety" on Justia Law

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulates contracts concerning commodities for future delivery when offered on margin or another form of leverage, 7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(D), with an exception for contracts that “results in actual delivery within 28 days or such other longer period as the Commission may determine by rule or regulation based upon the typical commercial practice in cash or spot markets for the commodity involved”. The CFTC began investigating whether Monex's precious-metals business was within this exception. Monex refused to comply with a subpoena, arguing that since 1987, when it adopted its current business model, the CFTC has deemed its business to be in compliance with all federal rules and that, because it satisfies the exception, the Commission lacked authority even to investigate. The district court enforced the subpoena. Monex turned over the documents. Monex appealed, seeking their return and an injunction to prevent the CFTC from using them in any enforcement proceeding. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Monex was impermissibly using its opposition to the subpoena to get a judicial decision on the merits of its statutory argument, before the CFTC makes a substantive decision. The propriety of an agency’s action is reviewed after the final administrative decision. Contesting the agency’s jurisdiction does not change the rules for determining when a subpoena must be enforced. View "Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Monex Deposit Co." on Justia Law