Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Lake County sought reimbursement from the State of Montana for costs incurred in enforcing state criminal jurisdiction on the Flathead Indian Reservation under Public Law 280 (P.L. 280). The County argued that the State was obligated to cover these costs, citing financial strain and the diversion of resources from other services.The District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District dismissed Lake County’s claims for unfunded mandate and unjust enrichment, ruling that the statutes of limitations had expired. The court determined that the claims accrued in January 2017, when the County expressed its inability to continue bearing the financial burden of P.L. 280. The court also ruled that the continuing tort and equitable tolling doctrines did not apply to toll the statutes of limitations. The court denied the State’s motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim but later granted summary judgment in favor of the State, ruling that the State was not obligated to appropriate any specific amount to reimburse the County.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s rulings. It held that Lake County’s claims were justiciable but that the continuing tort doctrine did not apply because the County sought monetary damages, not abatement. The Court also ruled that the equitable tolling doctrine did not apply as the County did not pursue a legal remedy within the doctrine’s scope. Finally, the Court held that § 2-1-301(2), MCA, only required the State to reimburse the County to the extent funds were appropriated by the Legislature, which retained discretion over such appropriations. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the unfunded mandate and unjust enrichment claims and the summary judgment on the declaratory judgment claim. View "Lake County v. State" on Justia Law

R.L., a sheriff’s deputy, was charged with driving while intoxicated, but the charges were later dropped. The Indiana Law Enforcement Training Board initiated proceedings to revoke R.L.'s basic-training certificate, which is necessary for his employment as an officer. R.L. sought and obtained a court declaration and injunction preventing the board from disciplining him before the board issued a final decision.The Martin Circuit Court granted R.L.'s request for declaratory and injunctive relief, barring the board from using facts from R.L.'s expunged arrest to revoke his certificate. The board intervened and moved to vacate the order, arguing procedural errors and lack of merit. The trial court vacated its initial order but issued a second similar order. The board appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, allowing the board to consider independent evidence of the facts underlying the expunged arrest records.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in granting R.L.'s request for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court emphasized that R.L. must follow the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA) to challenge the board's decisions and that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss R.L.'s declaratory-judgment action, reinforcing the necessity of exhausting administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. View "Indiana Law Enforcement Training Board v. R L" on Justia Law

Donald McCurdy appealed an order denying his petition for relief from the notice requirement of the Government Claims Act. McCurdy had submitted a claim for damages to the County of Riverside over a year after the Court of Appeal granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which found that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from a public defender during a probation revocation hearing. The County denied his claim for being untimely, as it was not presented within six months of accrual. McCurdy applied for leave to file a late claim, which was also denied. He then filed a petition for relief in the trial court, arguing that his claim did not accrue until the remittitur issued on the writ of habeas corpus and that he had one year to present his claim. Alternatively, he argued that he was misled by three attorneys who advised him that the one-year period applied.The Superior Court of Riverside denied McCurdy's petition, finding that his claim accrued when his probation was revoked and was therefore untimely under either the six-month or one-year period. The court also found that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to justify filing a late claim.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that McCurdy's claim arose in tort and was subject to the six-month claims period under section 911.2. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order. View "McCurdy v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

A Monongalia County deputy sheriff responded to a domestic dispute involving John D. Stewart, Jr., who suffered from mental illness. The deputy, after advising against backup, pursued Mr. Stewart, who allegedly threatened with a knife. The deputy shot Mr. Stewart, fatally wounding him. Amanda F. Stewart, Mr. Stewart’s daughter, filed a wrongful death action against the Monongalia County Commission and the deputy, alleging excessive force and negligence.The Circuit Court of Monongalia County dismissed claims against the Commission for direct liability but allowed claims for vicarious liability and against the deputy to proceed. The court also denied the motion to dismiss the demand for punitive damages, stating it was premature.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss the vicarious liability claim against the Commission, finding the Commission is not immune from vicarious liability for the deputy’s negligence. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the negligence claim against the deputy, as the complaint sufficiently alleged facts to suggest the deputy acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.However, the court reversed the lower court’s decision regarding punitive damages. It held that the Tort Claims Act prohibits punitive damages against the Commission and the deputy, as the deputy was sued in his official capacity. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Monongalia County Commission A/K/A Monongalia County Sheriff's Department and John Doe Deputy v. Amanda F. Stewart, Individually and/or as Administrator of the Estate of John D. Stewart, Jr." on Justia Law

Richard Shreves, while incarcerated at the Montana State Prison, received medical care and subsequently filed a complaint against Dr. Paul Rees with the Board of Medical Examiners at the Montana Department of Labor and Industry (DLI). The Correctional Health Care Review Team (CHCRT) reviewed the complaint and found no violation of law or practice rules by Dr. Rees, leading to the closure of the complaint without forwarding it to the Board of Medical Examiners. Shreves then petitioned for judicial review, challenging the CHCRT's decision and the lack of detailed findings in their response.The First Judicial District Court dismissed Shreves's petition, concluding that he lacked standing. The court reasoned that the CHCRT process did not implicate Shreves's legal rights, as it was designed to screen complaints for potential disciplinary action against the healthcare provider, not to adjudicate the complainant's rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The court held that Shreves did not have standing to petition for judicial review because the statute governing the CHCRT process did not authorize judicial review at the behest of the complainant. The court also found that Shreves's constitutional challenge to the CHCRT's authority did not confer standing, as he lacked a personal stake in the outcome. Additionally, the court determined that any alleged mishandling of filings by the District Court did not affect the outcome, as the legal conclusions regarding standing were correct. View "Shreves v. Montana Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Jessica Goodman, the Saline County Assessor, filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration regarding the correct classification of Saline County under Missouri law. Goodman argued that Saline County should be classified as a third-class county based on its assessed valuation over five years, rather than its current classification as a second-class county. The County moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the statute in question, section 48.020.1, exempts Saline County from reclassification regardless of changes in assessed valuation.The Circuit Court of Saline County dismissed Goodman’s petition. Goodman appealed the decision to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District. The Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri, believing that the case involved the validity of a state statute, which would fall under the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Missouri determined that it did not have exclusive appellate jurisdiction because Goodman did not properly raise a constitutional challenge to the statute in question. Goodman’s arguments against the County’s interpretation of the statute did not amount to a direct claim that the statute was unconstitutional. As a result, the Supreme Court of Missouri retransferred the case back to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, for further proceedings. View "Goodman vs. Saline County Commission" on Justia Law

The National Association of Government Employees, Inc. (NAGE) challenged the constitutionality of the Debt Limit Statute, alleging that it posed an imminent risk to its members, who are federal employees. NAGE claimed that if the debt limit was not raised, its members would face layoffs, furloughs, unpaid work, and loss of pension funding. NAGE sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and President Joseph R. Biden.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that NAGE's claims of past injuries were moot due to the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which suspended the debt limit until January 1, 2025, and required the Treasury Secretary to make whole the G Fund accounts. The court also determined that NAGE's claims of future harm were too speculative to establish standing, as they relied on a series of unlikely events, including a federal default, which has never occurred.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that NAGE lacked standing to pursue prospective relief because the anticipated future harms were speculative and not certainly impending. The court also found that NAGE's claims of past injuries were moot, as the Fiscal Responsibility Act had addressed the immediate concerns, and there was no reasonable expectation that the same harm would recur. The court rejected NAGE's arguments that the voluntary-cessation and capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exceptions to mootness applied, concluding that the legislative action was independent and not related to the litigation, and that the risk of future harm was not reasonably expected. View "National Association of Government Employees, Inc. v. Yellen" on Justia Law

The case involves Joseph Rued, who reported a potential sexual abuse incident involving his son to Scott County Health and Human Services. The County investigated and concluded that no abuse had occurred. Rued requested reconsideration, but the County upheld its initial finding. Rued then appealed to the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) for a fair hearing, which was denied by the Commissioner based on a recommendation from a human services judge.Rued subsequently appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the Scott County District Court. Under Minnesota Statutes section 256.045, subdivision 7, an appeal must be served on the Commissioner and any adverse party of record within 30 days. Rued served the notice on the Commissioner but failed to serve Scott County. Despite this, a Scott County attorney appeared at the initial hearing and argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to the failure to serve the County. The district court ruled that the County had waived any objection to personal jurisdiction by appearing at the hearing and denied Rued’s request for appeal on the merits.The Minnesota Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s decision, holding that the failure to serve the County deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. The court did not address whether Rued was entitled to a hearing on the no-maltreatment determination.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the 30-day time limit for serving a notice of appeal under section 256.045, subdivision 7, is a waivable limitations period, not a requirement for subject matter jurisdiction. The Court also clarified that adequate service of the notice of appeal is necessary for personal jurisdiction. The case was reversed and remanded to the district court to allow the County to either waive its defense related to the limitations period or move for dismissal on that basis. View "Rued vs. Commissioner of Human Services" on Justia Law

A man was unable to purchase a firearm because a background check revealed he was subject to a long-term domestic violence protective order (DVPO). He sued the State, claiming he was no longer subject to a protective order as defined by federal statute and sought a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment to have the Department of Public Safety (DPS) notify a national database that he was no longer subject to a protective order under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). He filed a motion for summary judgment, which the State opposed, filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. The superior court granted the State’s cross-motion, and the man appealed.The superior court found that the DVPO had not expired and remained a qualifying order under Section 922(g)(8). It also concluded that the man’s constitutional claims were not ripe because he had not initiated modification or dissolution of the order. The court entered a final judgment in favor of the State.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the DVPO remained in effect and was a qualifying order under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The court found that the legislative history supported the interpretation that DVPOs issued under AS 18.66.100(c)(1) are effective until further order of the court. The court also concluded that the man’s remaining claims were not ripe for adjudication because he had not attempted to dissolve or modify the DVPO. View "Eng v. State" on Justia Law

Jaime Morales, a Sheriff’s Deputy with the Scott County Sheriff’s Office, was shot and paralyzed during a law enforcement operation to apprehend a bank robbery suspect in September 2018. Morales filed a negligence suit against several employees of the City of Georgetown and the Georgetown Police Department, alleging that their actions led to his injuries. The case centers on whether the government defendants are immune from suit.The Scott Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that they were immune from Morales’s claims. The court found that Officer Joseph Enricco and Lieutenant James Wagoner were entitled to qualified official immunity for their discretionary actions, and that the City and the Georgetown Police Department were immune from vicarious liability and negligence claims.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some of Lt. Wagoner’s actions were ministerial and not protected by qualified official immunity. The court also found that the City and the Georgetown Police Department could be held vicariously liable for Lt. Wagoner’s ministerial actions and directly liable for their own negligence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. The court held that Officer Enricco’s decision to fire his weapon was discretionary and protected by qualified official immunity. However, it found that Lt. Wagoner had a ministerial duty to formulate a plan to apprehend the suspect and to enforce certain training requirements, making him potentially liable for negligence. The court also ruled that the City and the Georgetown Police Department could be held liable for Lt. Wagoner’s ministerial actions but were immune from direct negligence claims related to training and personnel selection. View "MORALES V. CITY OF GEORGETOWN, KENTUCKY" on Justia Law