Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

OXY USA, Inc. appealed a decision of the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Office of Natural Resources Revenue (“ONRR”) ordering it to pay an additional $1,820,652.66 in royalty payments on federal gas leases that were committed to the Bravo Dome Unit (“the Unit”). The owner of the leases OXY subsequently acquired - Amerada Hess Corporation (“Hess”) - used almost all of the CO2 it produced in the Unit for its own purposes rather than sale. ONRR rejected Hess’s valuation method and established its own. Hess appealed, and ONRR’s Director issued a decision reducing the amount Hess owed but affirming the remainder of ONRR’s order. Hess appealed to the Interior Board of Land Appeals, but the Board did not issue a final merits decision prior to the 33-month limitations period. On appeal to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, the district court rejected OXY’s challenge to the amount of royalties owed and affirmed the Director’s decision. Finding ONRR's interpretation and application of the marketable-condition rule to this case was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the applicable regulations, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. View "OXY USA v. DOI, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs did not purchase flood insurance for their house after the sellers told them that the property was not in a FEMA flood zone. Within weeks the area flooded, the home was destroyed and Plaintiffs sued the property sellers, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and private contractors.   Plaintiffs alleged that either FEMA or the Strategic Alliance for Risk Reduction (“STARR”) made the 2010 Change to the 100-year flood-line estimate and SFHA designation. They alleged that STARR is a joint venture by Defendants Stantec Consulting Services, Inc., Dewberry Engineers, Inc., and Atkins North America, Inc., but do not name STARR itself as a defendant. Atkins and Stantec filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), extending the federal-contractor defense. The district court granted the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court held that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because their complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter to show they are entitled to relief from Defendants. The court reasoned that Plaintiff’s complaint does not state how Atkins, Stantec and Dewberry work within STARR or which entity was responsible for any acts through STARR. Further, the complaint fails to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation against Atkins, Dewberry, and Stantec because the Plaintiffs provide “only naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” for three elements. Finally, the complaint similarly failed to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation because it does not plead which defendant made what representation. View "Derek Christopherson v. Robert Bushner" on Justia Law

Two sets of electors who were dissatisfied with the Attorney General’s ballot title for Initiative Petition 34 (2022) (IP 34) petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review. IP 34 was directed at changing Oregon’s process for reapportioning legislative and congressional districts after each decennial census. Both petitions argued the ballot title did not substantially comply with the requirements of ORS 250.035. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with some of the arguments raised in the petitions and, therefore, referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. View "Mason/Turrill v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

After a 21-year career as a firefighter with the City of Pocatello, Richard Nelson was diagnosed with leukemia. Nelson brought a workers’ compensation claim against the City. The Industrial Commission determined that the City failed to rebut a statutory presumption of causation with substantial and competent evidence. The City appealed, arguing there was substantial evidence to rebut the presumption that Nelson’s cancer was caused by his employment. The City also argued Idaho Code section 72-438(14)(b) unconstitutionally discriminated between the employers of firefighters who had cancer and the employers of other employees who claim to have contracted an occupational disease. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission. View "Nelson v. City of Pocatello" on Justia Law

Brenda and Gene Sauvageau petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a writ of supervision directing the district court to stop the Cass County Joint Water Resource District from using quick take eminent domain to acquire their property. The Sauvageaus claimed the District was prohibited from using quick take eminent domain to acquire a permanent right of way easement over their entire property. The Supreme Court concluded the quick take process was not available because the District is taking more than a right of way in the Sauvageaus’ property. The Court granted the Sauvageaus’ petition, directed the district court to vacate its order denying the Sauvageaus’ motion to dismiss the District’s complaint and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sauvageau, et al. v. Bailey, et al." on Justia Law

Hudye Group LP (“Hudye”) appealed a district court judgment affirming the Ward County Board of Commissioners’ decision to deny Hudye’s applications for abatement or refund of taxes as untimely. Hudye filed applications for abatement or refund of taxes relating to 85 acres of property that had been divided into 92 parcels which were located in Ward County, North Dakota. Hudye argued the failure to consider abatement requests received by the City Assessor’s Office on the first business day following the November first deadline resulted in an unjust outcome. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hudye Group v. Ward Cty. Bd. of Commissioners" on Justia Law

Defendant Mark Bartlett requested the City of Portland to release three city attorney opinions and one legal memorandum. The parties agreed that the documents were public records, were within the scope of the attorney-client privilege, and were more than 25 years old. The city declined to release the documents, arguing that they were exempt from the public records law because of the attorney-client privilege. The specific question presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s consideration in this case was whether the four documents that were prepared more than 25 years ago by the Portland City Attorney for the mayor and two city commissioners and that were subject to the attorney-client privilege had to be disclosed under ORS 192.390. The Court concluded those documents had to be disclosed. View "City of Portland v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

Appellants Patrick and Pamela Lutz (“Homeowners”) owned a single-family, detached home on a half-acre lot along Kesslersville Road in Plainfield Township, Northampton County, Pennsylvania. The property was located in a farm and forest district under the township’s zoning code. Single-family dwellings were permitted in that district but, per the zoning code, they are subject to setback requirements. Homeowners decided to add onto the back of their home. The design called for an addition to extend to the building envelope in the back: to 50 feet shy of the rear property line, with a raised, covered deck extending 18 feet into the rear setback area. When Homeowners submitted their plan to the township for approval, the zoning officer sent them written notice that the deck would not be allowed because it intruded into 50-foot setback area. He observed Homeowners could seek relief from the zoning hearing board (the “Board”) in the form of a dimensional variance. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed appeal to consider whether the Commonwealth Court correctly applied its standard of appellate review relative to the grant of a dimensional zoning variance. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was evenly divided; by operation of law, the Commonwealth Court’s judgment was thus affirmed. View "Kneebone v. Lutz" on Justia Law

This action stemmed from the San Bernardino County registrar of voters (ROV) initially miscalculating the number of signatures needed in support of plaintiffs and real parties in interest’s (RPI) initiative petition to repeal a special tax associated with a fire protection zone. The ROV told RPI the incorrect number, resulting in RPI incurring unnecessary costs in obtaining far more signatures than were required. Defendants and Petitioners County of San Bernadino and its ROV, Bob Page, (collectively, the County) petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the respondent trial court to vacate its order overruling the County’s demurrer and to enter an order sustaining the without leave to amend. The County contended that, when RPI requested the County to inform it of the number of signatures required for its initiative petition, the County did not owe RPI any statutory or constitutional duty to provide the information when requested. The County further argues it was immune from liability for communicating to RPI the incorrect number under Government Code sections 818.8 and 822.2. The Court of Appeal agreed that under Government Code sections 815 and 815.6, the County was not subject to liability because there was no breach of any statutory or constitutional duty. "[E]ven if the County owed RPI such a duty, the County was immune from liability under Government Code sections 818.8 and 822.2." The Court therefore concluded the trial court erred in overruling the County’s demurrer. View "County of San Bernardino v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

After a hearing, the California Gambling Control Commission (Commission) revoked and refused to renew the gambling license of cross-appellant Eric Swallow. The Commission also imposed a monetary penalty and costs against Swallow. Swallow petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate, challenging the revocation and nonrenewal of his gambling license, the amount of the monetary penalty, and the costs. The trial court granted Swallow’s petition in part and denied it in part, concluding the Commission did not violate Swallow’s due process rights when it revoked and refused to renew Swallow’s gambling license, except that the Commission may have relied on unproven misconduct. The trial court therefore remanded to the Commission “to ensure that Swallow is not disciplined based on misconduct that was not proven.” The trial court also concluded the amount of the monetary penalty imposed by the Commission was not supported by law, and the costs could only be assessed by the ALJ on remand. It therefore vacated the penalty and costs imposed and remanded for the Commission to redetermine the amount of the penalty and to refer the issue of costs to the ALJ. Both the Commission and Swallow appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) Business and Professions Code section 19930(c), when considered within the statutory and regulatory framework of the Gambling Control Act, did not authorize the monetary penalty; (2) the Commission had jurisdiction to revoke Swallow’s gambling license; (3) the Commission did not violate Swallow’s due process rights; (4) Swallow failed to present a proper argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence; and (5) the trial court properly remanded the issue of costs for further proceedings. The Court modified the judgment granting the peremptory writ of mandate to order the Commission to reconsider the monetary penalty in a manner consistent with its opinion instead of the trial court’s order. View "Swallow v. Cal. Gambling Control Commission" on Justia Law