Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The United States filed an in rem civil forfeiture complaint on the property, alleging that Carlos Alberto Oliva-Castillo was the true of owner of the property and that Oliva purchased the property with proceeds from the sale of illegal drugs. Dr. Carlos Ricardo Tirado Tamez filed an answer and amended answer to the complaint claiming to be the owner of the property. Dr. Tirado and his wife are the claimants. On appeal, Dr. Tirado challenged the district court's default judgment and final judgment of forfeiture. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dr. Tirado's Venue Motion; the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that claimants had been properly served; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering discovery sanctions resulting in default judgment against Dr. Tirado. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "United States v. 200 Acres of Land Near FM 2686" on Justia Law

Ardon claimed that Los Angeles improperly collected a Telephone Users Tax (TUT). Ardon asserted that a 2007 amendment to the TUT was illegal because it expanded an excise tax that required approval by a majority of voters. In 2013 Ardon's counsel requested and received documents pertaining to the issue. Ardon's counsel later informed the city that she had obtained copies of two documents that appeared to be listed in a 2008 privilege log and a third document that appeared to have been prepared in response to other documents listed in the privilege log. The city responded that the documents had been inadvertently produced and demanded their return. Ardon's counsel declined, contending that the city had waived any claim of privilege. The trial court denied the city's motion to compel return of the documents and disqualify Arden’s counsel, concluding that production of the documents in response to the Public Records Act request waived any privilege. The court of appeal affirmed.View "Ardon v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

After the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) certified an environmental impact report (EIR) for its 2050 Regional Transportation Plan/Sustainable Communities Strategy (transportation plan), CREED-2. The Affordable Housing Coalition of San Diego filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the EIR's adequacy under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Cleveland National Forest Foundation and the Center for Biological Diversity filed a similar petition, in which Sierra Club and the State of California later joined. The superior court granted the petitions in part, finding the EIR failed to carry out its role as an informational document because it did not analyze the inconsistency between the state's policy goals reflected in Executive Order S-3-05 and the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts after 2020. The court also found the EIR failed to adequately address mitigation measures for the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts. Given these findings, the court declined to decide any of the other challenges raised in the petitions. SANDAG appealed, arguing the EIR complied with CEQA in both respects. Cleveland National Forest Foundation and Sierra Club (collectively, Cleveland) cross-appealed, arguing the EIR further violated CEQA by failing to analyze a reasonable range of project alternatives, failing to adequately analyze and mitigate the transportation plan's air quality impacts, and understating the transportation plan's impacts on agricultural lands. The State separately cross-appealed, arguing the EIR further violated CEQA by failing to adequately analyze and mitigate the transportation plan's impacts from particulate matter pollution. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the EIR failed to comply with CEQA in all identified respects. The Court modified the judgment to incorporate its decision on the cross-appeals and affirmed.View "Cleveland Nat. Forest v. San Diego Assn. of Gov." on Justia Law

In 2009, IAWC petitioned the Illinois Commerce Commission under the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/1-101) for approval of its annual reconciliation of purchased water and purchased sewage treatment surcharges. The state was granted leave to intervene. In 2012, the Commission approved the reconciliation with modifications and denied the state’s request for rehearing. Under the Public Utilities Act, the state had 35 days to appeal, placing the deadline for filing the notice of appeal at October 16. Notice of appeal was filed on that date. The record and briefs were filed. The appellate court entered a summary order, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that the notice had not been timely filed, reasoning that under Supreme Court Rule 335(i)(1), the notice should have been filed within the 30-day deadline specified in Rule 303(a). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; the appellate court erred in concluding that separation of powers principles required the timeliness of the notice to be judged by Supreme Court Rule 303(a) rather than the period specified by the legislature in the Public Utilities Act.View "Madigan v. IL Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Health (DOH) announced that, pursuant to an extensive reorganization of public health services referenced in Governor Tom Corbett’s 2013-2014 budget, twenty-six State Health Centers would be closed and approximately twenty-six nurse consultants would be furloughed. In response, a lawsuit was filed in Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction by Appellants SEIU Healthcare Pennsylvania, an unincorporated labor organization, five nurses employed by the Centers and represented by SEIU, and five Pennsylvania state legislators (collectively referred to as “SEIU”), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, SEIU sought to prevent Appellees, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor Corbett, the DOH, and DOH Secretary, Michael Wolf, from closing the Centers and furloughing the nurse consultants. The Commonwealth Court denied the union's request. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found no reasonable ground for the denial of injunctive relief, and, accordingly, reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court.View "SEIU Healthcare, et al v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Alaska filed suit challenging the Forest Service's Roadless Rule in 2011. In 2001, the Forest Service adopted the Rule, which prohibited road construction, road reconstruction, and timber harvesting on millions of acres of national forest lands, including national forest land in Alaska. In 2005, the Forest Service repealed the Rule, but, in 2006, the District Court for the Northern District of California ordered reinstatement of the Rule. The court concluded that when the Rule was reinstated in 2006 after its repeal in 2005, a new right of action accrued. Under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), Alaska had six years from the time of the Rule's reinstatement in 2006 to file a lawsuit challenging the rule. Therefore, Alaska's suit is timely because it filed in 2011. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of Alaska's complaint and remanded for further consideration.View "State of Alaska v. Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Intervenors, a group of police unions, challenged the ruling of the district court that the City of New York's "stop-and-frisk" policy was carried out in a discriminatory manner, as well as its imposition of various reforms to that policy. These cases were previously ordered to be reassigned to a different district court judge. The new district judge denied the unions' motion to intervene in these cases and the unions appeal. At issue was whether public-sector unions may intervene into a litigation where the actual parties to that litigation, including a newly-elected mayoral administration, have agreed to a settlement. The court held that the unions' motions to intervene are untimely and do not assert an interest that the law seeks to protect; the unions knew, or should have known, of their alleged interests in these controversial and public cases well before they filed their motions; granting the unions' motions in the wake of the mayoral election would essentially condone a collateral attack on the democratic process and could erode the legitimacy of decisions made by the democratically-elected representatives of the people; and the unions' interests in their members' reputations and collective bargaining rights are, as a matter of law, too remote from the "subject of the action" to warrant intervention as a "party."View "Floyd v. City of New York" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether appellants waived the mental health records privilege provided under the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA) by filing a negligence suit to recover for physical injuries sustained by James Octave upon being struck by a tractor-trailer driven by appellee David Walker. The incident occurred in 2007; based on eyewitness reports, the state police concluded James attempted to commit suicide by jumping under the truck's trailer. Appellant Susan Octave, James's wife, filed a complaint in her own right and on behalf of James, an incapacitated person, against the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (DOT), Walker, and a number of other parties based upon their purported negligence. Because the state police concluded James was attempting to commit suicide, appellees sought discovery information regarding his mental health history and access to his mental health records, which Susan refused to provide. Appellees filed a motion for leave to access and copy sealed files pertaining to James's involuntary commitments pursuant to the MHPA and a motion to compel the execution of authorizations pertaining to his mental health and involuntary commitment records and full and complete answers to interrogatories. Thereafter, appellants filed an amended complaint, alleging James only suffered physical injuries as a result of the incident. The trial court issued denying appellees' motions, reasoning that because the amended complaint removed allegations pertaining to mental injuries, it did not place James's mental condition at issue. Appellees appealed to the Commonwealth Court, contending the trial court erred when it denied them access to James's mental health records specifically arguing the MHPA's confidentiality provisions were waived by Susan because she placed James's mental health at issue by filing the complaint. The Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded, finding "Susan Octave directly put James Octave's mental history, especially as it pertains to his previous suicide attempts, or considerations or contemplations of suicide at issue. The Supreme Court granted allocatur to address whether, given that petitioners amended their complaint to no longer raised a question of mental health, did the petitioners still put mental health at issue and impliedly waive the protections of 50 P.S. sec. 7111 though the act of filing the lawsuit. The Supreme Court held that a patient waives his confidentiality protections under the MHPA where, judged by an objective standard, he knew or reasonably should have known his mental health would be placed directly at issue by filing the lawsuit.View "Octave v. Walker" on Justia Law

Kolbusz owns and operates the Illinois Center for Dermatology and Skin Cancer and was a participating Medicare provider from 1993 until December 2012, receiving payment directly from Medicare. In October 2012 he was indicted for Medicare fraud. As a consequence, the Department of Health and Human Services imposed fraud prevention procedures on the practice, including payment suspension, resulting in his ultimate withdrawal from the Medicare program. In 2013, Kolbusz filed suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and her contractors, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 (federal question); the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395; and 28 U.S.C. 1361 (mandamus) to compel review of reimbursement claims he had submitted. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Kolbusz’s failure to exhaust Medicare’s administrative appeals process precludes subject-matter jurisdiction of his mandamus action.View "Ctr for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

An election dispute arose about which individuals were properly elected or appointed to govern the Thlopthlocco people. The Tribal Town filed suit in the tribal court of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and, accordingly, voluntarily submitted to that court's jurisdiction. The Tribal Town subsequently concluded it did not want to maintain its suit in tribal court and dismissed its claims. But the defendant in that suit had, by that time, filed cross-claims. Arguing that the Tribal Town's sovereign immunity waiver did not cover proceedings on the cross-claims, the Tribal Town attempted to escape Muscogee court jurisdiction, but, in various decisions, several judges and justices of the Muscogee courts held that they may exercise jurisdiction over the Tribal Town without its consent. The Tribal Town then filed a federal action in the Northern District of Oklahoma against those Muscogee judicial officers, seeking to enjoin the Muscogee courts' exercise of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction, defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity, the Tribal Town had failed to join indispensable parties, and the Tribal Town had failed to exhaust its remedies in tribal court. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded, however, that the Tribal Town presented a federal question and that the other claims do not require dismissal. But the Court agreed the Tribal Town should have exhausted its remedies in tribal court while its federal court action was abated. View "Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham, et al" on Justia Law