Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Brian Shaffer, who had severe autism and chemical sensitivities, resided with his mother, Delores Shaffer, who was paid to provide private duty nursing (PDN) care to Brian. In 2011, Brian’s Medicaid coverage was transferred to Coventry Health Care of Nebraska, Inc. When Coventry determined that the nursing services were not medically necessary, Shaffer requested a State fair hearing with the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services. Coventry participated in the administrative proceedings, at which a hearing officer concluded that the PDN services were not medically necessary. Delores sought judicial review of the order, but the petition did not name Coventry as a respondent. The district court reversed the order of the Department, finding the PDN services that Delores provided to Brian were medically necessary. Coventry appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court, holding that Coventry was a “party of record” at the State fair hearing and therefore a necessary party in the subsequent appeal to the district court, and the failure to make Coventry a party to the appeal deprived the district court of jurisdiction.View "Shaffer v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

At issue in these two cases was the applicable scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520, which sets forth specific procedural rights for police officers who are accused of misconduct and face the disciplinary processes administratively conducted by the police agency that employs them. Appellants in both cases were police officers who were subjected to administrative disciplinary actions that were initiated as a result of allegations that arose from within the police department itself. Both officers requested an administrative review procedure consistent with section 15.520. The requests were denied. Each Appellant sought review of the disciplinary actions in circuit court. The circuit courts concluded that the officers were not entitled to an administrative hearing subject to the due process provisions of section 15.520. The appeals courts affirmed, determining that section 15.520 applies only when the disciplinary action was initiated by a “citizens complaint.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 applies to both disciplinary proceedings generated by citizen complaints and those initiated by intra-departmental actions. Remanded.View "Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville" on Justia Law

In 2012, the North Mac School District adopted a resolution of intent to issue working cash bonds in the amount of $2,000,000. Bettis filed a petition, seeking to submit the proposition to the voters at the April, 2013 election. Marsaglia and O’Neal filed objections to the petition on seven bases, including that the petition sheets were neither numbered nor securely bound, as required by the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/28-3. The electoral board sustained the objections. Bettis sought judicial review. The caption of the petition identified only Marsaglia and O’Neal as opposing parties, but Bettis also served, by certified mail, all members of the electoral board, counsel for the board, counsel for the objectors, and the District Secretary. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, noting that the appeal was moot because the election had passed, but holding that failure to serve the electoral board as a separate legal entity required dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that courts may not add to or subtract from the requirements listed in the statute, which does not require the naming of parties and does not require that a copy of the electoral board’s decision be attached.View "Bettis v. Marsaglia" on Justia Law

The United States filed an in rem civil forfeiture complaint on the property, alleging that Carlos Alberto Oliva-Castillo was the true of owner of the property and that Oliva purchased the property with proceeds from the sale of illegal drugs. Dr. Carlos Ricardo Tirado Tamez filed an answer and amended answer to the complaint claiming to be the owner of the property. Dr. Tirado and his wife are the claimants. On appeal, Dr. Tirado challenged the district court's default judgment and final judgment of forfeiture. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dr. Tirado's Venue Motion; the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that claimants had been properly served; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering discovery sanctions resulting in default judgment against Dr. Tirado. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "United States v. 200 Acres of Land Near FM 2686" on Justia Law

Ardon claimed that Los Angeles improperly collected a Telephone Users Tax (TUT). Ardon asserted that a 2007 amendment to the TUT was illegal because it expanded an excise tax that required approval by a majority of voters. In 2013 Ardon's counsel requested and received documents pertaining to the issue. Ardon's counsel later informed the city that she had obtained copies of two documents that appeared to be listed in a 2008 privilege log and a third document that appeared to have been prepared in response to other documents listed in the privilege log. The city responded that the documents had been inadvertently produced and demanded their return. Ardon's counsel declined, contending that the city had waived any claim of privilege. The trial court denied the city's motion to compel return of the documents and disqualify Arden’s counsel, concluding that production of the documents in response to the Public Records Act request waived any privilege. The court of appeal affirmed.View "Ardon v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

After the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) certified an environmental impact report (EIR) for its 2050 Regional Transportation Plan/Sustainable Communities Strategy (transportation plan), CREED-2. The Affordable Housing Coalition of San Diego filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the EIR's adequacy under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Cleveland National Forest Foundation and the Center for Biological Diversity filed a similar petition, in which Sierra Club and the State of California later joined. The superior court granted the petitions in part, finding the EIR failed to carry out its role as an informational document because it did not analyze the inconsistency between the state's policy goals reflected in Executive Order S-3-05 and the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts after 2020. The court also found the EIR failed to adequately address mitigation measures for the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts. Given these findings, the court declined to decide any of the other challenges raised in the petitions. SANDAG appealed, arguing the EIR complied with CEQA in both respects. Cleveland National Forest Foundation and Sierra Club (collectively, Cleveland) cross-appealed, arguing the EIR further violated CEQA by failing to analyze a reasonable range of project alternatives, failing to adequately analyze and mitigate the transportation plan's air quality impacts, and understating the transportation plan's impacts on agricultural lands. The State separately cross-appealed, arguing the EIR further violated CEQA by failing to adequately analyze and mitigate the transportation plan's impacts from particulate matter pollution. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the EIR failed to comply with CEQA in all identified respects. The Court modified the judgment to incorporate its decision on the cross-appeals and affirmed.View "Cleveland Nat. Forest v. San Diego Assn. of Gov." on Justia Law

In 2009, IAWC petitioned the Illinois Commerce Commission under the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/1-101) for approval of its annual reconciliation of purchased water and purchased sewage treatment surcharges. The state was granted leave to intervene. In 2012, the Commission approved the reconciliation with modifications and denied the state’s request for rehearing. Under the Public Utilities Act, the state had 35 days to appeal, placing the deadline for filing the notice of appeal at October 16. Notice of appeal was filed on that date. The record and briefs were filed. The appellate court entered a summary order, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that the notice had not been timely filed, reasoning that under Supreme Court Rule 335(i)(1), the notice should have been filed within the 30-day deadline specified in Rule 303(a). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; the appellate court erred in concluding that separation of powers principles required the timeliness of the notice to be judged by Supreme Court Rule 303(a) rather than the period specified by the legislature in the Public Utilities Act.View "Madigan v. IL Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Health (DOH) announced that, pursuant to an extensive reorganization of public health services referenced in Governor Tom Corbett’s 2013-2014 budget, twenty-six State Health Centers would be closed and approximately twenty-six nurse consultants would be furloughed. In response, a lawsuit was filed in Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction by Appellants SEIU Healthcare Pennsylvania, an unincorporated labor organization, five nurses employed by the Centers and represented by SEIU, and five Pennsylvania state legislators (collectively referred to as “SEIU”), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, SEIU sought to prevent Appellees, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor Corbett, the DOH, and DOH Secretary, Michael Wolf, from closing the Centers and furloughing the nurse consultants. The Commonwealth Court denied the union's request. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found no reasonable ground for the denial of injunctive relief, and, accordingly, reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court.View "SEIU Healthcare, et al v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Alaska filed suit challenging the Forest Service's Roadless Rule in 2011. In 2001, the Forest Service adopted the Rule, which prohibited road construction, road reconstruction, and timber harvesting on millions of acres of national forest lands, including national forest land in Alaska. In 2005, the Forest Service repealed the Rule, but, in 2006, the District Court for the Northern District of California ordered reinstatement of the Rule. The court concluded that when the Rule was reinstated in 2006 after its repeal in 2005, a new right of action accrued. Under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), Alaska had six years from the time of the Rule's reinstatement in 2006 to file a lawsuit challenging the rule. Therefore, Alaska's suit is timely because it filed in 2011. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of Alaska's complaint and remanded for further consideration.View "State of Alaska v. Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Intervenors, a group of police unions, challenged the ruling of the district court that the City of New York's "stop-and-frisk" policy was carried out in a discriminatory manner, as well as its imposition of various reforms to that policy. These cases were previously ordered to be reassigned to a different district court judge. The new district judge denied the unions' motion to intervene in these cases and the unions appeal. At issue was whether public-sector unions may intervene into a litigation where the actual parties to that litigation, including a newly-elected mayoral administration, have agreed to a settlement. The court held that the unions' motions to intervene are untimely and do not assert an interest that the law seeks to protect; the unions knew, or should have known, of their alleged interests in these controversial and public cases well before they filed their motions; granting the unions' motions in the wake of the mayoral election would essentially condone a collateral attack on the democratic process and could erode the legitimacy of decisions made by the democratically-elected representatives of the people; and the unions' interests in their members' reputations and collective bargaining rights are, as a matter of law, too remote from the "subject of the action" to warrant intervention as a "party."View "Floyd v. City of New York" on Justia Law