Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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John Doe, an individual with a serious mental illness, sued James V. McDonald, M.D., New York’s Commissioner of Health, and other defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, and Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. Doe alleged that New York State regulations discriminated against him by preventing his readmission to Oceanview Manor Home for Adults, a Transitional Adult Home (TAH) where he previously resided. After filing the suit, the State allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations to permit readmission of former TAH residents with serious mental illness, and removed Oceanview’s classification as a TAH.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the State’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Doe lacked standing. The district court granted the State leave to file an interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the State contended that the district court erred in finding standing because Doe lacked a concrete plan to leave and seek readmission to Oceanview.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the State’s jurisdictional challenge should be assessed as a question of mootness, not standing, because it addressed events occurring after Doe filed the suit. The court found that Doe’s suit was moot because the State had allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations, and removed Oceanview’s TAH classification. Consequently, there was no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation would recur.The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal, vacated the district court’s order, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Doe v. McDonald" on Justia Law

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A young child, Rustin Atkerson, tragically died from severe head trauma while under the care of his mother, Elaine Hurd, and her boyfriend, who had a history of domestic violence. Rustin's father, Ian Atkerson, and Rustin's estate sued the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), alleging that their negligent investigation into reports of Rustin's injuries, including a broken arm, led to his death.The trial court denied DCYF's motion for summary judgment, ruling that Atkerson only needed to prove ordinary negligence, not gross negligence, to prevail. The court also largely excluded the testimony of retired Judge Kitty Ann Van Doorninck, who was to testify that a reasonable judge would not have removed Rustin from his mother's care based on the information available at the time. The trial court found her testimony would be unduly prejudicial.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's rulings, holding that the applicable standard of care was gross negligence and that the trial court erred in excluding Judge Van Doorninck's testimony. The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that RCW 4.24.595(1) applies to the early stages of child abuse and neglect investigations, requiring proof of gross negligence. The court also held that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Judge Van Doorninck's testimony, as her testimony was relevant to the core issue of whether any negligence by the State caused a harmful placement decision. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Atkerson v. State of Washington, Department of Children, Youth & Families" on Justia Law

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Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company (Great Lakes) sought a letter ruling from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) regarding the application of the Jones Act to its offshore wind farm project. CBP's initial ruling required Jones Act-qualified vessels for transporting scour protection rock from U.S. points to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). However, a modified ruling stated that the first delivery of rock to the OCS did not require a Jones Act-qualified vessel, but subsequent deliveries did. Great Lakes appealed this modified ruling, which CBP denied.Great Lakes then filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas, claiming the modified ruling was contrary to law and would expose its planned Jones Act-compliant vessel to unlawful competition. The American Petroleum Institute (API) intervened, arguing that Great Lakes lacked standing as it had no actual or imminent injury. The district court agreed with API and dismissed the case, finding Great Lakes' injury hypothetical since it did not have a vessel capable of handling the Vineyard Project and no current contract for the project.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Great Lakes argued it had competitor standing due to the potential for increased competition from foreign vessels. However, the court found no evidence of actual or imminent increased competition, as the Vineyard Project was completed and there was no indication that future projects would source rock from U.S. points. The court also rejected CBP's argument that the ruling applied to identical future projects, as there was no record evidence of such projects involving U.S.-sourced rock.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Great Lakes lacked standing to challenge the CBP's modified ruling. View "Great Lakes Dredge v. Magnus" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, alleging that he made and retained an unauthorized copy of her computer hard drive, which contained private and confidential data. The complaint included a claim for violation of Penal Code section 502, which prohibits unauthorized use of any computer system for an improper purpose. The plaintiff sought damages and attorney fees.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a civil jury trial was held, and the jury found in favor of the defendant on all of the plaintiff's causes of action. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for attorney fees and costs under section 502, subdivision (e). The trial court granted the defendant's costs but denied his request for attorney fees, concluding that section 502 does not permit an award of fees to prevailing defendants and that, even if it did, it would be unreasonable to award fees in this case because there was no evidence that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or abusive.The defendant appealed the order to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California. The appellate court agreed with the defendant that section 502 allows the award of attorney fees to prevailing defendants. However, the court concluded that section 502 defendants may only recover attorney fees where the plaintiff's claim was objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that the plaintiff's claim was not frivolous or abusive and affirmed the order denying attorney fees. View "Hay v. Marinkovich" on Justia Law

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Curtis Temple, a cattle rancher and member of the Oglala Sioux Indian Tribe (OST), had his grazing permits on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation expire on October 31, 2012. He reapplied for new permits, but another OST member, Donald Buffington, also applied. The OST allocation committee found Temple had over 1,600 cattle, exceeding the 300 animal unit limit, making Buffington the eligible applicant. Temple's permits were awarded to Buffington, and Temple's appeals to the OST executive committee and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) were unsuccessful. Temple continued to graze his cattle on the land allocated to Buffington, leading to multiple trespass notices and eventual impoundment of his cattle by the BIA.Temple filed a lawsuit in the District of South Dakota in August 2015, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and contesting the permit allocation. The district court denied the TRO and dismissed Temple's permit allocation claims, requiring him to exhaust administrative remedies. Temple's due process claims regarding the impoundment of his cattle proceeded, but the district court found that the written notices of trespass provided to Temple were sufficient and did not violate his due process rights. Temple's motion to continue the trial was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Temple was provided due process through the written notices of trespass and had ample opportunity to contest the trespass determinations. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Temple's permit allocation claims for failure to exhaust tribal remedies, as he did not appeal the tribal court's decision. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Temple's motion to continue the trial. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Curtis Temple v. Roberts" on Justia Law

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The Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC), a non-profit organization, filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the United States Park Police for information about legal actions against the agency. After the Park Police failed to respond within the statutory period, HRDC filed a FOIA lawsuit. The Park Police eventually produced documents but withheld the names of officers involved in three tort settlements, citing FOIA Exemption 6, which protects against unwarranted invasions of personal privacy. Additionally, the Park Police inadvertently disclosed names in some documents and sought to prevent HRDC from using or disseminating this information.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Park Police correctly withheld the officer names under Exemption 6 and issued a clawback order for the inadvertently disclosed names, invoking its inherent authority to manage judicial proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Park Police failed to meet its burden under Exemption 6 to show that releasing the officer names would constitute a substantial invasion of privacy. The court found the agency's justifications to be generic and conclusory, lacking specific details. Consequently, the court did not need to balance the privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure.The court also determined that the district court's clawback order was not a valid exercise of inherent judicial authority, as it aimed to fill a perceived gap in the FOIA statute rather than protect core judicial functions. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Park Police, vacated the clawback order, and remanded the case for the release of the non-exempt officer names. View "Human Rights Defense Center v. United States Park Police" on Justia Law

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Interfaith Sanctuary Housing Services, Inc. (IFS) applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a large-scale low-barrier shelter home in Northwest Boise. The Planning and Zoning Commission (PZC) initially denied the application, citing concerns about compatibility with the neighborhood, undue burden on public facilities, adverse effects on nearby properties, and insufficient information on mitigating adverse impacts. IFS appealed to the Boise City Council, which reversed the PZC’s decision and granted the CUP, imposing 30 conditions of approval. The Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. (VPNA) sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned the district court for judicial review.The district court upheld the City Council’s decision, finding no error in the Council’s actions. VPNA appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, based on unlawful procedure, and that the Council’s reasoned statement was inadequate under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA).The Idaho Supreme Court found that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and based on unlawful procedure because the PZC’s determination that the CUP could not be conditioned into compliance with the CUP criteria was not an error. The Court also found that the City Council’s reasoned statement was conclusory and failed to adequately resolve pertinent factual disputes, thus violating LLUPA and depriving VPNA of due process. The Court concluded that VPNA demonstrated a prejudice to its substantial rights.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to invalidate the City Council’s approval of the CUP. VPNA was awarded costs but not attorney fees on appeal. View "Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

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A Montana State Representative, William W. Mercer, requested access to certain child abuse and neglect case records from the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) under a statute that allows legislators to review such records. The DPHHS provided some records but withheld others, including emails, text messages, and attorney-client privileged materials. Mercer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DPHHS to release the additional records.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the DPHHS to provide the requested records, including those claimed to be attorney-client privileged, but imposed additional confidentiality protections. The DPHHS appealed, arguing that the District Court misinterpreted the statute and that the attorney-client privilege should exempt certain records from disclosure.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the plain language of the statute required the disclosure of the records to the legislator, subject to confidentiality protections. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, as Mercer demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities tipped in his favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court emphasized that the preliminary injunction did not resolve the ultimate merits of the case, which would be determined in further proceedings. View "Mercer v. Department of Public Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

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The Wisconsin Voter Alliance filed identical petitions for writ of mandamus against the registers in probate for 13 circuit courts in Wisconsin, seeking access to Notice of Voting Eligibility (NVE) forms under Wisconsin’s public records law. These forms document when a court finds an individual incompetent to vote. The Alliance argued that they needed this information to ensure the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) was updating voter records accurately.The Walworth County Circuit Court dismissed the Alliance’s petition, agreeing with the register in probate, Kristina Secord, that the NVE forms were exempt from disclosure under Wisconsin Statute § 54.75. The Alliance appealed to the Court of Appeals, District II. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals, District IV, had already ruled in a similar case (Reynolds) that NVE forms were exempt from disclosure under the same statute, affirming the Juneau County Circuit Court’s dismissal of the Alliance’s petition.In the current case, the Court of Appeals, District II, issued a split opinion. The majority held that the Alliance was entitled to the NVE forms, possibly with redactions, and reversed the circuit court’s dismissal. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that District II violated the precedent set by Cook v. Cook, which mandates that the Court of Appeals must follow prior published opinions unless overruled by the Supreme Court.The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that District II was bound by the Reynolds decision and should have either certified the appeal to the Supreme Court or adhered to the prior opinion while expressing its disagreement. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, District II, and remanded the case with instructions to follow the precedent established in Reynolds. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord" on Justia Law

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Petitioners sought review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) grant of an abandonment incentive to ITC Midwest, LLC (ITC). This incentive allows ITC to recover 100% of its prudently incurred costs if a planned transmission project is abandoned for reasons beyond its control. Petitioners, a group of organizations whose members purchase electricity, argued that ITC's ownership of the project was uncertain due to ongoing litigation challenging the Iowa Right of First Refusal statute.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved ITC's request for the abandonment incentive, finding that the project met the necessary criteria, including enhancing reliability and reducing congestion. Petitioners filed a protest, which FERC rejected, stating that regulatory or litigation uncertainty does not preclude granting an abandonment incentive. Petitioners then sought rehearing, which FERC also denied, reiterating that the approval was consistent with its precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that petitioners lacked Article III standing because they failed to show imminent injury from FERC's orders. The court noted that petitioners' claims of potential future higher rates were speculative and not concrete or imminent. The court also found that petitioners' interest in the proper application of the law and potential collateral estoppel effects did not constitute a cognizable injury. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Industrial Energy Consumers of America v. FERC" on Justia Law