Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A public interest law firm, TPM, requested certain budget-request documents from the Mayor of the District of Columbia under the D.C. Freedom of Information Act (D.C. FOIA). TPM sought documents related to the budget requests of the D.C. Public Schools (DCPS) and the Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE) for fiscal year 2019, as well as other related documents. The Mayor refused to produce the draft submissions, claiming they were protected by executive privilege. TPM then filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia seeking the documents and their online publication.The Superior Court denied the Mayor's motion to dismiss and granted TPM's motion for summary judgment. The court ordered the Mayor to produce the requested documents and to comply with the publication requirements of D.C. Code § 2-536. The Mayor appealed, arguing that the documents were protected by executive privilege and that TPM lacked standing to enforce the publication provision.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court rejected the Mayor's claim of executive privilege, stating that the budgetary process involves overlapping responsibilities between the Mayor and the Council, and thus does not fall under the exclusive purview of the executive branch. The court also found that TPM had standing to seek enforcement of the publication provision, as the failure to disclose the documents caused a concrete and particularized injury to TPM.The court affirmed the Superior Court's order requiring the production and online publication of the requested budget documents for fiscal years 2019 to the present. However, it vacated and remanded the portion of the order requiring the publication of other documents under D.C. Code § 2-536, instructing the lower court to clarify the scope of the required publication. View "District of Columbia v. Terris, Pravlik & Millian, LLP" on Justia Law

Cascade County discovered petroleum contamination under a county shop complex in 1996 and notified the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). A 2000 report identified the contamination source as four county-owned tanks. The DEQ approved a corrective action plan in 2006, and the County requested the site be designated as a multiple release site for reimbursement eligibility, which the DEQ declined. The County completed remediation in 2008 and submitted receipts to the Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board, but the costs exceeded the statutory maximum for a single release. The Board indicated further reimbursement requests would be denied.The County sought a writ of mandamus to compel the DEQ to assign multiple release numbers, but the DEQ and the County eventually stipulated to dismiss the action in 2013. The County then filed four separate applications for reimbursement in 2014, which the Board denied, stating the DEQ had classified all contaminations under a single release number. The County contested this, and a Hearing Examiner found four discrete releases but ruled the claims were time-barred. The Board adopted most of the Examiner's findings but rejected the conclusion of four releases. The district court later ruled in favor of the County, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, directing the Board to reimburse the County.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the Board had a clear legal duty to review the County's reimbursement claims, despite the County not submitting them in the manner required by Board regulations. The Court held that the Board must review and determine the eligibility of the claims submitted by the County for reimbursement of remediation costs. The District Court's order denying the County's writ of mandamus was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to issue the alternative writ of mandate. View "Cascade v. Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board" on Justia Law

In August 2022, a bin full of phosphate rock collapsed at the Lee Creek Mine in Beaufort, North Carolina, injuring three miners. Industrial TurnAround Corporation (ITAC), the independent contractor responsible for checking the structural integrity of the bin's support columns, was cited by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) for failing to take defective equipment out of service. MSHA sent a notice of proposed penalty to ITAC's outdated address of record, and ITAC did not contest the penalty, which became final 30 days later. ITAC subsequently filed a motion to reopen the penalty, claiming it had inadvertently failed to update its address of record.The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission granted ITAC's motion to reopen the penalty, citing excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The Commission noted that ITAC had not occupied the address since 2009 and had only discovered the MSHA notice when an employee checked for missing packages. The Secretary of Labor, representing MSHA, opposed the motion, arguing that ITAC's failure to update its address could not be excused under FRCP 60(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Commission’s order to reopen the penalty was not an appealable collateral order and dismissed the Secretary’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the order did not impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix a legal relationship, and that the interest in immediate review did not meet the high threshold required under the collateral order doctrine. The court concluded that the Commission’s decision to reopen the penalty did not involve a substantial public interest or a particular value of a high order that justified immediate appeal. View "Secretary of Labor v. Industrial TurnAround Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to a Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) rule that authorized state licenses for two residential facilities where the federal government detained mothers and children after their illegal entry into the United States. The plaintiffs, including detained mothers and Grassroots Leadership, Inc., sought to prohibit the detention of children at these facilities, arguing that the rule was invalid under state law. However, by the time the case reached the court of appeals, all the mothers and children had been released from the facilities.The trial court denied the pleas to the jurisdiction filed by the department and the facility operators, eventually ruling in favor of the plaintiffs by declaring the rule invalid and enjoining the department from granting licenses under it. The Third Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims were moot since they were no longer detained. However, the court of appeals proceeded to address the merits of the case by invoking the "public-interest exception" to mootness and held the rule invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Texas courts are not constitutionally authorized to adjudicate moot cases, even if they raise questions of considerable public importance. The court emphasized that mootness is a constitutional limitation on judicial power, and there is no "public-interest exception" to mootness in Texas. Consequently, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment regarding its jurisdiction, vacated the judgment on the merits, and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES v. GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, INC" on Justia Law

A group of appellants, including Firearms Owners Against Crime and two firearms dealers, filed a case against the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Commissioner, alleging that PSP was not complying with the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act. The appellants claimed that PSP was intentionally understaffing its Pennsylvania Instant Check System (PICS) Operations Section, leading to significant delays in background checks for firearm purchases, sometimes exceeding seven hours. They argued that these delays violated the statutory requirement for "instantaneous" or "immediate" background checks and caused financial harm to firearms dealers due to canceled transactions.The Commonwealth Court initially issued a preliminary injunction, finding that PSP had a statutory duty to employ sufficient personnel to ensure compliance with the Act and that the delays were causing financial harm to the dealers. However, the court later sustained PSP's preliminary objections, ruling that the statute did not specify a mandatory timeframe for background checks and that the operational decisions regarding staffing were discretionary. The court also dismissed the appellants' request for a refund of the $2.00 background check fee, as the statute did not provide for such refunds.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that while the statute did not require "instantaneous" responses, it did mandate that PSP provide results as quickly as possible with available resources. The court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's denial of injunctive and mandamus relief, as these would compel affirmative action barred by sovereign immunity. However, the court reversed the denial of declaratory relief, allowing the appellants to seek a judicial declaration of PSP's duties under the Act. The court also vacated the order denying leave to amend the petition, allowing the appellants to include new allegations regarding PSP's response to the preliminary injunction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Firearms Owners v. Comm'r of PSP" on Justia Law

In 2018, the City of Nashua approved a bond resolution to construct a performing arts center. Due to financing complications, the City formed two non-profit corporations to take advantage of a federal tax credit. In 2020, NPAC Corp., a private, for-profit corporation, was formed to aid in the tax credit process. NPAC is wholly owned by one of the non-profits, which is owned by the City. Laurie Ortolano requested NPAC's public records related to the center, but NPAC claimed it was not subject to the Right-to-Know Law (RSA chapter 91-A). Ortolano then filed a complaint seeking access to these records.The Superior Court dismissed Ortolano's complaint, agreeing with NPAC that it was not a public entity subject to RSA chapter 91-A. The court also dismissed the claims against the City, reasoning that the relief sought was derivative of the claim against NPAC. Additionally, the court denied Ortolano's motion to amend her complaint to allege constitutional violations because she failed to attach a proposed amended complaint.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the City, finding that Ortolano's complaint did not state an independent claim against the City. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the claims against NPAC, ruling that the trial court erred by not applying the "government function" test to determine if NPAC was a "public body" under RSA chapter 91-A. The court also upheld the trial court's denial of Ortolano's motion to amend her complaint, as the proposed amendment did not cure the defect in the original pleading.The case was remanded for the trial court to apply the "government function" test to determine whether NPAC is subject to the Right-to-Know Law. View "Ortolano v. City of Nashua" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a railroad company and La Plata County over land use changes made by the railroad at its Rockwood Station. The railroad made several modifications to accommodate increased passenger traffic, including enlarging a parking lot and adding portable toilets and tents. The County claimed these changes violated its land use code and demanded compliance or corrective action.The railroad initially sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction in La Plata County District Court, arguing that the County lacked jurisdiction over its operations. While this case was pending, the County petitioned the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a declaratory ruling that the changes required compliance with the County's land use code. The PUC accepted the petition, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" under the relevant statute, thus requiring compliance with the County's code. The PUC upheld the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed the PUC's ruling.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed several issues raised by the railroad. The court concluded that the PUC had jurisdiction to interpret the relevant land use statute, the County had standing to petition the PUC, and the PUC did not violate the railroad's due process rights. The court also found that the PUC's determination that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" was just and reasonable and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the PUC's decision. View "Am. Heritage Ry.s v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Town of Firestone applied for conditional groundwater rights and an augmentation plan to support its growing water needs. The application included five well fields, but Firestone did not provide specific well locations for three of these fields, instead proposing to use the water court's retained jurisdiction to provide more specific details later. St. Vrain Sanitation District opposed the application, arguing that Firestone's lack of specific well locations made its depletion calculations unreliable and that relying on retained jurisdiction to prove non-injury later was legally impermissible.The District Court for Water Division 1 partially granted St. Vrain's motion to dismiss, finding that Firestone's evidence was insufficient to establish that the proposed well fields would not injure senior water rights holders. The court dismissed without prejudice the claims for the three well fields with unspecified locations and declined to retain jurisdiction, as it could not make a threshold finding of non-injury. The court also allowed St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue at trial, despite a prior conditional stipulation.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the water court's decision, holding that the water court correctly evaluated the application on a case-by-case basis and did not create a new bright-line rule requiring completed wells for conditional groundwater rights. The court also upheld the water court's refusal to retain jurisdiction without a non-injury finding and found no abuse of discretion in allowing St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue. The Supreme Court concluded that the water court's factual findings were supported by the trial record and were not clearly erroneous. View "Town of Firestone v. BCL Colo., LP" on Justia Law

An inmate at Grafton Correctional Institution filed a mandamus action against the warden’s administrative assistant and public-information officer, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the production of public records and an award of statutory damages. The inmate had sent 13 electronic kites requesting copies of public records, focusing on seven kites sent between May 27 and June 2, 2024. The inmate claimed that the requested records were not provided in a timely manner.The case was initially filed in June 2024. The respondent acknowledged receiving the kites within four to seven days and provided some records on September 3 and others on September 5, 2024. The respondent argued that the delay was due to the volume of requests from the inmate, who had made over 50 public-records requests for more than 300 documents since May 2024. The lower court granted an alternative writ, setting a schedule for evidence and briefs. Both parties submitted their evidence and briefs, and the inmate filed several motions, including a motion to strike the respondent’s evidence and motions to proceed to judgment.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the inmate’s mandamus claim was moot because he had received all the requested records. The court also determined that the three-month response time was reasonable given the volume of requests the respondent had to handle. Consequently, the court denied the inmate’s requests for a writ of mandamus and statutory damages, as well as all his motions. View "State ex rel. Robinson v. Wesson" on Justia Law

An inmate, Kimani E. Ware, sent eight public-records requests to the Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Michael C. O’Malley, between September and December 2023. Ware sought 21 categories of records, including personnel files and payroll records of O’Malley and two assistant prosecuting attorneys, as well as a list of cases assigned to an assistant prosecutor. O’Malley denied the requests, arguing that the records concerned criminal prosecutions and that Ware, as an inmate, needed to comply with R.C. 149.43(B)(8) before being entitled to the records.Ware filed a mandamus action in April 2024, seeking an order for the production of the records, statutory damages, and court costs. The Supreme Court of Ohio previously granted in part O’Malley’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, leaving nine records requests at issue. O’Malley argued that R.C. 149.43(B)(8) applied, which limits an inmate’s right to obtain records concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution without a judicial finding.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the personnel files and payroll records of the prosecuting attorneys did not fall under R.C. 149.43(B)(8) and ordered O’Malley to produce these records, subject to proper redactions. The court also ordered O’Malley to produce a list of cases assigned to Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Williamson in 1999 or certify that no such record exists. However, the court denied the writ for the requests seeking specific invoices or pay stubs for work performed by Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Van, as no such records existed.The court denied Ware’s request for statutory damages for the personnel files and payroll records but deferred the determination of statutory damages for the list of cases until O’Malley complied with the limited writ. The court awarded Ware $200 for court costs. View "State ex rel. Ware v. O'Malley" on Justia Law