Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs (WLC) frequently submits Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) for records to aid in representing incarcerated individuals. Frustrated by the Bureau’s delays in responding to these requests, WLC filed a lawsuit claiming the Bureau has a policy or practice of violating FOIA by not responding promptly. WLC sought an injunction to reform the Bureau’s FOIA processes to expedite record production.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that WLC had a viable policy or practice claim but granted summary judgment to the Bureau. The court credited an affidavit from the Bureau describing efforts to improve FOIA response times and found no evidence of a policy or practice of violating FOIA. WLC appealed, arguing that the Bureau’s requirement to submit individual FOIA requests for prisoners’ disciplinary and educational records, rather than using an expedited process like the one for medical records under the Privacy Act, unnecessarily increased delays.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Bureau’s practice of processing requests for individual prisoners’ records under FOIA, rather than creating a separate expedited process, does not violate FOIA. The court found that FOIA does not require the Bureau to waive its statutory entitlements under the Privacy Act for non-medical records. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, concluding that WLC’s claim failed as a matter of law. The court also upheld the denial of WLC’s discovery request, finding it unnecessary given the legal insufficiency of WLC’s claim. View "Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Michael Muir, who has a congenital birth defect presenting as a hernia in his right scrotum, challenged the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Final Rule authorizing the use of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) scanners at airport security checkpoints. Muir argued that the scanners, which use electromagnetic radiation, flag his hernia as a threat, leading to painful and potentially life-threatening pat-downs. He claimed that the Final Rule and TSA’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) are arbitrary and capricious, contrary to TSA’s statutory authority, and violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court found that Muir had not raised his statutory challenges during the rulemaking process, resulting in forfeiture of those claims. However, the court agreed with Muir’s Rehabilitation Act claim, noting that TSA’s failure to provide an accommodation for his disability could be a violation of the Act. The court determined that Muir had identified a reasonable accommodation—screening with a walk-through metal detector (WTMD)—and remanded the case to TSA to determine if this accommodation would impose an undue burden on the agency.The court denied Muir’s other challenges to the Final Rule and his motion to supplement the record. The court emphasized that TSA must conduct the appropriate administrative process to address the implementation of Muir’s reasonable accommodation and explore alternative accommodations if necessary. View "Muir v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Northwestern Illinois Area Agency on Aging (NIAAA) filed lawsuits against Paula Basta, the former Director of the Illinois Department on Aging (IDA), alleging that Basta unlawfully refused to hold hearings on three administrative petitions filed by NIAAA. These petitions concerned grievances about withheld funding and rejected service provider designations. NIAAA claimed that these actions violated their rights under the Older Americans Act (OAA) and Illinois state law.The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of Basta, determining that NIAAA did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in the funding or service provider designations. Subsequently, the federal district court dismissed NIAAA’s suit, finding it time-barred and failing to state a claim. NIAAA then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that NIAAA’s claims related to the denials of the Initial Petition and APS Petition were barred by the statute of limitations, as they accrued by September 2019 and were not tolled by NIAAA’s state court litigation. The court also agreed with the district court that NIAAA failed to plausibly allege a due process violation, as the Illinois Supreme Court had determined that NIAAA did not have a property interest in the funding or service provider designations.Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit found that the OAA provisions at issue did not create individual rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court concluded that the OAA’s language and context did not unambiguously confer individual rights upon NIAAA, and thus, NIAAA could not enforce these provisions through § 1983. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Basta. View "Northwestern Illinois Area Agency on Aging v. Basta" on Justia Law

In this case, the Attorney General of New Jersey decided to supersede control of the Paterson Police Department following a fatal police shooting. The Attorney General appointed Isa M. Abbassi, a veteran NYPD officer, as the Officer in Charge (OIC) and reassigned the Paterson Police Chief, Engelbert Ribeiro, to the Police Training Commission in Trenton. Plaintiffs, including Paterson officials, challenged the Attorney General's authority to supersede the police department without local consent.The case was first brought to the Law Division, which transferred it to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division consolidated the actions and ultimately reversed the Attorney General's decision, ruling that the Attorney General exceeded his statutory powers. The appellate court directed the defendants to reassign Ribeiro to Paterson, relinquish control of the department to city officials, and provide a report summarizing their actions and expenditures during the supersession.The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the case and found evidence that the Legislature intended to authorize the supersession in two statutes: Chapter 94, which facilitated the OIC's leadership, and the appropriations bill for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2024, which funded the Attorney General's operation of the department. The Court did not base its holding on other statutes or authorities cited by the defendants. The Court reversed the Appellate Division's judgment, finding that the Attorney General's supersession of the Paterson Police Department was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and had fair support in the record. The Court did not address whether the Attorney General has general authority to supersede municipal police departments in other circumstances. View "Bulur v. The New Jersey Office of the Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involves the National Rifle Association of America (NRA) suing Maria T. Vullo, the former Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS), alleging that Vullo violated its First Amendment rights. The NRA claimed that Vullo engaged in coercive and retaliatory actions against the NRA by pressuring financial institutions and insurers to sever ties with the NRA, thereby infringing on its free speech and equal protection rights. Vullo argued that she was entitled to qualified immunity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied Vullo's motion to dismiss the NRA's First Amendment claims, finding that the NRA had sufficiently stated a claim and that Vullo was not entitled to qualified immunity at that stage. Vullo appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit initially reversed the district court's decision, holding that the NRA failed to state a First Amendment claim and that Vullo was entitled to qualified immunity. The NRA then petitioned the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to address whether the NRA had stated a plausible First Amendment claim. The Supreme Court concluded that the NRA had plausibly alleged a First Amendment violation and remanded the case to the Second Circuit to reconsider the issue of qualified immunity.Upon reconsideration, the Second Circuit concluded that Vullo was entitled to qualified immunity. The court reasoned that, although the general principle that a government official cannot coerce a private party to suppress disfavored speech was well established, it was not clearly established that Vullo's conduct—regulatory actions directed at the nonexpressive conduct of third parties—constituted coercion or retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity and remanded the case for the district court to enter judgment dismissing the remaining claims against Vullo. View "Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Vullo" on Justia Law

Jordan Watkins, while in federal custody, underwent hernia repair surgery and subsequently experienced severe pain and swelling in his groin. Medical staff at the correctional facility dismissed his symptoms as routine side effects and refused to schedule a follow-up appointment before his transfer to another facility. Watkins filed Bivens claims against the medical and correctional staff for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the United States for negligent medical treatment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed all of Watkins' claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the Supreme Court's framework for evaluating Bivens claims barred Watkins' claims and that his FTCA claim was filed too late.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Watkins' Bivens claims could proceed under the precedent set by Carlson v. Green, which allows federal prisoners to sue for damages resulting from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. The court found that Watkins' claims fit within the context recognized by Carlson and were not meaningfully different. The court also held that the district court's dismissal of Watkins' FTCA claim was premature. Watkins may be able to establish the requirements for equitable tolling due to extraordinary circumstances, such as disruptions caused by COVID-19, which prevented him from filing his suit on time. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Watkins v. Mohan" on Justia Law

In this case, the families of Michael Jackson, Carl Wiley, Jr., and Rashad Henderson, who were killed during high-speed police chases in Houston, Texas, sued the City of Houston. They alleged that the Houston Police Department (HPD) has a policy of racial profiling that leads to more high-speed chases in predominantly black neighborhoods, resulting in the deaths of their loved ones. The plaintiffs brought several federal municipal liability claims, including violations of equal protection, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, and substantive due process, as well as state tort claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted in part and denied in part Houston's motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for judgment on the pleadings. The court dismissed all claims except the equal protection claims and Jackson’s state law claims. Houston then filed an interlocutory appeal, raising issues regarding standing, failure to state federal claims, capacity to sue, and governmental immunity for Jackson’s state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review non-final district court orders except under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The court found that it could only review whether the plaintiffs had standing to assert their equal protection claims. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries did not stem from unequal treatment based on race. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s order regarding standing for the equal protection claims and vacated the district court’s decision on governmental immunity for Jackson’s negligence claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Tobias Jones, a self-described citizen journalist, was filming a Secret Service building in Washington, D.C. when two officers ordered him to stop. When he refused, they detained, handcuffed, and searched him. A third officer later informed Jones that he had the right to film, and he was released. Jones sued the officers for damages, claiming violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights, and sought prospective relief against the Secret Service.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Jones' case. The court held that Jones did not have a valid cause of action for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Jones' Fourth Amendment claims presented a new context under Bivens, as the Secret Service officers were performing protective duties, which differ from the law enforcement activities in Bivens. The court found that extending Bivens to this new context was inappropriate due to the potential for judicial intrusion into executive functions and the availability of alternative remedies through the Department of Homeland Security. The court also declined to extend Bivens to Jones' First Amendment claim, noting that the Supreme Court has never done so and has foreclosed Bivens remedies for First Amendment retaliation claims.Regarding prospective relief, the court held that Jones lacked standing because he did not plausibly allege a substantial risk of future harm. The court noted that Jones' allegations of potential future encounters with Secret Service officers were speculative and insufficient to establish standing.The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Jones' case. View "Jones v. Secret Service" on Justia Law

A female student at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Isabelle Arana, alleged that she was sexually assaulted by two football players, Quintez Cephus and Danny Davis III. Following an investigation, the university expelled Cephus for sexual assault and harassment. However, after Cephus was acquitted in a state court trial on a related charge, he petitioned for readmission, citing new evidence. The university's Chancellor readmitted Cephus without consulting Arana or reviewing the full trial transcript, allegedly under pressure from influential donors and the football program.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of the university, dismissing Arana's Title IX claim. The court acknowledged that a jury could find the university acted with deliberate indifference if it readmitted Cephus due to public pressure. However, it concluded that Arana could not show the harassment deprived her of educational opportunities, citing her continued academic success.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the harassment Arana experienced was severe and whether the university's response was clearly unreasonable, potentially having a detrimental effect on her education. The court noted that Arana's fear of encountering Cephus led her to avoid certain campus areas, skip classes, and delay her graduation, which could be seen as a deprivation of educational opportunities. The court also highlighted the suspicious timing of Cephus's readmission and the university's failure to involve Arana in the process. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Arana v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin" on Justia Law

James King sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and individual government employees under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, alleging physical abuse by U.S. officials. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both claims. King appealed only the Bivens claim, making the FTCA judgment final. The individual defendants argued that the FTCA's "judgment bar" precluded the Bivens claim. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants, stating that the FTCA judgment barred the Bivens claim.King then filed a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court to reopen the FTCA judgment to withdraw his FTCA claim and avoid the judgment bar. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that attorney error or strategic miscalculation is not a valid basis for reopening under Rule 60. King appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, as attorney error or strategic miscalculation does not justify reopening a final judgment under Rule 60. The court emphasized the public policy favoring the finality of judgments and noted that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is only available in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, which were not present in this case. View "King v. United States" on Justia Law