Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington a pro se action to challenge the denial of his claim for disability benefits by the Social Security Administration. A magistrate judge of that court, acting with the full civil authority of that court, reversed and remanded the matter to the agency for rehearing after the government conceded that there was an error in the agency’s adjudication. Plaintiff appealed that decision.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel considered whether the magistrate judge had authority to exercise the full civil jurisdiction of the district court over Plaintiff’s claim. There is no doubt that the district court had jurisdiction over the case, but Plaintiff challenged whether he had given the consent that was required for a magistrate judge to exercise that jurisdiction. The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review the antecedent question of whether the magistrate judge validly entered judgment on behalf of the district court. The panel rejected Plaintiff’s contention that, as a pro se litigant, he believed he was consenting to the magistrate judge’s issuance of a report and recommendation, not a final judgment. The panel held that Plaintiff was fully informed of the district court’s conclusion that he had knowingly and voluntarily consented to the assignment to the magistrate judge. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff was unable to show good cause or extraordinary circumstances to withdraw consent. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. View "VICTOR WASHINGTON V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

The Forest Service developed the Project to replace trees infested with laminated root rot and bark beetles with disease-resistant ones. In May 2016, the Service contracted with T2, a private company, for logging to implement the decision. The Service issued a revised Environmental Assessment (“EA”) in July 2020 and a revised decision notice in December 2020. BMBP filed this action challenging the 2020 decision notice. The Service filed an administrative record (“AR”) in 2021.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Forest Service. The panel first addressed BMBP’s argument that the AR was incomplete. First, BMBP argued that deliberative materials were part of the “whole record” and that a privilege log was required if they were not included in the AR. The panel held that deliberative materials are generally not part of the AR absent impropriety or bad faith by the agency. Because deliberative materials are not part of the administrative record, to begin with, they are not required to be placed on a privilege log. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to order the production of a privilege log. Second, BMBP argued that all documents in the 2016 AR should be in the AR for this case. BMBP contended that the documents in the 2016 AR were necessary before the agency in the 2020 process because the Project was a continuation of the withdrawn one. The panel held that BMBP’s arguments failed to overcome the presumption of regularity. View "BMBP V. SHANE JEFFRIES, ET AL" on Justia Law

While Respondent was employed as a truck driver at Greatwide Dedicated Transport II, LLC (“Greatwide”), he witnessed certain drivers receive additional driving assignments in violation of 49 C.F.R. Section 395.3, which regulates the maximum driving time for property-carrying vehicles. After collecting evidence related to the violations, Respondent submitted anonymous letters to management reporting his findings. Soon thereafter, Respondent revealed to management personnel that he was the author of the letters. The following month, Respondent was assigned to deliver two trailers filled with merchandise to two Nordstrom store locations in Manhattan, New York and Paramus, New Jersey. However, when Respondent returned from this assignment, he was suspended for—what Greatwide claimed to be—violations of company policy. Greatwide subsequently terminated and dismissed Respondent without a more explicit explanation. Respondent promptly filed a whistleblower complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”). Following several lengthy delays, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ruled in Respondent’s favor, ordering Greatwide to pay both back pay and emotional distress damages. The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) affirmed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the ARB’s conclusion that Respondent engaged in protected activity, that his activity was a contributing factor in his termination, and that Greatwide failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent would have been terminated absent his protected conduct. Nor was Greatwide prejudiced by the proceeding’s delays. Finally, the court declined to enforce the alleged settlement agreement because the company failed to challenge the ALJ’s decision before the ARB. View "Greatwide Dedicated Transport II, LLC v. United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Before the resumption of federal student-loan repayments that had been suspended during the coronavirus pandemic, the Secretary of Education announced a Plan that would discharge $10,000-$20,000 of an eligible borrower’s debt. The Secretary invoked the 2003 Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act (HEROES Act), which authorizes the Secretary “to waive or modify any provision” applicable to federal student financial assistance programs as “necessary” to ensure that recipients of student financial assistance are no worse off “financially in relation to that financial assistance because” of a national emergency or disaster, 20 U.S.C. 1098. The Act exempts rules promulgated under it from otherwise-applicable negotiated rulemaking and notice-and-comment processes. Borrowers who did not qualify for the Plan's maximum relief alleged that the Secretary was required to follow those rulemaking procedures.The Supreme Court held that the borrowers lacked Article III standing, having failed to establish that any injury they suffer from not having their loans forgiven is fairly traceable to the Plan.The Department also claims authority to forgive loans under the Higher Education Act (HEA), 20 U.S.C. 1082(a)(6). The borrowers cannot show that their purported injury of not receiving HEA loan relief is fairly traceable to the Department’s decision to grant relief under the HEROES Act. They are not claiming that they are injured by not being sufficiently included among the Plan’s beneficiaries but argue the Plan is unlawful and instead seek HEA debt forgiveness. The Department’s authority to grant HEA loan relief is not affected by whether the Plan is lawful. Any incidental effect of the Plan on the likelihood that the Department will undertake loan forgiveness under a different statute is too speculative to show that the absence of HEA-based loan forgiveness is fairly traceable to the Plan. View "Department of Education v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2006 and 2013, the Foothill/Eastern Transportation Corridor Agency (the Corridor Agency) approved extensions of California State Route 241, and the Environmental Parties along with other environmental organizations and the California Attorney General filed lawsuits challenging those approvals. In 2016, after years of litigation, the Corridor Agency entered a settlement agreement to resolve the litigation. The Corridor Agency continued its planning efforts and identified several alternatives for the transportation project. While these efforts were in progress, the Reserve Maintenance Corporation (the Reserve), a homeowner’s association, filed a lawsuit seeking to protect the interest of their homeowners in avoiding an extension of State Route 241 near their community. In 2020, after three years of litigation, during which the Reserve lost a petition for a restraining order and motions for summary adjudication and faced the prospect of dispositive motions from the other side, they agreed to dismiss their lawsuit. However, they moved for attorney fees and costs on the ground they were successful parties in the litigation under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. In March 2020, the Corridor Agency chose to proceed with a road construction alternative that steered clear of both an "Avoidance Area" and the Reserve Community, and the Reserve argued their litigation caused the agency to make that choice, meaning their litigation was successful as a catalyst of change. The Environmental Parties also moved for attorney fees on the ground they were successful parties because they gained the dismissal, and both they and the Corridor Agency moved for costs as prevailing parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032. The trial judge denied the request for attorney fees under section 1021.5 by both parties. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding the catalyst theory didn’t apply to this case but erred as a matter of law by exempting the Reserve from an award of attorney fees under In re Joshua S., 42 Cal.4th 945 (2008) and Save Our Heritage Organisation v. City of San Diego, 11 Cal.App.5th 154 (2017). The Court also concluded the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in awarding costs under section 1032 or by refusing to apportion costs. View "City of San Clemente v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Alaska Airlines’ (AA’s) Collective Bargaining Agreement with its flight attendants required those flight attendants to schedule vacation days in advance. The Department of Labor & Industries (L&I) argued that RCW 49.12.270 displaced the CBA’s mandatory advance scheduling requirement term without explicitly saying so. AA argued that it did not. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with AA: "It takes more to displace a mandatory CBA term than RCW 49.12.270 contains. In fact, RCW 49.12.270 explicitly preserves non-choice-of-leave terms of the CBA and RCW 49.12.290 bars interpreting RCW 49.12.270 to 'reduce any provision in a [CBA].'" The Court therefore held that RCW 49.12.270 did not displace the advance scheduling requirement of the CBA. View "Alaska Airlines v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The questions related to claims made by Kirk Menard, who worked as an environmental, safety, and health specialist at Targa Resources, LLC’s Venice, Louisiana plant. His job duties included ensuring Targa complied with various state and federal environmental and safety standards. Menard reported to two individuals: his “official supervisor,” David Smith, who resided at another facility, and an “indirect supervisor,” Ted Keller, who served as an area manager for the Venice plant. Menard’s indirect supervisor, in turn, reported to Perry Berthelot, a Targa District Manager. In a conference call, Menard reported that the total suspended solids in certain recent water samples exceeded regulatory limits. At the end of the call, Berthelot told Menard to call him back to discuss the plan for rectifying these exceedances. Menard obliged, and he alleged Berthelot told him he should dilute the sewage samples with bottled water. Menard claimed that in response he nervously laughed and said, “no, we’re going to correct it the right way.” The federal appellate court asked the Louisiana Supreme Court: (1) whether refusals to engage in illegal or environmentally damaging activities were “disclosures” under the current version of the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute ("LEWS"); and (2) whether LEWS afforded protection to an employee who reports to his supervisor an activity, policy, or practice of an employer which he reasonably believes is in violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation, where reporting violations of environmental law, rules, or regulations, is a part of the employee’s normal job responsibilities. The Supreme Court responded in the affirmative to both questions. View "Menard v. Targa Resources, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that a Transportation Security Officer (“TSO”) sexually assaulted her during an airport security screening. At issue is whether Plaintiff may bring claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States. The panel held that TSOs fall under the FTCA’s “law enforcement proviso,” which waives sovereign immunity for torts such as assault and battery committed by “investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h). The panel joined the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits in holding that the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity applies to certain intentional torts committed by TSOs. The district court, therefore, had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FTCA claims.   The panel considered whether, as officers of the United States, TSOs are “empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h). The government argued that TSOs do not “execute searches” by conducting screenings. The panel held that the screenings fit the ordinary, contemporary, and common meanings of searches. View "MICHELE LEUTHAUSER V. USA, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Idaho Industrial Commission issued an order denying Veronica Arreola’s petition for a declaratory ruling and motion for reinstatement of compensation. Arreola brought her petition and motion against the Granite State Insurance Co. (“the Surety”), when the Surety, without an order from the Commission invoked I.C. section 72-434 to suspend Arreola’s compensation payments. In the Surety’s unilateral and private determination, suspending Arreola’s compensation payments was appropriate because the Surety had purportedly scheduled Arreola’s Independent Medical Exam (“IME”) with its physician at a “reasonable” time, and Arreola “unreasonably” failed to submit to or had obstructed the scheduled IME by not appearing. Arreola’s petition and motion disputed these private conclusions by the Surety. Arreola also maintained that only the Commission has the authority to adjudicate the underlying medical exam dispute and determine whether there is a factual basis to execute the enforcement mechanisms in Idaho Code section 72-434. The Commission denied the petition and motion, instructing Arreola to instead proceed through a complaint for relief. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded its decision in Brewer v. La Crosse Health & Rehab, 71 P.3d 458 (2003) interpreting Idaho Code section 72-434 was manifestly wrong. "Only the Commission has the authority to adjudicate medical exam disputes, and to enforce that adjudication through the enforcement mechanisms in section 72-434." In light of this, Arreola’s concern that the Surety’s unilateral execution of the enforcement mechanisms in section 72-434 also suspended her right to file a “complaint” to seek relief was now abated. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not affirm: given the shift in the legal landscape with Brewer overruled, the Commission’s order denying the petition and motion was vacated, and the case remanded with instructions that the Commission: (1) order payment of prospective compensation payments that might be owed until such time as the Commission determines that payments are not required under section 72-434; (2) reconsider the appropriate procedural mechanism for adjudicating the underlying factual dispute; and (3) instruct the Surety what procedural mechanism it must use to obtain an order authorizing it to lawfully suspend compensation payments. View "Arreola v. Scentsy, Inc." on Justia Law

In the winter of 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determined that the threat posed by the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus constituted a public health emergency. The CDC published the rule at issue—the Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025-01 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“Mandate”). Plaintiffs initiated this litigation, arguing that the Mandate was unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC Section 706(2) (APA), and unconstitutional under non-delegation and separation-of-powers tenets.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and instructed the district court to dismiss the case as moot. The court explained that it found Plaintiffs’ contention that there is a reasonable expectation that the CDC will issue another nationwide mask mandate for all conveyances and transportation hubs to be speculative. Conjectures of future harms like these do not establish a reasonable expectation that a mask mandate from the CDC will reissue. Further, the court reasoned that there is no “reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.” View "Health Freedom Defense Fund, et al v. President of the United States, et al" on Justia Law