Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
Black Mesa Water Coalition v. Jewell
Black Mesa sought costs and expenses from the OSM after Black Mesa participated in a successful challenge to OSM's grant of a coal mining permit revision. The ALJ denied the fee request, the IBLA affirmed, and the district court affirmed. The court held that, on the standard of review applicable here, the review of the agency's "eligibility" determination is de novo and its "entitlement" determination is reviewed for substantial evidence; on de novo review, Black Mesa is "eligible" for fees because it showed some degree of success on the merits; in light of the court's decision on "eligibility," the court declined to reach whether, on this record, Black Mesa was "entitled" to fees; and the court remanded for the agency to consider the issue. In addition, the court rejected Black Mesa's argument that the Secretary waived a challenge to the reasonableness of any award amount that the agency might grant on remand for costs and expenses reasonably incurred for Black Mesa's participation in the proceedings at the agency level. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Black Mesa Water Coalition v. Jewell" on Justia Law
Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol
Bertoli was struck by a car as she walked inside a crosswalk on state Highway 116, and was rendered permanently physically and mentally disabled. Her attorney, Rouda, erved the Sebastopol Police Department with a request under the Public Records Act (Gov. Code, 6250) seeking all evidence, including photos, reports, audio logs, handwritten notes, and emails, with respect to the accident, and any surveys, traffic or pedestrian counts, and letters or complaints received with respect to the intersection, for the past 10 years. The city claims never to have received the request, but that, in response to an earlier request, had produced a copy of the collision report, notes of the investigating officer, and a report listing all accidents on Healdsburg Avenue for the past 10 years. Rouda submitted an additional PRA request, seeking 62 different categories of records. The city characterized the request as “overly extensive, overly broad and, in some cases, unlimited in time.” Ultimately, the trial court denied Rouda’s request for a writ of mandate, found the litigation “clearly frivolous” and awarded the city costs and attorneys fees. The court of appeal reversed with respect to fees and costs, reasoning that the city was not justified with respect to requested electronically stored information. View "Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol" on Justia Law
Kannikal v. Att’y Gen. of the United States
The Bureau of Prisons terminated Kannikal on September 3, 1999. In 2001, Kannikal filed a formal complaint with the EEOC, but he did not receive an administrative hearing until 2006. Kannikal’s case was then held in abeyance because it was considered part of a pending class action complaint. In 2007, the Department of Justice informed Kannikal that his case would no longer be held in abeyance. Kannikal asked the EEOC about his case status in 2008 and 2009, but never received a response. He filed suit on March 28, 2012. The district court dismissed, citing 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), which provides that “every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.” The court held that Kannikal’s cause of action accrued on October 17, 2001, 180 days after he filed his EEOC complaint, and expired six years later. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that section 2401’s six-year limitations period does not apply to suits brought under Title VII. View "Kannikal v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law
Tulips Investments, LLC v. Colorado ex rel. Suthers
The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on judicial enforcement of an administrative investigatory subpoena for documents of a corporation outside of Colorado, but was suspected of conducting business within the state in violation of state consumer protection statutes. Tulips Investments, LLC was a Delaware corporation that the State alleged was running a loan business in violation of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) and the Colorado Protection Act (CCPA). The State issued a subpoena requesting certain documents from Tulips, which Tulips failed to produce. The State then obtained a trial court order in an unsuccessful attempt to enforce the subpoena. The State then pursued a contempt citation against Tulips for failing to comply. Tulips responded by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision setting aside the trial court's grant of Tulips' motion to dismiss. View "Tulips Investments, LLC v. Colorado ex rel. Suthers" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
Sparkman Learning Ctr. v. Ark. Dep’t. Human Servs.
The Arkansas DHS regulates child care facility licensing and administers the USDA Child Care Food Program. Sparkman day care facility provided disability services funded by DHS and participated in the Program through DHS. The Program prohibits placement of disqualified individuals in a position of authority, 7 C.F.R. 226.6(c)(3)(ii)(B). DHS Policy states that violations can result in exclusion of a provider from further funding. DHS alleged that Sparkman placed a disqualified individual, Whitaker, in a position of authority. Sparkman believed that racial animus motivated DHS to place Whitaker on the disqualification list, but did not raise an equal protection claim at the hearing. Before the hearing was complete, the ALJ resigned, stating "as an African American male I cannot continue to work in a[n] office where racism and harassment continue to exist." Another ALJ, a Caucasian present as an observer, upheld DHS's termination of funding. With state appeals pending, Sparkman filed a federal complaint. The district court stayed proceedings. Following state court remand, DHS appointed a private attorney to serve as hearing officer; Sparkman agreed to the selection. Sparkman again made no equal protection or due process claims. The hearing officer decided in DHS's favor. Sparkman’s state court appeal alleged ex parte communications between DHS and the hearing officer. The state courts upheld the decision. The federal court concluded that claim preclusion barred Sparkman's due process and equal protection claims. The Eight Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims could have been brought during the state administrative proceeding and judicial review. View "Sparkman Learning Ctr. v. Ark. Dep't. Human Servs." on Justia Law
LA Police Protective League v. City of LA
A taxpayer and the Los Angeles Police Protection League sought to invalidate the Los Angeles Police Department’s policy regarding impounding vehicles, “Special Order 7.” The special order seeks to implement Vehicle Code sections 14602.6, and 14607.6, which provided for impoundment of a vehicle driven by a person without a valid driver’s license (regardless of ownership), and directs officers when to use those sections and other state statutes governing impounds. The court of appeal reversed the trial court judgment in favor of the taxpayer and the League, holding that Special Order 7 is within the wide discretion of the police chief, and that neither the individual nor the League has standing to challenge the chief’s implementation of the state statutes. View "LA Police Protective League v. City of LA" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
Speicher v. Columbia Township Bd. of Trustees
Defendants Columbia Township Board of Trustees and Columbia Township Planning Commission appealed the Court of Appeals’ decision holding that plaintiff Kenneth Speicher was entitled to an award of court costs and actual attorney fees based on his entitlement to declaratory relief under the Open Meetings Act (OMA). The Court of Appeals reached this decision only because it was compelled to do so by Court of Appeals precedent. If not for this binding precedent, the Court of Appeals would have denied plaintiff’s request for court costs and actual attorney fees on the ground that the plain language of MCL 15.271(4) does not permit such an award unless the plaintiff obtains injunctive relief. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that prior decisions of that court have strayed from the plain language of MCL 15.271(4). Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals opinion and order and reinstated the portion of its January 22, 2013 decision regarding court costs and actual attorney fees. View "Speicher v. Columbia Township Bd. of Trustees" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
Shaffer v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.
Brian Shaffer, who had severe autism and chemical sensitivities, resided with his mother, Delores Shaffer, who was paid to provide private duty nursing (PDN) care to Brian. In 2011, Brian’s Medicaid coverage was transferred to Coventry Health Care of Nebraska, Inc. When Coventry determined that the nursing services were not medically necessary, Shaffer requested a State fair hearing with the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services. Coventry participated in the administrative proceedings, at which a hearing officer concluded that the PDN services were not medically necessary. Delores sought judicial review of the order, but the petition did not name Coventry as a respondent. The district court reversed the order of the Department, finding the PDN services that Delores provided to Brian were medically necessary. Coventry appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court, holding that Coventry was a “party of record” at the State fair hearing and therefore a necessary party in the subsequent appeal to the district court, and the failure to make Coventry a party to the appeal deprived the district court of jurisdiction.View "Shaffer v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law
Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville
At issue in these two cases was the applicable scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520, which sets forth specific procedural rights for police officers who are accused of misconduct and face the disciplinary processes administratively conducted by the police agency that employs them. Appellants in both cases were police officers who were subjected to administrative disciplinary actions that were initiated as a result of allegations that arose from within the police department itself. Both officers requested an administrative review procedure consistent with section 15.520. The requests were denied. Each Appellant sought review of the disciplinary actions in circuit court. The circuit courts concluded that the officers were not entitled to an administrative hearing subject to the due process provisions of section 15.520. The appeals courts affirmed, determining that section 15.520 applies only when the disciplinary action was initiated by a “citizens complaint.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 applies to both disciplinary proceedings generated by citizen complaints and those initiated by intra-departmental actions. Remanded.View "Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville" on Justia Law
Bettis v. Marsaglia
In 2012, the North Mac School District adopted a resolution of intent to issue working cash bonds in the amount of $2,000,000. Bettis filed a petition, seeking to submit the proposition to the voters at the April, 2013 election. Marsaglia and O’Neal filed objections to the petition on seven bases, including that the petition sheets were neither numbered nor securely bound, as required by the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/28-3. The electoral board sustained the objections. Bettis sought judicial review. The caption of the petition identified only Marsaglia and O’Neal as opposing parties, but Bettis also served, by certified mail, all members of the electoral board, counsel for the board, counsel for the objectors, and the District Secretary. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, noting that the appeal was moot because the election had passed, but holding that failure to serve the electoral board as a separate legal entity required dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that courts may not add to or subtract from the requirements listed in the statute, which does not require the naming of parties and does not require that a copy of the electoral board’s decision be attached.View "Bettis v. Marsaglia" on Justia Law