Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
Consolidation Coal Company v OWCP
Dale Staten, a coal miner for nearly thirty years, retired in 2000 and passed away in January 2017 from respiratory failure after a two-week hospitalization. His widow, Bernadette Staten, filed for survivor benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. A Department of Labor administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded benefits, concluding that Bernadette qualified for a statutory presumption that Dale died from black lung disease due to his extensive underground mining work and total disability at the time of his death. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ's decision in a divided ruling.Consolidation Coal Company (CONSOL), Dale's former employer, challenged the ALJ's award, arguing that the 15-year presumption should only apply to chronic pulmonary conditions, not acute illnesses like Dale's respiratory failure. CONSOL contended that Dale's total disability was due to an acute condition rather than a chronic one. The ALJ had credited Dr. Sanjay Chavda's opinion that Dale was totally disabled at the time of his death, while discounting the opinions of CONSOL's experts, Dr. James Castle and Dr. Robert Farney, who argued that Dale was not disabled based on his medical history before his hospitalization.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the ALJ's award of benefits. The court held that the Black Lung Benefits Act does not require a claimant to prove that a miner's total disability arose from a chronic pulmonary condition to invoke the 15-year presumption. The court found that the ALJ acted within its authority in crediting Dr. Chavda's opinion and concluding that CONSOL failed to rebut the presumption that Dale's death was due to pneumoconiosis. The court denied CONSOL's petition for review and affirmed the judgment of the Benefits Review Board. View "Consolidation Coal Company v OWCP" on Justia Law
State of Missouri v. Trump
Seven states challenged a rule by the Department of Education that modified an existing income contingent repayment (ICR) plan for federal student loans, known as the Saving on a Valuable Education (SAVE) plan. This plan altered payment thresholds, stopped interest accrual, and forgave loan balances after as little as ten years of repayment. The states argued that the Secretary of Education exceeded statutory authority by forgiving loans through an ICR plan.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri found that the states were likely to succeed on their claim and issued a preliminary injunction against the rule’s early loan forgiveness provisions. Both parties appealed: the federal officials sought to vacate the preliminary injunction, while the states requested a broader injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the states were likely to succeed in their claim that the Secretary’s authority to promulgate ICR plans does not include loan forgiveness at the end of the payment period. The court held that the statute requires ICR plans to be designed for borrowers to repay their loan balances in full through payments that can fluctuate based on income during the payment term. The court determined that the Secretary had exceeded this authority by designing a plan where loans are largely forgiven rather than repaid.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the entry of the preliminary injunction but concluded that the district court erred by not enjoining the entire rule. The court remanded the case with instructions to modify the injunction to cover the entire SAVE Rule and the revived forgiveness provisions under the previous REPAYE plan. View "State of Missouri v. Trump" on Justia Law
Register of Deeds for Norfolk County v. County Director for Norfolk County
The plaintiff, the register of deeds for Norfolk County, filed a lawsuit against the county commissioners for Norfolk County, seeking declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief regarding funding and personnel matters within the registry of deeds. The dispute centered on hiring a new chief information officer and the funding for that position. While this litigation was ongoing, the plaintiff requested the county director to transfer funds within the registry's budget to cover legal fees for the personnel litigation. The county director denied these requests, prompting the plaintiff to file a second lawsuit for declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief.In the Superior Court, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment regarding the budget transfers, and the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. The judge granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ruling that under G. L. c. 35, § 32, the plaintiff had the authority to transfer funds within a main group of the budget based on his opinion of public necessity and convenience. The defendants appealed this decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the statutory language of G. L. c. 35, § 32, clearly grants the authorized official the discretion to transfer funds within a main group based on their opinion of public necessity and convenience. The court found that the plaintiff's opinion was sufficient justification for the transfers and that the defendants' interference was unlawful. The court ordered that any outstanding amounts that should have been transferred be specifically authorized by the defendants and that the defendants refrain from hindering lawful transfers within the Contractual Services main group in the future. View "Register of Deeds for Norfolk County v. County Director for Norfolk County" on Justia Law
Bray v. ID Dept of Juvenile Corrections
In 2019, Colby James Bray died while in the custody of the Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections (IDJC). His parents, Jeffrey and Michelle Bray, acting as personal representatives of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit in federal court one day before the two-year statute of limitations expired. They later voluntarily dismissed the federal case and refiled in state court nearly three years after Colby's death. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The district court granted the motions and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The Brays appealed, arguing that Idaho Code section 5-234 and 28 U.S.C. section 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations. The district court had concluded that section 5-234 did not toll the time for filing the state complaint and that section 1367(d) did not apply to IDJC due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also awarded costs and attorney fees to the defendants.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's ruling that section 5-234 did not toll the statute of limitations. It also agreed that the claims against Meacham and the Individual Defendants were time-barred under section 1367(d) because the Brays did not file within 30 days after the federal court dismissed those claims. However, the court found that section 1367(d) did toll the time for filing the complaint against IDJC, but IDJC was immune from the claims under Idaho Code section 6-904B(5). The court upheld the district court's award of attorney fees and costs to the defendants and awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to the respondents. View "Bray v. ID Dept of Juvenile Corrections" on Justia Law
In re Appeal of M.R.
M.R., a minor, was substantiated by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) for sexual abuse of another minor. DCF sent the notice of substantiation to M.R.'s father, who requested an administrative review but did not participate in it. The review upheld the substantiation, and M.R.'s father did not appeal further. M.R. later sought a second review from the Human Services Board after the appeal period had expired, claiming he was unaware of the substantiation and the review. The Board dismissed his appeal as untimely.The Human Services Board found that M.R.'s appeal was not filed within the required 30-day period after the administrative review decision. M.R. argued that he was entitled to personal notice under the statute, that the lack of direct notice deprived him of due process, and that there was good cause for his delay in filing the appeal. The Board rejected these arguments and dismissed the appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Board's decision. The Court held that the statutory requirement to send notice to the minor's parents or guardian was sufficient and did not violate due process. The Court found that the procedures in place were reasonably calculated to apprise the minor and their parents of the substantiation decision and their rights to request reviews. The Court also held that there was no good cause for M.R.'s untimely appeal, as the failure to appeal was due to factors within his father's control. Therefore, the Board's dismissal of the appeal as untimely was upheld. View "In re Appeal of M.R." on Justia Law
Diercks v. Scott County, Iowa
A vacancy on the Scott County Board of Supervisors occurred when Tony Knobbe resigned to become the Scott County Treasurer. A committee of county officials decided to fill the vacancy by appointment and kept certain applications confidential during the process. The committee referred to applicants by numbers and only revealed the name of the appointed individual. After the appointment, two individuals submitted open records requests for the confidential names and applications, which Scott County denied, citing Iowa Code section 22.7(18).The individuals filed a petition in the Iowa District Court for Scott County, which granted summary judgment in favor of Scott County, determining that the applications were exempt from disclosure under Iowa Code section 22.7(18). The district court relied on the precedent set in City of Sioux City v. Greater Sioux City Press Club, which held that employment applications could be kept confidential.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the applications for the vacant county board of supervisors position were not confidential under section 22.7(18). The court reasoned that the applicants were not promised confidentiality beforehand, and the public nature of the appointment process meant it was not reasonable to believe that people would be deterred from applying if their applications were disclosed. The court ordered that the names and applications be disclosed and awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees to the plaintiffs. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Diercks v. Scott County, Iowa" on Justia Law
Doe v. McDonald
John Doe, an individual with a serious mental illness, sued James V. McDonald, M.D., New York’s Commissioner of Health, and other defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, and Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. Doe alleged that New York State regulations discriminated against him by preventing his readmission to Oceanview Manor Home for Adults, a Transitional Adult Home (TAH) where he previously resided. After filing the suit, the State allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations to permit readmission of former TAH residents with serious mental illness, and removed Oceanview’s classification as a TAH.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the State’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Doe lacked standing. The district court granted the State leave to file an interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the State contended that the district court erred in finding standing because Doe lacked a concrete plan to leave and seek readmission to Oceanview.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the State’s jurisdictional challenge should be assessed as a question of mootness, not standing, because it addressed events occurring after Doe filed the suit. The court found that Doe’s suit was moot because the State had allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations, and removed Oceanview’s TAH classification. Consequently, there was no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation would recur.The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal, vacated the district court’s order, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Doe v. McDonald" on Justia Law
Atkerson v. State of Washington, Department of Children, Youth & Families
A young child, Rustin Atkerson, tragically died from severe head trauma while under the care of his mother, Elaine Hurd, and her boyfriend, who had a history of domestic violence. Rustin's father, Ian Atkerson, and Rustin's estate sued the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), alleging that their negligent investigation into reports of Rustin's injuries, including a broken arm, led to his death.The trial court denied DCYF's motion for summary judgment, ruling that Atkerson only needed to prove ordinary negligence, not gross negligence, to prevail. The court also largely excluded the testimony of retired Judge Kitty Ann Van Doorninck, who was to testify that a reasonable judge would not have removed Rustin from his mother's care based on the information available at the time. The trial court found her testimony would be unduly prejudicial.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's rulings, holding that the applicable standard of care was gross negligence and that the trial court erred in excluding Judge Van Doorninck's testimony. The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that RCW 4.24.595(1) applies to the early stages of child abuse and neglect investigations, requiring proof of gross negligence. The court also held that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Judge Van Doorninck's testimony, as her testimony was relevant to the core issue of whether any negligence by the State caused a harmful placement decision. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Atkerson v. State of Washington, Department of Children, Youth & Families" on Justia Law
Great Lakes Dredge v. Magnus
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company (Great Lakes) sought a letter ruling from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) regarding the application of the Jones Act to its offshore wind farm project. CBP's initial ruling required Jones Act-qualified vessels for transporting scour protection rock from U.S. points to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). However, a modified ruling stated that the first delivery of rock to the OCS did not require a Jones Act-qualified vessel, but subsequent deliveries did. Great Lakes appealed this modified ruling, which CBP denied.Great Lakes then filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas, claiming the modified ruling was contrary to law and would expose its planned Jones Act-compliant vessel to unlawful competition. The American Petroleum Institute (API) intervened, arguing that Great Lakes lacked standing as it had no actual or imminent injury. The district court agreed with API and dismissed the case, finding Great Lakes' injury hypothetical since it did not have a vessel capable of handling the Vineyard Project and no current contract for the project.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Great Lakes argued it had competitor standing due to the potential for increased competition from foreign vessels. However, the court found no evidence of actual or imminent increased competition, as the Vineyard Project was completed and there was no indication that future projects would source rock from U.S. points. The court also rejected CBP's argument that the ruling applied to identical future projects, as there was no record evidence of such projects involving U.S.-sourced rock.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Great Lakes lacked standing to challenge the CBP's modified ruling. View "Great Lakes Dredge v. Magnus" on Justia Law
Hay v. Marinkovich
The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, alleging that he made and retained an unauthorized copy of her computer hard drive, which contained private and confidential data. The complaint included a claim for violation of Penal Code section 502, which prohibits unauthorized use of any computer system for an improper purpose. The plaintiff sought damages and attorney fees.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a civil jury trial was held, and the jury found in favor of the defendant on all of the plaintiff's causes of action. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for attorney fees and costs under section 502, subdivision (e). The trial court granted the defendant's costs but denied his request for attorney fees, concluding that section 502 does not permit an award of fees to prevailing defendants and that, even if it did, it would be unreasonable to award fees in this case because there was no evidence that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or abusive.The defendant appealed the order to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California. The appellate court agreed with the defendant that section 502 allows the award of attorney fees to prevailing defendants. However, the court concluded that section 502 defendants may only recover attorney fees where the plaintiff's claim was objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that the plaintiff's claim was not frivolous or abusive and affirmed the order denying attorney fees. View "Hay v. Marinkovich" on Justia Law