Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Coronado, City of Imperial Beach, City of Lemon Grove, and City of Solana Beach (collectively “the Cities”) filed a combined petition for writ of administrate mandate and complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief against the San Diego Association of Governments and its board of directors (The Board) (collectively SANDAG). In their petition/complaint, the Cities maintained that SANDAG denied them a fair hearing when deciding the Cities’ administrative appeals of SANDAG’s regional housing needs assessment (RHNA): (1) by unfairly using a “weighted vote” procedure in which member jurisdictions cast votes based on their respective populations rather than a “tally vote” in which each member jurisdiction has a single, evenly-weighted vote; and (2) certain members of the Board were biased against the Cities and that their decision to deny the Cities’ administrative appeals was “predetermined,” thereby “rendering the decision on the [a]ppeals invalid.” In their prayer for relief, the Cities requested that the trial court enter a judgment “rescind[ing],” the “Final RHNA allocation.” The trial court sustained SANDAG’s demurrer without leave to amend, and entered judgment in its favor. On appeal, the Cities contend that the trial court erred in concluding that City of Irvine v. Southern California Assn. of Governments, 175 Cal.App.4th 506 (2009) precluded their action. The Cities also argued the Legislature’s 2004 deletion of the prior provision authorizing judicial review of an RHNA allocation was “not determinative” as to the court’s jurisdiction to entertain the Cities’ challenge to the fairness of the RHNA process in this case. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that City of Irvine controlled, and barred the Cities' action. View "City of Coronado v. San Diego Assn. of Governments" on Justia Law

In 2008, the City of Gulfport undertook a project to replace the infrastructure associated with its water and sewer systems relating to damage caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The repair project involved federal, state, and local agencies and ultimately cost approximately $85 million to complete. The original design of the Area 3B project, the sewer infrastructure that crossed the Cowan Road property located north of U.S. Highway 90 and east of Highway 605 were to be replaced, and the new infrastructure was to be installed within the City’s existing easements across the properties. The Cowan Road property at issue was located in the Area 3B geographic zone. Robert “Kris” Riemann, P.E., then-director of the City’s department of public works, was notified that John Felsher had inquired about relocating the sewer infrastructure in Area 3B. Based on an agreement with Felsher to relocate the utilities, the City had the Area 3B design drawings redrafted to move the utilities. The City's project manager was notified that the discovery of underground telephone lines and other utilities required that the sewer line being relocated had to cut the northwest corner of the property. Cowan Road filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, advancing a claim for inverse condemnation against the City. The chancery court transferred the case to the Special Court of Eminent Domain in Harrison County. Due to the jurisdictional limits of county court, the case ended up in Harrison County Circuit Court. The circuit court entered an order granting the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the City on the issue of the date of the taking. The parties eventually settled the reverse condemnation claim, and the City agreed to pay $100,000 to Cowan Road & Hwy 90, LLC, for the improper and unlawful taking of its property. The issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court centered on the circuit court's grant of attorneys' fees and expenses: Gulfport argued that Cowan Road should not have been allowed to recover attorneys’ fees under Section 43-37-9. Finding that the statute applied and fees were appropriate, the Supreme Court affirmed. However, the Court found the trial judge abused his discretion by disallowing requests for postjudgment interest. View "City of Gulfport v. Cowan Road & Hwy 90, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner Bruce Querbach sought to overturn a final order of the Oregon Department of Human Services (DHS) which determined that reports to DHS that petitioner had abused two children were “founded.” The circuit court, reviewing the order as an order in other than a contested case, assumed that the “reasonable cause to believe” standard in that rule was a “probable cause” standard. After holding a trial to develop the record for review, as required by Norden v. Water Resources Dept., 996 P2d 958 (2000), the circuit court concluded that only two of DHS’s four “founded” determinations could be sustained under that standard. On petitioner’s appeal and DHS’s cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the circuit court’s application of a “probable cause” standard and, instead employing the “reasonable suspicion” standard that it had used in an earlier, similar case, concluded that not just two, but three of DHS’s “founded” determinations had to be sustained. Appealing to the Oregon Supreme Court, petitioner argued that “probable cause” was the correct standard for determining that a report of abuse is founded and that none of DHS’s “founded” determinations hold up when the record on review was considered under that standard. Petitioner also argued that, given that the circuit court found that the DHS investigation and analysis into the reported abuse was incomplete and flawed in various respects, the “founded” determinations had to be set aside. The Supreme Court rejected those arguments and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that three of the four “founded” dispositions were supported by substantial evidence. View "Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

While residing in a nursing home, Hill died of COVID-19. Her estate sued in state court under the Illinois Nursing Home Care Act, The defendant removed the suit to federal court, asserting that Martin’s suit necessarily rests on federal law, 28 U.S.C.1441(a), and that it was “acting under” a federal officer under 28 U.S.C.1442(a)(1).The district judge remanded to state court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed,. The nursing home is subject to extensive federal regulation (especially for Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement), and CDC orders during the pandemic have increased that regulatory burden but regulation does not turn a private entity into a public actor. The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C. 247d, forbids liability under state law for injuries caused by use of a “covered countermeasure”, and creates a federal claim for injuries caused by “willful misconduct” in connection with covered countermeasures (payable from a federal fund), but does not preempt any other kind of claim nor occupy the field of health safety. The estate’s claims are not even arguably preempted. The principal disputes in this suit are likely to be whether the nursing home allowed members of the staff to work while ill or failed to isolate residents who contracted COVID-19, which are unrelated to federal law. View "Martin v. Petersen Health Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs, aliens who were detained under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6) after reentering the United States illegally, filed a putative class action, alleging that aliens detained under section 1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings after six months’ detention. The district court certified a class of similarly situated plaintiffs and enjoined the government from detaining the class members under section 1231(a)(6) for more than 180 days without providing each a bond hearing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court reversed. INA section 1252(f )(1) deprived the district courts of jurisdiction to entertain aliens’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief. Section 1252(f )(1) generally strips lower courts of jurisdiction or authority to “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” certain INA provisions. Section 1252(f )(1)’s one exception allows lower courts to “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” the relevant statutory provisions “with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” Here, both district courts entered injunctions that “enjoin or restrain the operation” of section 1231(a)(6) because they require officials to take actions that (in the government’s view) are not required by 1231(a)(6) and to refrain from actions that are allowed; the injunctions do not fall within the exception for individualized relief. Section 1252(f )(1) refers to “an individual,” not “individuals.” View "Garland v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Wilcox County Board of Education ("the Board") and individual Board members were defendants in a lawsuit filed by Jane Doe. Defendants petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Wilcox Circuit Court to grant their motion for a summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to immunity. On November 11, 2010, Doe, at that time, was a 12th-grade student at Wilcox County Central High School, was sexually assaulted by the principal of the school, James Thomas. According to Doe, Thomas made inappropriate comments of a sexual nature to her while she was serving as an aide in the school office and later called her into his private office, closed the door, and began kissing her and touching her. Doe reported the incident, and, as a result, Thomas was arrested the following day by the Wilcox County Sheriff's Department. After his arrest, Thomas was suspended from his duties as school principal and placed on administrative leave. He was ultimately convicted of having sexual contact with a student under the age of 19 years. In 2012, Doe initiated an action against Thomas, the Board, the individual members of the Board, and other individuals identified as former Wilcox County school-system superintendents. Doe asserted negligence and wantonness claims against the Board and the Board members, contending that those defendants had had knowledge of previous instances of similar misconduct by Thomas that they had allegedly failed to properly investigate or report. Doe also asserted claims of negligent or wanton hiring, training, and/or retention of Thomas against the Board and the Board members. The Supreme Court concluded the Board and the Board members, insofar as the Board members were sued in their official capacities, are entitled to immunity from the claims asserted against them but that the Board members were not entitled to State-agent immunity from the claims asserted against them in their individual capacities. View "Ex parte Wilcox County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Legal Aid submitted an Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Division of Workforce Services (DWS) seeking information about how DWS and its third-party vendors determined eligibility for applicants of the Unemployment Insurance and/or Pandemic Unemployment Assistance programs. Item 10 sought “[a]ll public records, including communications, created by, sent by, sent to, or otherwise provided to DWS employees between March 1, 2020, and present that contain the words ‘algo’ or ‘algorithm’ in singular or plural form.” Legal Aid did not request confidential information about any claimant.After DWS failed to provide a timeline for the production of the documents, Legal Aid filed suit. DWS’s representative testified that the records responsive to Item 10 were expected to comprise more than 42,000 pages of emails that had to be printed, reviewed, and redacted. The circuit court ordered DWS to submit an estimated timeline for production and to provide records on a weekly basis in accordance with its timeline. Legal Aid subsequently claimed that DWS redacted information that concerned algorithms, or factors, that the agency uses in its processes to determine benefit eligibility. DWS cited ongoing fraud investigations. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed an order that the unredacted documents be produced, and that access to and management of the documents be limited. The court found that neither the law enforcement nor the competitive advantage FOIA exception applied. View "Arkansas Department of Commerce, Division of Workforce Services v. Legal AId of Arkansas" on Justia Law

Christine Larson, doing business as Active Nutrition, appealed a judgment entered after the district court ordered Larson’s appeal be dismissed and denied her request for a writ of mandamus. In a notice of decision dated January 27, 2021, Workforce Safety & Insurance (“WSI”) informed Larson that it had determined Active Nutrition is an employer subject to N.D.C.C. tit. 65, the Workforce Safety and Insurance Act, and that Active Nutrition was required to submit all earned wages for all employees for the previous four years and pay premiums, assessments, penalties, and interest accrued. The notice of decision also advised Larson that she could appeal the decision by “[s]ubmit[ting] a written request to WSI within 30 days to have the decision reconsidered[.]” On February 25, 2021, Larson mailed a written request for reconsideration to WSI. WSI received the request on March 1, 2021. On March 10, 2021, WSI sent Larson notice it received her request for reconsideration but the request was not timely. The notice also informed Larson that WSI’s decision dated January 27, 2021 was final. On May 27, 2021, Larson sent WSI a second request for reconsideration. Larson argued her first request for reconsideration was timely because WSI’s notice of decision was served by regular mail and therefore three additional days should be added to the time computation under N.D.R.Civ.P. 6(e). On June 8, 2021, WSI informed Larson it had received her second request, the request was not timely, and the decision was final. To the North Dakota Supreme Court, Larson argued her request for reconsideration was timely. Alternatively, she requested a writ of mandamus determining her request was timely and to direct WSI to review the merits of her request. The Supreme Court concluded Larson did not appeal from an appealable order and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying her request for a writ of mandamus. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Larson v. WSI" on Justia Law

A Surety on a $50,000 bail bond appeals from an order denying its motion to set aside a summary judgment entered on the bond. Surety contends the summary judgment entered on the bail bond is voidable and must be vacated because it was not filed within 90 days after the appearance period expired as required by Penal 2 Code section 1306, subdivision (c).   The trial court concluded the Surety was estopped from arguing the reinstatement order was void. As Surety’s challenge to the summary judgment was based on the invalidity of the reinstatement order, the court concluded that the challenge must fail.   The Fifth Appellate District agreed with Surety’s contention that the trial court lacked the authority to reinstate the bond after the appearance period expired. However, the trial court correctly decided that Surety’s conduct estopped it from raising the invalidity of the reinstatement order as a basis for vacating the summary judgment. Here, Surety (1) had prior notice that a reinstatement order would be entered, (2) gave its written consent to the reinstatement, (3) paid a $50 reinstatement fee a few days after the reinstatement order, and (4) benefited when the forfeited $50,000 bail bond was reinstated. Furthermore, the trial court relied on Surety’s consent when it vacated the forfeiture and reinstated the bail bond. The court concluded such circumstances estop Surety from arguing the reinstatement order was invalid. Because the invalidity of the reinstatement order is a necessary condition to Surety’s argument that the summary judgment is voidable. View "P. v. Accredited Surety and Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Iredell-Statesville School District Board of Education (“ISSD”) and several individual defendants, alleging federal constitutional and statutory claims, as well as state law claims for negligence and negligent inflection of emotional distress arising from school officials’ mistreatment of her son.  Some of the defendants timely moved to dismiss, asserting that the state law negligence claims against them in their individual capacities were barred by public official immunity under North Carolina law.   The district court granted their motion in part and dismissed all federal claims against the appellants. But as for the state law negligence claims, it denied the school officials’ motion to dismiss. It concluded that the school officials were not entitled to public official immunity for a breach of a ministerial duty to report child abuse.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s negligence claims. The court reasoned that the school officials’ actions at issue here were discretionary. What to do when faced with allegations of a teacher mistreating her student is not a decision that can be made automatically, without regard to the administrator’s judgment.  Further, Plaintiff’s claim was against public officials, in their individual capacities, for state law negligence. For such claims, North Carolina law dictates that the plaintiff may only pierce public official immunity by “showing that the defendant-official’s tortious conduct falls within one of the immunity exceptions. Plaintiff has not satisfied this obligation because she did not allege malice, or any other piercing exception, in the amended complaint. View "R.A. v. Brady Johnson" on Justia Law