Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Ascension Medical Group sought to depose a DEA agent and a federal prosecutor in state court litigation. Their testimony would help Ascension prove that one of its doctors failed to disclose that he was under federal investigation, in violation of his employment agreement. The Department of Justice refused to make either employee available for depositions. Ascension sued to compel their testimony. The district court determined that the Department’s refusal was reasonable and entered judgment in its favor.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under 5 U.S.C. 301, each federal agency has promulgated “Touhy regulations,” governing when it will disclose information or make its employees available for depositions. The Department of Justice’s Touhy regulations are at 28 C.F.R. 16.21. Unless the Department unreasonably applied its Touhy regulations, a federal court is powerless to compel its participation in state court discovery. Because the Department reasonably applied its Touhy regulations to the particulars of Ascension’s request, its refusal was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court noted that if the doctor denies that he was under investigation, Ascension can point to the DEA proffer letter he signed acknowledging that he was “a subject of a federal investigation.” View "St. Vincent Medical Group, Inc. v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

According to allegations in the complaint, for over forty years, Monsanto was the only U.S. manufacturer of polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”). The federal government and states spent enormous sums cleaning up PCB environmental contamination. The State of Delaware alleged Monsanto knew that the PCBs it produced and sold to industry and to consumers would eventually be released into the environment and would cause lasting damage to public health and the State’s lands and waters. The State brought this action to hold Monsanto responsible for its cleanup costs, asserting claims for public nuisance, trespass, and unjust enrichment. A Delaware superior court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that even though the State alleged Monsanto knew for decades PCBs that were toxic and would contaminate the environment for generations, the State: (1) could not assert a public nuisance claim or trespass claim because Monsanto manufactured PCB products, which entered the environment after sale to third parties; (2) State did not have standing to bring a trespass claim because it held public lands in trust rather than outright and therefore did not have the exclusive possession of land needed to assert a trespass claim; (3) the superior court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the unjust enrichment claim as a standalone claim; and (4) the State could not use an unjust enrichment claim to recover future cleanup costs. The Delaware Supreme Court found the State pled sufficiently that even though Monsanto did not control the PCBs after sale it substantially participated in creating the public nuisance and causing the trespass by actively misleading the public and continuing to supply PCBs to industry and consumers knowing that PCBs were hazardous, would escape into the environment after sale to third parties, and would lead to widespread and lasting contamination of Delaware’s lands and waters. Further, the Supreme Court found the State alleged that it owned some land directly and therefore had exclusive possession of that land needed to assert a trespass claim. The Court affirmed in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Delaware v. Monsanto Company" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sarah Farum filed a frivolous asylum application. An immigration judge determined the application rendered her permanently ineligible for immigration benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Farnum did not challenge the frivolousness finding made by the immigration judge, nor did she challenge she had proper notice of the consequences of filing a false application. She instead challenged the timing of when the frivolous-asylum bar was effective. In her view, the frivolous-application bar outlined in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) could not be invoked in the same proceeding as a frivolousness finding was made, thus allowing an immigration court to consider other potential claims that might support a finding that the Attorney General should withhold her deportation. To this, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed: "Once an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals makes the required frivolousness finding, the statutory bar is effective." View "Farnum v. Garland" on Justia Law

Appellants in these tandem appeals are each a parent of a disabled child. Arguing that his or her child was entitled to benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i), each parent brought an administrative action against his or her local education agency and prevailed. Subsequently, each parent brought a federal action for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i)(3)(B). In each case, the district court awarded less attorneys’ fees than the parent requested, and the parents appealed.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of travel-related fees in No. 21-1961 and remanded for further proceedings. The court otherwise affirmed the judgments of the district courts. The court found that it was persuaded that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s calculation of reasonable attorneys’ fees in each case. Further, the court wrote that the district courts that declined to award prejudgment interest did not abuse their discretion because “delays in payment” may be remedied by “application of current rather than historic hourly rates.” However, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it denied any travel-related fees to M.D.’s counsel. A district court may permissibly adjust excessive travel costs. But the district court could not “eliminate all of the hours submitted by [CLF] as travel time” by denying travel-related fees altogether. View "H.C. v. NYC DOE, et al." on Justia Law

Two Texas employers: Braidwood Management, Inc. (“Braidwood”) and Bear Creek Bible Church (“Bear Creek”), filed suit, as per their closely held religious beliefs, asserting that Title VII, as interpreted in the EEOC’s guidance and Bostock, prevents them from operating their places of employment in a way compatible with their Christian beliefs. Plaintiffs have implicitly asserted that they will not alter or discontinue their employment practices. all parties admitted in district court that numerous policies promulgated by plaintiffs (such as those about dress codes and segregating bathroom usage by solely biological sex) already clearly violate EEOC guidance. Both plaintiffs also contend that they are focused on individuals’ behavior, not their asserted identity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable; reversed the class certifications; affirmed the judgment against Bear Creek; affirmed the ruling that Braidwood is statutorily entitled to a Title VII exemption; vacated the judgment that Braidwood is constitutionally entitled to a Title VII exemption; and vacated the judgment regarding the scope-of-Title-VII claims as a matter of law. The court reasoned that under the facts presented, it cannot determine a more appropriate, limited class definition for any of the classes presented here. Accordingly, the court held that both Braidwood and Bear Creek have standing and bring individual claims. Further, the court explained that the EEOC failed to show a compelling interest in denying Braidwood, individually, an exemption. The agency does not even attempt to argue the point outside of gesturing to a generalized interest in prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination in every potential case. View "Braidwood Management v. EEOC" on Justia Law

The False Claims Act (FCA) imposes civil liability on those who present false or fraudulent claims for payment to the federal government, 31 U.S.C. 3729–3733, and authorizes private parties (relators) to bring “qui tam actions” in the name of the government. A relator may receive up to 30% of any recovery. The relator must file his complaint under seal and serve a copy and supporting evidence on the government, which has 60 days to decide whether to intervene. As a “real party in interest,” the government can intervene after the seal period ends, if it shows good cause.Polansky filed an FCA action alleging Medicare fraud. The government declined to intervene during the seal period. After years of discovery, the government decided that the burdens of the suit outweighed its potential value, and moved under section 3730(c)(2)(A) (Subparagraph (2)(A)), which provides that the government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the relator if the relator received notice and an opportunity for a hearing.The Third Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The government may move to dismiss an FCA action whenever it has intervened, whether during the seal period or later. It may not move to dismiss if it has never intervened. A successful motion to intervene turns the movant into a party; it can assume primary responsibility for the case’s prosecution, which triggers the Subparagraph (2)(A) right to dismiss, consistent with the FCA’s government-centered purposes. The government’s motion to dismiss will satisfy FRCP 41 in all but exceptional cases. The government gave good grounds for believing that this suit would not vindicate its interests. Absent extraordinary circumstances, that showing suffices for the government to prevail. View "United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

Texas and Missouri filed suit seeking to compel DHS to employ the $2.75 billion Congress allocated “for the construction of [a] barrier system along the southwest border” before those funds expire. The district court dismissed Texas for “claim splitting,” held that Missouri did not have standing to sue, and denied the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. The states appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to "expeditiously consider the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction." The court explained Texas should not have been dismissed for claim splitting because Texas’s Article III standing confers federal jurisdiction. In terms of causation, Texas needs only to have alleged facts showing the Federal Defendants’ conduct is a cause-in-fact of the injury that the State asserts. Here, Texas claimed that border barriers (i) reduce illegal entries in areas where constructed, and (ii) increase the rate at which illegal aliens are detected and apprehended.However, the court declined to order the states' requested remedy, instead remanding the case to the district court. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law

Over the course of twenty-two months, Plaintiff-—a childhood victim of lead poisoning—assigned his rights to nearly one million dollars in structured settlement payments to factoring companies for pennies on the dollar. Through six transfer agreements that he lacked the capacity to understand, Plaintiff relinquished his rights to monthly payments with a total aggregate value of $959,834.42 spread over the course of about twenty-six years for a series of immediate lump-sum cash payments that amounted to $268,130. Plaintiff sued Transamerica Annuity Service Corporation and Transamerica Life Insurance Company (collectively, “Transamerica”), the entities that issued and funded his periodic payments before he assigned them. Plaintiff asserted two claims against Transamerica: one for breach of contract under New York law and the other for exploitation of a vulnerable adult under Florida’s Adult Protective Services Act (“FAPSA”), Florida Statute Section 415.1111.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s FAPSA claim fails under the plain language of the statute. In his operative complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that Transamerica intended to deprive him of the use of his funds. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that Transamerica “allowed” (or “facilitated”) his exploitation by the factoring companies, which resulted in an unauthorized taking of his assets. Based on the facts that Plaintiff pleaded, Transamerica’s actions simply do not amount to “exploitation,” as that term is defined in FAPSA. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a violation of FAPSA, the court affirmed the district court’s with-prejudice dismissal of his FAPSA claim. View "Lujerio Cordero v. Transamerica Annuity Service, et al" on Justia Law

San Diego City Attorney Mara Elliott successfully moved to strike a defamation complaint filed against her by a former political rival, Cory Briggs, under the California anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. Elliott spent the next seven months fruitlessly trying to collect on the unsatisfied judgment. She then filed a verified memorandum of costs claiming $13,789.10 in postjudgment collection costs, including $12,941.20 in attorney’s fees and $847.90 in other costs. The trial court awarded her the claimed costs, as well as $2,294.07 in postjudgment interest. Briggs appealed the cost award. Finding that the trial court properly awarded Elliott all of the costs identified in the memorandum of costs, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Briggs v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Methane is considered the most dangerous gas in underground mining; in sufficient concentrations, methane can ignite and cause a potentially catastrophic explosion. To protect worker safety, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) regulations thus require miners to deenergize equipment and cease work when they detect certain methane concentrations. But during the methane inundation at the Francisco mine the miners did not stop work. They instead continued operating an energized drill, trying to stop the flow of methane. MSHA issued two orders citing the mine operator, Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC, for violating the applicable safety regulations and designated those violations as unwarrantable failures. It also individually cited the mine’s manager as Peabody’s agent. An administrative law judge and then the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission agreed with MSHA that Peabody violated MSHA safety regulations, that those violations constituted unwarrantable failures, that mine manager was individually liable, and that civil penalties were appropriate. Peabody and the manager petitioned for review in this court.   The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that MSHA safety regulations unambiguously prohibited Peabody’s operation of an energized drill in a high-methane environment, and substantial evidence supports the Commission’s unwarrantable failure and individual liability determinations. Further, as the Commission recognized, by permitting miners to work with energized equipment, the manager risked incurring the very hazard section 75.323(c)(2) is intended to address, i.e., potential ignition [in a] high-methane environment. View "Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law