Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

On November 3, 2020, the voters of San Bernardino County passed Measure K, amending the county charter so as to: (1) limit a supervisor to a single four-year term; and (2) limit a supervisor’s compensation to $5,000 a month. At the same time, the voters also elected three new supervisors. The trial court ruled that the one-term limit was unconstitutional, but that the compensation limit was constitutional. The court ruled that because Measure K was not severable, it, too, had to be struck down. Finally, it ruled that Measure K did not apply to the new supervisors (although it acknowledged that the issue was moot, in light of its other rulings). Nadia Renner, proponent of Measure K, appealed.The San Bernardino County Board of Suprervisors (Board) cross-appealed, contending: (1) Supervisors’ compensation could not be set by initiative; (2) the compensation limit violated minimum wage laws; alternatively, if it effectively forced supervisors to work part-time, it impaired governmental functions; and (3) the compensation limit improperly acted as a referendum on San Bernardino County Code section 13.0614. After determining the trial court’s ruling was appealable, the Court of Appeal concluded the one-term limit was constitutional. Further, the Court held that the supervisors’ compensation could be set by initiative, and the Board did not show the limit violated minimum wage laws. The Board also did not show the limit conflicted with section 13.0614. “Even assuming that it does, the voters can amend or abrogate an ordinance not only by referendum, but also by initiative.” Because the Court held the one-term and compensation limits were valid, the Court did not reach the issue of whether Measure K was severable. The Court was split as to whether Measure K applied to new supervisors: the term limit applied, but the compensation limit did not. View "San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors v. Monell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are flight attendants who sustained injuries in connection with their employment by United Airlines. They filed claims in the Northern District of Texas, but the district court dismissed them because the flight attendants failed to adequately plead diversity jurisdiction. This was despite the fact that the parties agree that the flight attendants could have invoked the district court’s jurisdiction if they had included the proper allegations. The flight attendants appealed, and this court affirmed. They filed the instant case shortly after. The district court dismissed the claims as barred by the statute of limitations. This appeal presents two primary questions, both of which concern the interpretation of the jurisdiction savings statute.   The Fifth Circuit wrote that it cannot make a reliable Erie guess on these important matters of state law. Accordingly, the court certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Texas: 1) Does Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 16.064 apply to this lawsuit where Plaintiffs could have invoked the prior district court’s subject matter jurisdiction with proper pleading? 2) Did Plaintiffs file this lawsuit within sixty days of when the prior judgment became “final” for purposes of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 16.064(a)(2)? View "Sanders v. Boeing Company" on Justia Law

In 2019, the United States Forest Service (“FS”) issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) authorizing livestock grazing for 10 years on land in the Upper Green River Area Rangeland (“UGRA”) in Wyoming. Two sets of petitioners-appellants, the Center for Biological Diversity and Sierra Club (collectively, “CBD”) and Western Watersheds Project, Alliance for Wile Rockies and Yellowstone to Unitas Connection (collectively “WWP”) challenged the UGRA Project under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), and the Administrative Procedures Act. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded: (1) the Fish and Wildlife Service’s failures in the Biological Opinion to consider certain impacts the UGRA would have on female grizzly bears was arbitrary and capricious, but that the Opinion’s reliance on certain conservation measures was not; and (2) the Forest Service’s reliance on the Fish and Wildlife Service’s Biological Opinion was arbitrary and capricious. As to WWP’s NFMA claims, the Court determined the ROD’s failure to consider the adequacy of forage and cover for migratory birds in the Project area was arbitrary and capricious. The Court remanded without vacated to the agencies to address deficiencies identified. View "Western Watersheds Project, et al. v. Haaland, et al." on Justia Law

Kean University implements New Jersey’s Policy Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace through its Affirmative Action Office, which conducts an investigation and prepares a report. Kean’s Chief of Staff reviews the report and makes a final determination. A final determination by the Chief of Staff may be appealed to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission. In 2016, adjunct professor Borowski was accused of making insensitive in-class statements about gender, immigration status, ethnicity, and religion. The Chief of Staff ruled against her. Borowski’s teaching assignment was terminated.Borowski appealed to the Commission, which recognized that material facts were in dispute, and referred the matter to an ALJ. Before a decision on the ensuing hearing, Kean alerted the ALJ of an intervening Commission decision, holding that adjunct professors were not civil service employees entitled to appeal final determinations of Policy violations. The ALJ dismissed Borowski’s appeal; the Commission affirmed.Instead of appealing in the state-court system, Borowski sued in federal court. The district court relied on Younger abstention to dismiss the case. The Third Circuit vacated. Younger abstention prevents federal court interference with only certain types of state proceedings, such as quasi-criminal civil enforcement actions. An appeal to the New Jersey Civil Service Commission is neither quasi-criminal nor within another category of Younger-eligible proceedings. Another prerequisite for Younger abstention is that the state proceeding must be ongoing; the Commission’s dismissal was final. View "Borowski v. Kean University" on Justia Law

EBMUD, a municipal utility, provides water and wastewater services to the residents of Alameda and Contra Costa counties. The plaintiffs have paid for EBMUD water service since before July 2018. In 2017, EBMUD adopted the water rates for fiscal years 2018 and 2019; in July 2019, EBUMD adopted the rates for fiscal years 2020 and 2021. The plaintiffs alleged EBMUD determines the cost of service based on the volume of water used. There are three tiers of water usage; each successive tier is charged a higher rate than the previous tier. They allege that this rate structure violates the requirement of the California Constitution article XIII D, 6(b)(3) that the amount charged for water service shall not exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel.In July 2019, plaintiffs mailed EBMUD a claim under the Government Claims Act, seeking a refund of service charges collected in violation of section 6(b) since July 17, 2018. In January 2020, after the statutory time period for response had lapsed, plaintiffs filed suit. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal without leave to amend, citing the 120-day statute of limitations (Public Utilities Code section 14402). Plaintiffs cannot avoid the statute of limitations by characterizing their claim as merely seeking a refund of excess fees. The complaint frames a challenge to the “disproportionate rate structure.” Any time requirements imposed by the Government Claims Act did not extend the limitations period. View "Campana v. East Bay Municipal Utility District" on Justia Law

After extensive litigation, the United States, Michigan, and five federally recognized tribes entered the Great Lakes Consent Decree of 1985, governing the regulation of Great Lakes fisheries. The subsequent Consent Decree of 2000 had a 20-year term. The district court extended that Decree indefinitely “until all objections to a proposed successor decree have been adjudicated” and granted amicus status to the Coalition, which represents numerous private “sport fishing, boating, and conservancy groups” interested in protecting the Great Lakes. The Coalition has represented its own interests during negotiation sessions.As the parties were concluding their negotiations on a new decree the Coalition moved to intervene, stating that Michigan is no longer “willing or able to adequately represent the Coalition’s interests” and intends to abandon key provisions of the 2000 Decree that promote biological conservation and diversity, allocate fishery resources between sovereigns, and establish commercial and recreational fishing zones. The district court denied the Coalition’s most recent motion to intervene. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In finding the motion untimely, the district court properly considered “all relevant circumstances” including the stage of the proceedings; the purpose for the intervention; the length of time that the movant knew or should have known of its interest in the case; the prejudice to the original parties; and any unusual circumstances militating for or against intervention. View "United States v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

Appellants Pike Off OTA, Inc., Amy Cerato, Mike Leary, Vince Dougherty, Terrie Club, Mike Club, Twyla Smith, Cali Coward, Karen Powell, Mike Powell, Cedric Leblanc, Darla Leblanc, Claudette Wispe, Mark Dooling, Nate Piel, Kara Piel, Nikki Whitson, John Whitson, Robert Wallace, Chelsea Wallace, Robin Stead, Anna Olson, Tassie Hirschfeld, Ice Blast LLC, and Janette Ward (collectively Appellants) brought claims challenging the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority's (OTA) authority to construct three proposed turnpikes: the Tri-City Connector, the East-West Connector, and the South Extension. The OTA moved to dismiss these claims, arguing that Appellants' claims were within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The district court granted the OTA's motion to dismiss, and Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court concurred it had exclusive original jurisdiction to determine whether the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority is authorized to construct the proposed turnpikes in the bond validation matter. The Court further ruled that appellants failed to establish that they had a clear legal right to the injunctive and/or mandamus relief sought. View "Pike Off OTA v. Okla. Turnpike Auth." on Justia Law

Following the 2007-2009 “Great Recession,” the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) brought an enforcement action against Calcutt, the former CEO of a Michigan-based community bank, for mismanaging one of the bank’s loan relationships. The FDIC ultimately ordered Calcutt removed from office, prohibited him from further banking activities, and assessed $125,000 in civil penalties.The Sixth Circuit agreed that Calcutt had proximately caused the $30,000 charge-off on one loan because he had “participated extensively in negotiating and approving” the transaction. The court concluded that $6.4 million in losses on other loans were a different matter and that none of the investigative, auditing, and legal expenses could qualify as harm to the bank, because those expenses occurred as part of its “normal business.” Despite identifying these legal errors in the FDIC analysis, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the FDIC decision, finding that substantial evidence supported the sanctions determination, even though the FDIC never applied the proximate cause standard itself or considered whether the sanctions against Calcutt were warranted on the narrower set of harms that it identified.The Supreme Court reversed. It is a fundamental rule of administrative law that reviewing courts must judge the propriety of agency action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. An agency’s discretionary order may be upheld only on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself. By affirming the FDIC’s sanctions against Calcutt based on a legal rationale different from that adopted by the FDIC, the Sixth Circuit violated these commands. View "Calcutt v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

The Ohio Valley Conference ("the OVC") appealed a judgment dismissing its official-capacity and individual-capacity claims against Randall Jones, the Chair of the Board of Trustees of Jacksonville State University ("JSU"), and Don C. Killingsworth, Jr., the President of Jacksonville State University. The OVC was a men's and women's collegiate athletic conference that began in 1948. The OVC Constitution contained two relevant provisions concerning resignation of membership from the conference. In addition to alleging that JSU had failed to pay the conference-resignation fee described in Article 4.5.3 of the OVC Constitution, the OVC also asserted that JSU owed the conference money for tickets to certain conference championship basketball tournament tickets. JSU, Jones, and Killingsworth filed a joint motion to dismiss the OVC's complaint. With respect to the OVC's claims against JSU, defendants argued that the Alabama State Board of Adjustment ("the BOA") had "exclusive jurisdiction" over those claims. With respect to any claims the OVC asserted against Jones and Killingsworth in their official capacities, defendants argued the claims were barred by State immunity under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution. With respect to any claims the OVC asserted against Jones and Killingsworth in their individual capacities, defendants argued the OVC had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and they maintained that the claims were barred by the doctrine of State-agent immunity. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the OVC's claims against Jones and Killingsworth in their official capacities seeking payment for the liquidated amount of the conference-resignation fee and for the value of the tickets JSU received for the OVC's 2021 conference championship basketball tournament did not constitute claims against the State, and, therefore, they were not barred by State immunity. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in dismissing the OVC's official-capacity claims against Jones and Killingsworth. However, the Court found the OVC failed to state individual-capacity claims against Jones and Killingsworth for which relief could be granted because Jones and Killingsworth lacked any duty apart from their official positions to make the payments the OVC sought to recover and because the OVC's complaint did not supply the factual allegations necessary to support those individual-capacity claims. View "Ohio Valley Conference v. Jones, et al." on Justia Law

Hohenberg and Hanson failed to maintain their Memphis homes. The Environmental Court, a local court that hears cases involving alleged violations of county ordinances, including environmental ordinances, declared Hohenberg’s home a public nuisance and ordered remediation. Hohenberg eventually declared bankruptcy. Her house was auctioned off, mooting the enforcement action. The court found Hanson guilty of code violations and ordered remediations. The violations recurred; Hanson went to jail. The city bulldozed his house. The court dismissed his case as moot.Each homeowner filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the court and the county. They claimed that the court’s procedures, including failures to use Tennessee’s Civil and Evidence Rules, to keep complete records, and to consider constitutional claims or defenses, violated their due process rights. The county created, funded, and “fail[ed] to oversee” the court. The district court dismissed their complaint as amounting to improper appeals of state court judgments (28 U.S.C. 1257(a)).The Sixth Circuit reversed the jurisdictional ruling but affirmed in part. The injuries do not stem from state-court “judgments.” The plaintiffs mainly argued that the Environmental Court dragged out the proceedings and complicated them, targeting ancillary litigation expenses rather than the application of law to fact, outside section 1257(a)’s limited orbit. Damages would not amount to the “review and rejection” of any judgments binding the plaintiffs. Because the Environmental Court is not a “person” but an arm of the state, the Section 1983 action against it fails. View "Hohenberg v. Shelby County, Tennessee" on Justia Law