Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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Gillette, a serial sex offender, received a 27-year sentence for sex crimes. After his release, he never registered as a sex offender. On a tip, law enforcement found that Gillette had been living with a 15-year-old boy and had engaged in sexual contact with that child and another child. Gillette was convicted on 20 counts of territorial-law offenses; federal charges were dismissed. The court sentenced Gillette to 155 years’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed.Gillette filed a habeas petition in the Virgin Islands Superior Court. At Gillette’s request, the Superior Court issued a subpoena duces tecum to the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO). As required by Department of Justice regulations, the USAO requested that Gillette submit “a summary of the information” sought “and its relevance to the proceeding.” Gillette instead moved for contempt and sanctions against the USAO for failing to respond to his subpoena. The USAO then removed the proceedings to federal court and successfully moved to quash the subpoena. The Third Circuit dismissed Gillette’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The government never waived its sovereign immunity concerning non-monetary actions against it, so the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the USAO; the district court derived its jurisdiction over Gillette’s subpoena-enforcement action from 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) and also lacked jurisdiction. View "Gillette v. Golden Grove Adult Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

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Respondent G.W. had, in her lifetime, received a variety of mental health diagnoses, including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and borderline personality disorder. In May and June 2019, G.W. was arrested on a number of criminal charges, including criminal threatening and violation of a protective order, based upon her conduct towards a man with whom she previously had a romantic relationship and that man’s current partner (the complainants). G.W.’s conduct leading to her arrest included trespassing on the complainants’ property, contacting them after a protective order was in place, placing two improvised explosive devices and one incendiary device in the complainants’ vehicles, and making a bomb threat to the workplace of one of the complainants. G.W. appealed a circuit court decision ordering her involuntary admission to the Secure Psychiatric Unit (SPU) of the New Hampshire State Prison for a period of three years with a conditional discharge when and if clinically appropriate. On appeal, G.W. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that she met the involuntary admission standard. She also argued the court erred when it ordered that she remain in jail, where she had been detained on pending criminal charges, until a bed became available at the SPU. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the admission. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

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Miguel D. (Father) left his eight-year-old daughter, M.D., alone inside a locked apartment that had no electricity, an empty non-operable refrigerator, and no edible food. After waking up to find her father and his truck gone, M.D. climbed through a kitchen window to look for him and was found wandering the apartment complex. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a dependency petition alleging Father failed to adequately supervise and protect M.D., and willfully or negligently failed to provide her with adequate food and shelter. The juvenile court found the petition true, took jurisdiction, and removed M.D. from Father’s custody while he was offered reunification services. On appeal, Father argued the Court of Appeal had to reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order because Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b)(2) prohibited the juvenile court from assuming jurisdiction over a child “solely” due to a parent’s indigence or poverty. He further argued the Court should reverse the dispositional order because the Agency failed to demonstrate there were no reasonable means to protect M.D. without removing her from Father’s custody. Because the record did not support either contention, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.D." on Justia Law

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Show Me State Premium Homes wants its purchase of a foreclosed property to be free and clear of all other interests, including those belonging to the United States. Getting what it wants would require a “judicial sale.” After removing the case the United States filed a motion to dismiss. Its position was that there could be no foreclosure without a judicial sale. The district court agreed, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over what remained, and remanded to state court.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court but modified the dismissal of the ejectment and damages claims to be without prejudice. The court explained that a buyer’s interest is only “inchoate” before it gets a valid deed, not after. And here, title vested once the bond company “exercised its right to have the legal title transferred.” No “judicial sale” ever took place, and it is too late to hold one now, meaning that the interests held by the United States have never been foreclosed. View "Show Me State Premium Homes, LLC v. George McDonnell" on Justia Law

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Fritz Opp appealed the dismissal of his case for want of jurisdiction. Opp attempted to appeal a Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“BCI”) decision denying his application for a concealed weapons license under N.D.C.C. ch. 62.1-04. The court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Opp had not complied with the requirements for perfecting an appeal under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32 (“AAPA”). The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the action for want of jurisdiction, but modified the judgment to dismiss without prejudice. View "Opp v. Office of the North Dakota Attorney General - BCI CWL Unit, et al." on Justia Law

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Lance Hagen filed a public records request related to a condemnation case he was a party to involving the City of Lincoln and North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund (“NDIRF”). Hagen sought to determine how the City of Lincoln and NDIRF spent approximately $1.1 million dollars on litigation costs defending the action. NDIRF did not produce all requested records, and the parties sought relief from the district court. Hagen appealed the district court’s judgment that concluded certain documents belonging to NDIRF were exempt from release under the potential liability exception outlined in N.D.C.C. § 44-04-19.1(8). Hagen argued the court abused its discretion by finding NDIRF itself faced potential liability because its members could face potential liability, and because the court discussed the fiscal effect of a disclosure on NDIRF, which Hagen argued exceeded the scope of the North Dakota Supreme Court’s remand order in Hagen v. North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, 971 N.W.2d 833. Because the Supreme Court concluded the potential liability exception under N.D.C.C. § 44-04-19.1(8) did not apply to any of the documents determined by the district court to be exempt, the Court reversed. View "Hagen v. N.D. Insurance Reserve Fund" on Justia Law

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Courage to Change Recovery Ranch, recently known as Soaring Hope Recovery Center, provided treatment and housing for people recovering from drug and alcohol addictions in a single-family neighborhood in El Paso County, Colorado. But Soaring Hope claimed the County’s strict occupancy limits, standards for group homes for disabled persons, and policies restricting what treatment options Soaring Hope could provide in a single-family zone led Soaring Hope to close its home in a single-family neighborhood (the Spruce Road home). The Tenth Circuit determined the County violated the Fair Housing Act Amendments (FHAA) by imposing facially discriminatory occupancy limits on group homes for disabled persons without a legally permissible justification. Though Soaring Hope showed standing to challenge the occupancy limits which directly injured it, Soaring Hope did not show standing to challenge the standards for group homes for disabled persons—no evidence shows that the County enforced the standards against Soaring Hope. The Tenth Circuit also held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment against Soaring Hope on its zoning-out claim for intentional discrimination: Soaring Hope raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether the County had prohibited certain therapeutic activities in its Spruce Road home while allowing those same activities in other structured group-living arrangements and residential homes. The case was remanded for the district court to further address the zoning-out claim. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Courage to Change, et al. v. El Paso County" on Justia Law

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Defendant-appellant Marvin Sloan appealed an order finding he qualified as a sexually violent predator (SVP) and committing him to the State Department of State Hospitals. His sole argument on appeal was that the trial court erred in allowing the State to use a privately retained expert to testify at trial. To support this position, Sloan cited Needham v. Superior Court, 82 Cal.App.5th 114 (2022), which held that the State had no right to privately retain an expert under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). The California Supreme Court recently granted review in Needham and will decide whether Needham’s interpretation of the SVPA was correct. In the meantime, the Court of Appeal joined Needham in concluding that the State could not retain an expert to testify at an SVP trial. The order was therefore reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court to issue an order excluding the testimony of the State's privately retained expert and to conduct a new trial. View "California v. Sloan" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff claimed that because of circumstances beyond his control, he did not receive notice of the district court’s judgment for over 90 days after it was entered, and he filed a notice of appeal shortly after he did receive notice. In response, the Fourth Circuit found his notice of appeal untimely, but the court construed the notice as a timely motion to reopen the appeal period pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6), which implements an exception found in 28 U.S.C. Section 2107(c), and remanded the case to the district court. The district court then entered an order under Rule 4(a)(6), reopening the time for noticing an appeal for 14 days from the date of its order. Plaintiff, however, failed to file a notice of appeal within the window so provided.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed his appeal. The court explained that Section 2107(c) of Title 28, which is the statute prescribing the timing requirements for filing appeals in civil actions, provides that a would-be appellant who does not receive timely notice of a judgment and thereafter fails to file a timely notice of appeal may nonetheless request — not more than 180 days after the judgment is entered — that the district court exercise its discretion to reopen the time for appeal by providing a new 14-day window within which to file a notice of appeal. Compliance with this narrow supplemental opportunity for filing a timely notice of appeal is especially significant because the times specified by statute for filing appeals in civil actions are jurisdictional. View "Donte Parrish v. US" on Justia Law

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Defendants are the City of Niagara Falls ("Niagara Falls"), its water board, and various companies (collectively, "Defendants") tasked with remediation of hazardous waste disposal sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("Superfund"). Plaintiffs -- members of three families residing in Niagara Falls -- brought this action in the State of New York Supreme Court, County of Niagara, in 2012, seeking damages arising from purported deficiencies in Defendants' remediation of one Superfund site, the Love Canal. Between 2013 and 2017, 18 identical complaints were filed by other plaintiffs. In 2013, Defendants removed two of the 19 cases -- including this one -- to the court below on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, but the district court remanded the cases to state court. The cases remained in state court until 2020 when Plaintiffs in all 19 cases filed identical amended complaints. The amended complaints alleged additional sources of injury. Defendants again removed the 19 cases, this time on the basis of both federal officer and federal question jurisdiction. The district court held that the removal was untimely and again remanded the cases to state court. Defendants appealed.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs continue to allege the same injuries against the same Defendants, caused by the same toxins, and resulting in the same damages. The amended complaint highlighted only additional sources of already-alleged injury. The changes in Plaintiffs' pleadings 20 are not substantial, and the amendments did not result in essentially new lawsuits. View "Abbo-Bradley, et al. v. City of Niagara Falls, et al." on Justia Law