Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Kolbusz owns and operates the Illinois Center for Dermatology and Skin Cancer and was a participating Medicare provider from 1993 until December 2012, receiving payment directly from Medicare. In October 2012 he was indicted for Medicare fraud. As a consequence, the Department of Health and Human Services imposed fraud prevention procedures on the practice, including payment suspension, resulting in his ultimate withdrawal from the Medicare program. In 2013, Kolbusz filed suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and her contractors, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 (federal question); the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395; and 28 U.S.C. 1361 (mandamus) to compel review of reimbursement claims he had submitted. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Kolbusz’s failure to exhaust Medicare’s administrative appeals process precludes subject-matter jurisdiction of his mandamus action.View "Ctr for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

An election dispute arose about which individuals were properly elected or appointed to govern the Thlopthlocco people. The Tribal Town filed suit in the tribal court of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and, accordingly, voluntarily submitted to that court's jurisdiction. The Tribal Town subsequently concluded it did not want to maintain its suit in tribal court and dismissed its claims. But the defendant in that suit had, by that time, filed cross-claims. Arguing that the Tribal Town's sovereign immunity waiver did not cover proceedings on the cross-claims, the Tribal Town attempted to escape Muscogee court jurisdiction, but, in various decisions, several judges and justices of the Muscogee courts held that they may exercise jurisdiction over the Tribal Town without its consent. The Tribal Town then filed a federal action in the Northern District of Oklahoma against those Muscogee judicial officers, seeking to enjoin the Muscogee courts' exercise of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction, defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity, the Tribal Town had failed to join indispensable parties, and the Tribal Town had failed to exhaust its remedies in tribal court. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded, however, that the Tribal Town presented a federal question and that the other claims do not require dismissal. But the Court agreed the Tribal Town should have exhausted its remedies in tribal court while its federal court action was abated. View "Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham, et al" on Justia Law

After the South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) failed to produce public documents requested by Appellant Edward D. Sloan, Jr., Sloan filed s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action against DOR and its director, James Etter, seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. After suit was filed, the DOR produced the requested information and asserted that Sloan's action was mooted and should have been dismissed. The trial court agreed with the DOR and dismissed the complaint, denying all relief. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to Sloan. Despite the DOR's failure to comply with the requirements of FOIA, the Court held the trial court properly found that Sloan's request for a declaratory judgment was mooted when the DOR produced the requested information. Sloan contended, however, that the claim for declaratory relief remained viable. Here, the Court disagreed: "the information Sloan sought has been disclosed, [and] there [was] no continuing violation of FOIA upon which the trial court could have issued a declaratory judgment." As the prevailing party under these circumstances, the trial court erred in not awarding Sloan his reasonable attorney's fees and costs. View "Sloan v. SCDOR" on Justia Law

The 1977 Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. 801(c), authorizes the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) to promulgate mandatory health or safety standards, conduct regular inspections of mines, and issue citations and orders for violations of the Act or regulations. If an operator has a pattern of violations of mandatory health or safety standards and has been given required notice and an opportunity to comply, the Act authorizes issuance of an order requiring the operator to vacate the mine until the violation has been abated. The MSHA promulgated the first pattern of violations rule in 1990. The final rule issued in 2013, as 30 C.F.R. Part 104. Mining interests challenged the rule. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, concluding that the rule is not within the definition of a mandatory health or safety standard over which the Act grants appeals courts jurisdiction.View "Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Sec'y of Labor" on Justia Law

On March 7, 2012, Sean Donahue submitted a Right-to-Know Law (RTKL) request via email to the Office of the Governor (OG), seeking various budgetary and employment records. OG’s open-records officer did not receive the request until March 12, 2012; and five business days later, on March 19, 2012, the open-records officer proceeded to grant Donahue’s request in part. On March 29, 2012, Donahue appealed to the Office of Open Records (OOR). OOR determined that Donahue’s request was "deemed denied" because OG failed to respond to the request within a five business day period as required by 65 P.S. section 67.901. Even though OG prevailed in the matter before OOR, it appealed OOR’s final order to the Commonwealth Court, where it contested OOR’s interpretation of Section 901 of the RTKL. OG contended that OOR wrongly concluded that an agency must respond to a RTKL request within five business days from the date any person within the agency receives such a request. The OG argued that an agency, including it, has five business days to respond from the date its RTKL open-records officer receives the request for records. The Commonwealth Court issued a per curiam order quashing OG’s petition for appellate review. The Commonwealth Court held that OG lacked standing to appeal from the OOR order because OG was not "aggrieved" by the order, but merely disagreed with an issue decided against it regarding the time frame for responding to RTKL records requests. In addition to appealing OOR’s final order, OG simultaneously filed a declaratory judgment action in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, seeking a declaration that OOR misinterpreted Section 901 of the RTKL with respect to the commencement of the five business day period for responding to a RTKL request under Section 901.3. Finding no reversible error in the Commonwealth Court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Governor's Office v. Office of Open Records" on Justia Law

Given time constraints associated with an impending primary election contest, this election appeal was previously resolved in per curiam Order of the Supreme Court. With the exigency abated, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took an opportunity to supplement its brief explanation provided in the earlier Order. The Court determined that Pennsylvania courts are not empowered to employ principles of equity to override the express statutory command that the failure of a candidate for statewide public office to file a timely statement of financial interests with the Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission "shall . . . be a fatal defect to a petition to appear on the ballot." On March 10, 2014, Robert Guzzardi filed a timely nomination petition with the Department of State, seeking placement of his name on the ballot for the Republican nomination for the Office of Governor. Although an original statement of financial interests was appended to his petition, Mr. Guzzardi failed to make the mandatory tender to the Ethics Commission prior to the statutory deadline. Appellants, qualified electors and registered voters, filed a petition to set the nomination petition aside in the Commonwealth Court. Among other challenges, they invoked the statutory fatal-defect rule which, by its plain terms, required Mr. Guzzardi’s name to be removed from the primary election ballot, in light of his undisputed failure to file a timely statement of financial interests with the Ethics Commission. The Commonwealth Court, however, refused to enforce the governing legislative directive. Rather, the single judge administering the matter conducted a hearing and issued an order denying Appellants’ objections. In an unpublished opinion, she relied on a line of Commonwealth Court decisions which have found the judiciary to be possessed with the power to permit a fatal defect to be "cured" through the application of equitable principles: it was the court’s position that Mr. Guzzardi had offered sufficient, non-negligent explanations to justify treating his late-filed statement nunc pro tunc, or as if it had been submitted to the Ethics Commission on time. "[T]here is no dispute here that the statutory fatal-defect rule applied squarely in Mr. Guzzardi’s circumstances, on account of his failure to timely file a statement of financial interests with the Commission. Moreover, Appellants lodged timely objections to his nomination petition, bringing the matter squarely before the Commonwealth Court. In the circumstances, the Commonwealth Court erred in refusing to enforce the governing statutory command." View "In Re: Nomination of Guzzardi" on Justia Law

MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC (MPHJ) owned several patents relating to network scanner systems. Through subsidiary licensees, MPHJ wrote to various business and non-profit organizations operating in Vermont, requesting the recipient to confirm it was not infringing MPHJ’s patents or, alternatively, to purchase a license. If there was no response, a Texas law firm sent follow-up correspondence stating that an infringement suit would be filed. The State of Vermont filed suit against MPHJ in Vermont state court alleging MPHJ engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices under the Vermont Consumer Protection Act, stating that the letters contained threatening, false, and misleading statements. MPHJ removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, asserting federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. The State moved to remand the case back to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. MPHJ opposed the State’s motion to remand, and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and a motion for sanctions. Finding that it lacked jurisdiction to grant MPHJ its requested relief, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and appeal. View "Vermont v. MPHJ Technology Investments" on Justia Law

Appellant Kerry McCarty, as executrix of the Estate of Ruth C. McCarty, appealed a circuit court order denying her motion to dismiss the claim of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for repayment of medical assistance provided to the decedent through the State's Medicaid program. She argued the court erred by concluding that DHHS's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Estate of Ruth C. McCarty" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claims against Pfizer for alleged violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, and state law equivalents. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the court could not discern how much of the complaint the district court intended to dismiss. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "United States, ex rel. Dr. Jesse Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc." on Justia Law

Riverkeeper attempted to intervene in an effort to prevent LNG from constructing a liquefied natural gas facility and pipeline along the Columbia River in Oregon. Riverkeeper sought review of the Coast Guard's issuance of a letter of recommendation regarding the suitability of the waterway for vessel traffic, contending that the court has jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717r(d)(1). Section 717r(d) authorizes judicial review of agency orders and actions that issue, condition, or deny any permit, license, concurrence, or approval. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for review because the letter of recommendation was not such an order or action under section 717r(d)(1). View "Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard" on Justia Law