Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Several hundred children in Benton Harbor, Michigan, suffered from elevated lead levels in their blood after drinking lead-contaminated water from the city’s public water system for three years. Plaintiffs, represented by their guardians, filed a lawsuit against various state and city officials, as well as two engineering firms, alleging that these parties failed to mitigate the lead-water crisis and misled the public about the dangers of the drinking water. The claims included substantive-due-process and state-created-danger claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state-law negligence claims.The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the complaint in full. The court found that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a violation of their constitutional rights and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their federal claims against the city and state officials and the state-law claims against one of the engineering firms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the state officials, finding that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that these officials acted with deliberate indifference. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the claims against the city officials and the City of Benton Harbor, finding that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that these officials misled the public about the safety of the water, thereby causing the plaintiffs to drink contaminated water. The court also reversed the district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against the engineering firm and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor" on Justia Law

Lathfield Investments, LLC, Lathfield Holdings, LLC, and Lathfield Partners, LLC (collectively, "Lathfield") own three commercial buildings in Lathrup Village, Michigan, rented to various commercial tenants. The City of Lathrup Village and its Downtown Development Authority (collectively, the "City") require landlords to obtain a rental license and list each tenant's name and principal business. Lathfield applied for a landlord rental license in July 2020 but did not list the required tenant information, leading to the denial of their application and their tenants' business license applications. Lathfield sued the City, alleging unlawful compulsion to apply for unnecessary licenses and make unnecessary property improvements, bringing eleven claims, nine against the City.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the City on all nine claims. Lathfield appealed, arguing that the City improperly required site plan approval, violated due process and equal protection rights, and engaged in inverse condemnation, among other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Lathfield's request for declaratory relief regarding site plan approval was moot since the site plan process was already completed. The court also found that Lathfield was required to obtain a general business license under the City Code and that the City Code's tenant registration requirement applied to Lathfield. The court rejected Lathfield's due process claims, noting that the City’s adoption of the Michigan Building Code was a legislative act not subject to procedural due process requirements. The court also dismissed Lathfield's equal protection claim due to a lack of evidence of differential treatment and found no basis for the Contracts Clause claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lastly, the court concluded that Lathfield failed to establish an inverse condemnation claim or a civil conspiracy. View "Lathfield Investments, LLC v. City of Lathrup Village, Mich." on Justia Law

In July 2019, Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) workers encountered a two-month-old infant, L.M., with a severe skull fracture and extensive brain damage. The infant's parents, Erika and Brian Mabes, had taken him to the emergency room after finding him unresponsive. This led to child abuse and custody proceedings against the Mabeses. They eventually regained custody and sued nine DCS workers and a consultant doctor, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding unresolved factual disputes that precluded their requests for qualified immunity. The defendants appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's decision, granting qualified immunity to all defendants. The court found that the DCS workers and the consultant doctor acted reasonably under the circumstances and did not violate clearly established constitutional rights. The court emphasized the urgency and severity of the situation faced by the DCS workers and the consultant doctor, concluding that their actions were lawful and reasonable. The court also noted that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the defendants acted with intent to misrepresent facts or ignored exculpatory evidence. The court remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Mabes v McFeeley" on Justia Law

In May 2023, Officers Jacob Ondich and Mathew Lougee of the Casper Police Department arrested Daniel Charles Hemmer at his home and transported him to the Natrona County Detention Center (NCDC). Hemmer was charged with felony theft and entered a no-contest plea in December 2023. Subsequently, Hemmer filed a civil suit against the officers, the Casper Police Department, and NCDC, alleging unlawful entry, arrest without probable cause or a warrant, and a strip search at NCDC. He claimed the officers' actions constituted kidnapping and sought $12 million in damages.The Natrona County District Court dismissed Hemmer's complaint. The court found that Hemmer did not allege facts showing NCDC's involvement in his arrest or provide legal authority for his claims against the detention center. The court also dismissed the claims against the Casper Police Department due to a lack of specific allegations. The kidnapping claim against the officers was dismissed because Hemmer did not support it with legal authority. Additionally, the court concluded that Hemmer failed to submit a timely notice of claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and summarily affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court noted that Hemmer's pro se brief did not comply with appellate rules, lacked a statement of issues, and failed to present cogent arguments supported by legal authority. The court emphasized that while pro se litigants are given some leniency, they must still reasonably comply with procedural rules. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss Hemmer's complaint. View "Hemmer v. City of Casper Police Department" on Justia Law

Anthony Frank Romane, Jr. was arrested for driving under the influence after being found unconscious in his car. He exhibited signs of intoxication and failed field sobriety tests. At the police station, he refused to submit to a chemical test after being read the Chemical Test Admonition. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) initiated proceedings to suspend his license for one year due to his refusal to submit to testing. Romane requested an Administrative Per Se (APS) hearing to challenge the suspension.The APS hearing was conducted by a single hearing officer, Trena Leota, who introduced three documents into evidence: the arresting officer’s sworn DS 367 form, the unsworn arrest report, and Romane’s driving record. Romane’s counsel objected, arguing that the hearing officer was acting as an advocate, violating due process as explained in California DUI Lawyers Association v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The hearing officer overruled the objections and admitted the documents. Romane’s bodyworn camera footage was also admitted into evidence. The hearing officer ultimately sustained the suspension of Romane’s license.Romane filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of San Diego County, arguing that his due process rights were violated because the hearing officer acted as both advocate and adjudicator. The superior court agreed and ordered the DMV to set aside the suspension unless a new hearing was conducted with separate individuals acting as advocate and adjudicator.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case and reversed the superior court’s decision. The appellate court held that the hearing officer did not act as an advocate but merely collected and developed evidence, which is constitutionally permissible. The case was remanded to the superior court to consider Romane’s contention that the evidence did not support the hearing officer’s findings. View "Romane v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

K.A. and C.P. were married and had three daughters. Their marriage ended in divorce, and the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (ACDHS) initiated actions against K.A. regarding her relationships with her children, leading to the termination of her parental rights and several contempt judgments. K.A. attempted to appeal the termination, but the Colorado Court of Appeals denied it as untimely, and the Colorado Supreme Court declined review. She also sought to appeal a contempt sentence, but it was again deemed untimely.K.A. filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against Michelle Barnes, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS), in her official capacity; ACDHS; and Michelle Dossey, Manager of the ACDHS Division of Child and Adult Protective Services, in her official capacity. The Arapahoe County Board of Commissioners was initially named but later dismissed by K.A. The district court dismissed K.A.'s claims and denied her motion to amend her complaint. K.A. filed a timely appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear K.A.'s claims due to sovereign immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and lack of standing. The court found that K.A.'s claims for damages were barred by sovereign immunity, and her requests to reverse the termination of her parental rights and order a new hearing were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Additionally, her requests for declaratory relief were either barred by sovereign immunity or lacked standing. The court also upheld the district court's denial of K.A.'s motion to amend her complaint, as she failed to explain how the amendments would cure the jurisdictional defects. View "K.A. v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Tayvin Galanakis sued Officers Nathan Winters and Christopher Wing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Iowa law, alleging they arrested him without probable cause. He also brought federal and state claims against the City of Newton, Iowa. The district court denied summary judgment in part, determining that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity or state statutory immunity, and the City was subject to vicarious liability on a surviving state-law claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied summary judgment with respect to the § 1983 and false arrest claims against Winters and Wing, as well as the respondeat superior claim against the City predicated on Galanakis’s false arrest claim. The defendants appealed, arguing that qualified immunity and state statutory immunity protected the officers—and, as to the false arrest claim, the City—from suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Galanakis’s Fourth Amendment claim, concluding that no objectively reasonable officer could have concluded that there was a substantial chance Galanakis had driven while under the influence of marijuana. The court found that Galanakis evinced almost no indicia of intoxication and that his behavior during the stop did not suggest impairment. The court also dismissed the interlocutory appeal as to the state-law claims, noting that without clarification that resolution of the qualified immunity claim necessarily resolves the pendent claims, it declined to exercise jurisdiction. View "Galanakis v. City of Newton, Iowa" on Justia Law

The case involves Pueo Kai McGuire, who filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the County of Hawai'i, the county prosecutor, and three deputy prosecutors, alleging violations of his constitutional rights, including malicious prosecution. The United States District Court for the District of Hawai'i certified a question to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i to determine whether, under Hawai'i law, a county Prosecuting Attorney and/or Deputy Prosecuting Attorney acts on behalf of the county or the state when preparing to prosecute and/or prosecuting criminal violations of state law.The United States District Court for the District of Hawai'i reviewed the case and found the matter of whether county prosecutors act on behalf of the county or the state to be unsettled under Hawai'i law. Consequently, the court certified this question to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i for clarification.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i held that, under Hawai'i law, county prosecuting attorneys and their deputies act on behalf of the county when preparing to prosecute or prosecuting state law offenses. The court's decision was based on an analysis of the historical and current legal framework governing prosecutorial authority in Hawai'i, including the Hawai'i Constitution, state statutes, and county charters. The court emphasized that county prosecutors are primarily responsible for initiating and conducting criminal prosecutions within their county jurisdictions, with the state attorney general retaining only residual authority to intervene in compelling circumstances. The court declined to extend state sovereign immunity to county prosecutors, affirming that they are suable persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. View "McGuire v. County of Hawai'i" on Justia Law

An off-duty St. Louis Police Officer, Milton Green, was mistakenly shot by Officer Christopher Tanner during a pursuit of a suspect who had fired at police officers. Green filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tanner and the City of St. Louis, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Tanner did not violate Green’s constitutional rights and that official immunity barred the state-law claims. The court also denied Green’s motions to alter or amend the judgment and to submit newly discovered evidence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that Tanner’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances and that there was no constitutional violation. The court also ruled that Green’s Monell claim against the City failed due to the lack of an underlying constitutional violation and that official immunity protected Tanner from the state-law claims. Green’s motions to alter or amend the judgment and to reopen discovery were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Tanner’s use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, which involved a rapidly evolving and dangerous situation. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Monell claims against the City, as there was no constitutional violation by Tanner. Additionally, the court affirmed the denial of Green’s post-judgment motions and the dismissal of the state-law battery claims, agreeing that official immunity applied. View "Green v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

Jacob Doe, a student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH), was found responsible for two allegations of sexual misconduct and subsequently expelled from the university system. Doe sued the university and several employees, claiming violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, Title IX, and various state laws. The district court largely denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, allowing Doe’s federal and most state law claims to proceed.The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court found that the district court erred in rejecting the defendants' claims of sovereign and qualified immunity. The court held that the UNC institutions were entitled to sovereign immunity, reversing the district court’s decision to allow Doe’s claims against them. Additionally, the court determined that the individual university employees were entitled to qualified immunity regarding Doe’s due process claims for damages, as the right to cross-examination in university disciplinary proceedings was not clearly established at the time.However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow Doe to seek prospective injunctive relief for the alleged due process violations. The court recognized that Doe had adequately alleged a liberty interest due to the permanent expulsion and the ongoing harm from the erroneous disciplinary record. The court declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss Doe’s Title IX claim against UNC-CH, dismissing that portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part the district court’s rulings, allowing Doe’s claims for prospective injunctive relief to proceed while dismissing his claims for damages against the UNC institutions and individual employees. View "Doe v. The University of North Carolina System" on Justia Law