Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

An inmate at the Hancock County Jail, Monica J. Johnson, died by suicide after being incarcerated from September 21 to September 29, 2018. Her estate and surviving spouse filed a medical malpractice notice of claim against Hancock County and several county officials and employees, alleging negligence in her care. The County and its employees, along with Jail Housing Officer Kayla Dumond, appealed the Superior Court's denial of their motions for summary judgment.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) denied the motions for summary judgment, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) applied to the defendants and that the defendants had not demonstrated immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the interlocutory appeal.The court concluded that the issue of whether the defendants are "health care providers" under the MHSA is not immediately appealable. Additionally, the court decided to defer to the federal court on the issue of immunity under the MTCA, as the federal court is handling a related case involving the same parties and facts. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, allowing the MHSA screening process to proceed, with the understanding that the federal court will continue with the litigation once the screening process is completed. View "Carney v. Hancock County" on Justia Law

Steven Gomes filed a lawsuit to invalidate ordinances regulating groundwater use in Mendocino, adopted by the Mendocino City Community Services District (the district). The district argued that Gomes’s claims were barred by res judicata due to a prior case, Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist. (2019) (Gomes I), which challenged the district’s groundwater management program. The trial court found the ordinances contained an invalid attorney’s fee provision but rejected Gomes’s other claims.In Gomes I, the trial court denied Gomes’s petition challenging the district’s 2007 groundwater measures, but the judgment was reversed on appeal. The appellate court found the district had authority to limit groundwater extraction and that the 2007 measures were invalid due to non-compliance with statutory procedures. The district subsequently adopted new ordinances in 2020, which Gomes challenged in the present case.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Gomes argued the ordinances imposed fees for groundwater extraction that required voter approval, which the district did not obtain. The court concluded that the claim was not barred by Gomes I, as it involved different ordinances and provisions. The court held that the fees imposed by the district were not for the extraction of groundwater and thus did not require voter approval under section 10710. The judgment was affirmed, except for the invalid attorney’s fee provision. View "Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist." on Justia Law

Jeremy Kennedy filed a petition to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) to seek a declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus regarding a decision by the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board (Board). The Board had denied his request for transfer to the Arkansas Division of Community Correction (DCC) and his subsequent request for a six-month reconsideration hearing. Kennedy argued that he was eligible for transfer under Arkansas law and that the Board acted outside its statutory authority by denying his transfer eligibility.The Izard County Circuit Court denied Kennedy’s IFP petition, finding that his claim was a duplicate of a previous lawsuit (case number 33CV-23-123) that was on appeal and another case (33CV-23-57) that he had voluntarily dismissed. The circuit court concluded that Kennedy’s petition did not state a colorable cause of action.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kennedy’s IFP petition. The Supreme Court found that Kennedy’s latest filing did not present a legitimate claim that could be reasonably asserted based on the facts and current law. Therefore, the denial of Kennedy’s IFP petition was upheld. View "Kennedy v. Felts" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) on March 10, 2025, preventing the Government from terminating various education-related grants. The order also required the Government to pay past-due grant obligations and continue paying future obligations. The District Court concluded that the respondents were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Government filed an application to vacate the District Court's order on March 26, 2025, which was extended on March 24, 2025. The application was presented to Justice Jackson and referred to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted that the District Court's order had characteristics of a preliminary injunction, making it appealable. The Government argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to order the payment of money under the APA, as the APA's waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to claims seeking money damages or to orders enforcing contractual obligations to pay money.The Supreme Court of the United States granted the Government's application to stay the District Court's order pending the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and any subsequent petition for a writ of certiorari. The Court found that the respondents had not refuted the Government's claim that it would be unlikely to recover the grant funds once disbursed and that respondents would not suffer irreparable harm while the TRO is stayed. The stay will terminate automatically if certiorari is denied or upon the sending down of the judgment of the Supreme Court if certiorari is granted. The Chief Justice would have denied the application. View "Department of Education v. California" on Justia Law

Quintin Grillone resigned from his position as a police officer in 2014 while under investigation for providing false information to a prosecutor regarding a traffic citation against his mother. The Peace Officer Standards and Training Division (POST) did not learn of the incident until 2019 when Grillone disclosed it in his application to join a new police department. Following an investigation, POST initiated disciplinary proceedings, and an administrative law judge found that Grillone's conduct constituted obstruction of justice. The POST Council then retroactively suspended Grillone’s certification for three years.Grillone sought judicial review by the Utah Court of Appeals, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings were time-barred by the four-year catch-all statute of limitations for civil actions under Utah Code § 78B-2-307(4). He contended that the statute governing POST disciplinary proceedings referred to them as “civil actions,” thus subjecting them to the civil statute of limitations. The court of appeals, however, held that civil statutes of limitation do not apply to administrative disciplinary proceedings absent specific legislative authority and found that the POST statute did not incorporate the civil statute of limitations.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court agreed that civil statutes of limitation are generally inapplicable to administrative disciplinary proceedings unless the legislature indicates otherwise. The Court concluded that the POST statute’s reference to “civil actions” was intended to distinguish POST proceedings from criminal actions, not to incorporate the civil statutes of limitation. Therefore, the disciplinary proceedings against Grillone were not time-barred, and the POST Council’s three-year suspension of his certification was upheld. View "Grillone v. Peace Officer Standards" on Justia Law

Dr. Jeffery D. Milner, a physician, brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Baptist Health Montgomery, Prattville Baptist, and Team Health. Milner alleged that while working at a hospital owned by the defendants, he discovered that they were overprescribing opioids and fraudulently billing the government for them. He claimed that he was terminated in retaliation for whistleblowing after reporting the overprescription practices to his superiors.Previously, Milner filed an FCA retaliation lawsuit against the same defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, which was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court found that Milner did not sufficiently allege that he engaged in protected conduct under the FCA or that his termination was due to such conduct. Following this dismissal, Milner filed the current qui tam action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The district court dismissed this action as barred by res judicata, relying on the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc. and Shurick v. Boeing Co.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that Milner's qui tam action was barred by res judicata because it involved the same parties and the same cause of action as his earlier retaliation lawsuit. The court found that both lawsuits arose from a common nucleus of operative fact: the defendants' alleged illegal conduct and Milner's discovery of that conduct leading to his discharge. The court also noted that the United States, which did not intervene in the qui tam action, was not barred from pursuing its own action in the future. View "Milner v. Baptist Health Montgomery" on Justia Law

Relators Tiffany Montcrief and others filed a False Claims Act suit against Peripheral Vascular Associates, P.A. (PVA), alleging that PVA billed Medicare for vascular ultrasound services that were not completed. The claims were categorized into "Testing Only" and "Double Billing" claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Relators, concluding that PVA submitted knowingly false claims. A jury found these claims material and awarded approximately $28.7 million in damages against PVA.The district court granted partial summary judgment to Relators on the issues of falsity and knowledge of falsity. The jury found that the claims were material and caused the Government to pay out money. The district court entered judgment against PVA, including statutory penalties and treble damages. PVA appealed, challenging the district court's grant of partial summary judgment and certain rulings during and after the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment on the Testing Only claims but remanded for a new trial on damages. The court reversed the partial summary judgment ruling on the Double Billing claims, vacated the final judgment, and remanded for a new trial consistent with its opinion. The court concluded that the district court erred in interpreting the CPT–4 Manual and in concluding that the Manual required PVA to create separate, written reports for vascular ultrasounds before billing Medicare. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion in relying on Relators' post-trial expert declaration to calculate damages. View "Montcrief v. Peripheral Vascular" on Justia Law

Dennis C. Jackson, a prison inmate, sought judicial review in the district court for Johnson County of an agency’s final decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Jackson filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) along with his petition. The district court did not explicitly rule on the IFP application and dismissed Jackson’s APA petition as untimely. Jackson appealed the dismissal.The district court did not grant Jackson’s IFP application, instead deferring its ruling until Jackson filed an amended petition. Jackson complied, but the court dismissed the petition for being untimely, citing incorrect dates. Jackson filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court overruled without addressing the IFP application. Jackson then appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, filing another IFP application for the appeal.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the district court implicitly denied Jackson’s IFP application by dismissing the petition without ruling on the application. The Supreme Court determined that the district court erred by not following statutory procedures for IFP applications and by incorrectly calculating the timeliness of Jackson’s petition. The court held that Jackson’s petitions were neither frivolous nor malicious and that the denial of IFP status was plainly erroneous.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of Jackson’s IFP application and remanded the case with directions to grant the initial IFP application and proceed with further actions consistent with its opinion. View "Jackson v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Several residents of the City of Muscle Shoals filed a lawsuit against the City, seeking damages for negligence and trespass due to flooding caused by the City's management of a stormwater-drainage pond in their neighborhood. The plaintiffs claimed that heavy rainfall in February 2019 overwhelmed the pond, leading to the flooding of their homes. They argued that the City failed to plan adequately for such events and did not maintain the pond properly.The plaintiffs initially filed their complaint in the Colbert Circuit Court in March 2020, seeking damages for negligence, wantonness, and trespass. They later amended their complaint to drop the wantonness claim and added a request for injunctive relief, which the trial court denied. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, and that there was no substantial evidence to support the trespass claim. The trial court denied the City's motion, leading the City to file a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the City was immune from the plaintiffs' claims under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975. The Court found that the City's decision to plan for 25-year rainfall events was within common municipal practice and did not constitute neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness. Additionally, the Court concluded that the City's design and maintenance of the pond were not defective within the meaning of the statute. As a result, the Court granted the City's petition and issued a writ directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of the City, effectively barring the plaintiffs' claims for damages. View "In re: Burrell v. City of Muscle Shoals" on Justia Law

A fourteen-year-old boy, Tanner Smith, was vaccinated against COVID-19 at his school clinic without his or his mother Emily Happel's consent. The school clinic, operated in partnership with Old North State Medical Society (ONSMS), administered the vaccine despite lacking the required parental consent. Plaintiffs, Smith and Happel, sued the Guilford County Board of Education and ONSMS for battery and violations of their state constitutional rights.The Superior Court of Guilford County dismissed the case, agreeing with the defendants that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act preempted the plaintiffs' state law claims, granting them immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the PREP Act's broad immunity shielded the defendants from liability for all of the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the PREP Act's immunity only covers tort injuries and does not bar state constitutional claims. The court concluded that the PREP Act does not preempt claims brought under the state constitution, specifically those related to the right to control a child's upbringing and the right to bodily integrity. The court affirmed the dismissal of the battery claim but reversed the dismissal of the state constitutional claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Education" on Justia Law